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This thesis attempts to show that TS Eliot's social criticism between the years 
1916 and 1939 was influenced by Absolute Idealism, especially that of GWF Hegel. 
Special reference is made in the thesis to the 1939 The Idea of a Christian Society, 
and also to Eliot's annotations made in 1911 to his copy of Sibree's 1905 English 
translation of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. This thesis 
utilizes these marginalia extensively, it is believed, for the first time in academic 
study. 
I argue that Eliot's conception of society formed around a commonly held idea, 
the role of religion within society and its rural basis, his stance on democracy, the 
local, embedded nature of morality, and the notion of an unfolding tradition over 
time, all have Hegelian roots. I also demonstrate that certain phrases and arguments in 
his poetry and criticism were borrowed from Hegel, notably in For Lancelot 
Andrewes and Four Quartets. I explore some of the reasons why Eliot was reticent 
about his sources for his social criticism, and scrutinise those he did give, notably his 
contemporaries. 
In the thesis, I am mindful of the marked differences between the two authors, 
seen in such areas as Hegel's concept of Geist, and the development of freedom. 
These divergences are explored. Despite these disparities, there is I believe enough 
evidence to suggest that Eliot was working with an Hegelian framework in his mind 
late in his career. These observations, I argue, open a new seam in Eliot studies. 
Appendices reproduce all of Eliot's annotations in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, and give facsimile examples of his notes. 
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This essay originated in the reading of three books. The first, Hegel's Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History, is probably the most accessible of all Hegel's 
works, bar his journalism. It deals with the rise and fall of world cultures, tracing the 
growth in each of what Hegel sees as the principle of freedom. The second, Eliot's 
The Idea of a Christian Society, was published in the shadow of the Second World 
War, its subject being Christian Society which Eliot saw threatened by Fascism and 
Communism. It is a good example of Eliot's prose style. It is epigrammatic, circling 
its subject for a while before making suggestions and comments some of which are 
razor-sharp and still apposite today. My interest in this text grew over the years, and 
eventually developed into the wish to study Eliot's social criticism. 
The third book, Ricks' edition of Eliot's early verse, Inventions of a March 
Hare, read as I was preparing for this research, effectively turned this study in another 
direction and connected my first book with the second. While reading this work, in 
which Ricks attempts to list as many allusions as possible in Eliot's early poems, I 
came across two references to Hegel and his text which I had read before. These 
appear in "Suit Clownesque III", and "The Ballad of Bullshit"'. Ricks' notes do not 
attempt any interpretation of the allusions and focuses mainly on the stylistic 
influences over Eliot's poetry. On Eliot's "The Ballad of Bullshit", for example, Ricks 
Ricks' notes may be found on pages 173 and 308. Ricks suggests that Eliot's is the first known 
use of the word "bullshit" in English. 
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notes that Eliot had written the word "BULL" in the margin in his copy of Hegel's 
Lectures. This he annotated extensively, and it resides in the Houghton Library of 
Harvard University. This brought me back to the first book of the three. If Eliot had 
read and annotated one of Hegel's key texts, and some of this annotating had found its 
way into his early poetry, was there a case for investigating whether Eliot's other 
thoughts on Hegel had appeared in his work? And what better text to investigate than 
The Idea of a Christian Society, which was written around an Hegelian subject - the 
organisation of society on religious principles? 
I discovered Eliot's copy of Lectures littered with underlinings and marginal 
notes. The question arose: was there any correlation between the gobbets Eliot 
annotated, and his later work? Had Hegel's ideas about the organisation of society 
entered Eliot's mind, like the phrases of other authors which Ricks had demonstrated? 
And what of Hegel's other works? Had Eliot read these and, if so, how could one tell, 
and what were the consequences in Eliot's writings? 
There were some preliminary questions which had to be answered, however. 
First, Eliot's major philosophical work was to do with Bradley, usually known as an 
exponent of an Hegelian-derived system. If I were to discover an Hegelian strand in 
Eliot's thought, might this not come through Bradley? Or might we posit a "double 
source" theory, that Eliot got his sociological ideas from both Bradley and Hegel? 
Second. Eliot was versed in the work of many philosophers, and the possible 
influence of their ideas on Eliot's social criticism had to be examined as well. And 
third, Eliot publicly disavowed the likes of Hegel early in his career, and how could 
this be squared with any Hegelianism I might discover in the later Eliot? But if I 
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could discover an Hegelian strand in Eliot, then I knew that our understanding of 
Eliot's mind would be enlarged significantly. Not only would it put The Idea of a 
Christian Society into sharper focus, but Eliot's other work too. 
This attempt to chart Hegelian ideas in Eliot is the first to do so. Hegel's 
influence on Eliot has never been recognised before, despite such books as Jain's 1992 
TS Eliot and American Philosophy, Habib's The Early TS Eliot and Western 
Philosophy of 1999, Asher's 1995 TS Eliot and Ideology, Gray's TS Eliot's 
Intellectual and Poetic Development 1909-1922 of 1982, Margolis' 1972 TS Eliot's 
Intellectual Development: 1922-1939 and even Kojecky's TS Eliot's Social Criticism 
of 1971, which remains the only full-length examination of the subject. Each of these 
books mentions Hegel, but only in passing. If this examination is seen to be 
successful, then a significant and fertile new avenue will be opened for Eliot studies. 
Even if this is not seen to be the case, then this essay will have brought to light a 
major Eliot text, his annotated Lectures. These have never warranted more than a few 
lines before. It is my contention that they show much of Eliot's later thinking in 
nascent form. It is for this reason that I have reproduced Eliot's annotations in full in 
an appendix; they here are presented for the first time. 
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Part One: Introduction 
Chapter 1. The Thesis 
This essay attempts to show that Eliot's social thought between 1916 and 1939 
is influenced by the philosophy known as Absolute Idealism, especially that of Hegel. 
In particular, I will try to show that in Eliot's social criticism the following elements 
all have Hegelian roots: the conception of society as formed around an idea, the role 
of religion within society and its rural basis, his stance on democracy, his notion of 
education, social strata, the toleration of dissenting groups, and the local, embedded 
nature of morality. I will also demonstrate that certain phrases and arguments in his 
poetry and criticism were borrowed from Hegel, notably in Four Quartets and For 
Lancelot Andrewes. Some of Eliot's key notions, such as the unfolding of Tradition, 
can be shown to have an Hegelian tincture. 
I will be mindful, on the other hand, of the differences between the two. 
Hegel's philosophy centred on the concept of Geist and its immersion in history, 
developing in successive cultures the idea of freedom. Eliot does not appear to have 
such a framework. Geist's involvement in human history leads to a development 
within societies, whereas Eliot's conception of society is static. Moreover, Eliot's 
society appears as more orthodox in its Christianity. Although a definitive conclusion 
as to Hegel's orthodoxy has not yet been reached, it would be safe to say that Eliot is 
far more in the mainstream of Christian theological tradition than Hegel, whose 
philosophy has been accused of pantheism. If we are to accept this thesis, there are 
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differences to be explored. 
The field of study, the (approximately) inter-war period, has been chosen for 
two reasons. First, it provides a manageable field of study, spanning Eliot's work from 
his doctoral thesis to the publication of The Idea of a Christian Society. Second, it 
includes most of Eliot's contributions to political and social thought, including his 
"Commentaries" in The Criterion (1922 to 1939). The notable exception to this is the 
1948 Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, which have been omitted principally 
because they would make this essay unmanageable. In this study, special reference 
will be made to The Idea of a Christian Society, which remains perhaps the most 
neglected of Eliot's major works. It has often been dismissed by critics, such as 
Spender, whose Eliot said 
Eliot's socio-religious activities make one reflect on 
how... ineffective the Church. . . 
has been in bringing 
Christian principles to bear on political life. 
(Spender 1975: 230) 
As Edwards comments, Eliot's "... role as prophet.. . 
has not been taken... seriously" 
(Edwards 1982: 9), and this is cause for "scandal", according to Scott (Scott 1994: 60). 
The are several reasons for this being scandalous. Eliot's 1939 book is an interesting 
period piece, highlighting concerns prevalent in the 1930's; it is also an early 
appearance of environmental concerns, making Eliot seem uncharacteristically 
radical; and, with Eliot's concerns about society flourishing as a multi-faith organism, 
it raises questions which are germane to contemporary thinking. 
Auden once suggested that the inspiration for Eliot's poetry came from 
"... visionary experiences, which... occurred... early in life" (Auden 1965: 45). Eliot 
himself observed a similar pattern when he remarked "... in its sources [my work] 
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comes from America" (Moody 1994a: 4). This essay will suggest a similar provenance 
for Eliot's social thought in the period 1916-1939. It will be argued that many of the 
themes in his works of this era were garnered in his philosophical studies between 
1909 and 1916. It will be argued that the Absolute Idealist philosophy he encountered 
never left Eliot and that he thought in these categories well after he abandoned the 
aim of a professional philosophical career. 
The influence of Eliot's philosophical background cannot be underestimated. 
He was steeped in the traditions of philosophical thought. Nor did Eliot abandon his 
philosophy as soon as he finished its formal study. The transition from academic 
philosopher to poet was not abrupt. When he appeared in literary London in 1916, he 
was a new member of the Aristotelian Society2, and he was also known primarily as a 
writer on philosophy. As Kenner observes, 
... [in 1916 Eliot] made his debut.. . not as a poet or 
literary 
critic, but as [a] ... reviewer of philosophic 
books 
... (Kenner 1959: 44) 
During that year, his major work was philosophical. He wrote seven reviews for The 
International Journal of Ethics, and two for The Monist. This philosophical work 
continued throughout 1917 and 1918, with reviews and articles in the philosophical 
press. It was only in 1919 that Eliot ceased to publish philosophical work. His 
expertise garnered from formal studies so disciplined him in thinking in 
philosophical categories that he perhaps found it easier making a living as 
professional philosopher than as poet or critic. In 1916, for example, of his twenty 
2 He appears as "T. Stearns Eliot, M. A. " in the members' list for the years 1916-1917, 
according to the Society's "List of Officers and Members for the thirty-eighth Session". 
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one published pieces, only nine were on literary topics (Gallup 1969: 197-198). This 
expertise never left Eliot, although it shall be argued that for various reasons he took 
some pains to hide it. 
Eliot's philosophical career as student and reviewer coincided with the high- 
water mark of American and British Idealism. His tutors were amongst that school's 
finest, from Royce in Harvard to Joachim in Oxford. Eliot chose to study that doyen 
of British Idealists, Bradley. It should come as no surprise, then, to discover that Eliot 
was steeped in the traditions of Absolute Idealist philosophy which, this essay shall 
argue, coloured his social thought. We must now turn to a crucial question for our 
study, what constitutes Absolute Idealist philosophy, especially in its political forms? 
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Chapter Two. An Outline of Absolute 
Idealist Philosophy: introduction; Herder; 
Hegel; Bradley 
2.1 Introduction 
To outline the whole of Absolute Idealist philosophy in a short chapter is 
bound to be limited. However, it is the aim to give the main characteristics of the 
school's way of thinking both in its theory of the nature of reality, the mind and ideas, 
and also its political philosophy, where it held one, so that we might later see whether 
Eliot carried Absolute Idealist concepts and categories over into his own thought. 
Absolute Idealism is a form of Idealist philosophy. Perhaps the first 
observation to be made about Idealism is that it is about ideas rather than ideals and 
might be better described as idea-ism. Ideas and the minds that hold them are 
fundamental in the Idealist's account of reality, and not so much the world of physical 
matter. The mind is at the centre of the universe, around which everything else 
revolves. As Flew succinctly puts it, Idealism is 
.. 
[a] name given to a group of philosophical theories that 
have in common the view that what would normally be 
called "the external world" is somehow created by the mind. 
(Flew 1979: 160) 
The world is in a fundamental way somehow mind-dependent, and has no reality 
until acted upon by some mental faculty. With such a definition, as Rescher 
suggests, many forms of thought could be considered Idealist - "Doctrines of this 
sort have been the stock-in-trade of philosophy from... Plato... to Leibnitz" (Rescher 
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1999: 412). However, there is broad consensus that Idealism as generally understood 
is confined to some of the forms of philosophy which flourished in Europe from the 
eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. The movement started with Berkeley 
(1685-1753), "... the first idealist proper... " (Hamlyn 1995: 387), and would appear to 
end as a major force in Western philosophy in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century after the critiques of such philosophers as Moore, who in 1903 published 
The Refutation of Idealism. 3 It would seem that scholars differ as to the 
categorisation of the different types of Idealism. Rescher, for example, defines them 
around their placement of "the mind" in the world: 
A dispute has long raged within the idealist camp over 
whether "the mind" at issue.. . was a mind emplaced 
outside... nature (absolute idealism), or a nature-pervasive 
power... (cosmic idealism), or the collective impersonal 
social mind of a people (social idealism), or simply the 
distributive collection of individual minds (personal 
idealism). (Rescher 1999: 412) [Rescher's Italics] 
We might be tempted to conflate Rescher's first and second definitions, if only for 
our purposes. To this group would belong such figures as Herder and Hegel, Bradley 
and Bosanquet. Berkeley would belong to the division known as Personal Idealism. 
Unfortunately, Rescher gives no examples of Social Idealists. Other definitions of 
Idealism name other categories, such as Transcendental Idealism (espoused by Kant; 
3 There were of course later exponents of Idealism, such as Collingwood (1889-1943), whom 
Donagan categorises as Idealist (Donagan 1999: 156), and Croce (1866-1952), whose thought Verene 
calls "... philosophical idealism... " (Verene 1999: 196), both of whose work continued until the 
middle of the last century. There are contemporary defenders of Idealism. Breman, for example, in 
George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man (1994), suggests that "... Berkeley... was deeper and more 
hidden... than has been generally recognized" (Breman 1994: vi). 
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Rescher calls this "ontological idealism" [Rescher 1999: 412]), and Critical Idealism, 
which was Fichte's kind (Hamlyn 1995: 387). 
It is, however, Absolute Idealism that alone concerns us, for two reasons. First, 
it was the school in which Eliot was educated in Harvard and Oxford. Second, a 
focus in this study is Eliot's annotations of one of the key texts in Absolute Idealism, 
Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Given these reasons, it is appropriate 
for this essay that we lay aside Personal, Transcendental, and other forms of Idealism 
and begin by considering what elements of Absolute Idealism constitute a distinctive 
account of political and social theory, and whether these are absorbed by Eliot. 
Absolute Idealism's political ideas are but one strand of many which constitute 
the philosophy of political obligation. Raphael argues that the theory of obligation 
revolves around this central idea in politics: 
The authority of the State implies that those who exercise it 
have the right. . . to 
issue orders and the right. . . to 
have those 
orders obeyed, and that, corresponding to the second right, 
the citizens have a duty... to obey. 
(Raphael 1970: 78) 
Raphael lists five different accounts of what he terms "... grounds of political 
obligation": 
1. The State rests on social contract 
2. The State rests on consent 
3. The State represents the general will 
4. The State secures justice 
5. The State pursues the general interest or common good. 
(Raphael 1970: 85) 
The theory of Social Contract rests upon an assumption that 
... 
human beings would find life in a prepolitical "state of 
nature"... so difficult that they would agree.. . to the creation 
of political institutions that each believes would improve 
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his lot... (Hampton, J 1999: 855-6) 
Raphael further divides social contract theory into three forms. The first he terms 
Contract of Citizenship, in which an agreement is made between citizen and State. 
He cites Plato's Crito as an example, in which 
... 
if a man remains in a particular political society and 
enjoys its privileges, he is bound to accept the obligations 
also. (Raphael 1970: 86) 
It appears to be a tacit contract. Raphael's second category, Contract of Community, 
is more explicit. This theory 
... 
depicts man as being egotistic, out for himself. Everyone 
is liable to suffer harm as well as cause it, and so men make 
an ... agreement with each other to set up 
laws for the 
regulation of conduct. (Raphael 1970: 88) 
Into this category would fall Hobbes. For Hobbes the State is necessary to guard the 
liberty of each person against the depredations of others, and the population agrees 
to give up some freedoms in order to preserve the rest. People consent to give up 
their natural freedom (this is a "gift"; there is no "contract" with a sovereign), and 
present this freedom to a government for their own preservation. Each individual, 
however, always has the right for self-defence which (although this is moot point in 
Hobbes' theory) is apparently a guarantee against an over-mighty state. Most 
commentators (such as Hampton [1999]) also categorise Rousseau as a Social 
Contractarian, as his The Social Contract suggests. People are, in their natural state, 
free (Rousseau 1968: 49), and bind themselves in larger groups for "... self 
preservation" (Rousseau 1967: 50). The family is the first of these, though Rousseau 
does comment that it is the "... only natural one... " (Rousseau 1967: 50). State and 
Sovereign are two further levels of society to which the individual contracts. 
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Raphael's third category of social contract is Contract of Government, which 
appears to be the second refined. In this, there is a "double contract": 
... men 
first contract with each other to join in community, 
and then make a second contract in which they agree to set 
up a State and obey its laws. (Raphael 1970: 91) 
Raphael includes the work of Pufendorf in this category, and suggests the 
community which people agree to join is somehow "natural"; it is the State which is 
artificial. 
The second theory of obligation is what Raphael terms Theory of Consent. He 
considers this as a "... watered-down version of the social contract", as citizens do 
not contract with the State but assent to its authority (Rapahel 1970: 94). Raphael 
considers Locke's theory in this category, although he does suggest that in Locke 
there is a 
... 
double contract... together with the idea.. . that the State's 
purpose is to secure natural rights. (Raphael 1970: 94) 
Locke's society was more positive than Hobbes', but had ultimately the same goal. In 
its natural state, human life was "... free from external authority, [and lived] in 
families and loose groups" (Woodhouse 1995: 493). In this state, each person has a 
duty not to harm the three natural rights which Locke granted to humanity: life, 
liberty, and property (Locke 1967: 270-1). To protect each individual from external 
force, each agreed to unite and "... enter into society to make one people.. . under one 
supreme government" (Locke 1967: 325). This government was an arbiter, with 
power only to "... determine controversies and redress injuries that may happen to any 
member of the commonwealth" (Locke 1967: 325). 
The third category in Raphael's scheme is Theory of the General Will, and is 
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where Absolute Idealists are placed. This theory "... make[s] out that our obligation 
to obey the law is voluntarily assumed" (Raphael 1970: 97). Although he sees this 
theory as "... highly complex and rather obscure" (Raphael 1970: 97), Raphael states 
that 
The view [of Theorists of the General Will] is that we ought 
to obey the State's laws because they represent the general 
will. (Raphael 1970: 98) 
The "general will" is in reality the "common good", and "... not what any particular 
people want for themselves" (Raphael 1970: 99). It might be said that Raphael's 
description of this theory falls short of the mark. As we shall see in Part Two, 
Hegel's citizens do not "obey" the State, as this would imply that the State is 
something beyond themselves. For Hegel, State and citizens were organically 
linked, and their unity was not a matter of obligation, but more of natural impulse 
(providing that political education had been successful). This version of political 
obligation we might term "organic", for it is by joining together to form a larger 
organism of the State that people develop into their human potential. Unlike the 
Contract Theorists and the Utilitarians, there is no concept in the organicists' view 
of society that there is a "pre-political" or "natural" version of humanity that is free. 
It is only by joining together in communities that people become free. Society is the 
outcome of a process whereby individuals develop their full humanity. 
Raphael's fourth demarcation is Theory of Justice. Unlike the first three 
categories, the fourth (and indeed the fifth) are not based on voluntary association. 
Instead, 
They concentrate simply on the purposes of the State and 
hold that we are morally obliged.. . to obey the State because 
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it is a means to the fulfilment of moral ends which are the 
objects of obligation for everyone. (Raphael 1970: 102) 
In the theory of justice, the obligation to the state rests on the justice it secures for 
its citizens, which everyone is morally obliged to accept. There can be no idea of 
"contract" here, as this implies choice, and there can be no choice when it comes to 
justice. Raphael cites the American Declaration of Independence as an example. 
Raphael's last category, Theory of General Interest or Common Good, he 
gives to the Utilitarians, 
... who take the view that all moral obligations 
depend on 
their utility for promoting the general happiness. 
(Raphael 1970: 106) 
The State is a necessary vehicle for achieving these ends, and its citizens are obliged 
to join with it to fulfil moral duty. (As Utilitarianism, in category five, did not 
become predominant in political theory until after Hegel, their inclusion is a little 
anachronistic, at least for our current purposes). 
It was principally against the views of the Contractarian that Absolute Idealism 
was reacting. Contractarianism emphasised the individual as a unit preceding 
society, whilst Absolute Idealism in its political theories was holistic, a view which 
reflected its metaphysics. In brief, these can be best described as revolving around 
the notion of the Absolute, which Allard defines as "... the one independent reality of 
which all things are an expression" (Allard 1999: 3). For Hegel, this Absolute was 
Geist, which embodied itself in the world in order to come to self-consciousness and 
freedom. Reality being one "thing", the Absolute Idealist's metaphysics was 
consequently monistic, that is, in McLaughlin's words, it held that "... all reality is 
really of one kind" (McLaughlin 1999: 686). Leading from this monism, the Absolute 
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Idealists held a coherence theory of truth, in that if a proposition is true it can be 
related to all truths in one overall system, deriving ultimately from the Absolute. 
Therefore it was natural for Absolute Idealists in their political theories (where 
they held one) to view societies as organic. Individuals per se were not autonomous; 
it was only by bonding together to form groups and eventually states that human 
beings existed as free persons. The State for Absolute Idealists was the apogee of 
human life. It was not artificial; it was concordant with human nature. It was not a 
convenience by which individuals could fulfil their individual desires. It was the 
vehicle in which people came to find fulfilment. Nor was the state a collection of 
institutions or laws, although these were part. The state was the entire population, 
joined by a common ethos. Instead of a book of statutes and an array of powers, as it 
was for Hobbes, Locke and the Utilitarians, the state for Absolute Idealists was a 
kind of universal mind, a shared set of values. The process by which individuals 
came to possess this mind was education, learned in the development of socialisation 
which was undertaken in the intermediate groupings which sat between the 
individual and the state. 
2.2. Johann Gotfried von Herder 
It would appear that one of the first who contributed to the ideas which later 
came to be seen as Absolute Idealism was Herder (1744-1803). Herder's political and 
social views were in some way a reflection of his metaphysics, which started with the 
nature of God. He views the world not as mechanical systems, regulated by laws, but 
as an organic system of what he termed powers, or forces, Kräfte: "In nature, there 
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are a thousand forces... " (Herder 1880b: 72). God is its "... inner sustaining and 
organising principle, in virtue of which these Krafte constitute a living whole" (Byrne 
1989: 145). 
The human mind is one of these Kräfte. Being the same (though lesser) essence 
as God, the human sphere and God's are not separate. Byrne calls this a "... process of 
domesticating revelation" (Byrne 1989: 145). God and man inhabit the same space; 
there is one world and God is not outside it; God is the originator and developer of 
everything. Herder therefore sees the world as unified and organic; it grows and 
develops as a whole, according to God's will. Herder derived this theory from 
Spinoza's pantheism, in which God and nature are one. 
Moving from the doctrine of God, Herder believed that human beings were 
created possessing a common humanity. However, this essence was not complete at 
birth; everyone had to develop into it in order to reach their full potential. This 
process Herder called Bildung, "enculturation", or "education" (Herder 1993: 49). 
Individuals were brought up in the culture of the nation in which they were born. The 
aim of this development was to achieve what Herder called Humanität, the full 
expression of humanity: 
Human Nature, even at its best.. . must learn everything, 
must... advance further through gradual struggle. 
(Herder 1993: 40) 
This was enabled by the acquisition of Besonnenheit, or "reflective mind", in which 
people achieved self-awareness and freedom to determine their own society: 
"... man is created for freedom and has no law... but that which he lays upon 
himself' (Herder 1887a: 163). Individuals are in a process of development within 
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their own cultures, but also, in Herder's thought, humanity itself is in a grand 
process of Bildung. As individuals, 
We grow always as if from childhood... We are always in 
motion.. . the essence of our 
life is.. 
. always progression... 
(Herder 1891: 97-98) 
but also humanity itself must develop via the cultures in which individuals grow, 
for 
We develop only that which is occasioned by time, climate, 
necessity.. . or accidents of 
fate... (Herder 1993: 40) 
The goal for humanity, Humanität, was to "... enter into the magnificent whole", 
which Herder suggests is 
... the theatre of 
[the] guiding purpose on earth. It 
becomes.. 
. the theatre of God... 
(Herder 1993: 45) 
In summary, humans grow into full humanity within cultures which themselves 
also develop towards fulfilment of God's purposes, who "... is the One who 
conceives the entire unity of one and all nations... " (Herder 1993: 40). 
Herder developed his ideas through the study of language and its 
development, and history. Both history and language, for Herder, develop out of 
nature. Humanity is part of the natural world and this was in the process of 
development. In this, Herder "... emphasised the role of language like no other" 
(Cooper 1999: 301). Herder's first work in which this theory is expounded is the 
1772 On the Origin of Language. Language, being a synthesis of sensibility and 
understanding, was both part of the natural and the mental world. As Herder wrote, 
"... without language man can have no reason, without reason no language" (Herder 
1993: 67). Language is the expression of thought, and not "... simply outer clothing 
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for what could exist independently" (Taylor 1995b: 92). Thought and language were 
ultimately the same thing, and in endowing his creature with reason (or, as Herder 
preferred, "reflective thought"), God did not then have to re-endow humanity with 
language. It was as part of his nature as any of his organs. Man thus lives, in 
Taylor's words, ".. in the linguistic dimension", and it is this that marks him out 
from beasts (Taylor 1995b: 84). 
This theory had consequences beyond linguistics. It had cultural, social and 
political ramifications. As thought was language-dependent, variations of languages 
had therefore variations of culture. Different groups of people would think and 
develop differently. Each language variation would embody cultural differences; 
people would be formed in accordance with the characteristics of their mother 
tongue. As Taylor observes, 
Our words have the meaning they have only within the 
"language games" we play with them, and these find their 
context in a whole form of life. (Taylor 1995b: 96) 
Each language group would therefore have a different identity. Every language 
produced a distinct people, and each people, in Herder's theory of Bildung, enabled 
Humanity as a whole to develop towards its ultimate goal. Herder was to extend this 
idea into the theory of the Volk, the People. The German Volk, formed by the 
German language and with specific German ways of thought, came to occupy 
Herder's thinking ever after. He sought to salvage German culture from what he saw 
as domination by France. French, the choice of educated people in Europe, was to 
Herder's mind perverting the soul of the German Volk. With such colleagues as 
Goethe and Schiller, Herder sought to establish an independent German culture over 
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and against the French. He saw a paradigm for this movement in the works of 
Shakespeare, on whom he published an essay in 1773. He called Shakespeare "... the 
dramatist of a people (Volk)" (Herder 1993: 157), expressing the characteristics of 
the English. Literature and art were both the expression of and the forces behind the 
formation of cultures, and it was language which kept social groups cohesive over 
time. 
History was therefore another element in Herder's philosophy. In the 1774 Yet 
Another Philosophy of History, Herder argued that "... we should learn to.. . value the 
epochs we now despise", recognising that reason and happiness vary from culture to 
culture, and the rationalist "... illusion that everything is either true or false" should 
be abandoned. Herder saw that Kant's alleged sole reliance upon reason was false: it 
was, according to Herder, impossible "... to comprehend how reason can be... the 
single... purpose of all human culture", to the exclusion of "... heart ... blood, 
humanity, life" (Herder 1993: 39). In his 1799 Understanding and Reason: A 
Metacritique of the "Critique of Pure Reason" Herder argued that language, being 
both sensual and intellectual, denied Kant's dissection of the mind into sensibility 
and understanding. In humanity's history, the main player was not, as Kant held, 
reason, but also the organic development of humanity itself. A culture, being a 
social phenomenon formed by language, was open to influences from other nations 
and the forces of nature. Herder sought to identify these forces at work in the history 
of humanity. Herder's man is a person embedded in a cultural and biological whole. 
Herder created his philosophy of history in his Ideas for a Philosophy of the History 
of Mankind, published between 1784 and 1791. "The principles of this philosophy", 
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wrote Herder, 
... are as simple... as the 
fact that it is a natural history of 
human beings: tradition and organic forces. 
(Herder 1993: 83) [Herder's Italics] 
Ultimately for Herder the guiding hand of history was God. In his 1774 Yet Another 
Philosophy of History Herder, in Dahlstrom's words, 
... 
describes history as a theatre piece in which all are players 
in a chain of events that only the divine playwright can 
oversee. (Dahlstrom 1999: 84) 
Thus Herder chose to interpret history as one story of development. This applied to 
human nature as well as the forces of history. Herder wished to balance the 
uniqueness of each individual person with the dependence that person has upon the 
larger group within which he is placed. In Herder's view, "He [i. e. the individual] is 
a microcosm in himself', comments Barnard, 
and yet he cannot exist by himself alone.. . The problem 
is to 
discover a manner in which men can associate without 
sacrificing their distinct personalities. (Barnard 1968: 54) 
The solution Herder discovered was the Volk, which we saw above was the group 
formed by a distinctive language. It is into an already existing society that everyone 
is born. From its origin, all life is social. And as the individual develops, in the 
process described as "enculturation" (Bildung) it is the mores of that particular Volk 
that he or she adopts. There are of course various strata of social group, such as 
family and region, but ultimately it is the Volk which is the primary society. Herder 
described this as a "... family writ large" (Herder 1993: 53). As such, the Volk is as 
natural for humanity as a colony is for bees. To think of human beings as existing 
apart from a social structure is to think of an abstraction only. 
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Herder's social theory of the Volk is also political. Life in society needs 
organisation. Government, for Herder, is integral to human nature: 
Man has never existed without political organisation; it is as 
natural to him as his origin. (Herder 1993: 58) 
Herder developed a sophisticated theory of the Volk state. He asserted that there 
were five prerequisites for society: a common language; a definite area of land as 
the Volk's common heritage; the "... law of the constitution, as a covenant freely 
entered upon"; sub-strata of families and classes, and also "reverence for the 
forefathers" (Herder 1993: 62). There was no need, it seems, for the Volk state to 
have a single sovereign authority wielding political power, as "... the Volk state 
embodied... a pattern of communal life, rooted in history... " (Herder, in Barnard 
1993: 63). 
Given this brief introduction, we might detect correlations between Herder's 
concerns and Eliot's. Language was important to both. As will be discussed below, 
Eliot was an observer of developments in English and often attacked what he 
considered poor language because it would have an impact on the culture in which it 
was embedded. (This was of particular concern for him over the 1928 proposals for 
the revision of the Book of Common Prayer). Eliot also had an organicist view of 
society, which he describes in The Idea of a Christian Society. However, it would be 
fair to say that Eliot was probably not directly influenced by Herder. This is primarily 
because of a lack of sources. Herder does not appear to figure in any of his student 
courses either at Harvard or Oxford. As Bunge suggests, "... much of the secondary 
literature written in English on the eighteenth century mentioned Herder only in 
passing... " (Bunge 1993: viii). Few of Herder's works had been translated into English 
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over the years, and it is unlikely that any were in print during Eliot's student career. 
Herder was severely neglected in the early twentieth century, and even now 
... 
few of his writings have been translated and fewer still 
have become "required reading". 
(Cooper 1993: 301) 
To add to this lack of translations in which Eliot might have encountered Herder, 
he could not easily have studied Herder in German, it can be argued. Eliot's 
German, I believe, was never proficient enough to cope with a philosophical text 
like Herder's, which in Eliot's lifetime was only available in German. Herder's prose 
style has been called "... confusing, even for native German speakers" (Bunge 
1993: ix). Eliot's lack of competence can be seen in several areas. In his own works, 
Eliot rarely quotes in German, and by a perusal of his works it is clear that he is not 
as acquainted with German authors as he is with French or Italian. 5 Also, although 
he would review French works in The Criterion, such as Maritain's, he left German 
4 Bunge lists the following English translations of Herder's work: A Brief Commentary on the 
Revelation of St John (1821); The Book of Job Considered as a Work of Art (1870); The Divinity and 
Right Use of the Bible (1857); and The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry (1833) (Bunge 1993: xiii-xiv). 
' Eliot did quote from Tristan und Isolde in "The Waste Land", and in "Notes" to the poem 
pointed the reader to a supposed parallel in lines 366-76 to Hesse's Blick ins Chaos (Eliot 1969: 77- 
79). However, there are as many references in these notes to Sanskrit texts. Eliot did claim to have 
read Spoerri's Die Gotter des Abendlandes, in a letter to The New English Weekly of 12`h April 1934 
(p. 622). However, this might be misleading, as he was at this point involved in controversy with 
Pound over After Strange Gods, and the only comment he makes on Spoerri's book is that it 
"... expresses some of the opinions of "After Strange Gods". " (p. 623). Another piece of evidence 
contra Eliot is his unconvincing rendering of the German lines in his recordings of "The Waste 
Land". (Professor Elizabeth Daumer, of the University of Eastern Michigan, confirmed this opinion 
at the 2002 TS Eliot Society Conference). There is a case for suggesting that Eliot quoted in a 
foreign language more for effect than from scholarship. For instance, the original title of Poems 1920 
was Ara Vus Prec, supposedly from Provencal. This was a printing error: the word "vus" should have 
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reviews to FS Flint. When Eliot did take on board the theories of 
German writers, 
such as Hegel, it was in English translation, as far as we are able to tell 
from the 
evidence. We have to lay Herder aside, for it is likely that any correlation 
between 
been "vos". Eliot explained this mistake to Gallup: "The correct title of the book is Ara Vos Prec. It 
only happened to be Vus on the title page because I don't know Provencal. . . 
It would seem to me that 
there is no such word... in that language" (Gallup 1969: 26). This is significant: although Eliot could 
claim no proficiency in Provencal, he was still content to entitle one of his books in that language. If 
he could do this, he was surely capable of doing the same with German. Eliot's disastrous dalliance 
with Provencal was perhaps an attempt to keep pace with the linguist Pound. Perhaps Eliot's desire to 
portray himself as a connoisseur of European culture led him to portray himself as more competent 
than he was. In understanding this we may see more clearly his ability or not in reading such texts as 
Herder's. I am also indebted to the Cambridge scholar Iman Javadi who presented a paper entitled 
"Plurilingualism and the "Mind of Europe" in TS Eliot and Dante" at the 2004 TS Eliot Society 
Conference. He argues that Eliot's German was only elementary, and cites as examples Number 9 of 
the humorous "Noctes Binianinae", written by Eliot for John Hayward, which contains many 
elementary errors. Moreover, Eliot's 1948 "German Message" for the issue of "Ariel Poems" in that 
country was so bad that it had to be corrected by an unknown hand. 
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Herder's work and Eliot's would come through the mediating mind of our next 
subject of enquiry, Hegel. 
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2.3. GWF Hegel 
Hegel (1770-1831) was indebted to Herder for many of his ideas, notably the 
historical dimension in philosophy, the Volk and the rejection of the Kantian 
reliance upon pure reason. In his youth, observes Sabine, 
Hegel's speculation started from Herder['s] idea... of a 
progressive revelation of religious truth... Before Hegel, 
Herder had said that Germany had always had... a "fixed 
national spirit". (Sabine 1963: 629-630) 
Taylor believes Herder's ideas to be "foundational" for the later German Idealists, 
especially Hegel, changing the course of German philosophy from the 
intellectualism of Kant (Taylor 1995c: 79). Although Hegel developed Herder's 
ideas beyond their original limits, Herder remains one of those whose shoulders 
Hegel stood upon, although in Hegel's own writings this indebtedness is not 
acknowledged - in Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Herder's work receives 
scant notice: 
In the writings of Herder and Kielsmeyer [note that Herder 
does not warrant an entry by himself] we find 
sensibility... and reproduction dealt with... 
(Hegel 1896: 513) 
For Hegel, political theory had its origin in metaphysics. The world as we 
encounter it is what he termed "alienated Geist". Geist, roughly equivalent in 
function to Mind or indeed God, in Hegel's system enjoys radical freedom. It 
determines its own nature; it is an autonomous force. However, in itself it is not 
complete. It needs to alienate itself, objectify itself (as it is pure subjectivity by 
itself), and then, by overcoming the opposition it meets in this self-made 
objectification, return to itself as itself - it "... (consummates) itself through its 
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development" (Hegel 1977: 11). The theatre for this working out of itself is the 
world, of which humanity is a key part. 
Hegel regards the development of world history as a dialectical process. We 
might describe this process in the following way. Geist is the starting point for the 
dialectic of history. By and in itself, Geist was not fully developed. It was neither 
totally self-conscious nor did it enjoy true freedom. It had to act upon another entity 
in order to come to fulfilment. In order to do this, Geist had to alienate and objectify 
itself and enter into world history at its inception - in Hegel's theory, there is no 
period in world history in which Geist is not embedded. Eliot himself noted the 
following description of the beginning of this dialectic in the Lectures: 
[Geist] in its second phase separates itself from itself and 
makes this second aspect its own polar opposite, viz. as 
existence for and in itself as contrasted with the Universal. 
(Hegel 1905: 335-336) 
Geist guides each culture in which it is involved towards true freedom - or, in 
Hegel's terminology, the Idea. The nearer freedom is embodied, the nearer Geist 
comes to finding itself reflected back and recognized, and thus closer to self- 
fulfilment and a return to itself out of alienation. Geometrically speaking, Geist 
works in a spiralling process, proceeding upwards through differing cultures, resting 
at specific periods and in certain cultures whilst the concept of freedom is developed 
within them. However, in each culture the Idea eventually meets opposition, either 
internally such as in the practise of slavery, or externally from conflicts with other 
nations, and these conflicts Geist has to overcome. Sometimes cultures can reform 
themselves to allow a greater realisation of freedom for their citizens, but ultimately 
more advanced cultures have to take over the development of history and to these 
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Geist moves, and the spiralling towards Geist's ultimate goal continues. Such moves 
Hegel saw in the development of Roman society from Greek, and Christian culture 
out of Roman. Eliot noted the following example of the dialectic of Geist in the 
following from Hegel's Lectures: 
We have, then, to distinguish three periods in Greek 
history: the first, that of the growth of real individuality; 
the second, that of its independence and prosperity in 
external conquest (through contact with the previous 
World-historical people); and third, the period of decline 
and fall, in its encounter with the succeeding organ of 
World History. (Hegel 1905: 233). 
When each national culture, each resting place for Geist, collapses its successor 
culture in part builds upon and in part negates the conceptions of Freedom, 
personhood and nature embodied in it, as when Rome succeeded Greece as the 
mover in world history. Hegel uses the notion of "Aufhebung" to denote this part- 
negation, part taking-up. Thus history moves upward in a spiral of ever-more 
adequate expressions of Geist. 
For Hegel, this dialectical movement is seen across the panorama of history. It 
involved not just politics, but art, ethics, philosophy, culture and religion. Whatever 
the movement, however, it was part of the movement of Geist in its quest for self- 
fulfilment. Geist to Hegel was not restricted to the sphere of ideas. Geist 
encompasses all that exists, both the subjects who share its qualities and the physical 
objects upon which it acts. Hegel developed his theory of Geist in three principle 
works, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, The Philosophy of Right, and 
The Phenomenology of Spirit. It can be demonstrated beyond doubt that Eliot read 
the Lectures, and there is strong reason to think that he knew The Philosophy of 
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Right also. However, it appears from the available evidence that Eliot never read 
Phenomenology. I have been unable to find any examples of cross-references 
between Phenomenology and Eliot's work. I would suggest that, given the evidence 
that Eliot had read and absorbed much else of Hegel's oeuvre, and had reproduced 
ideas and excerpts from these in his own writings, that we are justified in this 
assertion. There appears, for example, no correlation for Hegel's Master and Slave 
analogy in the Phenomenology. Therefore I propose in our discussion to concentrate 
on the first two of these three books. 
In the Lectures, Hegel's scheme of history was portrayed on a vast canvas. He 
thought of the world as being made of groups of people (Volk), each possessing a 
distinctive spirit (Volksgeist) as its particular embodiment of Geist. Each nation had 
its own history and development which, when linked together, formed a chain of 
progress in Geist' development. Unlike any other of the works discussed in this 
section (with the possible exception of Bradley's writings, and even here the 
evidence, in documentary terms, is thin), it can be shown without doubt that Eliot had 
knowledge of the Lectures. In 1911 he bought a copy of Sibree's 1905 translation 
and made notes within it. This being so, the Lectures shall be examined in some 
depth6. 
Hegel did not set himself to write a work of history as we might understand it, 
and as its opening words explain: 
e Sibree's translation conflated the 1822,1828 and 1830 drafts of the Lectures. There are a 
large number of additions made by Hegel and also material added by editors. See Lasson's note in 
Nisbet's translation of the Lectures, introduced by Forbes (1975: 221-227). 
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The subject of this [book] is the philosophical history of the 
world. And by this must be understood not a collection of 
general observations respecting it... but Universal History 
itself. (Hegel 1991a: 1) 
This "Universal History" was the unfolding story of Geist's encounter with the 
world. This Hegel traces from the civilisations of China, India and Persia, through 
Ancient Greece and Rome to Mediaeval Europe and the Reformation, to the present 
situation (in Hegel's terms) of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. There 
was, as Hegel believed, a "... rational process of development" (Singer 1983: 10) 
through history, in which each society helped develop Geist. The end of this 
movement was, in Hegel's words "none other than the progress of the consciousness 
of Freedom" (Hegel 1991a: 19). 
Freedom in Hegelian terms was more than freedom from external influences. It 
was a radical freedom like that enjoyed by Geist. It was "... freedom in the 
metaphysical sense", as Singer suggests, and had little to do with freedom of speech 
or movement (Singer 1983: 20). It was freedom to live in a world which mirrored 
Geist, in that each person was recognised as an individual consciousness by others 
who shared the same quality. Freedom can only be achieved when human society 
can reflect back to its members human nature itself; this was the origin of Hegel's 
statement that the State is the "... hieroglyph of Reason" (Hegel 1991b: 234). This 
society was organic, with no alienation within; everyone was "at home". This 
process was that of Geist itself, working across human history, developing freedom 
until humanity reflected Geist back to itself. 
Hegel's concept of freedom can be understood via his example of Master and 
Slave in Phenomenology. "The Master", wrote Hegel, 
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... 
is the consciousness that exists for itself... whieh is 
mediated with itself through another consciousness, i. e. 
through a consciousness whose nature it is to be bound up 
with an existence that is independent... 
(Hegel 1977: 115) [Hegel's Italics and capitalisation] 
This "other consciousness" is the slave, who is "... the dependent consciousness 
whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another" (Hegel 1977: 115). The 
Master-Slave argument may be stated in the following way. Overall, the key 
concepts which it aims to explain are those of recognition and freedom. As we saw 
above, freedom was the "Idea" for Hegel, the goal of human history and of Geist. 
For anyone to enjoy freedom, it was necessary for that person to be recognized as 
free by another person (or entity) who was also free. As Taylor explains, 
... recognition must 
be mutual. The being whose 
recognition of me is going to count for me must be one 
that I recognize as human. (Taylor 1975: 153) 
This, Hegel explained, was an impossible dialectic for the Master and Slave. 
The Master attempts to wrest recognition from his slave. This would 
apparently be successful: the slave has to be utterly devoted to his master and serve 
his every whim. The master is therefore apparently free to be whatever he pleases, 
which quality he believes embodies freedom. However, he deceives himself. For 
the Master's values and those of his slave are fundamentally different. The master, 
for example, does not invest the slave with freedom, while he apparently enjoys this 
quality himself. The slave is forced to devote himself to his master's values, 
however, and because this is not a free choice, these values can never be the slave's 
own. There can be no true recognition by the slave of his master, and vice versa; 
there is only an "external" recognition. What matters is internal recognition, that 
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given freely. The master and slave remain unrecognised by each other, and as such 
neither enjoy freedom; neither can become fully self-conscious. 
However, the slave, although apparently the disadvantaged one, eventually 
finds a kind of freedom through the work he is forced to do. In this productive 
activity, working with what Hegel terms "material reality", he finds his values and 
worth externalised, and in the articles he produces, he begins to construct a world 
in which he finds himself reflected. Self-consciousness is the end result, and 
eventually freedom - servitude prepares the liberation of the slave. The master, in 
not doing this work himself but having material reality mediated to him through his 
slave, comes to find himself worse off. The slave finds freedom, whilst the master 
in one sense becomes a slave to the bondsman: 
... just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the 
reverse of what it wants to be [i. e. free and freely 
recognised as lordship], so too servitude in its 
consummation will turn into the opposite of what it 
immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, 
it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly 
independent consciousness. (Hegel 1977: 117) 
Freedom could not be developed in a master-slave relationship, where there was no 
recognition of the individual consciousness by similar others. This was true for Geist 
and human beings; it was a facet of consciousness per se, the potential for which 
was given to humanity as well as enjoyed by Geist. Geist, however, was embarked in 
a process of developing its consciousness, and had alienated itself into the world in 
order to do this. And to achieve this, as Hegel suggested in his master-slave image, it 
had to find a society whose idea of freedom matched its own, so that it could be 
recognised as Geist by other consciousnesses which were themselves conscious. 
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Geist sought a relationship of equals, and then it could return to itself as Geist. 
Hegel charted this quest through the epochs of world history. In Part One of 
the Lectures, he concentrated on the Orient. His characterisation is political rather 
than geographical, for he included Syria and Egypt with China, India and Persia. 
Law and morality were externally controlled, and only one person in society could 
be considered "free", the ruler(s). His subjects had no wills of their own. In China, 
the Emperor governed every element of the nation, and in India the caste system 
ensured an external regulation to life. These societies Hegel termed "static", in that 
there was no development of the idea of freedom. 
Persia did provide a start for the growth in freedom, in that the Emperor 
governed in accordance with a religious code, Zoroastrianism. He was still a despot, 
but his despotism was legally based. Freedom was further developed when the 
Persian world came into contact with Greek, at the battle of Salamis. The Greek 
victory ensured that the development of freedom passed from the despotic orient to a 
nation in which the principle of freedom was more articulated. 
Greece, however, had a restricted view of freedom. Society relied on slavery, 
and this contradicted freedom. Even those who were free "... had no concept of 
individual conscience... ", in that they could not conceive of themselves as separate 
from the state; they were not yet "... absolutely free... " and Geist "... had not yet 
advanced" towards its goal (Hegel 1991a: 250). To sublate himself to the good of 
society was not a choice that a Greek could make, and thus he was not free. Greeks 
relied upon habit rather than volition. In Socrates, however, Greek society made 
headway in developing freedom. His critical questioning of society led his audience 
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to reflect on customary morality. Ironically, this led to his death, and ultimately of 
Greek civilisation too. But Socrates showed the role reason could play in the 
unfolding of Geist, and from the Greeks onward the mental capacity of humanity 
was to be more important. 
Rome took the main role in history from Greece. Although Roman culture was 
despotic, being held together by force under the Emperor, there was the concept of 
individuality. The rights of citizens were fundamental, and a legal system had been 
built around it. This capacity for "individuation" was at the heart of true freedom, for 
society could only be made of individuals who of their own volition wished to join it 
by denying their individual rights. 
However, the Romans still lacked the fulfilment of Geist's quest for freedom. 
There was a tension between the State and individuality, which was forced into 
taking refuge in the Stoic, Sceptic and Epicurean philosophies. Freedom was 
therefore an inward, not outward, disposition. In Christianity, however, freedom was 
taken a step further. Christianity allowed the growth of "... religious self- 
consciousness... " in that Geist could be known as Spirit, and this became "... the axis 
on which the history of the World turn(ed)" (Hegel 1991a: 319). In the teaching of 
Jesus, Geist found an ally. However, it was to take the whole of Christian history for 
this precept to defeat the tendency of the Church to decadence. Until the 
Reformation, Christianity was essentially Roman, based on the structures of 
government and law of an age in which freedom was not fully developed. 
The Reformation ushered in what Hegel confusingly terms "the German 
world". This was not centred on Teutonic peoples. It was a generic term by which 
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Hegel seemed to mean "European Protestant", for England and Scandinavia were 
seen to be part of it. These nations had managed to throw off the "infinite falsehood" 
of the Middle Ages (Hegel 1991a: 366) and saw God as he was, a spiritual being, 
instead of trying to embody him in the material world, in government and state. This 
liberation of the idea of God was essential in the development of Geist. No external 
authority was needed in religious life, and individuals became the ultimate judge of 
truth. Thus the "... all enlightening sun" (Hegel 1991a: 412) dawned for the first time 
in world history. History since, to Hegel, is the unfolding of this principle by the 
application of reason. 
The last phase of world history with which Hegel concerns himself is the 
French Revolution. Hegel sees the Revolution in two aspects. First, it is a kind of 
compressed Reformation, achieving quickly in France what it took centuries to do in 
German nations. In doing away with Church and Monarchy it enabled the growth of 
freedom. It handed a sense of freedom to the French almost all at once. However, 
Hegel was not blind to the evils of the Terror, which curtailed these freedoms. Geist 
had to work slowly and carefully, and needed centuries to distil. 
This brief outline of Hegel's view of world history cannot provide a critique. 
To our modem mind, Hegel's system might be seen as at best sanguine and at worst 
preposterous. The history of the Twentieth Century, it might be said, shows how far 
the "German Nations" of the world had not embodied the idea of freedom as Hegel 
believed. To Eliot's mind, however, formed in a different age and before the 
cataclysm of world war, it may have been acceptable. 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right was his main treatise on politics, an account of 
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what he termed "objective Mind", that is, Geist acting in the world. In this work, 
Hegel examined the thesis that virtue and moral behaviour can only be accounted for 
within society, and not on an individual basis. He was to call this social-moral system 
Sittlichkeit, a complex term which will be discussed at greater length in Part Two. 
There is a triadic form to society, he argues. The first part is family, the natural group 
of individuals. The second is where these families come together to constitute civil 
society, or what Hegel calls "... a system of all-round interdependence.. . (in). . . the 
external state" (Hegel 1991b: 221). This is superior to the family unit, but is only 
based on need. This society is "external" because there is a sense of it being "out 
there", or - to use Hegelian terminology - estranged from its constituent units. The 
family and the civil state are sublated in the third part of political development, what 
Hegel called the State. In this, there is no distinction between members; the 
controllers and the controlled are the same, and there is no external imposition of 
rules or force, only internal. Each individual member submits his or herself willingly 
to the government of the whole. In Hegel's terms, this is what made true freedom. It 
was a "... substantial unity" which 
is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom 
enters into its highest right... (Hegel 1991b: 275) 
According to Hegel, the best constitution in which this sublation can happen is a 
constitutional monarchy. The monarch, in being an individual, represents to the 
people the characteristic common to all, that is, individuality - "... the most universal 
element" (Hegel 1991b: 313) - but in the aspect of being sublated into a greater 
whole. This monarchical state was the goal of government in world history. Under 
the monarch came the executive, consisting of civil servants. The other branch of 
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government is the legislature in a bicameral parliament. Hegel admired the British 
system of government' and this is expressed in his view that the upper chamber of 
parliament should be for the landed, and the lower for the business classes. Hegel 
here does not envisage representation for individuals, but for groups of people bound 
together by large-scale interests such as a Trade's Union, for individuals truly exist in 
terms of freedom only when formed into larger groups. This way of organising 
society was along rational lines. It was the whole which was the real, and to ally 
oneself to this greater picture was to act reasonably. The greater community provided 
each individual with the duties of a station and a role, and it was in fulfilling these 
that freedom was found. 
As in Lectures, Hegel took freedom as his central theme in Philosophy of 
Right. Freedom is something that has to be struggled for, and within a society. Hegel 
insists that each individual is part of an organic community. In joining with others, 
individuals sense that their own identity is part of that community. This provides a 
natural cohesion. Individuals will not work to their own interests, as these interests 
are those of the group. In sublating one's self to the whole, "I am myself', says Hegel, 
"I am free", and "I will what is rational" (Hegel 1991b: 49). The individual has 
recognised the source of his being, and has chosen to dedicate himself to community, 
which ultimately is himself. Society, and world history, were to Hegel the arenas in 
which Geist evolved into self-realisation. Men's minds, in being part of this greater 
In his "Vertrauliche Briefe", he suggested that "... there is no nation in Europe which enjoys 
greater apparent prosperity... This is because the Englishman is free, because he enjoys the rights 
inherent in freedom, in one word, he taxes himself', which, according to Hegel, was the benefit of 
Parliamentary rule (Pelczynski 1964: 11). 
40 
Mind, developed along with it, as we saw in the outline of the Lectures. In politics, 
ethics, and art, there is a gradual development of ideas which eventually would lead 
to total fulfilment of Geist itself. 
2.4. FH Bradley 
In the late nineteenth century, according to Macquarrie, Hegelian Idealism 
... underwent a remarkable revival.. . 
it [became] the dominant 
type of philosophy... (Macquarrie 1971: 23) 
Hegelianism flowered in late Victorian Britain, where philosophers such as 
Bosanquet and Green developed their own Absolute Idealism. They became known 
as the British Idealists, and prominent amongst them was Francis Herbert Bradley8. 
Bradley (1846-1924) for most of his life was a Fellow of Merton College, 
Oxford. He was a recluse9, and as his Fellowship did not engage him in teaching, he 
was able to devote his energy to writing. Bradley's was a controversial style, often 
aimed against his opponents, particularly Utilitarians. 
Bradley is not considered to be a major political philosopher. Apart from 
Ethical Studies, he did not write on sociological issues, except in two minor essays 
published in Collected Essays. Moreover, Ethical Studies does not deal head-on with 
8 There is currently a debate as to whether Bradley was an Idealist. Stock, in "The Realistic 
Spirit in Bradley's Philosophy" in his Appearance versus Reality (Stock 1998: 6), suggests that Bradley 
was "... realist in intent", in that he postulated an independent reality which could actually be known. 
This view is contrary to other accounts of Bradley. This essay has taken Acton's line that Bradley was 
"... the English idealist philosopher" (Acton 1968: 1/359). 
9 Eliot, studying at Merton, was never to meet Bradley. According to Wollheim (1959: 15), 
Bradley's reclusivity was due to illness. He was also reputed to shoot cats. 
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the organisation of society, and its focus is how the individual should live. Here, 
Bradley diverged from colleagues in British Idealism, most of whom wrote explicitly 
on politics and were also actively engaged in it. As Boucher comments, 
For British Idealists, with a few exceptions, notably Bradley 
and McTaggart, philosophy was integrally related to 
practical life and needed to be directed to improve the 
conditions of society. (Boucher 1997: ix) 
Bosanquet, for example, served in the Charity Organisation Society, Caird in The 
Women's Protective League (Boucher 1997: vi). Bradley, on the other hand, never 
troubled himself with such activities and Bradley's politics are not even mentioned in 
Stock's 1998 book Appearance versus Reali : Essays on the Philosophy of FH 
Bradley. 
Bradley's first major work was the 1876 Ethical Studies, described as his 
"... most Hegelian work" (Sprigge 1995a: 100), and its target was Utilitarianism. 
Bradley took an Hegelian line in suggesting that moral systems must be judged by the 
criterion of what "self-realisation" they offer. He examines, for example, hedonism, 
and Kantian "duty for duty's sake". Each system proves self-contradictory, and gives 
rise to its successor through these contradictions, dialectically. Hedonism is rejected 
because it seeks pleasure as an end, and not happiness. It dissipates itself in a series 
of unconnected and individualistic joys. Duty for duty's sake is an advance, as it 
attempts to provide a universal setting for morality, but ultimately fails because being 
dispassionate it does not provide satisfaction for its adherents. Bradley then moves to 
the position "my station and its duties", which appears broadly Hegelian. Indeed, 
Bradley includes quotations from Hegel in this section. Here morality is not an 
intellectual abstraction but part of a community of people which itself shapes the 
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mores of its members, similar to Hegelian Sittlichkeit. Each person, according to 
Bradley, has a certain position or standing in society, be it a Station Master or a 
Parson. These positions entail certain kinds of relationships with others and therefore 
ways of behaving. Ultimately, everyone in society is related to everyone else by 
virtue of their station, and this co-dependence produces a common code of conduct. 
However, "my station and its duties" fails to satisfy the moral man, for it does not 
encompass the whole of experience - there are parts of the life of the Station Master, 
for example, which are outside his duty of keeping a railway functioning and 
therefore these are outside of the morality which that induces. The ultimate ethic is 
what Bradley calls "ideal morality", in which in every situation the aim is to realise 
"the best self'. The notion of "best self' may have its origins in the society in which it 
was born, but it may also develop beyond this by its encounter with other societies 
and by criticism of its own. The "best self' sees life as unity, not split into series of 
different experiences as it is in hedonism, and it also sees itself in community. "To be 
a good man", wrote Bradley, 
... in all things, to try to do always the best in it... to suppress 
the worst self and realise the good self, this... is the dictate 
of morality. (Bradley 1927: 215) 
In this culmination of morality, Bradley's focus is from the viewpoint of the 
individual. The "dictate of morality" given above makes no substantial mention of 
society. The moral individual has a task of paramount importance to perform: the 
realisation of the "best self': 
It is a moral duty to realise everywhere the best self, which 
for us in this sphere is an ideal self... morality 
is 
... coextensive with self-realisation... (Bradley 1927: 219) 
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Reading Essay VI in Ethical Studies we may perhaps think Bradley's ethical theory as 
ultimately individualistic, concerned with developing the individual's best qualities. 
Bradley does temper this by suggesting that the sphere in which this self-realisation 
occurs is "My Station and Its Duties", an "objective world" in which we must seek 
"... social... and non-social perfection" (Bradley 1927: 226), but it is a setting only, and 
there appears to be little concept in Bradley of the whole of society as a single unit, as 
in Herder and Hegel and - we might suggest - Eliot. This may, however, 
be simply a 
question of emphasis within the text. This question may be important but it is not a 
question that can be answered, in Bradley's view. Despite arguing that morality is the 
ideal self's realisation, Bradley concludes that the concept of morality is a mere 
chimaera. His "Concluding Remarks" deflate all that goes before. "The position we 
are now in", he comments, 
can be put shortly. Morality is an endless process, and 
therefore a self-contradiction... it does not remain 
standing. . . 
but feels the impulse to transcend its existing 
reality. (Bradley 1927: 313) 
This conclusion is typically Bradleyan; an ultimate position is outlined, and then 
found to be limited. Bradley's mind is constantly searching for a transcendent 
conclusion, which is beyond human reason. The same conclusion is reached in 
Appearance and Reality, where in the concluding chapter he suggests that "... in the 
end Reality is inscrutable. " (Bradley 1946: 488). Morality is the same. 
Bradley's next work, the 1883 Principles of Logic, has no political or social 
content and we may safely pass it by except in its conclusion that ultimately every 
judgement has Reality as the subject, in one form or other. Reality is that greater 
whole which to our perception is presented only as a range of fragments. This found 
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its greatest expression in Bradley's 1893 Appearance and Reality. 
This comprises two Books. In the first, "Appearance", Bradley suggests that 
phenomena we encounter are merely appearances, and are contradictory. Concepts 
such as space and thing are appearance. All these attributes are related, and cannot be 
seen independently. This, he argues "... conducts us to no end" (Bradley 1946: 211) 
and is an inescapable quagmire of infinite relation. In Book Two, "Reality", Bradley 
argues that these infinitely related appearances are misrepresentations of the one 
underlying reality, the Absolute. This Absolute, similar to Hegel's, was the cosmic 
harmony of which all sentient beings were part. No individual member of this reality 
was independent; there was mutual dependence of things in their relationships, and as 
apparently separate items they "... are but features and aspects of a unity" (Bradley 
1946: 356). This Absolute was however difficult to comprehend by thought's 
processes. As with Hegel, Bradley did not consider the Absolute to be only a mental 
concept. The Absolute always tends to incarnate itself in existence. By existence 
Bradley meant an event in time that could be perceived. Ultimately, however, 
Bradley is virtually forced to admit defeat, and concludes that at the end of 
philosophical endeavours, we "... find in the end Reality is inscrutable" (Bradley 
1946: 488). He finishes his essay in agreeing with "... the essential message of 
Hegel... " (Bradley 1946: 489) that the Absolute resides beyond our apprehension of 
the world, and inhabits the spiritual dimension: 
Outside of the spirit there is not... any reality, and, the more 
that anything is spiritual, so much the more it is real. 
(Bradley 1946: 489) 
There is little of political interest in Appearance and Reality, although 
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Bradley does comment on practical activity in general, and some of what he has to 
say on that issue might be applicable to politics. But there is no link between theory 
and practice, according to Bradley. Philosophy does not spill over into action, as 
Bosanquet et al held. In Appearance and Reality, "activity" is dealt with by Bradley 
in the first Part, making it mere appearance. It is not real, and in examining activity 
"... we begin to involve ourselves in further obscurity"; Bradley also refers to 
activity as "... this ambiguity" (Bradley 1946: 55-56). Ultimately, it is 
... a mass of 
inconsistency... [it] must be condemned as 
appearance... activity has no meaning... 
(Bradley 1946: 59-60) 
Bradley's other comments on the organisation of society come in the two 
above mentioned essays. The first, "Some Remarks on Punishment", was first 
published in the International Journal of Ethics. It examines whether Darwinism in 
ethics might be as "revolutionary" as in biology. Bradley's remarks about society in 
this essay confirm him as Hegelian in politics. "We... need not distinguish", he 
suggests, 
the community from the state. The welfare of the whole 
exists nowhere outside the individual, and the individuals 
have rights and duties only as members of the whole. This 
is the revised Hellenism - or... the organic view of things - 
urged by German Idealism early in the present century. 
(Bradley 1935a: 1/150) 
In the other political essay, the 1894 "The Limits of Individual and National Self- 
Sacrifice", Bradley again supports an Hegelian thesis. Bradley claims that 
The life of the individuals in... the development of 
humanity in the organism of the state, is the end [of 
society]. (Bradley 1935c: 166) 
Although Eliot studied Bradley's work probably closer than that of any writer, 
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and, we might assume, knew Ethical Studies, Appearance and Reality and Collected 
Essays well, we might be bold enough to suggest that Eliot's political philosophy is 
not influenced by it to a noticeable extent. One reason for this, especially relevant for 
the author of The Idea of a Christian Society, is Bradley's secularism. He is 
dismissive of religion, which was at the heart of Eliot's later vision. In Ethical 
Studies there is little mention of the divine will for humanity until the last pages; 
Bradley's "dictate of morality", quoted above, is centred on the worldly man. There is 
no divine will, or any end for man except for in the world, a different view from 
Eliot. The world of theology, according to Bradley, and the world of morality, are 
completely discreet; in Essay VI, "Ideal Morality", Bradley suggests that the "ideal" 
self is for this world, but 
... of course 
if religion, and more particularly if Christianity 
be brought in, the answer must be different. 
(Bradley 1927: 231) 
Bradley seems here to think that the religious dimension is a distraction; moreover, 
the realm of faith 
... 
lies beyond morality: my moral conscience knows nothing 
about it. (Bradley 1927: 231) 
For Eliot, this was impossible. Bradley terms religion "... essentially a doing", which, 
given his stance on activity, suggests that it is merely appearance (Bradley 1946: 15). 
For Eliot, religion was essentially a believing; action stemmed from doctrine. 
Bradley's remarks on religion are at their most mordant when he suggests 
Well, culture has told us what God was for the Jews; and 
we learn that "I am what I am" means the same as "I blow 
and grow, that I do". [sic] (Bradley 1914a: 317) 
Ultimately, it cannot be said that Bradley was doctrinally a Christian. Bradley 
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denied the key Christian belief in the Incarnation. "Religion, we have seen, " wrote 
Bradley, 
must have an object; and that object is neither an abstract 
idea in the head, nor one particular thing or quality.. . It can 
not be a person or thing in the world. (Bradley 1914a: 319) 
This position led Bradley into developing a secular vision of society. There is 
no provision in Bradley for Divine Providence, nor of any idea of human society 
based upon a divine model. His essay "Some Remarks on Punishment" contains his 
most secular vision of society. "We have all agreed" 
that the community... should more or less consciously 
regulate itself, and deliberately play its own Providence. 
(Bradley 1935b: 150) 
There is no room in Bradley for God. For him, suggests Wollheim, "... both God 
and religion fall short of consistency" (Wollheim 1959: 271), and "... for Bradley, God 
is not ultimately real" (Wollheim 1959: 273). For Eliot this was impossible. Bradley's 
system was at odds with what would become Eliot's to such a degree that it is 
difficult to suggest that Bradley influenced Eliot's social criticism. We are bound to 
hold that, if Eliot was influenced by Idealist thought in his politics, then it was 
probably the Hegelian strain. And so this begs another question: what exactly did 
Eliot know of Absolute Idealist philosophy? Moreover, can we ascertain this, nearly 
a century after Eliot's philosophical studies concluded? 
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Chapter 3. TS Eliot's encounter with 
Idealist Philosophy 
Eliot's encounter with Idealism at Harvard and Oxford was extensive. He was 
studying philosophy at the time of Absolute Idealism's twentieth-century heyday, 
between 1907 and 1916. At Harvard 1907-1908, he took several courses in 
philosophy. Under Palmer he studied Philosophy Al, the history of ancient 
philosophy. With Santayana he took Philosophy B2, the history of modem 
philosophy. A year later, with Santayana, he took Philosophy 10, the philosophy of 
history, which pertained to "... the ideals of society, religion, art and science, in their 
historical development" (Jain 1992: 252). Eliot's own philosophical reading was 
wide. His personal library contained many philosophical works, which he read with 
great attention. In 1911, as mentioned above, he read Hegel's Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, the annotations of which will be used later. 
As a graduate student in the year 1911-1912 he took four courses. Philosophy 
4 was a course in ethics - "... the theory of morals, considered constructively" (Jain 
1992: 254) - with Palmer. With Woods he studied Greek philosophy, in Philosophy 
12. Adams guided Eliot through Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, in Philosophy 14a, 
while in an "... elementary laboratory course" (Jain 1992: 54) he studied experimental 
psychology. The following year saw Eliot undergo advanced study. With Schmidt he 
took Philosophy 8, advanced logic. With Bakewell he took two courses, Philosophy 
15, "... the Kantian philosophy", and course 20c, a seminar course in metaphysics, 





1913-1914 he continued the study of reality with Hoernle, a seminar course, 
Philosophy 20a. Another course was taken in ethics, 20d, with Perry, while he 
finished his taught studies at Harvard with Josiah Royce's 20c, "... a comparative 
study of various types of scientific method" (Jain 1992: 256). 
Unfortunately, there is little to aid us in seeing in depth exactly what Eliot 
studied. The material in the public domain in Harvard Archives relating to the above 
courses "... is not comprehensive"' 0. It comprises three documents. The first is the 
reading and course instruction list from History I a. The second is the class notes of 
Straussberger for Philosophy B, and the third is Morrison's class notes from 
Philosophy 10. 
The History 1a course covered, in thirty-one sessions, European history from 
the decline of Rome to "... the end of the Middle Ages", circa 1500AD (Harvard 
1906: 67). Its scope was primarily political, and not the history of ideas. 
The class notes from Philosophy B2 are different. Its range was wide, being an 
introductory course to Western Philosophy from the Socratics to Kant. Although it 
covered an enormous amount of material, the lectures appear to go into detail. 
Philosophy B2 ran three times a week, and made its way biographically rather than 
thematically, each lecture focusing upon one philosopher. There were three lectures 
on Berkeley, May 2nd, 7th and 9th 1908. Students had to read "... the first fifty 
sections of `Principles of Human knowledge"' (Straussberger HUC 89: 80). His 
system of thought is described as "... coherent, the simplest road to idealism" 
10 Letter to the author, 31/3/99. There are more texts in the archive, but these may not be 
consulted without the permission of Mrs Valerie Eliot and I failed to be granted this. 
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(Straussberger HUC 89: 84), and "... a profound piece of work... " which was "... all 
inclusive [and] touches every problem" (Straussberger HUC 89: 86). In these 
lectures, Eliot was presented with a positive view of Idealism, to such an extent that 
Hume's work is said to merely "supplement" that of Berkeley (Straussberger HUC 
89: 86). 
Kant's philosophy likewise occupied three lectures, May 21st, 23rd (missed by 
Straussberger) and 28th 1908. He was described as "... the greatest intellect in 
Europe" (Straussberger HUC 89: 95), although his style is lamented - "... he writes 
without any thought for the reader.. .A very poor writer" 
(Straussberger HUC 89: 96). 
The lectures deal mostly with the Critique of Pure Reason, of which it gives a 
comprehensive survey; Kant's other works may have been dealt with in the session 
missed. 
Morrison's notes from Philosophy 10 are not of the same quality, Morrison 
apparently being more interested in doodling than in listening to his professor. The 
course begins with Greek art and continues in what might be thought an eccentric 
fashion, at least for a philosophy course. There are few mentions of any texts. Its 
approach is thematic. As well as Greek art, science is studied, and politics, and the 
nature of religious sensibility. Some history creeps in also, with a lecture on the 
spread of Christianity and the reasons for its successes. Protestantism receives some 
notice, with the observation that "... the northern nations are apt to take Christianity - 
and give it up ([e. g. ] Darwin)" (Morrison HUC: 32) - Eliot, notably, was to later echo 
this theme in The Idea of a Christian Society (see below). The course concludes with 
a study of the Renaissance, and a session on "... Literature and Life" (Morrison 
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HUC: 36). Eventually, Morrison disengages with the course and his notes are filled 
with pictures of Santayana, "... our gentle-eyed professor" (Morrison HUC: 28). 
Although Philosophy 10's subjects in many ways precurse Eliot's own 
preoccupations, overall it does not contain much of interest to us. 
However, from the evidence given in Straussberger's notes of Philosophy B2, 
and the extant documents from the other lecture courses he took, it would seem 
reasonable to assume that Eliot had an excellent working knowledge of Idealist 
philosophy up to and including Kant; and that he knew Kant's philosophy in some 
depth from Philosophy 15 of 1912-1913, and that his mind was exercised in the 
understanding of the nature of reality, having taken Philosophy 20c in 1912-1913, 
and Philosophy 20a, 1913-1914. It was in 1913 that Eliot acquired his copy of 
Bradley's Appearance and Reality. From the extant Harvard sources, it is not 
possible to say that Eliot was acquainted formally with Hegel, but Eliot did his own 
detailed reading of Hegel. 
Eliot's knowledge of Bradley is easier to ascertain. In Oxford he became 
acquainted as few others have done with Bradley, the fruit of which work was 
published as Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of FH Bradley in 1964. 
This was no ordinary doctoral dissertation, and showed Eliot to be an accomplished 
philosopher. It is one of the relatively small number of secondary works on the 
British Idealist, was said by Eliot's supervisor to be of "... exceptional value" (Eliot 
1988: 139) and by Royce as "... the work of an expert" (Eliot 1988: 142) and forms 
part of the bibliography on Bradley in Edwards' Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(Edwards 1968: 1/363). It showed Eliot having a command of contemporary Idealist 
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philosophy which was beyond that of an ordinary student and its notes show that he 
was acquainted with the contemporary work of Russell and Frege also. Moreover, 
Eliot's PhD course was not solely on Bradley, and this is sometimes overlooked, as 
in Mallinson's 2003 TS Eliots Interpretation of FH Bradley. The Harvard 
programme demanded examinations also. There were three to be taken. First, a paper 
in ancient philosophy. Second, modern philosophy to Kant, and third, either 
metaphysics or modern philosophy from Kant, or ancient philosophy from Aristotle 
(Eliot 1988: 124). From this, it is reasonable to assume that Eliot had excellent 
working knowledge of the ideas of all the great Idealist and Absolute Idealists whose 
work has been outlined above (except Herder, who does not figure in his taught 
courses). Now it is time to examine more closely elements of the philosophy of 
Hegel, and to examine possible correlations with it in Eliot's work, with special 
reference to The Idea of a Christian Society. 
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Part Two: 
The Hegelian TS Eliot 
... 
it is just when we think that we may be moving away from him 
that Hegel is most likely to be sneaking up behind us. 
(Jacques Lacan, quoted in McCarney 2000: 5) 
The greatest debts are not always the most evident. 
(Eliot 1965e: 126) 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
(Eliot 1969: 197) 
I acknowledge that there are other readings of Hegel 
on these views. 
(Brod 1992: 7) 
Hegel is the least familiar of all the major philosophers, 
or rather, the most misunderstood. 
(Weil 1998: 1) 
Chapter 4. Some Introductory Remarks 
on Methodology and Hegel's Writings 
Having outlined the thesis, and briefly introduced Absolute Idealism, we 
proceed to a more detailed examination of Hegel's ideas in order to ascertain 
whether Eliot adopted any recognisable Hegelian strands of thought. Students of 
Hegel's philosophical system traditionally have found him a difficult writer, and 
some preliminary remarks will be helpful before we proceed. 
The examination of some key concepts in Hegel's political writings and 
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comparing Eliot's to them, will naturally lead to a sense of distortion; Hegel's 
system aimed at unity and coherence (although scholars differ as to the degree of 
this unity), and such qualities are difficult to achieve in what must for us be an 
inspection of key words and phrases. We dissect what Hegel united. Moreover, by 
examining concepts in turn one of Hegel's characteristics may tend to be denied: 
his work is extremely fluid, and in each work - and indeed within each individual 
work - concepts tend not to be exactly stable in meaning. As 
McCarney notes of 
the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
The framework ... 
is composed of a small group of elements. 
Those that must figure in the basic list are "reason", "the 
Idea", "God"... They have this status because each seems at 
different times to be cast in the role of the central category 
of the philosophy of history. (McCarney 2000: 23) 
As what we aim at is essentially a comparative study, and not an examination of 
Hegel's concepts per se, errors produced by this potential problem might perhaps be 
forgiven. 
There are other methodological problems facing our undertaking. First, what 
is the significance of Eliot's annotations in his copy of Hegel's Lectures? It will be 
worth while briefly to examine this artefact, as it has not been used before in 
academic study. With what are we dealing? It is part of the Eliot Bequest in the 
Houghton Library of Harvard University. It has a book plate inscribed "The Gift of 
the Children of Charlotte Eliot". This suggests that it may have stayed in America 
whilst Eliot travelled on his abortive grand-tour before Oxford. Whether Eliot was 
ever re-united with his book, cannot be discovered. It is catalogue number 
*AC9. E1464. Zz905H. Eliot inscribed the book with his name and lodging-place of 
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1911, Apley Court. 
There are questions we will need to address if these marginal notes are to 
reveal anything. Firstly, what does it mean to make a marginal note? We cannot 
know for certain what Eliot meant in his marks. There is no key provided. 
Presumably the passages he highlights were important in some way, either 
positively or negatively. If he then pondered them, perhaps they entered his 
memory and lodged there like so many other texts he drew upon later. 
A second problem is the perennial bugbear of translation. Lowe-Porter, in the 
translation of Mann's Doktor Faustus, quotes the following (mysoginist) epigram 
which sums up our problem with Hegel: 
Les traductions sont comme les femmes: lorsqu'elles sont 
belles, elles ne sont pas fideles, et lorsqu'elles sont fideles, 
elles ne sont pas belles. (Mann 1968: 7) 
If this is true of a novel, then it is doubly true of Hegel's texts which are renowned 
for their idiosyncrasies. This can produce some surprising translations, and we 
should bear this in mind as we come to seek the meaning of Hegel's concepts and 
whether Eliot used them. There are some wonderful examples of how Hegelian 
terms can be (mis)translated. Pulkinnen writes: 
... when 
Philosophy of Right was first translated into 
Finnish.. . the term used 
for "Sittlichkeit" was "siveellisyys", 
which means something like "prudishness" and has caused 
some unfortunate confusions. (Pulkinnen 1997: 40) 
Such (mis)translations are not confined to older texts, however. Even Taylor gives 
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the simple translation of "ethics" to Hegel's Sittlichkeit (Taylor 1975: xi)ll. Such 
translations can misrepresent Hegel's often very complex thought. However, 
another old text - Ernest Barker's 1915 Political Thought in England from Herbert 
Spencer to the Present Day, which may be of importance to our study because it 
was published when Eliot was at Oxford - translates Sittlichkeit more 
sympathetically, in describing 
That system of institutions and influences Hegel embraces in 
the term Social Ethics (Sittlichkeit); and in Social Ethics he 
finds the reconciliation of the mere externality of law and 
the mere inwardness of morality. (Barker 1915: 27) 
This definition may have appealed to Eliot who would later write The Idea of the 
Christian Society, with its notion of Christian culture. There are other examples of 
this kind of problem in Hegel's work, and it is worth holding this potential difficulty 
in mind as we approach our task. 
Linked with the problem of translation is the greater one of interpretation. In 
reading a small selection of the vast secondary literature on Hegel, and faced with 
the multiplicity of versions of the German philosopher's thought, one is tempted to 
think that there were several GWF Hegels. This is a problem for a comparative 
study like ours, where there is not scope to examine in detail each concept Hegel 
propounded. As Pulkinnen again comments -a propos of the term Sittlichkeit - 
This [term] always leaves room for interpretation ... The history of Hegel reception with its radically different 
interpretations of what Hegel actually meant, provides 
ample evidence of this. (Pulkinnen 1997: 31) 
" Perhaps Taylor's translation accords with his apparent dislike of what he terms Hegel's "bizarre 
doctrines", such as Geist (Taylor 1975: 571). 
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This leaves us with a dilemma: which version of Hegel do we see as authentic? We 
might be forced to accept that there is no universal "authoritative" Hegel, but only a 
variety of valid opinions. But alas further discussion on this must be left aside. 
Added to these pitfalls are two considerations which we must also bear in mind: 
first, that Hegel's thought changed over the years and as Patten comments 
... there are... significant 
differences between [Hegel's] early 
and mature texts that make it impossible to justify treating 
the entire Hegelian corpus as a unified body of thought... 
(Patten 1999: 5) 
Secondly, Hegel's writing can be ambiguous and even contradictory. As Patten 
comments, 
There is a genuine tension in his [i. e. Hegel's] conception of 
freedom between the emphasis on thought and philosophical 
reflection... on the one hand, and the desire to attribute 
freedom to ordinary agents living out the customary morality 
of their social institutions in an only partially reflective way, 
on the other. (Patten 1999: 61) 
It seems each interpreter has his or her own version of Hegel, and some of 
these appear contradictory. In relying upon them for guidance, we receive potential 
distortions, and also a snap-shot of current debate in Hegel studies, which may only 
by chance be helpful. We might spend a little time investigating this potential 
difficulty in our task in order, once again, to appreciate its difficulties. We might 
preface our discussion with Weil's remark in the 1998 English translation of his 
Hegel and the State: 
Despite the large number of excellent books on Hegel that 
have appeared in the course of the last thirty years.. . Hegel 
is 
the least familiar of all the major philosophers, or rather, the 
most misunderstood. (Weil 1998: 1) 
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Since Hegel's demise in 1831, he has received radically different interpretations. As 
Avineri suggests, 
Since [Hegel's death], almost every shade of political 
philosophy had protagonists claiming to state its case in 
what they considered to be a legitimate interpretation of 
Hegelianism. Socialists like... Marx and Lascelle related 
their philosophies to Hegel.. . 
just as did liberals like Green, 
Bosanquet and Croce, and fascists like Gentile... 
(Avineri: 1972: 3) 
In modem times, the debate about the status of Hegel's political thought - at least in 
the English-speaking world - has centred around the attempt by Pelczynski to 
rehabilitate Hegel as a liberal. As Dickey suggests, Pelczynski in the 1964 collection 
Hegel's Political Writings, 
... wished ... to 
introduce students to a more "liberal" Hegel, 
one whose ideas were more in line with the mainstream of 
western political thinking. (Hegel 1999: vii) 
A debate has followed. For Westphal, Hegel is definitely a liberal thinker. He 
prefaces his "The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" with 
the following: 
I argue that Hegel is a reform-minded liberal who bases his 
political philosophy on the ... 
fulfilment of individual human 
freedom. (Westphal 1993: 234) 
According to Westphal, 
... Hegel's organicism 
is not inherently conservative because 
he stressed that a society's practices are subject to rational 
criticism. (Westphal 1993: 237) 
For other writers, Hegel is such a conservative writer. Patten, in Hegel's Idea of 
Freedom, suggests in complete contradiction that 
Hegel was essentially a conservative political thinker... 
(Patten 1999: 136-7) 
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Brod would agree: 
The Hegelian political logic is decidedly anti-liberal... 
(Brod 1992: 5) 
Although many approach the classification of Hegel on the liberal/conservative 
dichotomy, coming to often completely opposite conclusions, there are others who 
attempt a different classification. Taylor, for example, suggests that it is impossible 
to classify Hegel at all: 
... Hegel 
has been difficult to classify on liberal/conservative 
spectrums. [sic] For... he speaks of the state as divine. And 
this kind of thing we think of as... conservative, even 
reactionary thought. But this order is utterly unlike those of 
the tradition. There is nothing in it which is not 
transparently dictated by reason itself.. (Taylor 1979: 81) 
Some authorities prefer to locate Hegel in a pre-modern political world, where 
differentiation into liberal and conservative is anachronistic. Wood, for example 
sees Hegel in the Classical mould: 
Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to renew classical 
philosophy, especially the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 
within the modern philosophical tradition begun with Kant. 
(Wood 1993: 211) 
Some more recent Hegel scholars also see the debate in terms of classical - or, 
perhaps more correctly, Renaissance - references. Patten, for example, sees the 
"civic humanist" reading of Hegel as accurate. For Patten, this critique derives from 
Hegel's 
... 
idea that the highest practical good for human beings 
involves participation in community... and, in particular, 
leading the life of the good citizen. (Patten 1999: 38) 
This side-steps the old left/right debate, but whether for our purposes it clarifies the 
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situation is yet to be seen. Another possible problem for us is that no author - at least 
those consulted for the present study - takes trouble to define what constitutes a 
conservative or liberal view of society. There is much assumption. This appears to 
centre around two nodes of thought, that: (a) that emphasis upon objective authority, 
private property, and the rule of law denotes conservatism; and (b) that emphasis 
upon freedom (for the individual and for groups), and democracy denotes a liberal 
view. 12 Hegel can be classified in parts of his work as either "conservative" or 
"liberal", and as we come to compare his work with Eliot's - who is nearly always 
seen to be conservative13 - this is another possible difficulty. 
Another pit-fall is Hegel's almost unique density of writing which sometimes 
seems to border on the inscrutable. The problem, in simple terms, is this: Hegel is a 
very difficult writer to understand. 14 Hegel himself did not find writing easy. 
McCarney notes the following from Hegel's letters: 
My Lectures on the philosophy of world history have taken 
up my time.. . 
day and night, so that in the end I found my 
stomach upset and my mind exhausted. (McCarney 2000: 9) 
Perhaps one reason why Hegel is seen as abstruse is his metaphysics. Politics is not 
simply politics for Hegel: it is also ethics, developing world history and also - and 
this is distinctively Hegelian - the development of Geist, which is also a theological 
12 These descriptions are taken from Scruton's The Meaning of Conservatism (1984), which 
admits that "conservatism" might in the end "only be negatively described" (p. 119). 
13 Scruton calls him an "articulate conservative" (Scruton 1984: 20), and "social conservative" 
(Scruton 1984: 41). 
14 1 have found only one suggestion that Hegel is anything but hard reading, and this is from 
Ryan, who states "Hegel's Philosophy of Right is not in the least difficult" (Ryan 1992: 8). 
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study. For some modern scholars this metaphysical leaning can be alien. As even the 
sympathetic Pelczynski suggests, 
Hegel could have kept his political theory quite distinct from 
his general philosophy... Hegel thought that only by 
transporting politics to the metaphysical plain and giving his 
concepts a speculative underpinning could he establish their 
validity. It is this quest for absolute proof... which constitutes 
one of the distinctive characteristics of Hegel's political 
thought. (Pelczynski 1964: 136) 
- and, we might add, also one of its characteristic difficulties 
for modern readers. But 
to strip Hegel of metaphysics is to make a naked Hegel. Even Taylor is guilty of this. 
In an effort to make Hegel approachable, he attempts to rid him of what he seems to 
imply are embarrassing metaphysics. He writes in the 1979 Hegel and Modern 
society: 
To understand why Hegel's philosophy remains... relevant 
for today even though his ontology of Geist is close to 
incredible, we have to [examine his concept of freedom]. 
(Taylor 1979: 69) 
Taylor, it seems, is at once embarrassed and impressed by Hegel. Such palpable 
mis-representations of Hegel are a potential source of problems for our study, for 
they will tend to distort our view of the "real" Hegel, especially when we compare 
Hegel with Eliot, for whom such "incredible" concepts such as Geist were perhaps 
not so alien. Unless, perhaps, we approach Hegel on his own terms - and this means 
learning a new vocabulary and system of reference - he is likely to always elude us. 
As Avineri suggests, 
... [Hegel's] thought 
is subtle and complex; his writings are 
difficult, even infuriating - laden with impenetrable and 
pretentious jargon from which his meaning can be separated 
only with skilled and careful surgery, even then usually not 
without risk of mortal injury. (Avineri 1972: xxvi) 
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There is another problem for us - that of the texts themselves. Many of Hegel's 
works are versions of lectures and often bear the hand of Hegel's editors. As 
Patten suggests, of Philosophy of Right, "The text is difficult in places", with 
alternative readings and perhaps even lacunae. Such problems are even more 
evident in Hegel's Phenomenology, part of the middle section of which overcomes 
most scholars, it seems. One could list many examples of scholar's problems with 
interpreting Hegel. We shall content ourselves with but two of these. Beiser calls 
Hegel's explanation of his historical method "... very brief, dense and obscure" 
(Beiser 1993: 282), while Maki describes 
The section on the system of needs in Philosophy of 
Right... [as] both extensive and dense. (Maki 1997: 93) 
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Chapter 5. Some Possible Hegel Allusions 
mature poets steal... (Eliot 1928a: 105)15 
Conscious of these problems, we now proceed in examining the possible 
Hegelian strand in Eliot's thought. If we come to recognise this in Eliot's mind, it will 
simply be one strand amongst many. Studying Eliot's mind is like attempting to 
assimilate the history of Western Civilisation, with much Eastern Civilisation as well. 
In Eliot's texts, there are countless allusions to other works of art, from literature to 
sculpture. Hegel would have to take his place amongst others. Eliot's juvenile poems 
Inventions of the March Hare, edited by Ricks and already referred to, show how 
many allusions can be found in the early poetry alone. Rick's textual notes are full of 
references (from The Acts of the Apostles to Yeats). Given the array of material Eliot 
drew upon for his poetry, it is tempting to suggest that Eliot never forgot anything he 
read. 16 Every word, it seems, lodged in his mind, later to emerge in his creativity. 
The works of philosophers are also cited in Eliot's early verses, according to 
15 The complete quotation is "Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what 
they take, and good poets make it into something better. " From "Philip Massinger", in The Sacred 
Wood, p. 105. 
16 In the essay "What Dante Means to Me", Eliot wrote of The Divine Comedy "... when I 
thought I had grasped the meaning of a passage...! committed it to memory; so that for some years, I 
was able to recite a large part of one canto or another to myself' (Eliot 1965: 125) [my italics]. Eliot 
suggests that this process was begun "forty years ago", which, as Eliot was writing in 1950, would put 
this memorisation circa 1910, around the same period as Eliot was reading Hegel's Philosophy of 
World History. 
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Ricks. Aristotle, Bergson, and Kant are listed, and so is Hegel. Ricks provides two 
examples of an Hegelian turn of phrase in Eliot, in the poems "Suite Clownesque"", 
and "The Triumph of Bullshit"'8. Both these poems make allusion to Hegel's 
Lectures, which Eliot had annotated. 
There are many other definite and some possible allusions to Hegel in Eliot's 
work, which I have discovered in the course of research, and which do not appear to 
have been recognised before. This may open a rich new seam in the mine of Eliot 
studies. These allusions, I believe, provide further evidence that Eliot was influenced 
by Hegelian philosophy in his social criticism. The allusions are in the following 
words or phrases used by Eliot, first of all in his poetry. 
In "Difficulties of a Statesman" (Eliot 1969: 129): 
1. A commission is appointed 
to confer with a Voiscian commission 
About perpetual peace... 
In "Burnt Norton" (Eliot 1969: 171-173): 
2. If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
and 
3. Caught in the form of limitation 
Between being and unbeing 
and 
4. Here is a place of disaffection 
Time before and time after 
" Eliot, T S, Inventions of the March Hare (Eliot 1996). The poem is on p. 35, and the notes on 
p. 173. 
18 The poem is on p. 307, the notes on p. 308. 
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and 
5. Erhebung without motion 
In "East Coker" (Eliot 1969: 177-178): 
6.... In a warm haze the sultry light 
Is absorbed, not refracted, by grey stone... 
Wait for the early owl. 
and 
7. The serenity only a deliberate hebetude 
and 
8. In that open field... 
On a summer midnight, you can hear the music 
Of the weak pipe and the little drum 
And see them dancing round the bonfire 
The association of man and woman 
In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie - 
A dignified and commodious sacrament... 
Earth feet, loam feet, lifted in country mirth 
Mirth of those long since under earth 
Nourishing the corn. Keeping time, 
Keeping the rhythm in their dancing 
As in their living in the living seasons 
The time of the seasons and the constellations 
The time of milking and the time of harvest 
The time of coupling of man and woman 
And that of beasts. 
In "The Dry Salvages" (Eliot 1969: 190): 
9. Driven by daemonic, chthonic 
Powers. 
In "Little Gidding" (Eliot 1969: 192-197) 
10. Nor is it an incantation 
To summon the spectre of a rose. 
and 
11. The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew-tree 
Are of equal duration. 
and 
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12. Here, the intersection of the timeless moment 
Is England and nowhere. Never and always. 
and 
13. So, while the light fails 
On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel 
For history is now and England 
The works of Hegel which may have given rise to these allusions are as follows. 
The first, perpetual peace, can be found in Philosophy of Rig, in discussion of 
Kant's idea of perpetual peace: 
Perpetual peace is often demanded as an ideal to which 
mankind should approximate. (Hegel 1991b: 362) 
A few pages later on, Hegel comments: 
Kant's idea of a perpetual peace guaranteed by a federation 
of states... (Hegel 1991b: 362) [Hegel's Italics] 
That Hegel's references to "perpetual peace" are about Kant's essay "Perpetual 
Peace", may raise the question of whether Eliot gained the phrase from Kant. This 
may be the case, but the probability - given both Eliot's other putative allusion to 
Philosophy of Right - remains that it is from Hegel. 
The second, eternally present, comes in Hegel's Lectures, in Sibree's 
translation: 
... 
for philosophy, as occupying itself with the True, has to 
do with the eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost for 
it... Spirit is immortal; with it there is no past, no future, 
but an essential now. (Hegel 1905: 82) [Hegel's Italics] 
Eliot made a marginal note on the above (see Appendix 1). The phrase obviously 
had resonance with him in 1911, more than twenty years before "Burnt Norton". 
The third phrase - or, rather, one similar - being and unbeing, occurs in Hegel's 
67 
1803 work On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law: 
The critical philosophy has had the important negative 
effect on the theoretical sciences [firstly] of demonstrating 
that the scientific element within them is not something 
objective, but belongs to the intermediate realm between 
nothingness and reality, to a mixture of being and not- 
being... (Hegel 1999e: 104) [my Italics] 
The slight dissonance between phrases should not dissuade us from suggesting that 
one led from the other. Eliot had the need for euphony, and, as a perusal of Eliot's 
The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry will show, Eliot when quoting from memory 
often made slips. 
Phrase number four, time before and time after, like phrase three is slightly 
changed. In Hegel, the wording is before or after time, which is part of his definition 
of eternity contained in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The eternal world, he asserted, 
is not "before or after time", but rather "the absolute present, the now" (Hegel in 
McCarney 2000: 50). Eliot's context would appear to have a certain parallel with 
Hegel's: Eliot describes "this place of disaffection", which is characterised by "time 
before and time after" (Eliot 1969: 173). 
The fifth word, Erhebung, Eliot may have picked up in reading a German 
version of Hegel's writings, as the term revolution is a consistent one in his work. 
"Erhebung", however, is a more problematic allusion, as in its context in Burnt 
Norton it refers to a prayerful attitude rather than political upsurge. Milward, for 
example, suggests that 
... the term "Erhebung", which is the German word for 
elevation or "levitation", [is] a phenomenon which appears 
in some mystics... (Milward 1968: 38-3) 
Given that this better fits the context, and also the paucity of Eliot's German, we lay 
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this aside. 
The sixth of our collections of words is tenuous, although enticing. Any 
mention of owls with Hegel summons up the (in)famous Owl of Minerva, which only 
flew at dusk: 
When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has 
grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only 
recognised, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of 
Minerva begins its flight only at the onset of dusk. 
(Hegel 1991b: 23) 
Eliot's East Coker, in which he sets his own "early owl", is, like Hegel's Minerva, 
approaching the end of day - the owl is expected. The village stones are grey, just as 
Hegel's philosophy. And, perhaps, there is a correlation between the setting of Hegel's 
owl and Eliot's. For Hegel, the owl flies only in the approaching darkness, which is 
usually interpreted as a comment on philosophy that it only comprehends and speaks 
when this is no longer needed. Eliot's "early owl" is set to fly over the village in which 
ghostly dancers are appearing, which one will see only if "one does not come too 
close". Perhaps Eliot is hinting that to approach the real meaning of the ancestors' 
significant soil is an approach made when that world has all but disappeared, in 
Hegel's phrases "grown old" and beyond "rejuvenation". Both Hegel's philosophy of 
philosophy and Eliot's rural idyll are given in decaying visions. 
The seventh word, hebetude, again occurs in Sibree's translation of Hegel's 
Lectures: 
In contrast with the wretched hebetude of Spirit which we 
find among the Hindoos, a pure ether... meets us in the 
Persian conception [of Spirit]. 
(Hegel 1991a: 177) [Italics mine] 
There is no other occurrence of the word "hebetude" in Eliot, and it is such a rare 
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word that it is possible that Eliot first read it in 1911. 
The eighth allusion - given in the quotation from East Coker - follows 
from the 
fifth. In Hegel's vision of society, he seems to share with Eliot a sense of its 
fundamentally rural origins: 
The proper beginning ... of states 
has been equated with the 
introduction of agriculture and of marriage. For the former 
principle brings with it the cultivation of the soil.. . and 
it 
reduces the nomadic life of savages.. . to the tranquillity of 
civil law.. . This 
is accompanied by the restriction of sexual 
love to marriage, and the marriage bond is in turn extended 
to become a lasting and inherently universal union... 
(Hegel 1991b: 235) [Hegel's Italics] 
Moreover, 
The substantial estate has its resources in the natural 
products of the soil which it cultivates... Given the 
association of work and acquisition with the fixed individual 
seasons, and the dependence of the yield on the varying 
character of the natural processes, the end to which need is 
directed in this case becomes that of provision for the future. 
But because of the conditions to which it is subject, this 
provision retains the character of subsistence in which 
reflection and the will of the individual play a lesser role, 
and thus its substantial disposition in general is that of an 
immediate ethical life based on the family relationship... 
(Hegel 1991b: 235) [Hegel's Italics] 
Although the lines of "East Coker" also correspond with Sir Thomas Elyot's The 
Booke of the Governour, we should not discount the possibility that Eliot chose 
them because of their close resonance with Hegel. Their provenance, it might be 
argued, is neither here nor there. We might suggest that Eliot's "East Coker" is the 
poetical expression of Hegel's vision of agrarian society. The life of Eliot's loam- 
feeted "dauncers" around the bonfire is centred around agriculture and "The 
association of man and woman" which is matrimony, called "a dignified and 
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commodious sacrament". They keep "the rhythm of the seasons" in their living, just 
as Hegel's pre-industrialists rely upon the "natural processes" and have their ethical 
life based on them. Moreover, in Eliot's vision there are no individuals as such; the 
dancers are considered as a group and they share a common fate of "nourishing the 
corn". The individual wills of Hegel's agrarians "play a lesser role". Eliot appears 
remarkably close to Hegel in East Coker's expression of agricultural society. 
The ninth phrase, chthonic powers, appears in Hegel's On the Scientific Ways 
of Treating Natural Law: 
This reconciliation [i. e. between the needs of the individual 
and the group] consists precisely in the recognition of 
necessity... - and to the chthonic powers - by giving up and 
sacrificing part of itself to them. 
(Hegel I999e: 151) [Italics mine] 
Allusion number ten, admittedly tenuous, has a possible link with Hegel's 
comment - which Eliot underlined - in the Lectures: 
... we must 
banish from our minds the prejudice in favour of 
duration, as if it had any advantage as compared to 
transience: the imperishable mountains are not superior to 
the quickly dismantled rose exhaling its life in fragrance. 
(Hegel 1991a: 231) 
Hegel's thoughts on time interested Eliot, and in this context more telling is allusion 
number eleven. Here, a yew tree and a rose are compared - representing longevity 
and transience, respectively. The yew tree might be seen to be like the mountains in 
Hegel's comment, while the rose - partly, at least - plays the object of fleeting 
beauty. '9 These objects are seen to be of equal worth, and both, we must note, use 
19 Eliot's use of the symbol of the rose in poetry is complex. In "Ash Wednesday" it appears to 
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the key word duration, which we can be certain that Eliot read in Sibree's translation 
of Hegel's Lectures. 
We end Eliot's poetical allusions to Hegel with a meditation on history. 
Numbers eleven and twelve above have a possible echo in Hegel's reflection on time 
in Lectures: 
... 
for philosophy, as occupying itself with the True, has to do 
with the eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost for it, 
for the Idea is ever present... with it there is no past, no 
future, but an essential now. 
(Hegel 1991 a: 82) [Hegel's Italics] 
From the above, two points must be made immediately. Except for the word 
erhebung, all the words and phrases appear in translation, and that might pose a 
difficulty: except for the Lectures, we cannot be sure that Eliot read these texts, 
and if he did we do not know whether he read them in the original or translation. 
However, we do know that Eliot read Sibree's translation of Lectures, and so can 
be certain beyond reasonable doubt that the words "hebetude", "eternally present" 
and the others would have been read by Eliot. For the other three words and 
represent the Virgin Mary. In "The Dry Salvages" the figure of the rose is one of transience; it is 
likened to "a faded song". This carries forward initially into "Little Gidding", where at first it is only 
as a "spectre" that the rose appears. However, the rose becomes a symbol of permanence and 
salvation: it is of equal duration with the yew-tree, and appears in the vision of the united fire and 
rose. 
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phrases, it seems likely that, given the unusual terminology of "being and unbeing" 
and even more of "chthonic powers", that Eliot had read Hegel's On the Scientific 
Ways of Treating Natural Law, and perhaps - or even probably - in an English 
translation. 
Given the above, we have supported the idea in the same manner as Ricks in 
Inventions of the March Hare that Eliot owed certain words and phrases in his poetry 
to Hegel. From this, we might posit that his thoughts towards the end of the 1930's 
had taken at least an Hegelian cast of phrase. 
The above allusions bar one occur within Four Quartets, and show Eliot, much 
later than the poems contained in Inventions of the March Hare, thinking in Hegelian 
terminology. Notably, The Idea of a Christian Society, written in 1939, is 
encapsulated between the first and last three Four Quartets: could Eliot's Hegelian 
turn of phrase be extended to include Hegelian arguments, in his critical writing? 
Eliot's critical works also contain Hegelian allusions, and sometimes more. One 
example may be seen in the authors' treatment of Judaism. Both Hegel and Eliot have 
a similar understanding of this people, which will be examined in more depth later. 
Here, it suffices to suggest that both authors use similar arguments. For Eliot, in The 
Idea of a Christian Society, the Jews were an ambiguous group. Shying away from his 
1934 suggestion in After Stran ends that society would not prosper from too many 
"free thinking Jews", Eliot in his 1939 book is more conciliatory but still not totally 
accepting of Jewish citizens. As will be discussed below, this is fundamentally a 
philosophical standpoint and not racial: Eliot was too much an Absolute Idealist to 
accept a society which had two first religious principles - Christianity and Judaism. 
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Eliot's view is expressed in cautious language, for example: 
I am not suggesting that the latter alternative [i. e. a Christian 
Society] must lead to the forcible suppression... But a positive 
culture must have a positive set of values, and the dissentients 
must remain marginal... (Eliot 1939: 70) 
The members of these "sects" are not considered even as a viable group of people; 
they remain individuals, and as such they are fundamentally opposed to the 
rationally organised society Eliot desires: 
And perhaps there will always be individuals who.. . will yet 
remain blind, indifferent, or even hostile [to Christianity]. 
(Eliot 1939: 68) 
Jews, by very definition, had to be members of Eliot's "indifferent" "individuals". 
Individuals as such were outside society. This has some echo of Eliot's PhD thesis, 
wherein he makes the phrase "... the real is the organised" (Eliot 1964: 82). Despite 
this rather limiting definition of social membership, Eliot is at pains to insist that 
non-Christian did have a voice in society. Although Eliot's "Community of 
Christians" would be made up of those who professed Christianity, there was room 
for other faiths. Of the people who made up this community, Eliot wrote: 
The mixture will include persons of exceptional ability who 
may be indifferent or disbelieving; there will be room 
for... other persons professing other faiths than Christianity. 
(Eliot 1939: 63) 
Eliot's language is grudgingly conciliatory. To this extent, it has certain similarities 
with Hegel. Whether Hegel was anti-Semitic or not is as moot a point in Hegel 
scholarship as it is in Eliot's, and it does seem that both have detractors and 
supporters. Pinkard suggests that accusations of anti-Semitism are justifiable in 
Hegel's early writings, where he saw Judaism as a religion "... merely of legalistic 
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servility" (Pinkard 2000: 584). However, the later Hegel had "mulled over" and 
"rethought" this stance (Pinkard 2000: 584). However, for Hegel the Jews "presented 
a distinct problem for Hegel's views" (Pinkard 2000: 586). Firstly, Judaism had 
survived as a distinct culture well after Geist had passed it over in its development - 
Pinkard suggests Judaism should have "... vanished along with Egyptian, Greek and 
Roman religions... " (Pinkard 2000: 586). Secondly, Hegel's vision of the state, which 
is based like Eliot's on a shared set of ideas bringing uniting culture, has a problem 
when it comes to dealing with members of groups who hold different ideologies. 
Judaism presented a differing Sittlichkeit to that of Christian-based society. Hegel is 
more positive than Eliot in granting Jews formal status in the State, it must be said. 
Seeing that membership of a religious community is beneficial for society, Hegel 
suggests that 
The state ought even to require all its citizens to belong to 
such a community - but to any community they please, for 
the state can have no say in the content of [religious belief]. 
(Hegel 1991b: 295) 
Hegel, however, qualifies this by adding the rider: 
... 
it may well have been contrary to formal right to grant even 
civil rights to the Jews, on the grounds that the latter should 
be regarded not just as a particular religious group but also as 
members of a foreign nation... 
(Hegel 1991b: 295) [Hegel's Italics] 
The problem with Jewish members of society, according to Hegel, was that they had 
their own Sittlichkeit, a peculiar social system (and see below), and this led them to 
draw apart. Despite this, they also desired membership of the State. They were 
unassimilated. However, it seems as if Hegel were making an exception to his rule 
for the Jews, much in the same way as Eliot. As a religious group, they could not be 
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full members of the pervading Christian faith; and as such their status as true citizens 
was - logically at least - open to question. For Hegel, the 
Jews might be considered 
"foreigners"; for Eliot, the Jews might be seen in a similar way, for as non-Christians 
they could not really be full members of English (and in Eliot's mind, this meant 
Christian) society. 
A second example of Eliot and Hegel coinciding in argument is that of a 
symbolic monarch. In For Lancelot Andrewes's "John Bramhall", Eliot made his 
debut as a Royalist, stating that the divine right of Kings was "... a noble faith" (Eliot 
1970g: 35). For Bramhall, Eliot believed, "... the king himself was a kind of symbol" 
(Eliot 1970g: 35). Given the shortness of the essay, Eliot cannot elaborate on what he 
meant by this, but we might surmise that it involved the King being a representative 
figure to his people, who had, in Eliot's words, "... not merely a civil but a religious 
obligation toward his people" (Eliot 1936a: 40). Perhaps Eliot had in mind the King 
being an exemplar of Christian living, the rest of society taking lead from its head. 
However, we must not pretend that the Bramhallian King was anything but absolute 
- Eliot states that Bramhall held that the "... monarch should have absolute power" 
(Eliot 1936: 40). 
Hegel's monarch was nothing like Bramhall's in executive power. He was 
much more akin to a constitutional monarch. Despite this, there is an interesting 
correlation between Eliot and Hegel in the king being a symbol. In The Philosophy 
of Right, Hegel suggests that the monarch holds a representational role as well as 
that of the governing of the state. "If a people", Hegel wrote, 
... 
is envisaged as an internally developed and truly organic 
totality, its sovereignty will consist in the personality of the 
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whole, which will in turn consist in the reality appropriate to 
its concept, i. e. the person of the monarch. 
(Hegel 1991b: 319) [Hegel's Italics] 
Although Eliot's interest in "John Bramhall" and Hegel's in Philosophy of Right are 
different, they both seem to view the monarch as a representational figure. Eliot may 
have picked up this idea from Hegel, although other potential sources cannot be 
excluded. 
To the Jews and the monarch can be added Thomas Hobbes in the list of 
parallels. To Eliot, again in For Lancelot Andrewes, Hobbes is a figure of derision. 
Eliot's statement that Hobbes was an "upstart" whom the Renaissance had thrust 
upon the world is - we might consider - eccentric, except in a provocative essay like 
"John Bramhall". However, Eliot's concern to put Hobbes' mechanistic philosophy 
in its place has an echo in Hegel. For Eliot, viewing the development of seventeenth 
century philosophy, 
... a philosopher like Hobbes 
has already a mixed attitude, 
partly philosophic and partly scientific... His theory of 
government has no philosophic basis: it is merely a 
collection of discrete opinions, prejudices, and genuine 
reflections upon experience which are given a spurious unity 
by a shadowy metaphysic. (Eliot 1970g: 37) 
Hegel, writing in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, has the same message. 
"Society, the state, is to Hobbes, " he wrote, 
absolutely pre-eminent... and because he places these in 
subjection to the state, his doctrines were of course regarded 
with the utmost horror. But there is nothing speculative or 
really philosophic in them... (Hegel 1896: 316) [My Italics] 
The above is taken from the 1896 translation of Hegel's work; Eliot conceivably 
may have consulted this in his studies. It is noteworthy that both authors use the 
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word philosophic: for Eliot, Hobbes's theory of government has no philosophic 
basis; Hegel suggests that there is nothing speculative or really philosophic in [it]. 
Hegel also notes that Hobbes's theories are derived not from first principles of 
logic, but 
... 
from principles that lie within us, which we recognise as 
our own. (Hegel 1896: 316) 
In other words, they were subjective principles. Hegel also suggests that 
The views that he [i. e. Hobbes] adopts are shallow and 
empirical, but the reasons he gives for them.. . are original 
in 
character, inasmuch as they are derived from natural 
necessities and wants. (Hegel 1896: 316-317) 
This is not an entirely different opinion from that expressed by Eliot, who called 
Hobbes's theories "... merely a collection of discrete opinions, prejudices and genuine 
reflections upon experience. " 
There are, possibly, more ideas in Eliot's criticism which he gleaned from 
Hegel. Earlier than For Lancelot Andrewes, and interestingly in the middle of Eliot's 
seemingly "scientific" phase as a critic (see Part Three), he might be seen to adopt an 
Hegelian position on tradition and the writers of the European past. In his copy of 
Hegel's Lectures, Eliot made a note by the side of this text, in which Hegel discusses 
the importance of the historians of the ancient world: 
... these 
historians, whom we must make thoroughly our 
own, with whom we must linger long, if we would live with 
their respective nations, and enter deeply into their spirit: of 
these historians, to whose pages we turn not for the purposes 
of erudition merely, but with a deep and genuine enjoyment, 
there are fewer than might be imagined. (Hegel 1991a: 3) 
It was not the paucity of ancient historians that interested Eliot here, it was Hegel's 
insistence that we must have an intimate relationship with them. This position Eliot 
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himself was to adopt in his "Tradition and the Individual Talent", in which he 
argues for an almost "scientific" approach to the study and manufacture of texts. 
Eliot suggests that a writer needs the "historical sense" in his attaining the tradition, 
and this 
... 
involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, 
but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to 
write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but 
with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe.. . 
has 
a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous 
order. (Eliot 1975: 38) 
Moreover, this historical sense is what make a writer part of the tradition: 
The historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well 
as the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal 
together, is what makes a writer traditional. (Eliot 1975: 38) 
Eliot seems to share with Hegel a concern for the importance of past writers. Eliot 
would have authors write with the historic writers in his bones in a "simultaneous 
existence", and have a vibrant sense of history; Hegel would have his do much the 
same, entering deeply into the spirit of the dead writers, "lingering" with them, and 
entering their world wholeheartedly and not for "mere erudition". Both Eliot and 
Hegel had a profound historical sensibility, and perhaps Eliot's was fostered by 
reading Hegel. 
The phenomenon of personality appears to have exercised a similar interest in 
both authors. In his copy of Hegel's Lectures, Eliot underlined an observation of the 
role of the Lama in Indic religion: 
The Lama's personality as such - his particular individuality 
- is therefore subordinate to the substantial essence which it 
embodies. (Hegel 1991 a: 179) 
In discussing Greek civilisation, Hegel also focuses upon the role of personality, 
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and Eliot underlined the following sentences: 
The exhilarating sense of personality, in contrast with 
sensuous objection to nature... constitutes... the chief 
characteristic ... of the 
Greeks. (Hegel 1991a: 251) 
This exhilaration, however, was not altogether a positive attribute. It led to a 
cultural limitation: 
... 
it must be observed, that the divinity of the Greeks is not 
yet the absolute.. . 
but Spirit in a particular mode... still 
dependent as a determinate individuality on external 
conditions. (Hegel 1991 a: 253) [Hegel's Italics] 
Moreover, 
That higher thought, the knowledge of Unity as God, - the 
one Spirit, - lay beyond that grade of thought which the 
Greeks had attained. (Hegel 1991 a: 256) 
Brilliance marred by individuality might be seen as Hegel's judgement upon the 
Greeks. Eliot's critical writings would appear to put him in the same school. Perhaps 
reacting against his contemporaries' "cult" of the artist's personality, exemplified by 
the contemporary Bloomsbury Set, and previously by Romanticism, Eliot sought to 
sublimate the personality of the artist into his task. In the 1919 "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent", he suggested that the 
... poet 
has not a "personality" to express, but a particular 
medium.. . 
in which impressions and experiences combine in 
peculiar and unexpected ways. (Eliot 1975: 42) 
This might be seen to approach the description of Hegel's Lama. In this essay's 
(scientifically incorrect) analogy of platinum introduced into oxygen and sulphur di- 
oxide, this subsuming of personality in the artistic task is given its famous formula. 
This process allows the poet to escape from the shackle of personality: 
Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from 
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emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an 
escape from personality. (Eliot 1975: 43) 
For Eliot's poet, emotion 
is impersonal. And the poet cannot reach this impersonality 
without surrendering himself wholly to the work to be done. 
And he is not likely to know what is to be done unless he 
lives in what is not merely the present, but the present 
moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is 
dead, but of what is already living. (Eliot 1975: 44) 
The artist had to eschew personality, and in so doing would find himself in 
communion with the living tradition (in Eliot's mind) of European civilisation. He 
would write with tradition "in his bones", as previously noted. Hegel's Lama had a 
similar vocation. 
For Hegel, the highest development would come in the Reformed traditions of 
Germanic nations, and in this we have another remarkable correlation between his 
work and Eliot's. Lutheranism, for Hegel, was the arena for the true development of 
Geist. In the Lectures, he wrote: 
In the Lutheran Church the subjective feeling.. . of the individual is regarded as equally necessary with the 
objective side of Truth. Truth with Lutherans is not a 
finished thing; the subject himself must be imbued with 
substantial Truth, surrendering his particular being in 
exchange for the substantial Truth, and making that truth 
his own. . . Thus Christian 
freedom is actualised. If 
Subjectivity be placed in feeling only, without that 
objective side, we have the stand-point of the merely 
Natural Will. (Hegel 1991 a: 416) 
This process is similar to Eliot's belief, in "Tradition and the Individual Talent", that 
in striving to "procure the consciousness of the past" the artist embarks upon 
... a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality. (Eliot 1975: 40) 
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It might be considered notable that Eliot and Hegel use surrender to describe their 
own processes. Hegel also made reference to artistic impersonality in a comment on 
Schleiermacher in Lectures on the History of Philosophy which as we saw above 
Eliot may well have read. Hegel rejected Schleiermacher's emotionally-led 
philosophy. In criticising the view that "... subjectivity was everything... ", Hegel 
suggests that "... the bad picture is that in which the artist shows himself... " (Hegel 
1896: 510): the artist should be invisible, his personality irrelevant. 
Perhaps the best example of Eliot adopting wholesale Hegel's argument and 
language is seen through the lens provided by Machiavelli. For Hegel, Machiavelli 
is a seminal figure, for he prescribed for Italy what Hegel wished to see in Germany 
- unification and freedom. In The German Constitution, Hegel deals with 
Machiavelli at length and accords him a position which he has rarely achieved 
before or since. "In that unfortunate period", commented Hegel, 
Deeply conscious of this state of universal misery... an 
Italian statesman, with cool deliberation, grasped the 
necessary idea of saving Italy by uniting it into a single 
state. (Hegel 1964a: 79) 
For Hegel, Machiavelli appears as a saviour, anxious to rid his homeland of foreign 
occupation. His allotted task was simple: to devise a scheme of advice for his Prince 
in order to achieve this. Hegel, however, notes that Machiavelli has been largely 
misunderstood by subsequent generations. Although 
It is evident that a man who speaks with such true gravity 
was neither base-hearted nor frivolous-minded.. . the very 
name of Machiavelli carries with it the guarantee of 
disapproval... (Hegel 1964a: 80) 
People misconceive Machiavelli's principles, observed Hegel. Some were even 
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... short-sighted enough to regard 
his work as no more than a 
foundation for tyranny... (Hegel 1964a: 80) 
Machiavelli, according to Hegel, saw the problem in hand and simply suggested the 
best way to deal with it. To judge his stern methods of achieving Italian unity as 
despotic was simply, in Hegel's view, to misjudge context: 
... even 
if his aim [of uniting Italy] is acknowledged, it is 
alleged that his means are abhorrent... But there can be no 
question here of any choice of means: gangrenous limbs 
cannot be cured by lavender-water, and a situation in which 
assassination has become common... permits no half- 
measures. (Hegel 1964a: 80) 
To achieve a true picture of Machiavelli, we have to judge him by the context of his 
times. Always with a mind for historical veracity, Hegel suggests that 
One must study the history of the centuries before 
Machiavelli... and then read The Prince in the light of 
[this] ... and it will appear not only justified, but as a distinguished and truthful conception produced by a 
genuinely political mind of the highest and noblest 
sentiments. (Hegel 1964a: 80-81) 
Moreover, in studying the historical context, it is possible to see that Machiavelli 
intended his work to be applicable only to Italy, and not for general use: 
It is quite senseless to treat the exposition of an idea directly 
derived from observation of the Italian predicament as a 
compendium of. .. principles applicable indiscriminately to 
all situations... (Hegel 1964a: 81) 
Hegel is anxious to place Machiavelli in his context, and from that derive his true 
standing. 
Machiavelli is also discussed by Eliot, in the essay "Niccolo Machiavelli", 
which was published in the 1928 For Lancelot Andrewes. Eliot's inclusion of the 
Machiavelli essay has always appeared odd (at least to me). It seems out of kilter 
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with the rest of the collection - so much so that Eliot expunged it when he re- 
published much of For Lancelot Andrewes' in the 1936 Essays Ancient and Modern; 
"Niccolo Machiavelli" was never to be published again. It also forms an opinion of 
Machiavelli which is distinctly eccentric - at least in the English tradition20 - until 
one compares it with Hegel's observations. 
There are notable similarities between the comments made by both men about 
Machiavelli. Hegel had placed him as a saviour of Italy, who was "deeply 
conscious" of its woes. Eliot too sees Machiavelli as a "Florentine patriot", who was 
... wholly 
devoted - to his task of his own place and time; yet 
by surrendering himself to the cause of his particular State, 
and to the greater cause of the united Italy which he desired, 
he arrives at a far greater impersonality and detachment 
than Hobbes. (Eliot 1970b: 51) [Eliot's Italics] 
Not only should we note another "impersonality" theory, but we should also notice 
Eliot's concern, which is shared with Hegel, of placing Machiavelli "in his own 
place and time". To Eliot, he was devoted; to Hegel he was a man of true gravity. 
He is also a man who possessed a "political mind of the highest and noblest 
sentiments". Eliot's Machiavelli also had this quality. In discussing his view of 
religion within the state, Eliot suggests that 
His attitude is that of a statesman, and is as noble as that of 
any statesman. (Eliot 1970: b: 55) 
Eliot's sentence is so close to that of Hegel that it almost seems to be a paraphrase. 
Eliot's Machiavelli is like Hegel's misunderstood: 
20 This attitude can be seen in Sabine's A History of Political Theory which, although slightly 
later than Eliot's "Niccolo Machiavelli", contradicts Eliot's portrayal on virtually every point. 
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No history could illustrate better than that of the reputation 
of Machiavelli the triviality and the irrelevance of 
influence ... And yet no great man 
has been so completely 
misunderstood. (Eliot 1970: 49-50) 
Eliot's view that Machiavelli's influence has been somehow irrelevant and trivial 
accords with Hegel's that "... Machiavelli's voice has died away without effect" 
(Hegel 1964a: 83), in that his true voice has rarely been heard. To achieve a straight 
picture of the Florentine, one must have the proper context, argues Eliot. In 
criticising current views of Machiavelli, Eliot comments that 
It is all very well for writers like Lord Morley to present 
Machiavelli as a stealthy surgeon... caring only for his 
clinical examination. Morley had not, like Machiavelli, seen 
his country torn and ravaged, humiliated... by foreign 
invaders... The humiliation of Italy was to Machiavelli... the 
origin of his thought and writing. (Eliot 1970b: 53) 
To understand the historical context was to understand the man and thus form a 
valid opinion. One is perhaps reminded of "Tradition and the Individual Talent"'s 
dictum that writers should have the history of Europe in their bones. Linked with 
this idea of using the historical context for judging Machiavelli, is Eliot's insistence 
- shared with Hegel - that Machiavelli never intended The Prince to be seen as 
anything but for Italy. "Machiavelli", he wrote, 
... is not interested in the modern view of empire; a united 
Italy was the limit of his vision... (Eliot 1970b: 53) 
Given that Eliot's and Hegel's arguments over Machiavelli, which do not sit well 
with the vast majority of literature, I suggest the following. The year 1928 is 
seminal for Eliot. Not only did it publicly see him as a member of the Church of 
England and - as a corollary of this -a British citizen, sporting himself as anglo- 
catholic [sic], royalist and classicist (Eliot 1970: vii), but he also (re)appears as an 
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Absolute Idealist after apparently eschewing this philosophy. And it was the 
collection For Lancelot Andrewes which show-cased all these changes in Eliot. As 
such, it can be seen to act as a kind of hinge in Eliot's writings. The essay "Niccolo 
Machiavelli", which seems so odd without this dynamic, is the signal that he is 
(re)adopting Hegelian principles, so closely as to resemble a paraphrase of Hegel's 
line of thinking (at least in this context). If this line of argument is not accepted, 
then it remains to be shown why Eliot wrote this strange essay at all. Surely it was 
not simply to be perverse and controversial. There may well have been a desire to 
reintegrate Machiavelli into the line of the European tradition, as he had done with 
the Metaphysical poets, but even if this is the case that he did so in Hegelian 
terminology is still significant. The question must remain, however, whether Eliot 
consciously did this, or whether this use of Hegel's arguments was unconscious. 
Either way, it is still noteworthy. If it were conscious, then it shows a mindful re- 
adoption of Absolute Idealist ways of thinking. If it were unconscious, the force is 
hardly abated, as it would suggest that Eliot's stock of Idealist ideas was still intact - 
and intact to a remarkable degree. The Idea of a Christian Society, to which we will 
shortly turn, may well exhibit a similar stamp from Hegel's political thought. 
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Chapter 6. An examination of key 
concepts in Hegel and Eliot 
The examples given above of the Hegelian strand in Eliot would appear to 
show beyond reasonable doubt that Eliot was both well read in Hegel and that what 
he read surfaced later both linguistically and in forms of argument. We must now 
proceed to our central concern, of tracing a possible Hegelian origin for some of the 
reasoning in Eliot's social criticism, especially The Idea of a Christian Society. 
Given the problems outlined above, we must proceed with caution, and bear in mind 
that Hegel's thought is so complex that there would appear to be a variant reading on 
(it seems) any statement given about his philosophy. Fortunately for us Eliot is not 
such an idiosyncratic or dense a prose writer. Overall his thought, especially on 
social issues in our period of enquiry, seems coherent. 
I propose to proceed in a straightforward way, that of examining certain key 
concepts in Hegel's thought to see if Eliot has correlations. The list of concepts is I 
believe authoritative but not exhaustive. Necessarily, we might well have to exclude 
to a large extent certain concepts in Eliot's thought which have no apparent parallel 
in Hegel's system, and vice versa. 
6.1 The place and power of ideas in Hegel 
This section must be considered as a preliminary discussion of Hegel's use of 
the term "idea", which cannot be complete until we examine concept of "the Idea". 
This latter usage Hegel normally reserves for Freedom, and we will discuss this 
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later. In 6: 1, however, it is Hegel's general term "idea" that will occupy us, of which 
"the Idea" is a particular manifestation. 
An idea to Hegel was not a simple concept. It went far beyond a "normal" 
definition, such as found in dictionaries, for example 
... the product of mental activity whereby the mind 
consciously conceives a thought; conception. 2 
For Hegel, "idea" had layers of meaning, and ultimately could be almost described 
as an organism independent of mind. Given what is Hegel's complex usage of the 
term, we might begin by conferring with Inwood's A Hegel Dictionary. As Inwood 
suggests, "Hegel's use of Idee [Idea] has several distinctive features. " First, it is "not 
a subjective or mental entity", 
... 
it is thus distinct from a representation, and does not 
contrast with "reality"... The idea is the full realisation or 
actualisation of a concept... (Inwood 1992: 123) 
One of the many expressions of this may be seen in one of Hegel's letters: 
Daily do I get more convinced that theoretical work achieves 
more in the world than the practical. Once the realm of ideas 
is revolutionised, actuality does not hold out. 
(in McCarney 2000: 55) 
The world of ideas therefore was not distinct from external reality; it was 
intrinsically part of it and indeed - in the sense we discussed in Part One - its master. 
Hegel held that, in "the world" the product of the mind was more influential than the 
product of the hands. 
Although Inwood largely omits the notion of "concept" from his definitions of 
21 This is from Hanks, P [Ed. ], Collins Dictionary of the English Language, 1979. 
88 
Hegel's "Idea"22, in Hegel's use of the word there is a sense in which he does have a 
category which accords with everyday usage of the word "idea", in that of something 
limited to mental activity. For Hegel, a concept (Begriff) is something which can be 
defined as "... something abstracted from particulars" (Wood 1991: 392), although it 
has other definitions as well. The "concept", according to Hegel, is "... nothing other 
than the "I" or pure self-consciousness" (Hegel 1976: 583). The concept, in Hegel's 
dynamics, always strives for objective existence, and when this happens this is called 
the "idea". The idea, we might see, in Hegel's thought is the incarnated or realised 
concept - "... the Idea for [Hegel] is strictly the concept together with the reality of 
the concept" (Inwood, in Hegel 1993: xix). Hegel gives this notion a highlighted 
place in his works by making it the starting point of his Philosophy of Right: 
The subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is 
the Idea of right - the concept of right and its actualisation. 
Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what 
are described as mere concepts. 
(Hegel 1991 b: 25) [Hegel's Italics] 
Although Hegel's usage of the term "concept" has a greater variety and shade of 
meaning than given here, it is I believe a potentially valid reading of Hegel, and 
gives us some understanding of Hegel's dynamic of ideas. 
Inwood's second definition of Hegel's use of "idea" is a refinement of his first 
given above, and suggests that 
An idea is not... separate from particulars: it is fully realised 
in certain types of particulars. (Inwood 1992: 124) 
22 He does, however, have a separate entry for "concept", but it seems to lack references to 
ideas. 
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Hegel is keen to see a unity of what is usually seen (following Descartes) to be the 
distinct "mental" and "physical/external" worlds. Ideas are not separate from 
actuality; they cannot be examined apart from particular existences in which they are 
embodied. On this Hegel basis his whole world-view, as instanced in the preface to 
Philosophy of Right: 
What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. This 
conviction is shared by every ingenuous consciousness as 
well as by philosophy. (Hegel 199lb: 20) 
Hegel's famous phrase - which he quotes from Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 
1977: 482) - has attracted much attention, some of which is contradictory. It seems 
that Hegel is suggesting that ideas - that which is rational, i. e. produced by thought - 
have real existence (i. e. it does not just have "mental" existence as if this were some 
kind of sub-real world), and what has real existence can be understood by thought. It 
is a kind of circular argument. For Hegel, the State can be studied because it is the 
product of ideas - indeed, is the incarnation of ideas - and, in its fullest expression, 
the State is the expression of the Idea of Freedom, such as Geist enjoys. A flavour of 
this is given in Hegel's comment on the nature of the Napoleonic Spanish 
Constitution. He criticised Napoleon's attempts at legislating ex nihilo for Spain, 
because by doing so he disregarded centuries of development of Geist within Spain. 
"For a constitution", Hegel suggests, 
is not simply made: it is the work of centuries, the Idea and 
consciousness of the rational... (Hegel 1991b: 313) 
Inwood's third definition of the Hegelian "Idea" suggests that 
An idea is not an ideal that we ought to realise: it is actual in 
the present. (Inwood 1992: 124) 
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We might consider this as connected to the previous two definitions, and in essence 
it defined Idealism per se: to be an "Idealist" in the philosophical sense is not to be 
interested in ideals, but ideas. Hegel's Idealism pushes Idea-as-reality to its natural 
conclusion: ideas are reality. Inwood's third definition leads to his fourth and more 
substantial suggestion, that in Hegel 
Ideas are rational, but they do not simply regulate our 
understanding of the world: the idea of life, e. g., involves 
purposeiveness [sic], just as much as mechanistic systems 
involve causality. (Inwood 1992: 124) 
Hegel's ideas are not just to do with our understanding of the world. They are part 
of the world. For Hegel, the fundamental idea is Geist, the totality of existence, 
which depends upon nothing else for existence. However, Geist is not fully formed: 
it is developing; its task is to evolve throughout history to its conclusion, self- 
consciousness. 
This is also in Hegel a theological expression. In Lectures, Hegel suggests that 
the evolution of the Idea is also the evolution of Geist: 
God and the nature of his will are one and the same, what 
we call in philosophy the Idea. 
(Hegel in McCarney 2000: 26) 
McCarney calls this Hegel's 
... triple identity, in which the Idea" figures as the 
philosophically favoured term for reason and God... the 
deepest level of [Hegel's] thought... (McCamey 2000: 26) 
At each stage of its "evolution", however - despite this sounding contradictory - 
Hegel's Idea as expressed in the State of the nations of world history, is actually a 
true state. 
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6.2 The place of ideas in Eliot 
Did Eliot's use of the term "idea" have any correlation? Like Hegel, Eliot's use 
of the word is often layered, befitting a student of philosophy. Unlike Hegel, Eliot 
could use "idea" in its everyday way, which had few philosophical overtones. This 
can be seen most clearly in his plays. For example, Colby in The Confidential Clerk 
says "I've no idea how I ought to behave" (Eliot 1969: 450). But we may find uses of 
"idea" which have a deeper meaning. In The Confidential Clerk, for example, 
Colby, who is in search of his father, says: 
I've never had a father or mother... 
As for a father - 
I have the idea of a father... 
Whose image I could create in my own mind, 
To live with that image. An ordinary man 
Whose life I could in some way perpetuate 
By being the person he would have liked me to be... 
(Eliot 1969: 513) 
Although The Confidential Clerk is not a philosophical treatise, it is interesting that 
Colby uses the word "idea" in this stilted way. He has "the idea of a father", which 
appears to be something free-standing, and it is an idea which has concreteness 
about it, for Colby talks of this "idea" of father as though it has actual existence - he 
wants to live a life which would be pleasing to it. 
Interestingly, Eliot's poetry has only three examples of "idea". Two may be 
seen to be in contrast with Hegel's use of the term, though in different degrees. In 
the 1925 The Hollow Men, for example, Eliot writes 
Between the idea 
And the reality... 
Falls the shadow 
(Eliot 1969: 85) 
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This appears to suggest a difference between idea and reality, a distinction which 
Hegel would not recognise. However, in the stanza following is something more 
akin to Hegel - 
Between the conception 
And the creation... 
Falls the shadow 
(Eliot 1969: 85) 
- the concept precedes the actuality, and becomes such as an idea. However, this is 
probably over-interpreting the text. An earlier use of "idea" in Eliot's poetry, in the 
1917 "Portrait of a Lady", has Eliot using the word in its every-day way: 
I keep my countenance... 
Are these ideas right or wrong? 
(Eliot 1969: 20) 
The other use comes in the 1934 The Rock, which contains the lines 
O world of spring and autumn, birth and dying! 
The endless cycle of idea and action, 
Endless invention, endless experiment... 
(Eliot 1969: 147) 
and appears to use the word "idea" as contrasting with the world of "action". 
Surprisingly, given that they are sometimes interpreted as being Eliot's working-out 
of his personal vision or philosophy, there is no usage of the word "idea" in Four 
Quartets. 
We are therefore obliged to turn to Eliot's prose writings for significant uses 
of the term. Knowledge and Experience contains philosophical uses of the word. In 
discussing this, we must always bear in mind Eliot's complex relationship to it, 
which we shall examine more in Part Three. Suffice it to say here that I believe it 
remained canonical in Eliot's view. 
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For Hegel, the dynamic of idea started with the concept. Ideas were, to Hegel, 
actualisations of concepts. Eliot has a similar way of describing the movement of 
mental constructs into reality, although his is expressed in terms which had been 
refined by a study of linguistics and psychology. A concept, Eliot suggests, is 
... that which a word 
denotes, and idea... as that which a 
word refers in reality, this reference being contingent. 
(Eliot 1964: 46) 
Although Eliot here is revealing his interest in the role words play in consciousness 
(an interest only nascent in Hegel), the basic theory in both writers of the concept 
being a pre-thought existence only in the mental word holds true. In Eliot, it is some 
kind of inarticulate denotation, in Hegel pure consciousness. 
Eliot's meaning of the "idea" is, like Hegel's, complex, although we might say 
it is somewhat more straightforward than Hegel's. Eliot's fundamental definition of 
"idea" is stated thus: 
The idea is the total content which we mean about reality, 
in any particular presentation ... furthermore, 
its meaning 
partially coincides with the reality which it intends. Nor is 
the idea purely a logical entity, since it always... comes to 
occupy a particular place in a real world. (Eliot 1964: 40) 
Although this is perhaps more tentatively put than Hegel's arguments about the 
relationship between idea and reality - it "partially coincides with the reality which 
it intends" - Eliot is nonetheless arguing an Hegelian thesis here, albeit via Bradley. 
Eliot's idea "always... comes to occupy a particular place in a real world", and this 
accords with Hegel's statement, given above, that in the face of ideas "actuality does 
not hold out". Moreover, Eliot sees that although ideas are in part "logical entities" - 
that is, they exist as pure thought - they are not limited to that sphere. Hegel's ideas 
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are also not confined to the mental world - "Philosophy has to do with Ideas and 
therefore not with what are described as mere concepts". 
Not only do both authors see ideas being part of the "actual" world, both 
ultimately see reality subsisting as an idea. For Hegel, history is set to see the 
fulfilment and appearance of "the Idea", Geist, and as we saw before "God and the 
nature of his will are... what we call in philosophy the Idea". For him, the Idea was 
the whole of existence. Eliot had the same ultimate theory: 
Hence.. . the 
idea is the whole reality meant... meaning is 
ultimately the whole of reality. (Eliot 1964: 42) 
and 
... the external world and the mental world are of exactly the 
same stuff, and are ultimately identical... (Eliot 1964: 74) 
Despite these similarities, there are however differences between Hegel and 
Eliot in their consideration of Ideas. For Hegel, there is a great sense of ideas - or at 
least, the Idea - objectively existing in the depths of history. It is society's role to 
develop and attain this Idea. Except in the Phenomenology of Spirit there is less 
sense of ideas within individuals. Although this might be simply a matter of a 
difference of emphasis, Eliot's treatment of ideas in Knowledge and Experience is 
virtually all individualistic, ultimately giving rise to fears of solipsism in Eliot's 
philosophical system. For example, "The idea", wrote Eliot, 
... 
is that reality which I intend, and the identity is only the 
assumption of one world... (Eliot 1964: 43-44) 
For Eliot, there has arisen the spectre of multiple worlds. For Hegel, this was not 
something that appeared of interest. 
Knowledge and Experience is of course a highly specialised book and does 
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not tend to touch upon what chiefly concerns us here, Eliot's social criticism. Are 
there other instances, then, of Eliot using ideas in a way that is reminiscent of 
Hegel? In 1926, in his The New Criterion definition of a literary review, "The Idea 
of a Literary Review", Eliot displays a certain Hegelian stance. Eliot's 1926 
statement is worthy of note on two counts. First, Eliot waited until he had been 
publishing his journal for nearly four years before defining what it was. Thus, we 
could say, Eliot's "idea" of a journal was what it actually was; it was - in Eliot's 
words - the reality which he intended. Second, he entitled the piece "The Idea of a 
Literary Review", and chose not to use such words as theory, plan, notion, concept, 
principle, or ideal or any other word which was also applicable. Moreover, the way 
he defined literary journals in the article was exactly what The New Criterion and its 
immediate predecessor The Criterion actually was. It had certainly avoided 
... the temptation ever to appeal to any social, political or 
theological prejudices... (Eliot 1967va: 4) 
It had also included 
... beside "creative" work and literary criticism, any material 
which should be operative on general ideas... 
(Eliot 1967va: 4) 
Although it might be said that Eliot was simply redefining the position of The New 
Criterion over and above that of The Criterion, the only real change was in the title. 
The contributors remained largely the same, and as Eliot suggested when, a little 
later, The New Criterion changed again into The Monthly Criterion, 
The Criterion and its successor, The New Criterion, began 
and continued for four years as a quarterly. It was part of the 
original programme, in 1922, to revive some of the 
characteristics of the quarterly reviews of a hundred years 
ago... 
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The journal was also to have 
... a certain corporate personality which 
had almost 
disappeared from quarterly journalism... a common tendency 
which its contributors should illustrate by conformity or 
opposition... [it] was to be up-to-time in its appreciation of 
modem literature, and in its awareness of contemporary 
problems; it was to record the development of modern 
literature and the mutations of modern thought. 
(Eliot in Ali 1986: 71) 
Eliot clearly saw The Criterion and The New Criterion as having the same 
programme. Thus, when he wrote "The Idea of a Literary Review", the "Idea" was 
already in existence. As Inwood said of Hegel, above: "An idea is not an ideal that 
we ought to realise: it is actual in the present"; this was certainly true of Eliot's 
"Idea" of The Criterion in 1926. 
This can also be seen in the "Note" Eliot appended to the first volume of The 
Criterion: 
On the completion of the first volume of The Criterion, it is 
pertinent to define... the purpose of a literary review ... A literary review should maintain the application, in literature, 
of principles which have their consequences also in politics 
and in private conduct. (Eliot 1967ra: 421) 
Eliot thus never intended The Criterion to be hermetically sealed from life; Eliot's 
journal shared the same principles as political action. In Eliot's words 
It is the function of a literary review to maintain the 
autonomy and disinterestedness of literature, and at the 
same time to exhibit the relation of literature - not to "life", 
as something contrasted to literature, but to all other 
activities which, together with literature, are the 
components of "life". (Eliot 1967ra: 421) 
To re-apply Hegel's definition of philosophy, Eliot's definition of a literary review 
"was to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are described as mere concepts". 
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The New Criterion in 1926 was what it had been in 1922; and, as published, it was 
the idea of a literary review. 
The same kind of relationship between ideas and actuality may perhaps be 
seen in The Criterion's stance on politics. In 1927, disillusioned with politicians' 
efforts to deal with issues which culminated in the 1926 General Strike, Eliot wrote 
in his "Commentary" that 
It is a trait of the present time that every "literary" review 
worth its salt has a political interest; indeed that only [in] the 
literary reviews... are their [sic] any living political creeds. 
(Eliot 1967vb: 283) [Eliot's Italics] 
By the next volume of The Criterion, Eliot's had further advanced his claim to be a 
politician: 
The man of letters of to-day... finds that the study of his own 
subject leads him irresistibly to the study of others ... Three 
events in the last ten years may be instanced: the Russian 
Revolution... the transformation of Italy.. . and the 
condemnation of Action Francaise by the Vatican. All of 
these events compel us to consider the problem of Liberty 
and Authority, both in politics and in the organisation of 
speculative thought. Politics has become too serious a 
matter to be left to politicians. (Eliot 1967vc: 386) 
Not only is this, perhaps, an example of the Absolute Idealist position of 
"everything is ultimately connected", but it is noteworthy how easily Eliot slips in 
the above extract from being the "man of letters" to the "amateur economist" who, 
as "politics and economics can no longer be kept apart", is also a politician. The 
ideas which form the world of the man of letters are the same ideas which ultimately 
are actions in the world of politics. 
It might be said that Eliot's position in The Criterion is an example of the 
Hegelian view given above - "Daily [wrote Hegel] do I get more and more 
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convinced that theoretical work achieves more in the world than the practical. " Eliot 
expressed himself in a similar vein: 
If .. there remains any place 
for quarterly reviews... their task 
is surely to concern themselves with political philosophy, 
rather than with politics, and the examination of the 
fundamental idea of philosophies rather than with the 
problems of application. (Eliot 1967u: 265) 
However, we should bear in mind, as Margolis reminds us, of 
... how little enthusiasm Eliot brought to his new calling.. . 
he 
greeted this expansion of interest almost begrudgingly. 
(Margolis 1972: 76) 
as Eliot, ultimately, only wanted to do his service to politics and then 
... return to our own 
business, such a writing a poem, or 
painting a picture. (Eliot 1967vc: 387) 
Eliot's other great use of the word "Idea" is the title of the 1939 The Idea of a 
Christian Society, and it is here that we can perhaps see Eliot's nearest 
approximation to Hegelianism. We have already examined Eliot's statement 
In using the term "Idea" of a Christian Society I do not mean 
primarily a concept derived from the study of any societies 
which we may choose to call Christian; I mean something 
that can only be found in an understanding of the end to 
which a Christian Society, to deserve the name, must be 
directed. I do not limit the application of the term to a 
perfected Christian Society on earth... My concern with 
contemporary society, accordingly, will not be primarily 
with specific defects, abuses or injustices but with the 
question what - if any - is the "idea" of the society in which 
we live? to what end is it arranged? (Eliot 1939: 43) 
Eliot's thought here is complex. As we shall see below in Part Three, he borrowed 
this definition of "idea" from Coleridge, who may well have had Hegelian leanings. 
But there are other points in Eliot's definition which we must examine. First, he 
capitalises "Idea" when he refers to it in respect of "Christian Society", much as 
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Hegel tended to do when he wrote of the "Idea" in its full sense, as in the march of 
history. Eliot does not usually capitalise a word unless it is a proper noun. This is 
significant. Secondly, he suggests that by using the word "Idea" he is not meaning a 
"concept" - another Hegelian distinction. And by using the term 
"Idea" he is not 
concerned with some hypothetical society, some "perfected Christian Society on 
earth", and although he does not explicitly say so in this passage, it might be seen 
that he is actually concerned in The Idea of a Christian Society about the 
development of English Society as it existed: he is not interested in "specific 
defects" but with its ultimate aims. Eliot's "Idea", like Hegel's, is engaged with the 
here and now yet not completely realised. It appears, in 1939, very similar to the 
description of "idea" which he first wrote in 1916, as quoted above (Eliot 1964: 46). 
Eliot, in The Idea of a Christian Society desires to reform society so that its Idea can 
be more clearly expressed. Eliot, throughout the work, writes of the "Idea of the 
Christian Society" as if it were already part existing, and how it can be improved: 
I am here concerned only secondarily with the changes in 
economic organisation... my primary interest is in... such 
changes as could bring about anything worthy to be called a 
Christian Society. (Eliot 1939: 45) 
Eliot was clear that The Idea of a Christian Society was not pure theory. He 
asseverated that it "was not a blueprint". It was based upon the existing social and 
ecclesiastical life of England. "I have.. . 
limited my field", wrote Eliot, 
to the possibility of a Christian society in England, and 
speaking of the Church... it is the Anglican Church I have in 
mind. (Eliot 1939: 70) 
This can be seen in his discussion of the principle of unity, which 
... 
if the desirability of unity be admitted.. . then 
it can only be 
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realised, in England, through the Church of England.. .1 am 
only affirming that it is this Church which, by reason of its 
tradition... and its relation in the past to the religious-social 
life of the people, is the one for our purpose... 
(Eliot 1939: 71) 
Again, Eliot is defining his "Idea" of a Christian Society around what is already 
existing. Moreover, this "Idea" of a Christian Society is not just the objectification 
of a concept (in the Hegelian sense) of what society should be in institutions and 
laws. The "Idea" is also something to be grasped by individuals in society, so that 
each can be united into a common mind. Christian beliefs and practices were to be 
taught in an homogeneous education system, which would "... train people to think 
in Christian categories" (Eliot 1939: 57). The result of this would be that "... the 
Christian faith would be ingrained" in society (Eliot 1939: 58), either consciously 
within the Community of Christians, or "... almost wholly realised in behaviour" by 
the rest of society (Eliot 1939: 57). This Christianity would unite all members so that 
society's goals might be achieved. The "Idea" being both objectively expressed in 
the institutions of society and in its subjects, is an Hegelian notion. As Barker 
suggests, 
Hegel treated the State under the head of objective mind; he 
spoke of the State as a self-consciousness... An Oxford 
college is not a group of buildings... it is a group of men... in 
a sense of a group of minds. That group of minds, in virtue 
of the common substance of the uniting idea, is itself a 
group mind. There is no group-mind existing apart from the 
minds of the member of the group; the group mind only 
exists in the minds of its members... (Barker 1915: 72) 
Hence for Eliot, the "Christian mind" of the Christian Society, its "Idea", was also 
unitative, especially important in the face of Fascism and Communism. As he 
suggested in The Idea of a Christian Society, the pivotal Community of Christians 
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were those people who were "possessed of an idea": it inspired everything they did. 
Eliot's Knowledge and Experience also hinted at this kind of uniting force, when he 
suggested the necessity of "yoking divers worlds together" in order to make a whole 
(Eliot 1964: 85). 
6.3 Geist, Freedom, and the Idea 
The concept of Geist is an essential part of Hegel's whole philosophy, and this 
in one view cannot be emphasised too strongly. There is another view, however, 
which takes the opposite line, and some modern critics such as Taylor and Patten 
are tempted to divest Hegel's work of any such metaphysics. Central as the theory of 
Geist is to Hegel, he rarely defines it, and when he does the definition is, in the 
words of one critic, brief and "notoriously obscure". It is as though Hegel saw Geist 
as such an obvious constituent of the universe that description was superfluous. 
There are two explanations of Geist which Eliot noted, in Lectures. By the first, 
Eliot made the marginal note "Definition of Spirit": 
The nature of God as pure Spirit, is manifested to man in 
the Christian Religion. But what is Spirit? It is the one 
immutably homogeneous Infinite - pure Identity - which in 
its second phase separates itself from itself and makes this 
second aspect its own polar opposite, viz. as existence for 
and in itself as contrasted with the Universal. 
(Hegel 1905: 335-6) [Hegel's Italics] 
He also underlined some words in the following passage: 
If Spirit be defined as absolute reflection within itself... it is 
recognised as Triune: the "Father" and the "Son", and that 
duality which essentially characterises it as "Spirit". 
(Hegel 1905: 336) 
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Eliot also noted two instances of how, in Hegel's mind, Geist manifested itself in the 
particular: 
The Greek Spirit was a consciousness of Spirit, but under a 
limited form, having the element of Nature as an essential 
ingredient. (Hegel 1905: 331) 
Eliot also noted the following; 
... 
implicitly and explicitly, then, we have the truth, that man 
through Spirit - through cognition of the universal and the 
Particular - comprehends God himself. (Hegel 1905: 332) 
In Sibree's translation, Eliot would also have come across the following references 
to Geist: 
[Spirit] is entirely individual, active and alive: it is 
consciousness but also its object - and it is the being of 
Spirit to have itself as object. (Hegel in McCamey 2000: 56) 
and 
The next step is that we consider more closely Spirit, which 
we grasp essentially as consciousness... 
(Hegel in McCarney 2000: 56) 
and also 
The universal spirit is essentially present as human 
consciousness.. . The spirit that 
knows itself and exists for 
itself as subject posits itself as immediate and existent: thus 
it is human consciousness. (Hegel in McCarney 2000: 56) 
Geist was active in the life of nations: 
[Spirit] ... alone propels 
itself forward in all the deeds of the 
people. Religion, science, the arts, destinies and events are 
all forms of its development. (Hegel McCarney 2000: 138) 
This spirit of a people is "essentially particular", the "universal spirit in a particular 
form" (Hegel in McCarney 2000: 138). 
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From the above, we might suggest that Geist was the fundamental substance 
of the universe, existing by and for itself. According to the Lectures, Geist went 
through two phases, first of all pure existence, marked by "pure reflection"; second, 
when it split from itself and became its opposite, when it began its quest for self- 
fulfilment in the world. At some point it is also individual human consciousness, as 
well as the life-force active in nations, creating out of them homogeneous groups of 
people. The primeval splitting of Geist created the essential duality, sometimes 
characterised as the Thesis and Antithesis, in the Dialectic which is at the heart of 
all Hegelian understanding of the world. Although Hegel's terminology is somewhat 
recondite, we might see his description of the existence and development of Geist as 
somehow similar to the classic Christian account of the Creation by God, and 
indeed Hegel, at the end of the second extract which Eliot highlighted, does give it a 
Trinitarian gloss, although it is hardly the zenith of orthodoxy. Eventually, Geist's 
goal is to arrive at full consciousness by way of overcoming the oppositions to itself 
which it meets in the world, but this process is achieved in the form of the fully 
realised State. 
The above might be categorised as a theistic reading of Hegel's account of 
Geist. However, as noted above, "I acknowledge that there are other readings of 
Hegel on these views" (Brod 1992: 7). Copplestone, for example, on his reading of 
Hegel suggests that Geist did not have an existence before that of the material 
world - the world of Geist and that of creation are "of one essence and existence" 
(Copplestone 1957: 7: 208). There is no creation ex nihilo, as in the Biblical 
tradition. This view may be supported from some of the definitions of Geist given 
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above - it is consciousness, but also its object. Again, one 
is inclined to view 
Hegel's thought as ambiguous, and that there is a spectrum of valid interpretations. 
I have tended to fall on the side of the theistic view of Hegel, principally because, I 
believe, Eliot would have encountered this in his close reading of the Lectures, and 
indeed he annotated one of the more theistic definitions of Geist above. Two recent 
studies have tended to confirm the ambiguous nature of Hegel's theology. Pinkard 
in Hegel concludes that Hegel's theory of historical development through Geist is 
"... the history of humanity in its social and political existence, and not a 
providential tale written by God" (Pinkard 2000: 494). Desmond, on the other hand, 
sees things differently, and suggests that Hegel's Geist in its panoramic 
development "accomplishes God" (Desmond 2003: 168), although ultimately 
Desmond concludes that Hegel's idea of God is a "counterfeit double" (Desmond 
2003: 173). 
Despite these difficulties of interpretation, we might put forward Hegel's 
theory of Geist as something along the following, and this will also be seen to 
provide us with Hegel's philosophy of Freedom and world history. Geist for Hegel 
was the "... pure Identity" or consciousness (Hegel 1905: 335-6), one of the 
fundamental substances of the universe. As we saw above, although it was pure 
consciousness, it was not fully self-conscious, for to achieve this level Geist needed 
another consciousness or collection of conciousnesses with which to react. Self- 
consciousness for Hegel relied fundamentally on two or more entities recognising 
each other as equals. Whether Geist created the universe as a theatre in which to 
achieve this, or acted upon an already existing world, does not in this scheme of 
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explanation matter; what is essential is the other to Geist's pure identity. 
The goal of Geist being to return to itself as consciousness, it "... separates 
itself from itself' and immerses itself into the world of human affairs (Hegel 
1905: 336), seeking other consciousnesses with which to interact. However, the 
humans it meets first of all in this quest are not fully developed, that is, they do not 
enjoy that radical Freedom in which they are able to create a world around them of 
their own devising which reflects their own being back to them. Nor do they live in 
societies in which Freedom is recognised for everyone. The societies which Geist 
first encounters in the world are like a vast expression of the Master-Slave 
relationship which Hegel delineated in Phenomenology. Hegel's version of freedom 
was positive; it was not freedom from certain things, merely to live without external 
pressures, nor even to be able to enjoy liberties such as movement or speech. 
Hegel's version was one in which humans enjoyed freedom for things, that is, self- 
consciousness and an ability to act from that. Just as the goal for Geist was complete 
self-realisation with absolute freedom, so the goal of humanity was to come to that 
point of freedom that Geist itself enjoyed. This Geist-enjoyed freedom Hegel called, 
simply, "the Idea". 
Finding the first societies underdeveloped, Geist has to work human society 
into something like itself, that is, fully conscious and imbued with the Idea of 
Freedom. Hegel traces this development of the Idea in his Philosophy of World 
History and also briefly in Philosophy of Right. Successive human societies, as we 
saw in Part One, grow more and more into the realisation of Freedom. In the 
earliest of human societies, only one or a few citizens enjoy true freedom; this 
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number rises as Hegel describes the Greek and Roman worlds, but their practice of 
slavery ensures that not everyone is free. 
The goal of society is embodiment of the Idea in what Hegel terms the 
"Universal State", that is, one in which all enjoy the benefits which Geist-like 
freedom brings. In this society, each individual member exists in and for himself. 
He or she is fully self-realised and self-conscious and enjoys these qualities in the 
same way as Geist, by being embodied in a vast web of inter-relationships in which 
that self-realisation is recognised by all others. 
This story of the evolution of society along with that of the self-realisation of 
Geist provides Hegel with both a philosophy of history and theory of humanity. 
Hegel's anthropology might be described in the following way. What made human 
beings unique in the world of creatures was that they possessed Geist, with its 
faculty of reason. But in possessing Geist they needed to become self-realised in a 
free world in which they were recognised as such. To be anything less was to be 
alienated. People needed to create a world of their own devising which would 
reflect back to them their true selves, like Geist. This is the spring for Hegel's theory 
of art and religion and all other expressions of humanity. By engaging in acts of 
creation, people worked out their self-realisation, objectifying it in the world. In 
these works Geist too was developed. The development of Geist both in itself and in 
individuals was thereby a community process: relying on the recognition of others, 
it was a sine qua non of the growth of freedom. 
The development of Freedom, therefore, was the story of Geist's involvement 
in human societies which were themselves involved in the same process. It was a 
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wheel within a wheel, the end product of which was the fully formed Hegelian 
State, embodying the Idea. Being essentially a community effort, every human was 
involved in Geist's development. Geist's evolution entailed a flowering of human 
nature; the history of Geist was the history of everything, a universal history. It also 
had a definite goal, a telos, that of the true State, and this goal was to be achieved 
within the realm of human history. Essentially, the fundamentals of Hegel's 
philosophy (when one has accepted his terminology) is in one sense simple: it is a 
story of Geist's quest for self-realisation and the story of humanity's involvement in 
it both for Geist and for human society. 
Given this, we turn to Eliot's work, and ask whether we can possibly see any 
correlation between that and Hegel's theory of Geist? Was Eliot's social theory, or 
indeed any part of his work, imbued with the theory of Geist, or was Hegel's 
metaphysics to Eliot like it was to Taylor - "bizarre" and "incredible"? We might 
suggest that Eliot - whose "monstrous and corrupt" Hegel one might begin to see in 
his "incredible" metaphysical conceptions - did not share such a vision of the grand 
working out in history of some (in pejorative terms) nebulous Geist. 
6.4 Eliot and Geist 
If we take the theistic reading of Hegel as unlikely, then we would surely be 
bound to suggest that Eliot was not influenced by Hegel's Geist, which was open to 
accusations of pantheism -a charge which Hegel vigorously denied. Eliot, we can 
reasonably be sure, was orthodox in his theology of Creation. However, if we lean 
more to the theistic side of the interpretation, then Hegel's influence might be 
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admitted, as it perhaps accorded more with Christian doctrine. Even here, though, 
there is a marked difference between Hegel's thought and dogma as Eliot would 
have understood it. God had no need of "self-fulfilment" in Christian accounts of 
the universe. 
Even given this, we should not conclude that Geist could not have been 
appropriated by Eliot. Outside our main text The Idea of a Christian Society, there is 
a point at which we might see vestiges of a kind of Geist. Notably, it originates in 
the period when Eliot was going through his putative "scientific" stage of criticism 
(see Part Three). This possible Hegelianism is concealed in Eliot's conception of the 
"mind of Europe" and the doctrine of Tradition that accompanies it, as discussed 
above. As these schemes are closely related, there will be a certain overlap in the 
following discussion. 
Eliot first uses the term "mind of Europe" in the 1919 "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent". Eliot argues for the existence of and the adherence to the 
concept of "the tradition" of European literature. Hitherto, he argued, the notion of 
"tradition" has been rather negative: 
In English writing we seldom speak of tradition, though we 
occasionally apply its name in deploring its absence.. . If 
otherwise, it is ... approbative, with the 
implication... of some 
pleasing archaeological reconstruction. (Eliot 1932f: 13) 
Tradition, however, is something more dynamic and alive, relating the living writer 
to his forebears. These predecessors form a sort of union, a mind, which the living 
writer can come to know. Eliot suggests: 
... (the poet) can neither take the past as a 
lump... nor... form 
himself wholly upon one preferred period.. . He must 
be quite 
aware... that art never improves, but that the material of art is 
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never quite the same. He must be aware that the mind of 
Europe - the mind of his own country -a mind which 
he 
learns in time to be much more important than his own 
private mind - is a mind which changes, and that this change 
is a development which abandons nothing en route. . . this 
development, refinement perhaps.. . 
is not... improvement... But 
the difference between the present and the past is that the 
conscious present is an awareness of the past in a way and to 
an extent which the past's awareness of itself cannot show. 
(Eliot 1932f: 16) 
This fundamental need to grasp the "mind of Europe" - which Eliot seems to believe 
encompasses Greece as well - is not a matter of intellectual endeavour, or as Eliot 
suggests "much learning". To have the mind of Europe is more: it is - and this is the 
important point, which perhaps links Eliot with Hegel -a matter of developing the 
consciousness of the past: 
What is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop a 
consciousness of the past... What happens is a continual 
surrender of himself... to something which is more valuable. 
The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a 
continual extinction of personality. (Eliot 1932f: 17) 
Thus for Eliot, this attaining the "mind of Europe" is no historical or archaeological 
delving. It is the process of developing a consciousness of a living substance, or 
attaining a relationship with that living past. This European mind is greater than the 
individual mind of the artist which must surrender to the greater. There are several 
Hegelian overtones here. One might recall that for Hegel Geist was defined as 
"consciousness"; and as the human mind was also for Hegel a manifestation of Geist 
- "the universal spirit is essentially present as human consciousness" - then Eliot's 
prescription that the artist's mind must develop a consciousness of the European 
mind through its past, has an echo of Hegel's words which, as we saw above, it can 
be proved that Eliot read and noted. This is further corroborated with Hegel's own 
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belief that Geist itself was the primal mover in art: 
... [Geist]... propels 
itself forward in all the deeds.. . of the 
people. Religion, science, the arts.. . are all 
forms of its 
development. (Hegel 1991 a: 46) 
Admittedly there are differences between Eliot's "European Mind" and Hegel's 
Geist. Eliot's is a European mind, and not a Universal Mind, although we might 
suggest that Hegel, ultimately, was more interested in Geist's European 
manifestation as it tended in that continent to approach its self-realisation. Hegel, 
like Eliot, is unashamedly Eurocentric. Another difference of emphasis is that while 
Geist tends to develop all things, consciousness of Eliot's European mind does not 
bring "improvement" as such; art, in Eliot's doctrine, does not "improve", although 
there is some movement forward admitted, in that it might be "refined"; moreover, 
the present manifestation of the European mind is somewhat greater than it was in 
the past for it also has the sum of its past included in the present - the mass of the 
European mind is increased. Another difference is that Geist is active in all branches 
of society's endeavours, whereas Eliot's appears, in this context, confined to 
literature. 
Eliot appeared consistent in his "European mind" theory throughout his career. 
He always attempted to enlarge his consciousness of European heritage, and through 
this individual endeavour the consciousness of society as well. The re-appraisal of 
the English Metaphysical poets is a good example, as is the essay on Andrewes and 
Hooker in For Lancelot Andrewes. Notably, in these Eliot is at pains to stress the 
European nature of these writers, with special reference to Dante, who was in Eliot's 
mind the doyen of European-ness. 
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Are there Geister to be found in The Idea of a Christian Society? Although 
perhaps not as explicit as the dynamic role of tradition and the European mind in 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent", there are some attributes of our 1939 text 
which might be Hegelian. There is a strong sense within the book of V esprit 
d'Anglais, the English character. This might well be the main reason why Eliot sees 
his work as applying only to England, which otherwise might seem eccentric or 
super-nationalist. He can only suggest things for the English, he says: 
But if what I say... has... direct application only in England, 
it is not because I am thinking of local matters.. . It 
is partly 
that I can only discuss.. . the situations with which 
I am most 
familiar.. .1 
have therefore limited my field to the possibility 
of a Christian society in England, and in speaking of Church 
and State it is the Anglican Church that I have in mind... If 
the idea of a Christian society be grasped. . . then 
it can only 
be realised, in England, through the Church of England ... I 
am only affirming that it is this Church which, by reason of 
its tradition, its organisation, and its relation in the past to 
the religious-social life of the people, is the one for our 
purpose... (Eliot 1939: 70-71) 
It is the unique character of the English situation that Eliot is dealing with, the 
Englishness of England, we might say. It is very different, he argues, from the 
situation as found in Wales, although Eliot knew that Wales was politically part of 
the same unit, as was (although with certain differences) Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. However, these four provinces of Britain were different, Eliot argued. This 
can be seen in Eliot's discussion of the Disestablishment of the Church in Wales. 
Such moves to Disestablishment of the Church in one province of Britain cannot, he 
argues, be applied to the other parts: 
Apart from the differences of racial temperament which 
must be taken into account, the full effect of 
Disestablishment cannot be seen from the illustration of a 
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small part of the island... (Eliot 1939: 73) 
Wales cannot be compared to England because its people are racially different. We 
should not here impugn Eliot with racism. That would be anachronistic. In Eliot's 
day, "race" could be used by some writers (as diverse as TE Lawrence and Robert 
Cude, of the East Kent Regiment in the Great War) as an interchangeable word with 
"nation"23. Moreover, in discussing Murry's contribution to the debate between 
"Romantic" and "Classical" attitudes in literature, Eliot in the 1923 "The Function 
of Criticism" suggested that the debate had become "... a national, a racial issue" 
(Eliot 1932f: 26). It seems that for Eliot the words "race" and "nation" were 
synonymous. And so in discussing Disestablishment, Eliot suggests that Wales and 
England are two different nations, with different circumstances. Like the Hegelian 
concept of nations - groups of people in whom Geist has manifested itself in a 
particular way - Eliot's England and Wales are almost foreign to each other. That 
they shared a common language - at least in most of the area - and in part a common 
history is no matter for Eliot: they are different people with different mores. This 
sense of the underlying spirit of a nation comes across strongly in a discussion Eliot 
has on national identity earlier in the work. "You cannot", he wrote, 
expect continuity and coherence in politics... unless there is 
an underlying political philosophy: not of a party, but of the 
nation. (Eliot 1939: 67) 
This "underlying political philosophy" was fundamental to the nation's character, 
23 Lawrence uses the word "race" as an equivalent for "nation" in Seven Pillars of Wisdom. 
Cude wrote after seeing a German's death in the Somme: "It was a... cheering spectacle ... 
I set my 
thoughts on... the extermination of the whole race" (Brown 2001: 191) [My Italics]. 
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and as we saw above "nation" was a distinct group of people knit together by a 
common culture. In being concerned with "the nation", Eliot is perhaps here 
broadening his concerns with tradition from his earlier, purely literary perspective as 
in "Tradition and the Individual Talent". The "nation" would comprise all that went 
on in the state, and not just the arts, as Eliot himself suggests in the above text. 
Eliot's "nation" in The Idea of a Christian Society comes to appear like Hegel's Volk, 
a group of people sharing the same social, political and cultural ideas (the same 
"social-religious life"), and as such it is also a manifestation of Geist. 
Despite similarities between Hegel's Geist and some elements of Eliot's 
ideology, overall we cannot truly equate Eliot's vision for humanity and the society 
in which it lived with Geist. Fundamental to Hegel's theory was Geist's splitting 
from itself and immersing itself in the world of human affairs in order to come to a 
telos - self-fulfilment for itself and humanity in the rational State. There is no such 
undertaking in Eliots work. Eliot's society, at least as expressed in The Idea of a 
Christian Society, is not in the process of evolving towards Freedom along with a 
cosmic agency. It is static; it has no "goal" towards which it must develop, and nor 
has it "evolved" from any kind of former state. Eliot sees the Christian state as free- 
standing, a-historical, almost, and this is far from Hegel's story of human society. 
Geist - even if we put the most orthodox gloss on Hegel - is far from Eliot's God, 
that of Christian orthodoxy - involved in the world in the person of Christ, but in no 
way involved in a process of self-realisation. Christian dogma accords God self- 
realisation as one of his fundamental characteristics; it is neither enhanced nor 
diminished by God's action in the world. Moreover, the concept of the "Idea" in 
114 
Hegel's account of Geist, is also missing in Eliot to a large extent - this will be 
discussed in detail below. 
6.5. The Idea of Freedom and Hegel's Society 
In Hegel's politics, a starting point is the concept of "the Idea". This in Hegel 
is closely linked to Geist. As we saw above, Geist is involved in a process of self- 
realisation in human history. World history, therefore, was on a march towards 
freedom, which Hegel described in the image of Master and Slave in 
Phenomenology. This concept of freedom Hegel called "the Idea", and all of human 
history had it as its goal. Ultimately, freedom was to be embodied in the State. 
Overall, Hegel's theory of politics is Geist's development in human affairs, how 
society incarnated the concept of freedom which enabled Geist to be fulfilled. 
There is a problem of semantics to overcome before we proceed. The essential 
point is that the terms "State" and "Society" meant something different to Hegel, 
and to Eliot, than they tend to do to us in the twenty-first century, and it is prudent 
to keep these differences in mind when we come to examine the texts. 
It is important for us to recognise the historical complexity which was the 
context of Hegel's political writing. Hegel's Germany, although linked more or less 
by common language and culture, was politically divided into many states, in which 
different legislations and powers were in force. This often led to weakness, as in the 
Napoleonic era. There was no cohesion between the German states and common 
policy was difficult to achieve. Hegel tackled this problem in his German 
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Constitution, which has been discussed above in relation to Machiavelli. 
Essentially, Hegel wished for the unification of German States, just as Machiavelli 
desired a stronger Italy. As Avineri suggests, 
The dissolution which [had] taken hold of Germany [was] 
fraught with dangers. The disappearance of the common 
bond. 
. . pushed men 
into an atomistic isolation... 
(Avineri 1972: 54) 
Hegel wrote in The German Constitution 
The German people may be incapable of intensifying its 
obstinacy to particulalrism to that point of madness reached 
by the Jewish people -a people incapable of uniting in 
common life with any other... Nevertheless, particularism 
[sic] has prerogative... in Germany. 
(Hegel in Avineri 1972: 54) 
To understand Hegel's concerns with German atomism, which became obvious in 
the Napoleonic era, is to go far in understanding Hegel's politics. Hegel's attitude to 
the French Revolution, which ultimately led to the demise of old Germany, was not 
however negative. He drank a toast to it on Bastille Day every year (Pinkard 
2000: 45 1) and admired it in as much as it brought the "bright dawn" of human 
freedom and abstract right into feudal Europe, against which the Ancien Regimes 
could not stand. The Revolution's excesses, however, Hegel denigrated. Eliot, we 
might suggest, did not share Hegel's enthusiasm for the Revolution's better 
qualities. 
This might allay the problems we may have in comprehending Hegel's 
position vis-ä-vis the common conception of the state, which might still be defined 
by Weber's classic suggestion that it is the authority that claims a monopoly on 
violence. As Woods suggests 
116 
Since Hobbes, the state has been conceived mainly as a 
coercive institution: for conservatives a preserver of order, 
for liberals a protector of rights, for radicals a promoter of 
ruling class interests, but always... an enforcer. 
(Woods 1993: 230) 
Hegel's theory of the State was much richer than these views. But yet another 
difficulty arises for us: as McCarney suggests, Hegel's use of "State" was not 
consistent in its meaning, and we must note 
... 
how varied are Hegel's use of the term "state" by the usual 
standards of [his] time... (McCarney 2000: 156) 
He goes on to say that 
It seems that one may speak of a less and a more 
comprehensive sense of the term. In the narrow sense, the 
state is the political and legal framework... In a wider... 
sense, the state incorporates a range of spiritual phenomena, 
including religion, science and art ... The sense 
is never 
clearly defined... and it may be pointless to seek for it a 
sharper outline than he provides. The state in the wider 
sense may well be one of those useful, but inherently vague 
notions that are distorted in being made more precise... 
(McCarney 2000: 167) 
Before examining Hegel's theory, we might preface the whole discussion by 
suggesting that Hegel did not see the state, like Hobbes, as a necessary yet artificial 
construction. He saw it as a natural and organic phenomenon, in which humans 
were social animals and their relationships formed natural nexuses. The state, on 
one level, was part of human biology. Indeed, Hegel often speaks of the state as 
being an "organism", not only in being "... a self-knowing... individual" (Barker 
1915: 73) but also, in the context of how it might be damaged by individuals who, if 
alienated from its institutions, might "... become a massive power in opposition to 
the organic state" (Hegel 1991b: 342). This opposition was dangerous, wrote Hegel, 
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spreading like cancer through the body politic: 
If opposition does make its appearance... the state is close to 
destruction. (Hegel 1991b: 342-343) 
And so what was Hegel's theory of the State? On one level - and here we meet 
the complexity of Hegel's thought - Hegel does suggest that the State is a simple 
organisation with a straightforward task. In The German Constitution, for example, 
he suggests that the State is primarily for the defence of its members: 
The health of the state is generally revealed not so much in 
the calm of peace as in the stir of war... in war the power of 
association of all with the whole is evident. 
(Hegel 1964a: 141) 
The "actual readiness for common action and common defence", as Avineri 
suggests (Avineri 1972: 41), was one of the key moments of Hegel's State. The old 
German Empire, Hegel suggests in The German Constitution, failed as a State 
because it could not protect its members from aggression. However, although 
Hegel's State fundamentally is an association for the protection of liberties, it is 
much more. How the State goes about its associations is more complicated than 
simply a military co-operative. 
Hegel's theory of the State was one which, at inception, was new and based on 
different principles from what had preceded. As Brod suggests, in constructing his 
theories Hegel 
... rejected as ... 
foundation[s] of political theory an appeal to 
tradition... as in the patriarchialist tradition of paternal 
authority ... or an appeal to religion, as 
in... the Divine Right 
of Kings.. . Only universal principles rationally arrived at 
could satisfy the demands of modern political consciousness. 
(Brod 1992: 30) 
For Hegel, the state was a rational entity. It was created by and could be 
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comprehended by reason, because political society can only exist if knit together by 
shared norms and these cannot be wholly external. There were no institutions which 
were based on precedent; the state was a reasoned structure, and as such - and this is 
a key to understanding Hegel's insistence that the state as a whole and the individual 
within it could be one - every individual with the gift of reason (i. e. everyone, Hegel 
seems to assume) could comprehend it, know it to be reasonable and act with it 
rationally. As Hegel outlined in the introduction to Philosophy of Right, 
This treatise, in so far as it deals with political science, shall 
be nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray 
the state as an inherently rational entity. 
(Hegel 1991 b: 2 1) [Hegel's Italics] 
The state in being rational was not just a human creation: it was the manifestation of 
Geist, Reason itself, and for that alone it deserved from its citizens 
... their ultimate allegiance 
because it [was] the expression of 
the very foundation of things, the Concept. 
(Taylor 1979: 80) 
The state was not just theoretical, however. It affected life at every level. To be 
rational in Hegel's scheme of things was not just to be level-headed; it was to be 
also ethical. And the state, as rational entity, was also ethical: 
Ethical life is the Idea of freedom... and its actuality through 
self-conscious action... Ethical life is accordingly the 
concept of freedom which has become the existing world... 
(Hegel 1991 b: 189) [Hegel's Italics] 
It is clear from this that Hegel's ethics are richer than that which normally pass for 
such, and this will be discussed later in the examination of Sittlichkeit. Suffice it to 
say here that Hegel's ethics comprehended the actions, beliefs, thoughts and mores 
of the state's inhabitants, individually and corporately. In a real way, ethical life was 
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the state: "The state in and for itself is the ethical whole... " (Hegel 1991b: 279). 
Hegel's State was not just a part of its citizens' lives. At a profound level, it was 
their lives. Everything that each citizen did and thought, was part of the State. We 
should not, however, see this as some kind of totalitarian regime. Here, the will and 
thought of individuals were controlled by an outside force which was the State. In 
Hegel, the people themselves were the State, voluntarily associating themselves 
with one another. The citizens of the State were able to do this without the need for 
exterior compulsion to conform because, as we saw above, the State was rational, 
and it was the natural end of humans to live together in a State, in order to gain 
freedom. The State needed to be a rational entity because its end was rational, i. e. 
the realisation of freedom. As Pinkard suggests, 
World history is ... 
fundamentally about the development of 
the "Idea" of freedom, that is, our collective and individual 
grasp of the normative "whole" in terms of which freedom 
is both intelligible to us and "actual" (in Hegel's sense) for 
us. (Pinkard 2000: 491) 
Although Hegel saw the State as a unity, it did admit of degrees within its 
organisation. Society was tripartite. These parts were: 1. the family; 2. civil society; 
and 3. the State. These marked a progression from basic human nature to the 
fulfilment of the Idea in human society. Each individual belonged biologically to the 
level of family, and then by process of education, employment and needs became a 
member of civil society. The end and final movement of the individual was to 
become a member of the State, which was the ultimate expression of humanity and 
Geist. 
Hegel had an Aristotelian view of the family. It was for both authors the 
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building block of the state, what Brod calls "... the most immediate, natural form of 
association" (Brod 1992: 62). Hegel defines the family in the following terms: 
The family, as the immediate substantiality of spirit, has as 
its determination the spirit's feeling of its own unity, which 
is love. Thus, the disposition is to have self-consciousness 
of one's own individuality within this unity as essentially 
which has being in and for itself, so that one is present in it 
not as an independent person but as a member. 
(Hegel 1991b: 199) [Hegel's Italics] 
Love, according to Hegel, is "... the consciousness of my unity with another" (Hegel 
1991b: 199). The family provided that moment in society where the individual 
realises that it is by association that he or she has social existence - as an individual 
I would feel deficient and incomplete" (Hegel 1991a: 199). Hegel's whole political 
theory rests upon the concept of association, and it is in the family that persons 
learn this. This association provides a distinct "ethical life", characterised by the 
rite of marriage, and by what Hegel calls the "external existence" of "... the property 
and assets of the family" (Hegel 1991b: 200). 
However, the family is not sufficient for society's development, for it is a 
self-contained unit with members living and working for each other; there is no link 
in family life between different groups. These groups act like atomistic individuals. 
The association of persons within a family, Hegel suggests, has ultimately to be 
dissolved in order for its members to achieve a higher political plane, that of Civil 
Society. (Here, Hegel is not intimating that the marriage bond has to be broken in 
this move to Civil Society. He is suggesting instead that the boundaries of 
association have to be expanded from the limits of family to those of society in 
general. Hegel's citizens would always belong to a family group, but not 
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exclusively. ) This movement from family to civil society was a natural process, 
which Hegel described as "... the bringing up of children and the dissolution of the 
family" (Hegel 1991b: 200). It was not an artificial act. In Hegel's words, 
The family disintegrates in a natural manner... into a 
plurality of families whose relation to one another is in 
general that of... an external kind. (Hegel 1991b: 219) 
For Hegel, the family was essentially a process, that of raising children and, by 
virtue of the family wealth, endowing the individual with property and hence - in 
Hegelian terms - personality. 
The dissolution of the family, in Brod's words, released 
... that propertied 
individual who serves as a foundation for 
modem political theory. (Brod 1992: 64) 
Hegel described the product of family as "the concrete person", who is "particular", 
"... a totality of needs and. . . mixture of... necessity and arbitrariness... 
", who is 
nevertheless "... one principle of Civil Society" (Hegel 1991b: 220). That individual 
was not like Hobbes', however, for through family's educative process he has an 
ethical nature which gives a "... predisposition to think of [himself] as a part of a 
larger social unit" (Brod 1992: 65). 
The next stage of society is Civil Society, where the fully-formed individuals 
produced by the family form a larger social bond. This level of society is one based 
on need. The "particular persons", wrote Hegel, 
... stand essentially 
in relation to other similar particulars, 
and their relation is such that each asserts itself and gains 
satisfaction through the others. 
(Hegel 1991b: 220) [Hegel's Italics] 
If the family can be described as a self-contained, self-interest group, intent on its 
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own welfare and equipping members with property and personality, then Civil 
Society can be described as a half-way house between that self-interest and what 
Hegel termed the "universal", that is the full realisation of inter-dependency and 
unity in society which is the State. "Civil Society", wrote Hegel, 
is the [stage of] difference which intervenes between the 
family and the state... (Hegel 1991b: 220) 
although he insists that the State must pre-exist Civil Society, or else there could be 
no graduation. Like the family, Civil Society is a sphere of learning, that of 
individuals understanding the necessity of the universal. In Hegel's words, 
In civil society, each individual is his own end... But he 
cannot accomplish the full extent of his ends without 
reference to others... through [this] reference... the particular 
end takes on the form of universality and gains satisfaction 
by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of others... [civil 
society] is the sphere of mediation in which all individual 
characteristics ... are 
liberated... 
(Hegel 1991 b: 220-221) [Hegel's Italics] 
A movement occurs, from self-interested individual emerging from family, to self- 
interested individual who learns that this interest is best served in relationship with 
others who are not his family. However, this relationship is still based on need and 
requires development for it to become universal, the embodiment of Idea. In Civil 
Society, as Patten suggests, 
... the universal 
is an unintended consequence of the actions 
of agents for whom the particular is the primary ... factor. 
(Patten 1999: 18) 
The State, as this suggests, is the sphere of social life where "... agents consciously 
have the universal as their end and goal" (Patten 1999: 172). The universal, Patten 
suggests, is that which is 
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... good 
for all free and rational agents... Obvious candidates 
for universal good, in Hegel's philosophy, include the goods 
associated with ... art, religion and philosophy. 
(Patten 1999: 171) 
Hegel's citizens in the "external state" of civil society have to learn by process of 
"cultural education" (Bildung) the importance of these universals and the need to 
advance towards full membership of the state proper. 
Civil Society was the arena for society's economic and administrative life. In 
Philosophy of Right, for example, Hegel describes the workings of employment, 
justice and what he terms the "implementation of external order" within the section 
devoted to Civil Society. All these parts of society are based on need in the 
"external state" but which help individuals become aware of the universal. Work 
begins by being a means to an end. Hegel describes it: 
The mediation whereby appropriate and particularised 
means are acquired and prepared for similarly particularised 
needs is work. (Hegel 1991b: 233) [Hegel's Italics] 
However, this process of manufacture and consumption ultimately leads the 
participating agents into universal thoughts: 
In this dependence and reciprocity of work and the 
satisfaction of needs, subjective selfishness turns into a 
contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of 
everyone else. (Hegel 1991b: 233) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel further subdivides the arena of work into three estates. These are not simply 
divisions of labour. They are "... divided this way... in accordance with the concept", 
that is, the concept of freedom (Hegel 1991a: 237). Each estate embodies freedom in 
a particular way and there appears a natural progression from first to third. These 
Hegel describes in typically abstruse ways: 
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The estates are determined, in accordance with the concept, 
as the substantial or immediate estate, the reflecting or 
formal estate, and lastly, the universal estate. 
(Hegel 1991b: 234) [Hegel's Italics] 
The first of the estates "... has its resources in the natural products of the soil which it 
cultivates" (Hegel 1991 b: 234). It is agricultural, entwined with the rhythm of the 
seasons, and is, Hegel suggests, "... the proper beginning and foundation of states" 
(Hegel 1991b: 234). The second estate, the "reflecting or formal estate", is trade and 
industry. Hegel gives it these rather peculiar names because 
... the estate of trade and industry 
has the task of giving form 
to natural products, and it relies on its livelihood on its 
work, on reflection and understanding, and essentially on its 
mediation of the needs and work of others. 
(Hegel 1991b: 236) [Hegel's Italics] 
The first two estates, Hegel suggests, are different levels in human development. 
The first is rural, and because of its ties with the organic world 
... 
has little need to think for itself: what it gains is an alien 
gift... of nature. This feeling of dependence is fundamental 
to it... The first estate is therefore more inclined to 
subservience, the second to freedom. 
(Hegel 1991b: 237) 
The second estate had "arisen mainly in towns". Although Hegel makes no formal 
connection between the second and third estates, one is perhaps tempted to suggest 
that the latter, the "universal estate", develops from the former: 
The universal estate has the universal interests of society as 
its business. It must therefore be exempted from 
work... either by having private resources, or by receiving 
an indemnity from the state-so that the private interest is 
satisfied through working for the universal. 
(Hegel 1991b: 237) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel, later in Philosophy of Right, equates the universal estate with the civil 
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service, that branch of government which has the task of 
... upholding... 
legality and the universal interest of the 
state... (Hegel 1991b: 329) [Hegel's Italics] 
Clearly Hegel's definition of "civil servant" is wider than currently used, and its 
broad definition could also include teachers and clergy. Perhaps Hegel's "universal 
estate" lies behind Coleridge's idea of "clerisy", and Coleridge's putative 
Hegelianism we shall examine in Part Three. 
Justice also belongs to Civil Society, as it is essentially about the resolution of 
conflicts between different parties - "... through the administration of justice, 
infringements of property or personality are annulled" (Hegel 1991b: 260). Hegel 
suggests that: 
... it 
is through the system of particularity that right becomes 
externally necessary as a protection for particular interests. 
(Hegel 1991b: 240) 
These laws, although universal in nature in that they embody reason, have to be 
applied to the complicated arena of civil society. These laws are applied 
... to the material of civil society - to 
its relationships and 
varieties of property and contracts in their endlessly 
increasing diversity... (Hegel 1991 b: 244) [Hegel's Italics] 
Civil Society is a system of relationships between groups. Although it is a stage 
further in the development of society than family, it is - apart from the universal 
estate, an anomaly which Hegel does not clear up - still a system of self-interests: 
... civil society 
is the field of conflict in which the private 
interest of each individual comes up against that of 
everyone else... (Hegel 1991b: 329) 
and 
.. civil society [is where] the Idea 
has lost itself in 
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particularity... (Hegel 1991b: 259) 
There are two ways in which civil society, in Hegel's scheme, progresses to the 
universal State. The first is what Hegel calls "the Police", or rather the External 
Authority of the state, the means by which it implements universal interests over 
particular: 
... 
in so far as the principle by which this or that end is 
governed is still that of the particular will, that authority of 
the universal which guarantees security remains.. . an external 
order. (Hegel 1991b: 259) 
The police are also there to prevent the different estates of society from coming into 
conflict: 
The differing interests of producers and consumers may 
come into collision with each other, and even if, on the 
whole, their correct relationship re-establishes itself 
automatically, its adjustment also needs to be consciously 
regulated by an agency which stands above both sides. 
(Hegel 1991b: 260-261) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel's "police", therefore, encompasses not just agents of law, but also what we 
might call today arbitration services, and perhaps also agencies like social services. 
The police in Philosophy of Right exist to ensure the smooth operating of civil 
society, preventing the estates from coming into conflict, and thereby turning their 
natural inclinations to particularity into those of the universal. The police help turn 
civil society into the Hegelian state by means of active intervention in an external 
manner. 
The second way this process is implemented is by that which Hegel termed 
the Corporations. These groups - or associations, Hegel's preferred term, hinting at 
their cohesive function - are primarily based upon trades which the citizens practise. 
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The Corporations are therefore firstly instruments of particularity, as at one level 
they exist to serve the needs of a specific group of people; their ends are - to some 
extent - "selfish" (Hegel 1991b: 270). Corporations are to be "second families" to 
members, giving them security and recognition within society (Hegel 1991b: 271). 
However, Corporations are more than a Trade's Union or medieval guild. Their 
function is also educational and cultural, making Corporations agents for 
universality. Members of corporations have responsibility for someone (we might 
call them apprentices) outside their biological family; this itself engenders a form of 
universality, for the master in teaching his apprentice has to look to the good of 
another. The corporation also has responsibility for keeping its trade in order for 
society's good. What started as a trades' self-interest group flowers into a union of 
men who, in preserving their skills for successive generations, serve wider society. 
Another universalising aspect of the corporation is that in granting membership to 
properly qualified people, it provides members with what Hegel terms the sense of 
being "somebody" (Hegel 1991b: 271). They have status and recognition. This is 
crucial in the Hegelian system: being recognised in broader society is a way by 
which citizens see themselves as part of the whole. As Hegel puts it, 
In this way [i. e. by being recognised by the Corporation], it 
is also recognised that he [i. e. the skilled tradesman] 
belongs to a whole which is itself a member of society in 
general... Thus, he has his honour in his estate. 
(Hegel 1991b: 271) [Hegel's Italics] 
The corporations are also microcosms of society. They foster selfless work, and in 
running internal organisations their members are given what Brod calls "... a 
concrete political education" (Brod 1992: 112). This can then be transferred to the 
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State as a whole. As Brod comments, 
Corporations can play [a] key integrating role [in political 
life] because they are simultaneously situated at the apogee 
of... civil society and at the perigees of the orbit of the 
universal interests of the state... the corporations play an 
essential role in investing private interests with a public 
character... (Brod 1992: 113-114) 
Patten concurs: 
[Hegel] views the corporation] as a transitional institution 
between the market economy and the state. The corporation 
orientates its members to a common good... 
(Patten 1999: 187) 
Perhaps the closest correlation in British history is the Working Men's education 
movement, with its libraries and evening schools (in which Eliot himself was a 
teacher in 1919). However, whilst the British model was restricted largely to the 
labouring classes, and was voluntary, Hegel's system is not so class-based. Everyone 
who possesses a skilled trade is expected to belong to a Corporation: 
... and the member of civil society, 
in accordance with his 
particular skill, is a member of a corporation... 
(Hegel 1991b: 270) 
Labourers and women, however, are excluded. Hegel does not appear to give much 
thought to those outside Corporations, and these seem to be left out of the 
movement in society towards universality. Perhaps this is one reason (although not 
articulated as such) why Hegel did not see corporations as the final stage in the 
emergence of the rational State. Their ends are not entirely universal, as they also 
exist to promote particular interests of their craft groupings. Their ends remain, in 
Hegel's words, "limited and finite" (Hegel 1991b: 273), and even the "common 
interests" of the corporations are likely to be "particular" (Hegel 1991b: 229). The 
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corporations on their own would not be able to resolve these potential conflicts with 
the universal, which has to have its embodiment in the State. The link between the 
corporations and the State is not clearly defined by Hegel. There is not some 
institutional progress between corporation and State. It is more an attitude of mind 
that creates the State. The corporations might be seen as a ladder, the bottom rung of 
which is in the mire of civil society, and up which the members ascend by looking 
to the good of other members, and society as a whole through the perpetuation of 
their own trade, and by their "concrete political education", to the upper strata of the 
universal, where each member of society is seen to be connected with every one else 
in a web of relationships and recognitions. However, given Hegel's innate suspicion 
of civil society, one cannot be sure in Philosophy of Right whether the corporations 
would ever be able to provide enough universally-minded members to form the 
State. Corporations, it seems, always taint their members with some form of 
particularity, and this has led to the situation where, in Brod's words, 
... the precise nature of the relationship 
between civil society 
and the state difficult to grasp. (Brod 1992: 96) 
Hegel himself only gives a brief hint of the transition: 
The end of the corporation... has its truth in the end which is 
universal in and for itself and in the absolute actuality of this 
end... The sphere of civil society thus passes over into the 
state. (Hegel 1991b: 273) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel's theory of the State, as noted briefly above, is organicist. It cannot be 
legislated for; it has to grow naturally out of the spirit of a people and out of that 
Geist comes closer to self-realisation. As Wood comments, the life of the state 
... 
is a well-constituted ethical life, which integrates the right 
of persons and subjects into an organic system of customs 
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and institutions providing individuals with concretely 
fulfilling lives. (Wood 1991: xvi) 
The lives of the citizens constitute the state; essentially the state is therefore 
biological (as we shall see through the life of the monarch, below), and a living 
community. There is no state outside the lives of its constituent members. It is not 
something manufactured by human beings. For Hegel, we must call the life of the 
citizens a state in the same way that we call an ant-hill a society run by, made up of, 
and run for a community of ants. As Weil suggests, politics is essentially 
... the whole science of the common 
life shared by the 
political animal known as man... (Weil 1998: 29) 
Although Hegel refers to society as an organism, it is different in kind from the rest 
of the natural world. The state is not an organism in the same way as a kangaroo, 
nor organic in exactly the same way as an ant-hill. What marks it out as different - 
as human kind is different - is reason. This faculty makes humans moral, in that they 
are conscious of their actions and can interpret them, unlike animals which act on 
instinct. However, this difference does not divorce human affairs from the natural 
world; it only develops the natural world into another sphere, wherein Geist can 
come to fulfilment. 
Hegel consistently sees society as organic. In describing the power of the 
sovereign, Hegel suggests that it is "the moment of individuality" in the state, when 
the king as an individual performs an act which also has a universal significance: he 
is acting also in the totality of the state, and his actions include all others in society. 
Hegel calls this representative mode the spiritual nature of society. Thus 
the state, as spiritual in character, is the exposition of all its 
moments, but individuality is at the same time its inner soul 
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and animating principle... (Hegel 1991b: 313-314) 
It would be wrong, I would suggest, to think that Hegel was using the terms inner 
soul and animating principle as figures of speech; for Hegel, this kind of 
terminology denoted reality, not metaphor. This can be seen in Hegel's discussion 
of the Estates. He examines the idea "... that all individuals ought to participate in 
deliberations and decisions", and sees that it seeks to 
implant in the organism of the state a democratic element 
devoid of rational form, although it is only by its rational form 
that the state is an organism. 
(Hegel 1991b: 347) [Hegel's Italics] 
The state was a living thing; it was also rational; and being rational was its mode of 
being organic. The rationality of Hegel's organic state helps us to consider a crucial 
question in regard to his philosophy, around which much criticism has gelled. What 
for Hegel is the relationship between individuals and society as a whole? There are 
critics who see Hegel as collectivist, by which is meant the subsumption of the 
individual into the state. Others have seen Hegel as more liberal, espousing 
personal freedoms, and celebrating Bastille Day. However, the principle of 
rationality enables a different and subtle view of Hegel's state. In being a product of 
reason, society is subject to rational criticism and revision, through the 
deliberations of the Estates and the law-enacting sovereign. If any practice is 
unreasonable, then it is the duty of society to correct it; indeed, this cleansing action 
enables Geist to achieve self-fulfilment. Hegel sees individuals and society in a 
symbiotic relationship, as befits an organic being. Individual members of society in 
becoming ever more deeply involved in it, attaining its universal aspects, become 
more the human beings that they should be. Society cannot exist without these 
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individuals. It was not the case of "there is no society, only individuals", or vice 
versa, but "there are individuals because there is society", and vice versa. 
Fundamentally, however, judgement on Hegel's system relies upon one's valuing of 
human reason. If it is seen to be a tool of divining society's way forward, and can 
be guaranteed as defectless, then Hegel's system is benign. If, however, it is seen to 
be flawed, then Hegel's system must be based on a misconception. 
Hegel's notion of the constitution of society is likewise organicist. The 
institutions and relationships within states cannot be simply dreamt up by reason 
alone, like Bentham's 1831 Polish Constitution. Constitutions have to reflect what 
already exists within society, its mores and dynamics. Hegel introduced his 
discussion of constitution in the following words: 
The political constitution is, first, the organisation of the 
state and the process of its organic life with reference to 
itself .. Secondly, the state 
in its individuality is an exclusive 
unit which accordingly has relations with others... 
(Hegel 1991b: 304) [Hegel's Italics] 
Constitutions are two-fold, an organisation of its interior and exterior relations, the 
former between its constituent parts such as family, civil society and corporations, 
police, justice etc., and the latter as a whole society in dealings with others. As such, 
constitutions treat societies as whole objects, and thus are part of the universal. But 
this universal must be rooted in the particular of society; there was a balance to be 
struck. Hegel explains this: 
... the state, as the spirit of the nation, 
is both the law which 
permeates all relations within it and also the customs and 
consciousness of the individuals who belong to it, the 
constitution of a nation will... depend on the nature and 
development of its self-consciousness... Each nation 
accordingly has the constitution appropriate and proper to it. 
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(Hegel 1991b: 312) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hence the failure, cited by Hegel, of the Napoleonic Spanish Constitution: although 
it was reasonable and superior to what the Spanish had before, it was doomed to 
failure because 
... they [i. e. the Spanish] rejected 
it as something alien... The 
constitution of a nation must embody the nation's feelings 
for its... condition. (Hegel 1991b: 313) 
Hegel's natural inclination for a constitution was monarchical. Philosophy of 
Right outlines in essence a constitutional monarchy. However, the King was not 
just presidential nor a figure-head. Hegel saw the role of the monarch as 
fundamental in society. Hegel explained it: 
The power of the sovereign itself contains the three 
moments of the totality [i. e. of the state] within itself, 
namely the universality of the constitution and the laws, 
consultation as the reference of the particular with the 
universal, and the moment of ultimate decision as the self- 
determination 
... 
from which its actuality originates. 
(Hegel 1991b: 313) [Hegel's Italics] 
For Hegel, the King represents all citizens, embodying true citizenship and living a 
universal life from within his particularity. He represents the state as a totality and 
by his place in the legislature he gives laws a human face. Laws are laws in Hegel's 
society because an individual, the monarch, assents to them. They are personal, and 
also personable. This leads Hegel to see an hereditary monarchy as the best 
constitution, for, as Pelczynski explains, 
... philosophy... demands that the individuality of the state 
should find concrete embodiment in an individual brought 
to his position in an immediate, i. e. natural way, through 
birth. (Pelczynski 1964: 127) 
Weil suggests that it is 
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... the essential 
function of the Hegelian prince.. . to represent 
the almost biological continuity of the state. (Weil 1998: 63) 
Moreover, Hegel maintained that hereditary monarchy gave the state a real stability, 
in that 
The rights of birth and inheritance constitute the basis of 
legitimacy... If the mode of succession is clearly defined - 
i. e. if the throne is inherited - the formation of factions is 
prevented... (Hegel 1991b: 323) 
Hegel explains this complicated arrangement, characteristically, in a compressed 
few words. Within the power of the sovereign, he suggests, 
... 
i. e. that moment of individuality... contains within itself the 
three moments of the state as a totality. In other words, the 
"P" is simultaneously the most individual and the most 
universal [element]. (Hegel 1991b: 313) 
Hegel's monarch is also desirable in a constitution because he is an embodiment of 
reason. According to Hegel, the structure of the state follows on logically from "the 
philosophical concept of the free, rational will alone" (Brod 1992: 151). The 
monarch embodies this reason and its subjective freedom which is the goal of all 
citizens. The monarch is the symbol of reason because in putting his "I will" to 
laws, he shows that society is free from all irrational sources of authority, such as 
nature or religion (as in the case of ancient oracles), or by blind appeals to tradition 
for tradition's sake. There is nothing in the constitution that is foreign to reason and, 
therefore there is nothing in the state that cannot be understood and assimilated by 
its citizens. Brod further suggests that 
The monarch's "I will" ends this quest [i. e. for authority 
outside human reason] and makes possible the self- 
grounding of political obligation. (Brod 1992: 153) 
Despite the pivotal role Hegel gives to the monarch in Philosophy of Right, he is not 
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the only figure who represents and embodies the idea of freedom or the essence of 
the state. Citizens of Hegel's society also have their legislative government in which 
rational freedom is expressed and developed. Hegel distinguishes between 
government and the state. He termed the government the "strictly political state" 
(Westphal 1993: 25) and reserves the term "state" for the whole of society. The 
"strictly political state", apart from the monarch, had two principle arms. These 
were 
a. the power to determine and establish the universal - the 
legislative power; 
b. the subsumption of particular spheres and individual 
cases under the universal - the executive power 
(Hegel 1991b: 308) [Hegel's Italics] 
These roughly correlate to a form of Parliament in (a), and a civil service in (b). 
These are independent of civil society and corporations, although their personnel 
will be members of both. 
Hegel's first division of government he termed "the Estates", bodies which in 
some way represent the State's citizens. The Estates are essential to society's 
organisation; with the monarch they are partners in government. The monarch is 
that "moment of ultimate decision", while the Estates have 
... the executive power as the advisory moment which 
has 
concrete knowledge and oversight of the whole... and 
knowledge of the needs of the power of the state in 
particular. (Hegel 1991b: 339) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel suggests that the Estates have one primary function: they are to "bring the 
universal interest into existence", and 
... to 
bring into existence... the public consciousness as the 
empirical universality of the views of the many. 
(Hegel 1991b: 339) [Hegel's Italics] 
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The Estates have a duty of over-seeing society to ensure that it is well-governed and 
legislated for, and also to ensure that society realises the universal. In other words, 
it is to interpret the universal on behalf of society and to interpret the universal to 
society. As such, the Estates are not made up of delegations or elected 
representatives, for as a mass the citizens of the state do not actually know "what is 
in their best interest", and nor do they even "know their own will" (Hegel 
199lb: 340). The Estates act as a "mediating organ" between the government and 
the people. They ensure that the monarch "does not appear as an isolated extreme 
and... as an arbitrary power of dominion", and they fulfil the same function for the 
corporations and individuals of society. They act as a kind of bridge between the 
two (Hegel 1991b: 340). 
According to Hegel, there are two "sections" of the Estates. The first is that of 
"landed property", although it would be to misunderstand Hegel's system to simply 
call this an aristocratic Estate. Hegel sees that the landed have their place in the first 
section of the Estates because they possess a "natural ethical life", based upon the 
family and dependent on the soil. It is stable, and has in it a sense of tradition and 
permanence. "Thus", writes Hegel, 
in its particular aspect, this estate shares in that independent 
volition and natural determination which is also contained in 
the moment of sovereignty. (Hegel 1991b: 345) 
Just as the monarch is free from faction because he was born into the job, so are the 
members of the first Estate. Because of their inherited positions they are immune 
from particularity: 
This estate is better equipped for its political 
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role... insomuch as its resources are independent of the 
resources of the state and of the uncertainty of trade... It is 
likewise independent of... executive power and the masses, 
and is even protected against its own arbitrariness by the 
fact that [its] members... do not have the same right as other 
citizens.. . to 
dispose freely of their entire property... Thus, 
their resources become inalienable inherited property... 
(Hegel 1991b: 345) [Hegel's Italics] 
Not everyone who is a member of the "landed" and "naturally ethical" class will 
fulfil a role in the first section of his Estate. Although "the right of this section of 
the substantial estate is based upon the natural principle of the family", not 
everyone is "called to this vocation" (Hegel 1991b: 346). Presumably there is some 
form of selection, but Hegel does not explain. 
The second section of Hegel's Estates "encompasses the changing element in 
civil society" (Hegel 1991b: 346). These are not only merchants and professionals, 
but also landed persons, although of recent origin. This would be a house made up 
of deputies. These would be drawn from those who 
... are thoroughly 
familiar with... each particular major 
branch of society (e. g. commerce, manufacturing industries, 
etc. ) (Hegel 1991b: 350) 
Despite Hegel's natural suspicion of democracy (see below), he believes that an 
elected chamber is the only way to institute this Estate. There are two reasons for 
this. There is "the external reason", which is simply that society has too many 
members for each to play an equal part in the deliberations of their Estate. There is 
also the "essential reason", which is because of "the nature of its [i. e. civil society's] 
determination and activity" (Hegel 1991b: 346). As civil society is not a mass of 
individuals but is "articulated into its associations", the election of deputies gives 
these a political side to their existence and this - given Hegel's previous discussions 
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- enables their members to sense the universal, and ultimately 
facilitates the 
development of Geist. Deputies should be 
... credited 
by those who elect them with a better 
understanding of such matters [of universal interest] than 
they themselves possess. (Hegel 199lb: 348) 
They are the more politically developed members of civil society, who are able to 
overcome particularity and "not subordinate the universal interest to the particular 
interest of a community or corporation" (Hegel 1991b: 348). They are not 
representatives (or deputies in the strict sense) because they do not represent the 
views of the electorate; rather, they are to freely deliberate in their Estate, rising 
above the concerns of their originating community. How these elections are to be 
held, Hegel does not specify. In Hegel's system, democracy does not really exist, as 
even those elected are specifically required not to represent the electorate. The 
system is designed to produce deputies who are there to divine the universal. 
Hegel's bicameral Estates are designed with reason in mind. The division into 
two houses "ensures that the Estates are less likely to come into conflict with the 
government", presumably by not enacting unreasonable legislation, although Hegel 
does not articulate this. When functioning properly, the Estates do not have a 
leading role in government of the state "... for their role ... 
is purely accessory" 
(Hegel 1991b: 351). This is not to say that their role is unimportant. It is vital, for 
they ensure 
... that, through their participation 
in [government]... the 
moment of formal freedom attains its right in relation to 
those members of civil society who have no share in the 
government. (Hegel 1991b: 351-352) [Hegel's Italics] 
Ultimately, the Estates are part of Hegel's scheme of education and inculturation 
139 
into the ways of Geist. 
Separate from the King and Estates is the Civil Service. This is important in 
Hegel's system. The members of this are "professional seekers after universality", in 
that they are paid for their labours and have no other employment. Being 
independent, the civil servant is freed from "... subjective dependence and influence" 
(Hegel 1991b: 333). Hegel describes the task of the civil service as 
"... upholding... legality and the universal interest of the state" (Hegel 1991b: 329). 
The Civil Servant is to find satisfaction in the task appointed, which has "... a value 
in and for itself... " (Hegel 1991b: 333). They are the "universal estate", and its 
members are "... not destined by birth or personal nature to hold a particular office" 
(Hegel 1991b: 332). In this, they are appointed differently than the King or the first 
Estate. Hegel's civil service is a meritocracy, based upon "... knowledge and proof of 
ability". This "... guarantees every citizen the possibility of joining the universal 
estate" (Hegel 1991b: 332). Hegel does however, in a contradiction, later suggest 
that the civil service is drawn from "... the middle class, which embodies the 
educated intelligence.. . of the mass of the people" 
(Hegel 1991b: 335). The 
sovereign has the duty to appoint the civil service. There are several strata within it. 
At the top are departmental heads, meeting regularly with the King, and below them 
are those whose work is taken up within their own departments. 
Hegel's monarch, Estates and the civil service were not democratic 
institutions, at least by modern standards. Hegel opposed rule via elections, as this 
put inappropriate power in the majority's particularism. In considering an elective 
monarch, Hegel suggests that 
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Elective monarchy may well seem the most natural idea, i. e. 
the most obvious to superficial thinking; for since it is the 
concerns and interests of the people that the monarch must 
look after, it can be argued that the people must also be left 
to choose whom they wish to entrust their welfare to... This 
view... bases itself on the will in the sense of 
caprice... [which] is completely opposed to the idea of 
ethical life. (Hegel 1991b: 324) [Hegel's Italics] 
The people, in elections, act upon particular needs, and would not contemplate the 
whole. These "particular needs" for "the people" meant negative freedom: it was 
freedom from things. True freedom, the Idea, to Hegel was a system for things, that 
is, the development of Geist-like self-consciousness. "The people" as such 
constituted a threat to stability: 
The many as single individuals... do indeed live together, 
but only as a crowd, i. e. a formless mass whose movement 
and activity can consequently only be elemental, irrational, 
barbarous, and terrifying. 
(Hegel 1991b: 344) [Hegel's Italics] 
Eliot noted Hegel's antipathy to "the People" in the Lectures: 
... 
it is a dangerous and false prejudice, that the People alone 
have reason and insight.. . the question as to what constitutes 
the State is one of advanced science, and not popular 
decision. (Hegel 1991 a) [Hegel's Italics] 
However, Hegel's attitude to democracy was complex. It cannot be said, as some 
critics have, given the election of deputies to the second section of the Estates, that 
he was anti-democratic. 24 The issue revolves around the articulation of universals 
within politics. The whole Hegelian political process was dedicated to revealing the 
universal in society and acting upon it. It was reasonable, and every reasonable 
24 Weil, for example suggests that Hegel's Estates had "... no direct elections" (Weil 1998: 70), 
which cannot be surmised from Philosophy of Right. 
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person in society would hold that it was a natural process, and so potential problems 
of non-representation of groups and individuals in the Estates would not occur. 
6.6. Eliot and the Idea, Society and State 
How far was Eliot's political thought influenced by Hegel? Is there any notion 
of "the Idea", i. e. the development of freedom, in Eliot's thinking? And how far did 
Eliot's sociology mirror the theories contained in Philosophy of Right? First, we 
must give a brief outline of Eliot's system of politics as contained in his 1939 The 
Idea of a Christian Society. 
Eliot's book was originally a course of lectures delivered at Cambridge in 
March 1939, and published in September in revised form along with introduction 
and notes. They were undertaken by Eliot at the invitation of the Master and 
Fellows of Corpus Christi College, and the Boutwood Foundation (Eliot 1982: 41). 
Thus they were of an academic nature, their audience being primarily students and 
dons. This 1939 commission in some ways mirrored his 1926 Clark Lectures. In the 
spring of 1939, and even more so at publication, there was the threat to Western 
Civilisation posed by Communism and Fascism, and The Idea of a Christian 
Society is set in their shadow. They were founded on strong ideological systems, 
and, as Eliot had made clear in The Criterion, English society needed a firm system 
of belief with which to counter them. Human beings, according to Eliot, naturally 
have "... a craving to believe in something" (Eliot I967pp: 282) [Eliot's Italics]. This 
belief was normally vested in religion, but sometimes political systems can be 
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"... substitutes for religious beliefs" (Eliot 1967pp: 282). This was especially true of 
Fascism and Communism, as Eliot explored in his The Criterion article "The 
Literature of Fascism". Here, he examines the "... popular result of ignoring religion" 
which had marked 1920's English society, and this fall from religious norms led to 
"... the populace transfer[ing] their religious emotions to political theories" (Eliot 
1967pp: 283). And it was the theory, the ideas, of Fascism and Communism that 
were the real enemy, not military might - "What matters", wrote Eliot in 1928, "is 
the spread of the Fascist idea" (Eliot 1967pp: 283). Traditional beliefs in God were 
losing force; and so were beliefs in democracy - many, according to Eliot, had 
joined in the "... disparagement of democracy" (Eliot 1967pp: 283). Democracy had 
failed, notably, in solving the 1926 General Strike. Democracy had been given up as 
a "silly idea", and the trouble was: "When the whole world repudiates one silly idea, 
there is every chance that it take up with another idea just as silly... " (Eliot 
1967pp: 283). 
Given the weakness of religion and democracy in the face of foreign 
ideologies, Eliot poses the question, does English Christianity have the force to 
combat the new threats? A healthy society, according to Eliot, is ultimately based 
upon sound ideology, and as he suggests at the end of the book: "If you will not 
have God... you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin. " 
Eliot prefaces his 1939 work by stating that 
My point of departure has been the suspicion that the 
current terms in which we discuss... political theory may 
only tend to conceal from us the real issues of 
contemporary civilisation. (Eliot 1982: 41) 
These "current terms" Eliot does not define at this point, but as later in the work he 
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suggests that discussions of the intricacies of Church-State relations and 
Parliamentary democracy do not interest him, we might posit that Eliot considers 
these "terms" to be the structure of political life, the State in its Hegelian "political 
aspect". Eliot, with characteristic modesty which belied the contemporary 
importance of The Idea of a Christian Society25, suggests that its pages will "... have 
little importance by themselves... " (Eliot 1982: 41), but will simply high-light the 
problem which "... must occupy many minds for a long time to come... " (Eliot 
1982: 41). Eliot states that 
... what I am concerned with 
here is... the organisation of 
values, and a direction to religious thought which must 
inevitably proceed to a criticism of political and economic 
systems. (Eliot 1982: 42) 
His study is concerned with the fundamental ideas of what it is to be a Christian 
Society, rather than the structures by which that society is expressed. In seeking 
these ideas, Eliot suggests he is pursuing a political philosophy, but in a particular 
way: 
... what I mean by a political philosophy 
is not merely even the 
conscious formulation of the ideal aims of a people, but the 
substratum of collective temperament, ways of behaviour, and 
unconscious values which provides the material for the 
formulation. (Eliot 1982: 50) 
By understanding this we might see how Eliot can suggest that his subject is "... a 
preliminary to the problem of Church and State" (Eliot 1982: 45-46). He is 
interested in ideas, and Eliot's definition of "idea" - an unacknowledged borrowing 
from Coleridge (and see below) - is worth quoting in full: 
2s The book was published in October 1939, and reprinted in November and December. 
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In using the term "Idea" of a Christian Society I do not 
mean primarily a concept derived from the study of any 
societies which we may choose to all Christian; I mean 
something that can only be found in an understanding of 
the end to which a Christian Society, to deserve the name, 
must be directed. I do not limit the application of the term 
to a perfected Christian Society on earth; and I do not 
comprehend in it societies merely because some profession 
of Christian faith... is retained. My concern with 
contemporary society, accordingly, will not be primarily 
with specific defects, abuses or injustices but with the 
question, what - if any - is the "idea" of the society in 
which we live? to what end is it arranged? 
(Eliot 1982: 43) [Eliot's capitalisation] 
Eliot's study is therefore ideological; it examines the theory of society, but not from 
a Utopian standpoint - Eliot's concern is with contemporary society. The study 
is 
also a teleological one; it examines society in reference to its end. Eliot expands on 
this goal of society in reference to what he sees as its two main groupings of 
citizens, which will be examined shortly. 
One of Eliot's concerns throughout The Idea of a Christian Society is that the 
Christian faith should be given "... intellectual respect... " (Eliot 1982: 43; Eliot's 
Italics). Eliot is keen to highlight its theoretical strengths, in contrast to its 
emotional side - for the individual believer, Christianity is a "... matter primarily of 
thought and not feeling" (Eliot 1982: 43). In this scenario, it is clear that 
contemporary English society is not organised around Christian principles to an 
extent which would make the term "Christian Society" appropriate; it is, in fact, a 
"... Neutral Society... " (Eliot 1982: 44). This assertion leads Eliot into a judgement on 
all writing on the subject prior to his own: 
... neither the classical 
English treatises on Church and 
State, nor contemporary discussion of the subject, give me 
the assistance that I need. For the earlier treatises... assume 
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the existence of a Christian Society; modern writers 
sometime [sic] assume that what we have is a pagan 
society... it is these assumptions that I wish to question. 
(Eliot 1982: 46) 
Eliot makes a bold claim for himself: he is the only person who has correctly 
defined English society as Neutral. His colleagues past and present either over-play 
the nation's Christianity or else its pagan side. The latter term is used by Eliot to 
categorise theories of the state which are positively anti-Christian, such as Fascism 
and Communism. However, England, in limbo, has not yet given birth to another 
faith. Eliot wishes to raise a positive Christianity from its ruins. 
One reason why society has not adopted a "pagan" position is that it still held 
fast to democracy and liberalism, which had stood it well in the past: 
What the Western world has stood for - and by that I mean 
the terms to which it has attributed sanctity - is 
"Liberalism" and "Democracy". (Eliot 1982: 48) 
Eliot distrusted both concepts. Liberalism for Eliot was paradoxical. It was a stage 
which society went through when it abandoned one positive set of beliefs and had 
not yet found another. It "... may be a tendency towards something very different 
from itself... " (Eliot 1982: 49), for it tends to "... relax rather than to fortify" (Eliot 
1982: 49). Here, one hears echoes of After Strange Gods' society "... worm-eaten 
with liberalism. " What was so dangerous about liberalism, argues Eliot, is that it 
... can prepare the way 
for that which is its own negation: 
the ... brutalised control which is a desperate remedy 
for its 
chaos. (Eliot 1982: 49) 
and 
Out of Liberalism itself come philosophies which deny it. 
(Eliot 1982: 51) 
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For Eliot, liberalism with its concomitant of freedom, was something different than 
it was for Hegel, who stressed its positive side, that of freedom for something, that 
is, the self-realisation of individuals within the State and through this, Geist itself. 
Democracy, Eliot asserts, is also an ambiguous term, and he asks whether it 
"... means anything, in meaning too many things... " (Eliot 1982: 48). A case can be 
made, suggests Eliot, that Nazi Germany is democratic: Hitler was elected by 
democratic process in 1933. What the West enjoys, Eliot suggests, is not 
democracy but "... financial oligarchy" (Eliot 1982: 48), run by "... congeries of 
banks" (Eliot 1982: 56). In 1939, "We are living... in a kind of doldrums between 
opposing winds of doctrine... " (Eliot 1982: 52). 
It was possible that English society would move towards the paganism of 
Communism and Fascism. Eliot sees this as possible because of the 
industrialisation of society: 
The more highly industrialised the country, the more easily 
a materialistic philosophy will flourish in it... the tendency 
of unlimited industrialisation is to create bodies of men and 
women... detached from tradition, alienated from religion, 
and susceptible to mass suggestion: in other words, a mob. 
(Eliot 1982: 53) 
Not only is Eliot echoing Hegel's fear of the atomisation of society, but there might 
be seen an echo too of Leavis and Thompson's 1933 Culture and Environment. This 
book argued for the creation within universities of a "... discriminating and highly- 
trained intellectual elite whose task it was to preserve the cultural continuity of 
English life" in the face of mass-media (Leavis 1958: 24). Although Leavis and 
Thompson's cure for modernity were different from Eliot's The Idea of a Christian 
Socie , we can see that Eliot's concerns were not unique. Eliot's charged words in 
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the above citation need careful consideration. He equates, in a simple manner, 
materialism with the means of production. This may well be correct, but he gives 
no reasons for this assertion, and we might posit a counter-example of the Soviet 
Union, which in 1939 was still predominantly an agrarian society. Eliot also 
equates the breaking of bonds between people and the soil with materialism, as 
though the shifting population from countryside to town and the move to regulated 
hours at the machine by themselves created these "bodies of men and women". 
Eliot in this passage seems to rely upon general observation and anecdote rather 
than research. This move from life's traditional norms entails a potential problem 
for Christianity, Eliot argues. In the dislocation of families amidst industrialisation, 
Anything like Christian traditions transmitted from 
generation to generation within the family must disappear, 
and the small body of Christians will consist entirely of 
adult recruits. (Eliot 1982: 54) 
In the face of liberalism, democracy and industrialisation, society must either 
... proceed 
into a gradual decline of which we can see no 
end, or.. . reform 
itself into a positive shape... 
(Eliot 1982: 55) 
This shape must be Christianity - "... the only possibility left is that of a positive 
Christianity" (Eliot 1982: 55). This would be a difficult task for England, as "... the 
Anglo-Saxons display a capacity for diluting their religion... " (Eliot 1982: 55; Eliot's 
Italics). Eliot, in The Idea of a Christian Society, does not claim to provide a 
scheme of action "... by which such a Christian society could be brought into being. " 
He confines himself to an "... outline of what I consider to be the essential features 
of this society... " (Eliot 1982: 55). 
In his theory of Christian Society, Eliot asks 
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... to 
be allowed to use the following working distinctions: 
the Christian State, the Christian Community, and the 
Community of Christians... " (Eliot 1982: 56) 
The first category, the Christian State, Eliot conceives as simply "... the Christian 
Society under the aspect of legislation, public administration, legal tradition... " (Eliot 
1982: 56). It is the Political State, in Hegel's terms, concerned with government and 
administration. Eliot, however, does not spend much time in discussing this; it does 
not fit his examination of the ideas of society, which lie behind the Christian State. 
Governments merely implement the ideas that are inherent in the society which they 
regulate. Eliot does not consider that it is necessary for State officials to be 
Christian, for "The Christian and the unbeliever do not.. . 
behave very differently in 
the exercise of office... " (Eliot 1982: 56), for it is the society which they govern 
which determines their actions, and "... not their own piety... " (Eliot 1982: 56). 
Eliot divides politicians into three sorts. First, there are those who take a 
ready-made philosophy as their guide, e. g. Marxism. Second are those who have 
made their own philosophy "... combining invention with eclecticism... " (Eliot 
1982: 57), and lastly there are those who govern "... without appearing to have any 
philosophy at all" (Eliot 1982: 57). Eliot does not prescribe for politicians any 
particular philosophy; he "... should not expect [them]... to be philosophers... " (Eliot 
1982: 57). Nor does he desire to see them form ideas eclectically, nor does he wish 
them to have no guiding ideas at all. Instead of cleaving to any particular theory of 
politics, Eliot wishes all leaders of the Christian state (and all members too), to have 
a thorough-going Christian education, which would equip them, believers or not, 
with the right basis for action. 
149 
As this education in Eliot's theory lies at its heart, it is worth our while 
examining it closely. Eliot makes it clear that Christian education "... would not be 
merely to make men and women pious Christians... " (Eliot 1982: 57). This would be 
to limit education to instruction. It was a broader undertaking than this, and its aim 
would be to "... train people to think in Christian categories... " (Eliot 1982: 57), that 
is, to think around issues using Christian terms of reference. This objectified 
education, according to Eliot: one need not be a believing Christian to be able to do 
this. Issues of personal belief did not arise in this education - it would not "... compel 
belief and would not impose... insincere profession of belief' (Eliot 1982: 57). Thus 
the Statesman's personal beliefs did not matter, as long as he were clear about the 
"... beliefs to which they would be obliged to conform" (Eliot 1982: 570). Overall, 
Eliot suggests, 
... a sceptical or 
indifferent statesman, working within a 
Christian frame, might be more effective than a devout 
Christian statesman obliged to conform to a secular frame. 
(Eliot 1982: 57) 
Eliot conceives his governing class as, perhaps, a kind of civil service, who were 
obliged to implement the policies of whatever party was in office. Their own 
political beliefs are irrelevant to their work. Eliot, in this comparison, sees the 
Christian tradition as the "ruling party", and the politicians in his scheme as its 
impartial facilitators whose education enables them to function. Their education 
enables them to seek what Hegel might have termed the "Universal" in human 
affairs, and act upon that alone. Eliot is perhaps too sanguine. He does not give 
much place to the Christian State; he sees it as a cipher through which the idea of a 
Christian Society is implemented. 
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Eliot's theory of education is not simply that of inculcating Christian values 
into individuals who will then imbed these in their own lives and in the nation. 
There was for Eliot a cultural component too in education, and this was part of the 
wider realm of Christian values for it was Christian culture that marked England (or 
should do), and these two strands of life, education and culture, were connected. 
Just as the Christian categories in which people were educated had to be uniform, so 
had the cultural side of education: 
You cannot expect continuity and coherence in literature 
and the arts, unless you have a certain uniformity of culture, 
expressed in education by a settled... agreement as to what 
everyone should know... (Eliot 1982: 67) 
As such, a nation's education for Eliot 
.. 
is much more important than its system of government; 
only a proper system of education can unify the active and 
contemplative life... politics and the arts. (Eliot 1982: 67) 
Only education, and this in Christian categories, can protect against what Eliot saw 
as the threats to England; "... a state secularised, [and] a community turned into a 
mob... " (Eliot1982: 67). 
Eliot's theory of education leads us to consider Eliot's two other groups in the 
triptych of Christian Society. Everyone undertakes a Christian education. For the 
majority of people, however, relationship to the "Christian categories" in which they 
were educated would be largely one of behaviour, and "... unconscious behaviour... " 
at that (Eliot 1982: 58). This group Eliot called "the Christian Community". He saw it 
as "... the great mass of humanity... " (Eliot 1982: 57), akin to Hegel's First Estate, 
whose 
attention is occupied mostly by their direct relationship to 
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the soil, or the sea, or the machine, and to a small number 
of persons, pleasures, and duties... (Eliot 1982: 58) 
The members of this group have 
... 
little capacity for thinking about the objects of faith.. . their 
Christianity may be almost wholly realised in behaviour: 
both in their customary and periodic religious observances, 
and in a traditional code of behaviour... 
(Eliot 1982: 58) [Eliot's Italics] 
This "traditional" code of Christian ideals "... should form for them a natural 
whole... "; one might almost say that it is an organic social and ethical life -a 
Sittlichkeit (this will be examined below). 
This social system, according to Eliot, is parish based. Although the parochial 
system is "... certainly in decay... " (Eliot 1982: 58), its reform is not Eliot's business. 
This "community unit" must not be "... solely religious, and not solely social... " 
(Eliot 1982: 58). It contains the totality of human life, and Eliot suggests that 
... nor should the individual be a member of two separate, or 
even overlapping units, one religious and the other social. 
The unitary community should be religious-social, and it 
must be one in which all classes.. . 
have their centre of 
interest. (Eliot 1982: 58-59) 
The religion of the people 
... must 
be integrated with its social life, its business and 
pleasures; and the specifically religious emotions must be a 
kind of extension and sanctification of the domestic and 
social emotions. (Eliot 1982: 59) 
This certainly had parallels within Hegel's thought. In the Lectures, in a passage 
which Eliot annotated, Hegel suggested that 
Secular existence... is consequently only relative and 
unauthorised; and receives its validity only in as far as the 
universal soul that pervades it - its principle - receives 
absolute validity; which it cannot have unless it is 
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recognised as the definite manifestation, the phenomenal 
existence of the Divine Essence. On this account it is that 
the State rests on religion. 
(Hegel 1905: 53) [Hegel's capitalisation] 
For both authors, the citizen's was a social-religious life, a totality - it is a 
"... unified system of [a] religious-social code of behaviour" (Eliot 1982: 62). For 
Eliot, it is geographically based, literally in a specific area of land parcelled by 
ancient boundaries, which are entirely religious in origin. Eliot envisages a society 
split into micro-societies, organically linked to the soil. This has echoes of the 1934 
After Strange Gods, in which Eliot praises Virginians for preserving their 
traditional way of life in the face of industrialisation, rooted in "... fertile soil" (Eliot 
1934: 25). Industrialisation had caused disruption to English Society and Christian 
Community, according to Eliot. By the way of life which industrialisation 
engenders, "... the masses of people have become increasingly alienated from 
Christianity" (Eliot 1982: 59). Eliot does not expand on how this process is 
achieved; presumably by the erosion of the traditional "community unit" of the 
parish, which he presents as 
... the idea of a small and mostly self-contained group 
attached to the soil and having its interests in a particular 
place, with a kind of unity... which... has to grow through 
generations. It is the idea, or ideal, of a community small 
enough to consist of a nexus of direct personal 
relationships... (Eliot 1982: 59) 
Sharing the same ethical-social life as the Christian Community were the 
members of Eliot's third part of society, the "Community of Christians". These 
were people who were "... conscious human beings... ", from whom one could expect 
"... a conscious Christian life... " (Eliot 1982: 58), in that their thought and behaviour 
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were governed not by instinct but by conscious reflection on Christian faith. This 
group acts as a guardian to the Christian ethos of Society. This is necessary 
because, as the majority will have a Christian faith which is largely based on habit, 
and given the Anglo-Saxon attitude of diluting religion, there arises the potential of 
a slip toward what Eliot terms "... expediency.. . 
lethargy and superstition" (Eliot 
1982: 62). The Community of Christians is not a local group nor one with clear 
membership; Eliot calls its outlines "nebulous". Details are not given as to how 
members might be chosen; it seems that they simply appear and begin their task. 
"These", wrote Eliot, "will be the consciously and thoughtfully practising 
Christians, especially those of intellectual and spiritual superiority" (Eliot 1982: 62- 
63). 
Eliot is mindful that his Community of Christians has a similarity with the 
"Clerisy" that Coleridge devised, and which in Eliot's day Murry had attempted to 
revive. Not wishing to pre-empt the discussion in Part 3, it will be sufficient here to 
say that Eliot sees his own term "Community of Christians" as one which is "... at 
once wider and more restricted" (Eliot 1982: 63). It is more restricted because it 
does not automatically include such professions as teachers and clergy, as in 
Coleridge; it is wider because Eliot envisaged that it would include not just 
Christians, but those who "... may be indifferent or disbelieving" and even a 
proportion ".. of other persons professing other faiths than Christianity" (Eliot 
1982: 63). Eliot allows this because, given their common education in Christian 
categories, they would all effectively think the same way. The Community of 
Christians "... would contain both clergy and laity of superior intellectual and/or 
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spiritual gifts", and it would "... also include some of those who are ordinarily 
spoken of... as 'intellectuals"' (Eliot 1982: 64-65). The members of this group were 
not professionally so; they lived their lives as everyone else (in parishes), and went 
about their employment; their action as members of the Community was that of 
influencing those around them and keeping society on Christian lines. They might 
be members of the government, or of the Church, or the teaching profession, or of 
the "various occupations" (Eliot 1982: 64). 
The Community of Christians was to be dispersed across society in its efforts 
to keep it on the right track. In being dispersed, its members would safeguard 
against a decline in English culture. Instead, the Community of Christians would 
ensure that the values of a Christian and cultured nation would be inculcated across 
the provinces. They would also militate against the tendency of industrial society to 
depress the "... standards of ... culture" (Eliot 1982: 66), chiefly through 
"... advertisement and propaganda", especially the popular press, which tended to 
create a "mob" which was "... susceptible to mass suggestion" (Eliot 1982: 53). The 
mob thus created is then used as a market for mass-produced goods, further 
reinforcing its existence. This is seen not only in manufacturing, but also in cultural 
output: 
Accordingly the more serious authors have a limited, and 
even provincial audience, and the popular write for 
an ... uncritical mob. (Eliot 1982: 66) 
Overall, in doing their work, the Community of Christians are to act to "... form the 
conscious mind and the conscience of the nation" (Eliot 1982: 68). 
But to what end was society formed? Eliot is circumspect on this, and, in 
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keeping with his sketch of society "... from which are omitted many details that will 
be considered essential... " (Eliot 1982: 68-69), what he does suggest is brief. A 
Christian society is one 
... in which the natural end of man - virtue and well-being 
in 
community - is acknowledged for all, and the supernatural 
end - beatitude - for those who have eyes to see it. 
(Eliot 1982: 62) 
Eliot's suggestions will shortly be compared to Hegel's, and suffice it to say here 
that Eliot seems to envisage a twin-track teleology of society. Eliot definitely sees 
society's raison d'etre as embodying in some way the wherewithal for its citizens to 
lead the good life (in an Aristotelian fashion), and to provide for others the 
wherewithal for "beatitude". A number of points can be made. Eliot does not 
suggest who might be the receivers of beatitude, but one suspects that they would 
be coterminous with his Community of Christians, who are the more "spiritual" of 
the nation. Eliot does not expand on exactly what "beatitude" is; he may have in 
mind those to whom Christ referred on the Sermon on the Mount. How far Eliot's 
"ends" of society compare with Hegel's notion of society embodying the Idea of 
Freedom will be discussed later on. 
Despite Eliot's denigration of both Liberalism and Democracy, he insists that 
... the 
form of political organisation of a Christian State does 
not come within the scope of this discussion. 
(Eliot 1982: 77) 
The reason is simple: to do so would be to "... confound the permanent with the 
transitory... " (Eliot 1982: 77). This is an implied judgement; politics belongs to the 
realm of the ephemeral (a hint of Bradley here? ), whilst the ideas of society are 
permanent. The political incarnation of Christian society is almost an irrelevance: 
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Those who consider that a discussion of the nature of a 
Christian society should conclude by supporting a 
particular... political organisation, should ask themselves 
whether they really believe our form of government to be 
more important than our Christianity... (Eliot 1982: 77-78) 
However, even given this, there are forms of government inimicable to Christianity, 
that is, those essentially Pagan. In The Idea of a Christian Society it is Fascism and 
Communism which are the bogies, and they have that role for one reason only: their 
underlying ideologies, their Ideas, are atheist. It is "... dogma that differentiates a 
Christian from a pagan society" (Eliot 1982: 79): 
As political philosophy derives its sanction from ethics, and 
ethics from the truth of religion, it is only by returning to 
the eternal source of truth that we can hope for any social 
organisation which will not... ignore some essential aspect 
of reality. (Eliot 1982: 82) 
This is another reason why Eliot dismisses beliefs in democracy and liberalism: 
these were mere political forms, and what really mattered was the substance filling 
them. The choice in 1939 was clear: God, Hitler, or Stalin. It was only this unlikely 
trinity which offered any core of ideas on which to build society. In Eliot's mind, 
the Christianity of England was superficial, but it was yet to become something 
else. There was still time to awake, and for society to envelop itself once more in 
Christianity, but the time was short; Fascism's and Communism's forces were soon 
to arrive. The Munich Crisis had shown that Democracy had no substance, and had 
been "humiliated... we had no ideas with which we could either meet or oppose the 
ideas opposed to us" (Eliot 1982: 82). What was needed, pleaded Eliot, was that 
core of ideas which would reinvigorate society, and this had to be Christianity. 
Eliot's indifference to forms of government might help to explain why he is 
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not interested in relations between Church and State. This view might seem 
surprising, especially given that the relationship between the two had been much 
debated in Eliot's day, following the debacle over the 1928 revisions to the Book of 
Common Prayer, when it seemed that Parliament had the final say in matters even 
pertaining to the Church's liturgy. Eliot side-steps all this debate; by 1939 it had 
become an irrelevance. 
Eliot is aware that the Church-State relationship was likely to be troubled, but 
as there was no blue-print for Christian government, the problem was likely to be 
unique to every society in which there was a Church and State. As these could not 
be legislated for, Eliot simply suggests that the problem 
... will take a different form according to the traditions of 
that society - Roman, Orthodox, or Lutheran. 
(Eliot 1982: 69) 
It was implied that each society had to provide its own form of government; this 
however was of secondary importance compared to its underlying Christian ethos. 
Although Eliot does not spend much time on reflecting what form of 
administration fits Christian Society the better, he is more interested in what type 
of Church it should be that enters into the Church-State relationship. Overall, it 
should be the Church 
... as can claim to represent the traditional form of Christian belief and worship of the great mass of the people of a 
particular country. (Eliot 1982: 70) 
In England, this would be the Church of England. Eliot suggests that this "official" 
status of the Anglican Church should give it a special status in society - "... such a 
society can only be realised when the great majority of sheep belong to one fold" 
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(Eliot 1982: 71). This may have been the case in 1939; Eliot does not expand on the 
problem which would be met if no one Church could claim to be the "traditional" 
Church. This was a moot point in America, Eliot admitted - here, the "... variety 
of.. . religious 
denominations represented appears to render the problem insoluble" 
(Eliot 1982: 69-70). A Christian Society, therefore, was healthiest when there was a 
unitary religious system. 
Eliot's Church in his Christian Society was to have several characteristics. It 
was to have hierarchical organisation "... in direct and official relation to the 
State... " (Eliot 1982: 71). It was to have an organisation "... such as the parochial 
system, in direct contact with the smallest units of the community... " (Eliot 
1982: 71), and it must have "... officers... [in] relation to the Community of 
Christians" (Eliot 1982: 71). In matters of morals and doctrine it would have the 
final say. Sometimes it might find itself "... in conflict with the State... in matters of 
national policy. " Whether the Church in a Christian Society should be Established 
is a moot point for Eliot. Although he takes the Established role of the Church of 
England as given, 
I do not assume that the relation of Church and State in 
England... is a model for all other communities. 
(Eliot 1982: 72) 
Once again, Eliot does not wish to write a "blue-print". As the Anglican Church is 
already Established, Eliot does not see any reason for disestablishment. This would 
be a disaster, an "abdication" of its duties - it would be a "... visible... withdrawal of 
the Church from the affairs of the nation... " (Eliot 1982: 72). It would tend to lower 
the Christian faith to the level of "... private and independent sects" (Eliot 1982: 74); 
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having an Established Church keeps Christianity on the nation's agenda. Moreover, 
Eliot's Established Church, which he also calls the "National Church", is not simply 
a home-grown affair. It is part of the Church Universal, and relates to all other 
Christian Churches. A national Church is that branch of the Universal Church 
incarnated in a particular country, and this may "... vary according to the racial 
temperaments and cultural traditions of each nation" (Eliot 1982: 75). He notes that 
the growth in the Ecumenical Movement had affirmed "... the Universal Church on 
earth" (Eliot 1982: 75-76). It was in keeping the Universal in mind that the National 
Churches would be prevented from becoming "... no more than the voice of that 
people's prejudice, passion or interest" (Eliot 1982: 76). Its theology "... has no 
frontiers" (Eliot 1982: 76). 
These things having been observed, we are now in a position to better 
ascertain how Eliot's The Idea of a Christian Society compares to Hegel's political 
philosophy. From the outset, we must make clear one major difference between 
Eliot's attempts at describing society and Hegel's: the latter's is more detailed and 
longer. Hegel spent many years defining his political theory, whereas Eliot's social 
criticism, in our period of investigation is largely confined to The Idea of a Christian 
Society, which in page length is barely one-seventh the length of Philosophy of 
Right alone. We cannot therefore expect an exact correlation between the two 
authors, by simple reason of page space, but we might be able to detect influences 
and parallels, if there are any. 
Another remark we might make in preface to our next comparison is a simple 
but potentially striking one. It has been recognised that Hegel admired much of the 
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British system of government, with its constitutional monarch, and its bicameral 
parliament. Roughly contemporary with Hegel was the move in British 
administration to found a professional civil service. Hegel's account of the formal 
structures of state in Philosophy of Right has a resonance with the British 
constitutional system, at least in nineteenth century form. Hegel, on one level, 
appears to be describing nineteenth century Britain. By Eliot's time, although the 
role of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Government would have developed 
considerably, the political system in Britain was still close to the Hegelian model, at 
least in outline. As Eliot appears to take much of the existing system for granted in 
The Idea of a Christian Society, and refuses to talk about the reform of political 
structures, we might even suggest that he takes the Hegelian system, as revealed in 
Britain, as read. However, this is just conjecture, although it is worth bearing it in 
mind alongside Eliot's other putative Hegelian parallels. 
The first comparison between Hegel and Eliot on the matter of state and 
society apparently reveals a divergence. Hegel's use of the term State could also be 
interchangeable with the word society. He also had many different nuances of 
definition, as we saw above. Eliot has little complexity. He confines the word state 
solely to the formal institutions of government and administration, although it is not 
used in contrast to the term society: 
I conceive then of the Christian State as of the Christian 
Society under the aspect of legislation, public 
administration, legal tradition, and form. (Eliot 1939: 56) 
The state, then is part of society, its officers drawn from its members and its 
functions aimed at aiding society's goal. It is true that Hegel had the idea of the 
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formal structures of the state, the state "in its political aspect", but it would be true 
to say that Eliot's vision of the state is not as broad as Hegel's. Moreover, Eliot 
never actually takes the pains to define "society" properly; he seems to assume it is 
something like "all the inhabitants of a certain nation considered together". 
However, both authors are clear that society is not artificial, but organic. Like 
Hegel, Eliot is Aristotelian in his conception of the biological basis for society. This 
can be seen in his anxieties about industrialisation. This tended to divorce men and 
women from "the life of significant soil", and create something which was 
ultimately destructive of society as a whole: 
Britain has been highly industrialised longer than any other 
country. And the tendency of unlimited industrialisation is 
to create bodies of men and women - of all classes - 
detached from tradition, alienated from religion, and 
susceptible to mass suggestion: in other words, a mob. 
(Eliot 1939: 53) 
Industrialisation tended to break society's natural bonds, which Eliot saw as 
predominantly family orientated and based upon a close union with the land. This is 
seen in his description of the parish system, by which he sets so much store. The 
parish he sees as "... an example of community unit [sic]" (Eliot 1939: 58), which is 
... a small and mostly self-contained group attached to the 
soil and having its interests centred in a particular place ... a 
community small enough to consist of a nexus of direct 
personal relationships. (Eliot 1939: 59)26 
This network of communities, however, according to Eliot had been threatened for 
26 In English society, the word "parish" has two meanings. Both refer to an area of land, but one 
is ecclesiastical and the other political. The former relates to a geographical area the inhabitants of 
which have certain rights in the local church. The latter is a unit of civil administration, usually 
confined to rural areas. Eliot always deals with the ecclesiastical parish. 
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some time, because of industrialisation's artificial communities. "The parish", he 
asserted, "is certainly in decay" (Eliot 1939: 58). That it decays tells us that Eliot 
sees it as organic. Following from this, Eliot does not see society's reform to be by 
artificial means. In examining solutions to the problems of urbanisation, he sees the 
flaws inherent in the "Ruskinian" view of a "return to a simpler mode of life", and 
suggests rather that 
... if such a way of life ever comes to pass, 
it will be - as may 
well happen in the long run - from natural causes, and not 
from the moral will of men. (Eliot 1939: 60) 
Society has to grow naturally; solutions to its problems cannot be constructed. One 
is reminded of Hegel's comments on Spain's Napoleonic Constitution. 
Although Hegel believed the state a biological entity, he also viewed it as a 
"hieroglyph of reason". As there was no divorce between human thought and the 
natural world in Hegel, so the organic state was a creation and embodiment of 
reason. As such the conception of Hegel's state was something radically new on the 
political scene. Eliot has a similar way of defining his task in The Idea of a Christian 
Society. Although at first sight his book might well seem to be a call to traditional 
values in political life - with the parochial system, for example - Eliot's rationale in 
his 1939 work is something new, at least in Eliot's eyes. Despite the reliance upon 
such writers in the English tradition as Hooker and Bramhall in his 1928 For 
Lancelot Andrewes, in The Idea of a Christian Society he eschews all authority this 
tradition might have given him. He rejects the nineteenth century Arts and Crafts 
return to the simple land-based life of communities as apparently exemplified in the 
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medieval period. 27 And, moreover, he categorically states that in coming to his task 
... neither the classical 
English treatises on Church and State, 
nor contemporary discussions on the subject, give me the 
assistance that I need. (Eliot 1939: 46) 
This is noteworthy, given the great importance Eliot puts on "the Tradition" in many 
other writings. Moreover, it is a complete reversal of his views in For Lancelot 
Andrewes where Bramhall's writings "... are very much to the point today" (Eliot 
I970f: 35), and that even 
There could hardly be a greater difference than that between 
the situation in the first half of the seventeenth century and 
the situation to-day. Yet the differences are such that as to 
make the work of Bramhall the more pertinent to our 
problems. (Eliot 1970f: 48) 
This does mark a massive shift in Eliot's thinking (even if it is temporary); alas there 
is little space for us to explore this. It is perhaps not far of the mark to suggest that 
the Abdication Crisis of 1936 shattered Eliot's belief in the role of the monarchy in 
British society, and as this was a pivotal institution in his scheme of things (he was, 
after all - if hyperbolically over-stated - "... a royalist in politics" [Eliot 1970: 7]), its 
seeming destruction may well have soured his views of the other institutions in the 
English tradition, notably Parliament and the Established Church. The only potential 
reference to the Abdication issue in The Idea of a Christian Society is oblique; in 
discussing Disestablishment, he suggests that it would lead the Church into an 
"abdication" (Eliot 1939: 72) by the Church of its duties towards society. The word 
2' Led by Ruskin and Morris, the Arts and Crafts Movement may be characterised by a desire 
for society to return to organically-based life, built upon the products of the soil and artisan labour, in 
the face of the perceived evils of Industrialisation. 
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"abdication" was surely used deliberately: if the Church, he might be suggesting, 
were to distance itself from society, then it would lead to a catastrophe as great as 
Edward VIII in his abdication, potentially wrecking constitutional balance. It is 
interesting that Eliot examines substantially neither Parliament nor the Established 
Church in The Idea of a Christian Society and in his next contribution to 
ecclesiology, the 1943 Reunion by Destruction, he criticises the scheme for reunion 
of the Churches in India, which was supported by the English Bishops. Given this 
apparent bankruptcy of political thought at the time, Eliot, therefore, like Hegel, has 
to look for other sources of authority with which to plan his vision of society. 
He does this by appeal to the Christian faith, but in no straightforward 
manner. He does not wish for a "religious revival". Perhaps having the 1933 Anglo- 
Catholic Revival in mind, he suggests these movements 
... seem[s] to 
imply a possible separation of religious feeling 
from religious thinking which I do not accept. 
(Eliot 1939: 42) 
He had also noted that 
Towards the end of 1938 we experienced a wave of 
revivalism which should teach us that folly is not the 
prerogative of any one political party or any one religious 
communion.. . It 
is not enthusiasm, but dogma, that 
differentiates a Christian from a pagan society. 
(Eliot 1939: 78-79) 
Reason was central to Eliot's Christian society; society, as for Hegel, had to be 
rational. For Hegel, it was based on the first principle of "the Idea", rational 
freedom; for Eliot, the "idea" of Christianity had to provide a reasoned account of 
itself in order to stand up to Communism and Fascism, which had strong ideologies. 
Eliot distrusted anything which appeared to dissociate intellect from sensibility, 
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preferring to appeal to reason. He was primarily concerned, he explained at the 
beginning of his 1939 work, 
... not 
[with] spiritual institutions in their separated aspect, 
but the organisation of values, and a direction of religious 
thought... (Eliot 1939: 42) 
It was the rational side of the revealed faith that Eliot wanted to amplify in order to 
analyse society. Christian Society, logically, should be run on Christian lines, and 
this meant theological lines. That Eliot called his 1939 work The Idea of a Christian 
Socie shows how this lay at the heart of his endeavour. This "idea", wrote Eliot, 
is one which we can accept or reject; but if we are to accept 
it, we must treat Christianity with a great deal more 
intellectual respect than is now our wont; we must see it... 
for the individual as a matter primarily of thought and not 
of feeling. (Eliot 1939: 43) [Eliot's Italics] 
This would appear similar to Hegel's system, where by reason individuals become 
aware of society's universals and thereby rise to be true members of the state. 
Although Eliot would never perhaps call the Christian State a "hieroglyph", he may 
well have seen it as part of Divine providence. Certainly he would have seen the 
"idea" of Christian society as bringing its members into unity, as opposing 
continental ideologies had done. However, it is probable that Eliot did not see 
reason as an Hegelian dynamic force; Eliot's concept of reason was perhaps more 
akin to the Scholastic vision of it as a faculty of human nature. 
As we saw above, Hegel's vision of society was structured. Eliot is less 
concerned with providing structures for The Idea of a Christian Society. He appears 
to take for granted the existing dynamics of British society, which in essence could 
be seen as Hegelian anyway, as we saw above. Rather, Eliot focuses upon the 
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groupings of people in society, which cut across formal institutions such as the 
family. As we have seen before, Eliot's two groups are the Christian Community, 
and Community of Christians. As such, there is no immediate clear-cut 
correspondence between Eliot's two groups and any strata within Hegel's system. 
However, there are notable similarities between some characteristics of Eliot's 
groups and those Hegel gives to bodies within society. 
Hegel saw society composed of three "estates". These were not divisions on 
socio-economic terms, but rather in "accordance with the concept" of society 
(Hegel 1991b: 237), that is, freedom. Eliot's two classes are also not divided on 
simple terms of birth, wealth, or education. People are of one group or another 
according to how each approximates to the idea of Christianity. In the Christian 
Community the Christian faith would be "ingrained", a thing of habit, requiring 
"only a largely unconscious behaviour" (Eliot 1939: 58). It would be by far the 
biggest group within society; it was 
... the great mass of 
humanity, whose attention is occupied 
mostly by their direct relation to the soil, or the sea, or the 
machine, and to a small number of persons, pleasures and 
duties. .. their capacity 
for thinking about the objects of faith 
is small, [and] their Christianity may be almost wholly 
realised in behaviour... (Eliot 1939: 58) [E1iot's Italics] 
This group of people would appear to correspond to the members of what Hegel put 
into his first two estates - the "immediate estate" (those linked intimately to the 
soil), and the "estate of trade and industry". Moreover, Hegel does admit (in a 
somewhat paradoxical fashion, given that his ultimate aim for every citizen is to 
achieve consciousness of the universal state), that the "political disposition" of 
people is one based on "... a volition which has become habitual" (Hegel 
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1991b: 288). Hegel in his view differentiates between rural and urban groups, 
whereas Eliot sees no such differentiation. This would appear the only difference. 
Both Eliot's Christian Community and Hegel's first and second estates have their 
immediate lives as their chief concern and the immediate products of their industry. 
Hegel's third estate, the "universal estate", corresponds to the "Community of 
Christians". Hegel saw his universal estate as having "... the universal interests of 
society as its business" (Hegel 1991b: 237) [Hegel's Italics]. Eliot likewise saw his 
community in a similar manner. It would: 
... include, 
besides many of the laity engaged in various 
occupations, many... of the clergy... The Community of 
Christians... would contain both clergy and laity of superior 
intellectual and/or spiritual gifts. (Eliot 1939: 67) 
Members of Hegel's universal estate were appointed on their "... knowledge and 
proof of ability" (Hegel 1991b: 332). Eliot's Community were to 
... influence and be influenced by each other, and collectively 
to form the common mind ... of the nation. 
(Eliot 1939: 68) 
This would appear similar to Hegel's task for his estate, articulating and 
implementing the state's universal interests. For Eliot, the "universal interest" of 
the Christian State was faith's implementation in society, through forming the 
collective mind and conscience of the people. Another similarity between Hegel's 
universal estate and Eliot's Community of Christians is education. Hegel's estate is 
drawn from the "... educated intelligence ... of the... people", whilst Eliot's is bonded 
by their "... identity of beliefs and aspirations, [and] their.. . common system of 
education" (Eliot 1939: 68). It would appear that both authors see their top estates as 
an educated elite, acting as society's mind, reminding it of its ultimate ends. There 
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are several ways, however, in which Eliot and Hegel diverge on their thought here, 
although in the grand scheme of things we might see these differences as minor. 
Hegel employs the members of his "universal estate" in the civil service. Eliot's 
Community of Christians is not officially employed, but acts in society through 
doing its quotidian tasks. It is "... not an organisation, but a body of indefinite 
outline... " (Eliot 1939: 58) which, not being employed as Community members, 
have liberty to act as such. The members of Hegel's civil service were employed by 
virtue of being members of the universal estate, and this employment, according to 
Hegel, guarantees them impartiality. However, we must keep in mind that Hegel's 
civil service is much broader in shape than contemporary counterparts. It could also 
be interpreted as including social services, teachers and ministers of religion. 
Another Hegelian concept which resonates within Eliot's The Idea of a 
Christian Society is that of the Corporations. This is not immediately obvious, as 
Hegel's scheme owes much to medieval guilds. Eliot has no such interest in any 
English equivalent, such as the Trades' Unions. However, Hegel's Corporations as 
we saw above are not merely bodies to regulate trade. That is their superficial 
function; their main task is to educate citizens to extricate each from particularity to 
the universality which is Hegel's State. By being a member of a Corporation, each 
person 
... 
belongs to a whole which is itself a member of society in 
general, and that he has an interest in, and endeavours to 
promote, the less selfish end of this whole. 
(Hegel 1991b: 271) 
Thus society is on one level an association of associations, and the individual's 
participation in the whole is mediated by way of the manageable unit of the 
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corporation. Eliot's comparable scheme, not at first similar to Hegel's corporations, 
is his system of parishes. 
Just as Hegel's corporations were not simply trades organisations, so are 
Eliot's parishes not simply units of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They are not, says 
Eliot, "... solely religious, and not solely social" (Eliot 1939: 58). Rather, they are 
"unitary communities" which mix the religious and social life of those who live in 
its bounds, and it includes everyone who lives in a particular area - the parish must 
"... be one in which all classes... have their centre of interest" (Eliot 1939: 58). Each 
parish is a microcosm of wider society, just like Hegel's corporation, although the 
membership of the Hegelian scheme is more restricted. Eliot's parishes are organic 
and unitary and like Hegel's corporations, membership is restricted to one parish 
only - "... nor should the individual be a member of two separate... units" (Eliot 
1939: 58). The entire social and religious life of each parishioner would be 
contained within a particular geographical area - Eliot takes as his norm 
... the 
idea of a small and mostly self-contained group 
attached to the soil and having its interest centred in a 
particular place. (Eliot 1939: 59) 
Education, too, would fall within its parameters, just as it did to a large extent in 
Hegel's corporations - one learnt to be a true citizen by involving oneself in the 
corporation's affairs. Eliot admits the parish system would be difficult to achieve, 
but nonetheless he places the whole of The Idea of a Christian Society on its 
foundation. As such, Eliot's society appears like a vast tapestry of communities just 
like that envisaged in "East Coker", which was surely impossible in the Britain of 
1939 and probably always was. Likewise, Hegel's corporations appear to be largely 
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a pipe-dream, and just as difficult to achieve. Both authors, it might be argued, had 
visions of society based on small community units which were adaptations of what, 
at the time of their writing, was a disappearing social system. We might even 
suggest that, in this, they were what we might call radical reactionaries. 
The purpose of Hegel's corporations, despite beginning in the particularity of 
civil society, was to form their members into true citizens of the State, by way of 
universality. As such, the State is society's culmination. Eliot has, on first 
inspection, no such teleology involving "the State". Although Hegel would 
differentiate between the "political state" and the state proper which was society 
consisting of reasoning individuals, Eliot only speaks of the state in its former 
sense: 
I conceive then of the Christian State as of the Christian 
Society under the aspect of legislation, [and] public 
administration... (Eliot 1939: 56) 
Moreover, Christian society does not develop into the Christian state, as it would in 
the Hegelian scheme, but rather society chooses which form of state (in 
governmental terms) is appropriate to itself: 
What I mean by the Christian State is not any particular 
political form, but whatever state is suitable to a Christian 
Society, whatever State a particular Christian Society 
develops for itself. (Eliot 1939: 46) 
Although it could be argued, from the words used, that Eliot does see the Christian 
State as society as a whole - the former is the latter under the aspect of different 
categories- it would be true to say that Eliot's idea of the state is only administrative. 
This becomes clearer as Eliot describes the relationship between Church and State. 
In accepting this dichotomy, Eliot affirms his intention in using the term "state" in 
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the limited sense; in Hegelian usage there could be no divide; the church would be 
part of the state, and in some ways coterminous. 
However, despite these different emphases, it would be true to say that Eliot's 
scheme of society does have a similarity with Hegel's. Hegel's state, which was 
society fully realised in reason, was the goal towards which each member of civil 
society aspired. It marked the final progress from particularity into the arena of 
Geist, which would be realised in human affairs when the Idea came to fruition. 
Eliot too has a teleology, although it is not expressed in metaphysical terms. If we 
examine the purpose of society, we might see that Eliot envisages some form of 
realisation of a cosmic "Idea" in Christian society. We can see this emerge in Eliot's 
concept of education: 
A Christian education would primarily train people to be 
able to think in Christian categories, though it would not 
compel belief and would not impose the necessity for 
insincere profession of belief. (Eliot 1939: 57) 
Each citizen would have the groundwork of Christian reasoning, and would be able 
to examine for himself the merits of society's aims, at least in theory. (Eliot shortly 
after this rather deflates his aim for education by suggesting that for the "Christian 
Community" the "... capacity for thinking about the objects of faith is small" (Eliot 
1939: 58). There is a definite tension within The Idea of a Christian Society between 
Eliot's theoretical aims and his reflections on how society actually operates, and this 
can lead to confusion. ) If we bear this in mind as Eliot describes the "ends" of 
society, then we might see Eliot's scheme as having some relationship to Hegel's. 
Eliot states that 
.. the Christian can be satisfied with nothing less than a 
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Christian organisation of society.. . It would be a society in 
which the natural end of man - virtue and well-being in 
community - is acknowledge for all, and the supernatural 
end - beatitude - for those who have eyes to see it. 
(Eliot 1939: 62) 
Given that "the Christian" produced by Eliot's education system would be able to 
see such "supernatural ends" (this, surely, is one of the most fundamental "Christian 
categories"), then the expectation for each member of society would be "beatitude". 
Eliot had a mixed message for society: although on the one hand he expected each 
member to be educated to achieve beatitude, as a pragmatist he saw that such a 
system would fail. "Beatitude" Eliot does not define satisfactorily; it is not clear 
whether he means a state of grace upon earth or the Heavenly Kingdom. 
Presumably, it is something realised upon earth, as it is to do with the Christian 
organisation of society. Although Eliot does not call this state of beatitude the 
"universal" state, it is obviously the ultimate stage of development in the peoples' 
social lives, and would - again, presumably - be about the ultimate things, that is, of 
divine providence. As such, it is really a state of mind in the individual (taking 
"mind" as equal to "soul") for both our authors. To attain the universal in Hegel is a 
matter of reason; in Eliot, it is a matter of "seeing it", based on an individual's faith. 
To be a member of Hegel's State, and to be a fully realised member of Eliot's, 
demanded a certain level of consciousness or sensibility. 
It is perhaps in examining Eliot's "ends" of society that we might see that he 
comes closest to Hegel's vision of the State as embodying the Idea of Freedom. For 
Hegel, as we have seen, the goal of the State was to incarnate the realisation that 
"... all men as such are free, and that man is by nature free" (Pinkard 2000: 492). 
173 
Although Hegel suggests that this is the goal for all members of the State, he does 
acknowledge that this attainment of the Universal is not possible for everyone. 
Some Dissenting groups will never attain this level of development, such as 
Anabaptists and Quakers, who preferred to create their own distinctive cultures 
over and against the mainstream. They will, nevertheless, enjoy the benefits of 
Civil Society. In essence, Hegel envisages a twin-track citizenry. Might Eliot's twin 
goals of society, "beatitude" and "well being in the community", be similar to 
Hegel's view? Eliot's Community of Christians attain the level of beatitude. Those 
citizens in Hegel's State who exercise their Geist-like powers of reason attain 
Freedom within the State. Eliot's Christian Community, whose attainment of the 
Idea of Christianity is habitual, will possibly fail to achieve beatitude but 
nevertheless enjoy well-being. Hegel's citizens who do not achieve freedom in the 
State remain within the parameters of Civil Society, nonetheless enjoying 
protection and an amount of recognition. Eliot, alas, is too brief in his description 
for us to be more definite about this possible correlation. Moreover, it is not 
possible to say whether Eliot's "beatitude" is akin to Hegel's idea of Freedom. Its 
overtones of the heavenly realms might suggest that it is not a state which Eliot's 
citizens achieve in society, which Hegel's Freedom definitely was. A likeness 
between the two systems is that both authors envisage that some citizens will 
achieve the higher planes; others will not. The correlation between Hegel and Eliot 
on development towards universal ends works on the level of the individual - for 
Eliot, each citizen has the potential of rising to "beatitude", and each citizen in 
Hegel's system may achieve membership of the State. However, Hegel envisages 
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such a development for entire societies also, whereas Eliot does not. Eliot's vision 
of Christian Society is static: it does not develop in the way that Hegel charts the 
evolution of human society in such works as the Lectures. For Hegel, Geist in its 
search for self-realisation within human affairs is constantly moving history 
forward. Eliot's "Idea" of the Christian Society is on a different metaphysical plane. 
It does not "move" societies in an objective way like Hegel's Geist. There is a sense 
that society changes itself to approximate to the Idea of Christianity, but this is not 
done in a grand fashion across human epochs and is instigated by human society by 
itself, and not so much in conjunction with what Hegel's Geist almost appears to be, 
an objective force. This is a crucial difference between our two authors and cannot 
be stressed too vigorously. 
Whether Eliot had such a positive view as Hegel on human freedom is a moot 
point, also. However, it surely would not be far of the mark that Eliot would agree 
with the central Hegelian tenet that every human being as such is free, and should 
enjoy freedom. However, this is not articulated in his social criticism; perhaps there 
was no need for it as with Hegel, who attempted an historical critique of the State 
wherein the central tenet of freedom underwent an evolution. Eliot deals only with 
his present situation, although he is anxious to preserve freedom from Fascism and 
Communism. For Eliot, however, as in Hegel, freedom was not simply a question 
of preserving a lifestyle in which one could choose what one wished to do or be; it 
had to be a positive freedom and have a goal other than itself, that is, beatitude and 
well-being. Whether this echoes anything of Hegel's concept of Freedom is open to 
interpretation, but I suggest there is a similarity. 
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As with the goal of society, there is no immediate link between Hegel's and 
Eliot's ideas of society's constitution. Hegel outlines his notion at length, but Eliot 
is vague about his. Instead of suggesting any particular form of government 
Christian society should take, Eliot leaves it to society to choose. Eliot intended 
Christian society to be adaptable to suit the needs of different nations, and he 
suggests the problems of how to form a Christian society 
... will take a 
different form according to the traditions of that 
society - Roman, Orthodox, or Lutheran. It will take still 
another form in... the United States of America and the 
Dominions... (Eliot 1939: 69-70) 
However, despite Eliot's wishes that The Idea of a Christian Society be seen as 
applicable for different nations, and this mirrors Hegel's political philosophy, 
throughout its pages Eliot does take England (not, notably, Britain as a whole) as 
his arena. This shows a divergence from Hegel, and should be added to that other 
major divergence between the two, that of the telos of society. Moreover, as we saw 
above Hegel's political theory is also his theory of Geist's development towards 
self-realisation, and this provides Hegel with a philosophy of history. Eliot's social 
theory, on the other hand, has no such theory of evolution. Society must attain a 
certain level of Christian development, and there it may stop. There is no "march of 
history" or further goals to accomplish. Eliot's vision of society has another 
difference from Hegel in that it is anglo-centric. He talks of the necessity of the 
Church of England, for example, and parishes, which can only be applicable to 
England. Herein is another tension, or perhaps flaw, in the work: Eliot is not 
entirely clear as to what is his target audience - is it English society, or all others 
which might call themselves Christian? On one level he wants to avoid limiting the 
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work by not making it too specific, yet on the other hand it appears to lack clarity 
when applied to England. If we do take it as an English document (which I believe 
we should), it would appear glaringly lacking in any discussion on the role played 
by the monarchy. This is especially so given Eliot's royalism, which saw him in his 
"Commentary" in The Criterion of October 1933 suggest that "... a devotion to the 
Throne" (note the capitalisation) "... may act as a check and balance upon devotion 
to the party ... or the 
State" (Eliot 1967rrr: 629-630). The king, therefore, could act 
as a deterrent to totalitarianism, and this suggestion makes the monarchy's 
exclusion in The Idea of a Christian Society - written in the face of European 
totalitarianism - doubly puzzling. In some ways, it might be said that the scheme of 
things developed by Eliot in The Idea of a Christian Society would be the natural 
arena for a monarch. The gradations of society - the masses in the Christian 
Community, the few in the Community of Christians - would be topped out nicely 
with the figure of the King. It would make Eliot's system personal and the King 
could be a representational figure, showing the people at large an example of the 
life of beatitude and Christian living. In the absence of such a figure, the individual 
in Eliot's society is a vague presence, and society's strata nebulous. Perhaps the 
Abdication Crisis and the role Parliament played in it disillusioned Eliot as to the 
English constitutional scheme. When crisis loomed, it was a democratically elected 
body which seemed to have the power over the nation's traditions, and this Eliot - 
given his fear of democracy - could not accept. Moreover, it was not simply a 
question of Parliament usurping a new role for itself: Edward VIII's brief reign had 
brought the whole notion of monarchy into question. In abdication, Edward as King 
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was turning his back on the whole concept of monarchy. George VI's position was 
ambiguous: the true heir being still alive, it might be reasoned that George was not 
truly King but a Parliamentary-sponsored usurper. Although Eliot remained silent 
on the issue in public (Eliot's "Commentaries" in The Criterion throughout the 
period of Edward VIII's reign and the Abdication Crisis contain no reference to 
either), and the preceding argument can only be a suggested reconstruction of his 
thought, it might go some way in explaining why there is no monarchy in The Idea 
of a Christian Society. Eliot seems to shift from an extreme royalist position to 
complete indifference within a few years. We may only speculate on what the 
constitution of The Idea of a Christian Society might have been if there were no 
Abdication; one would think that the role of the monarch would be very prominent, 
if not quite couched in Hegelian terms. 
Hegel's monarch was assisted in his task by bicameral Estates, to which he 
devotes several sections of Philosophy of Right. Eliot, however, had no wish to 
discuss the role of Parliament in The Idea of a Christian Society. This makes for a 
less substantial work but there were perhaps two reasons for the omission. First, 
there was Eliot's long-standing distrust of democracy which we shall examine in 
Part Three. Suffice it to say here that democracy for Eliot brought several woes on 
society. It lead to a political vacuum that paved the way for Totalitarianism. It also 
had a debilitating affect on literature. In his 1933 The Use of Poetry and the Use of 
Criticism he wrote 
... when the poet finds himself in an age... when power is in the hands of a class so democratized [my Italics]... the necessity of 
criticism becomes greater. (Eliot 1933a: 21) 
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In The Idea of a Christian Society Eliot's scepticism about democracy was 
continued. English democracy - and its Parliaments - was an empty concept. 
Although in 1939 Eliot saw "democracy" being at "the height of its popularity", he 
also saw that 
... when a term 
has become so universally sanctified as 
"democracy" now is, I begin to wonder whether it means 
anything... (Eliot 1939: 48) 
Moreover, 
... 
defenders of the totalitarian system can make out a 
plausible case for maintaining that what we have is not 
democracy, but financial oligarchy. (Eliot 1939: 48) 
Eliot's cynicism about democracy was not just some uninformed elitist complaint: 
he had a fear that, the main element of Western society being weak, totalitarian 
regimes might easily overcome any resistance. In these views, Eliot and Hegel had 
a certain congruence. Although the latter's Estates were elected, Hegel had no time 
for the rule of the masses. As we saw above, in elections people tended to act on 
their own particular interests and not the universal concerns of society at large. The 
population form a "crowd", the behaviour of which was "... irrational, barbarous, 
and terrifying" (Hegel 1991b: 344). 
Second, and as a corollary to this, there was the role played by Parliament in 
the crisis of 1936. (If this is an accurate depiction of Eliot's position, then it points 
to his rather a-historical politics, as Parliament had played a crucial role in the 1688 
Settlement). Eliot had been disillusioned with politics throughout the 1930's. 
Leading from the 1926 General Strike, for which the politicians had no substantial 
answer, according to Eliot (see Part Three), Parliamentarians of the succeeding 
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decade were decidedly under-par. Writing in his "Commentary" in the October 
1930 The Criterion, Eliot bemoaned the fact that 
... the 
distinction of M. P. is not what it once was; and we 
may hear at any moment from the more inflammable daily 
press that Parliamentary Government is an "anachronism". 
(Eliot 1967ccc: 1-2) 
Parliament seemed to be a declining institution. In 1930 the summer session of the 
House ".. ended in public depression and decay", and Eliot commented that "... we 
look forward to the autumn resumption with still less hopefulness" (Eliot 
1967ccc: 1). No party offered any real ideas; foreign policy was of 
... presenting premature 
"self-government" [to the Colonies], 
such self-government to be, of course, invariably on an 
English model; and it involves the same old fallacies. 
(Eliot 1967ccc: 2) 
The English political system was not just based on a fallacy, but it was also a system 
in decay: 
The rot in Parliament is only a symptom of the rot 
without... mediocrity of mind and spirit is to be found 
conspicuous. (Eliot 1967ccc: 2) 
Eliot in 1939 had no reason to change his views on English government; the decade 
had been one of undistinguished Parliamentary affairs and political uncertainty. It 
seemed to him a world of decaying "fallacy". Things had not improved by 1939, and 
this may well have been the background to Eliot's omission of Parliament in his 
1939 work: that the crisis of that day had come about at all was further proof of an 
inadequate system. In summary, Eliot gives us one of his most barbed comments 
about the state of English politics and society: 
The Roman Empire left behind it at least a few ruined 
temples, aqueducts, and walls; one is sometimes inclined to 
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wonder whether the British will leave... anything better than 
the traces of innumerable golf courses... (Eliot 1967ccc: 4) 
6.7. A Problem of Unity: toleration, alienation, Judaism 
For Hegel and Eliot society is unified. The state, for Hegel, was a structure 
made up of families and corporations, administered by a civil service and legislated 
for by the Estates and the monarch. The whole of society was orientated to achieve 
the universal by dint of reason, in order that the Idea and thus Geist could achieve 
self-fulfilment. For Hegel, every individual knew that the fulfilment of the self was 
in harmony with others in community. There was, commented Hegel, an 
"... absolute identity of duty and right" within the state - "... what is right for one 
person ought also to be right for another" and "... what is one person's duty ought 
also to be another person's duty" (Hegel 1991b: 284). Everything in the state 
"... depends on the unity of the universal and the particular" (Hegel 1991b: 285). For 
Eliot, unity within society was made by the "idea" of Christianity. This pulled 
people together, unifying their social and educational life. 
There were major problems for both authors, however, in their quest for 
unity. Perhaps, we might say, it was the bug-bear of all Absolute Idealists' 
conceptions of society, or certainly those seeking cohesion in society around a core 
of ideas: there was no real place for those who chose not to live by these ideas. In 
essence, this was perhaps another version of the One-Many problem that could dog 
Idealism. At the outset, I would suggest that neither Hegel nor Eliot adequately 
address the issue of the non-compliant individual in their schemes. Hegel sees such 
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people as a kind of logical non-starter, for they would have to fly in the face of 
reason in order to take this position. Eliot's treatment of the non-compliant likewise 
has an unconvincing ring. For Eliot, Christianity was so obviously true that he 
found it difficult to see the possibility that anyone would not share its revelations 
and hence the social scheme in The Idea of a Christian Society. Both authors' quests 
for unity tended to make them blind to the possibility of plurality. 
Despite Hegel's suggestion that his system of society was strongly unified at 
every level, and was like this because of reason, he nevertheless had ambiguity over 
the issue of unity. At certain points Hegel displays a fear of what he termed 
"atomicity", that is, the inclination for society to decay into a mass of individuals. 
As Wood comments, 
From Hegel's point of view, a... serious threat to freedom in 
modem society is... the tendency in modern life for 
individuals to be only abstract persons and subjects... 
(Wood 1991: xvi) 
This led to people insisting on personal rights and freedoms, at the expense of the 
universal. This ultimately led to alienation, which lay at the root of all social ills. 
This entropy not only affected individuals in society, but also afflicted states. In The 
German Constitution, for example, Hegel identified the chief weakness of the 
German Federation as being its decay into what Pelczynski termed "... independent 
political units" (Pelczynski 1964: 14). This led Hegel to state pessimistically that 
"Germany is no longer a state", which meant for Hegel that it was mired in 
particularity (Hegel in Pelczynski 1964: 14). In Germany's case, Hegel's proposed 
solution was a Machiavelli figure who would unite the nation; Bismarck, perhaps, 
would fulfil Hegel's prescription. Hegel did not intend his essay The German 
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Constitution to be a plan of action but he hoped that it would have "... no other 
effect... save that of promoting the understanding of what is... " (Pelczynski 1964: 17). 
Like Eliot's The Idea of a Christian Society, as a piece of political theory is was "not 
a blueprint" (Eliot 1939: 71). From the person in the street, to the state in the union, 
there were problems of particularity. Unity was a concern at every level. The true 
path for society for Hegel was that of integration, the many into one, as expressed in 
this excerpt from The Philosophy of Right: 
... the 
individual finds the existence of the people as a ready- 
made, stable world, into which he must fit himself. He has 
to appropriate this substantial existence to himself in order 
that he may be something himself. (Hegel 1991 b: 237) 
The world of the people joined together was, in Hegel's term, "stable". This is a good 
example of the general Absolute Idealist axiom that reality was somehow the unity 
of all particulars. As we saw in Part One, Hegel's Idealism was founded on the one 
proposition, that everything that existed "... is a form of one mind, the "Absolute 
Mind"". But as we saw, this Mind (Geist) was engaged in self-fulfilment. Hence 
everything that aided this fulfilment was positive, and that which did not had to be 
overcome. Hence Hegel's stress on Universality within Philosophy of Right - in 
seeking the universal interests of the state, individuals aided Geist's development. 
The opposite was also true: particularity vitiated Geist. For Hegel, those in society 
who did not act universally were not just undermining the State's unity: they were 
committing metaphysical sacrilege. A state not bonded by universals was a weak 
state, as in pre-Unification Germany, and such states could not embody the Idea. Not 
only was Geist sunk in German particularity, but also (and as a consequence) the 
nation could not defend itself adequately. Hegel's metaphysics naturally flowed into 
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his politics. 
Eliot's thought followed the same kind of path, although not as obviously. 
Inheriting Hegel's notion of unity, Eliot saw that society had to mirror the unity in 
the realm of reason and reality. In his doctoral thesis, Knowledge and Experience, he 
took pains to outline this imperative of unity and in examining a little its basic 
precepts we might see The Idea of a Christian Society as a kind of political 
articulation of his 1916 thesis. "The idea", he wrote in 1916, 
... 
is the total content which we mean by reality in any 
particular presentation.. . nor 
is the idea a logical entity, since 
it always, in the end, comes to occupy a particular place in a 
real world. (Eliot 1964: 40) 
Eliot, calling his 1939 book The Idea of a Christian Society, was perhaps echoing 
his earlier proposition. The 1939 idea was the "total content" of Christian society; 
there was nothing outside of nor at variance with it. The idea of Christian society 
was, in his 1916 words, "... the whole reality meant... the whole meaning is ultimately 
the whole of reality" (Eliot 1964: 42). Moreover, it could not simply remain an 
intellectual concept: its meaning could not "... simply be a meaning - for a meaning 
always means something more than a meaning" (Eliot 1964: 43). However, Eliot - 
following here Bradley's refinement of Idealism rather than the more positive Hegel 
- suggests that this united, whole world of idea and reality could only be 
experienced as "fragments" (Eliot 1964: 74). It was the task of philosophers to 
"... yoke these divers... " (Eliot 1964: 85) fragments together in order to enjoy a vision 
of the whole, the Absolute. This kind of thinking, I believe, lies at the heart of 
Eliot's concern with a united society in The Idea of a Christian Society. For England 
to be strong, in order that it might survive the threat of the ideas of Fascism and 
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Communism (and it is notable that Eliot sees them primarily as ideas and doctrines 
rather than military forces), the underlying Christian faith (or idea) of the nation had 
to be healthy. The citizens had to unite around Christianity. They had to be educated 
in its categories. They had to live in community units which reflected its 
organisation into parishes. They had to live by its precepts in society or if they were 
to be member of the Community of Christians they had to be theologically 
competent. The whole of society was founded on the idea of Christianity; its idea 
was the reality intended and meant and also as it existed. 
But what of those who did not share the founding principles of the State? 
These are acknowledged by our authors, but in such a way to make them only a 
vague possibility. Hegel saw his system as so in accord with human reason that 
nobody, it seemed, could be other than convinced by it. Eliot's Christian faith was so 
reasonable and right that he could not believe that anyone would be against it. Those 
who declared themselves not inside Hegel's society were usually given short shrift. 
There is what we might call an "imperative of integration" in Hegel's political 
writings. The individual, as we saw above, as he developed entered into "... a ready- 
made.. . world, 
into which he must fit himself (Hegel 1991b: 343) [my Italics]. To 
be outside of its orbit was to inhabit a nebulous world of particularity with unruly 
passions which could at any moment threaten society: 
The many as single individuals... do indeed live together, 
but only as a crowd, i. e. a formless mass whose activity can 
consequently only be elemental, irrational, barbarous, and 
terrifying. (Hegel 1991b: 344) [Hegel's Italics] 
Although Hegel does not suggest what should happen to such "atomic" individuals, 
in his system they cannot enjoy the full benefits of citizenship but lurk somewhere 
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around the edges of the State, ready at any time, so it seems, to wreak havoc. In 
Hegel's structure, these individuals might be able to be members of a family group, 
but certainly not a corporation and even more definitely not the state. Despite these 
instances of Hegel's stress on the communal aspects of the state, we must not lose 
sight that he was also a defender of individual liberty, hence his enthusiasm for the 
"bright dawn" of the French Revolution. This freedom was however positive, in 
that citizens were free for something, self-realisation and lives in accordance with 
reason and Geist. It was because of this power of reason that Hegel saw the 
existence of such individuals - despite his apparent fear of them - as somehow 
illogical, like finding a wood ant living a hermetic life. 
Eliot was more candid in discussing "outsiders" in his system. Eliot wishes to 
include at least some members of these groups in his scheme, but is reticent in 
naming any group explicitly. However, Dissenting groups are present in The Idea 
of a Christian Society but their presence is veiled, albeit thinly. There are no Jews 
named as such, for example, but Eliot does inveigh against the "... sin of usury" 
(Eliot 1939: 61) at one point, which might be an oblique reference to the Jewish 
financial community28. Eliot's objection to the deistic religion as expounded by 
Hauer in Germany's New Religion might also be considered a critique of certain 
English Dissenters, such as Unitarians, especially as he terms Hauer "the end 
product of German Liberal Protestantism, a nationalistic Unitarian. " This was 
typical of Eliot's view of the "decay" of Catholicism to Protestantism and then to 
28 If this is correct - and probably Eliot did not write usury lightly - then it is another possible 
anti-Semitic point in his work, and one which has eluded such critics as Julius. 
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Totalitarianism, and is a severe charge, one might read, against Unitarians (Eliot 
1939: 72) The way Eliot defined Christianity tended to exclude groups which, by 
their Christian (or semi-Christian) profession, might naturally form the core of 
Eliot's society. 29 Although, like Hegel, Eliot assumes a unitary organisation of 
society around the idea of Christianity, at several points he makes reference to those 
who would rather choose another idea by which to live. This discussion centres 
around membership of the Community of Christians. These, as we have already 
seen, were those of especial intellectual and spiritual capabilities. They were 
naturally all Christian, as the name suggests, and demonstrated "... a conscious 
Christian life on its highest social level" (Eliot 1939: 58). However, Eliot does 
realise that not everyone who would naturally fit into this community by reason of 
their intellectual gifts would be a Christian, but if they were of appropriate ability, 
Eliot envisaged that they would be integrated into it. Its 
... personnel will inevitably be mixed: one may even 
hope 
that the mixture may be a benefit to its intellectual vitality. 
The mixture will include persons of exceptional ability who 
may be indifferent or disbelieving; there will be room for a 
proportion of other persons professing other faiths than 
Christianity. (Eliot 1939: 63) 
Eliot does, therefore, include non-Christians in his Community of Christians. Their 
role, however, is limited. They have certain (and unspecified) "limitations" imposed 
29 At one point Eliot did group together Jews and nonconformist sects. It is notable that Hegel 
prompted this. In his annotated Lectures, Eliot wrote the comment "Characteristically Jewish idea 
also Puritan sects" by the text: "With this [i. e. following a religious regime] is conjoined 
happiness... and prosperity as its reward... here... the understanding has become prosaic... men are 
regarded as individuals. " (page 205. ) 
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upon them, and they would be never more than a certain "proportion", whose only 
stated duty was to bring a certain intellectual difference to the otherwise 
homogeneous group to be a benefit to its "intellectual vitality". Eliot's inclusion is, 
when one considers it in a certain light, grudging, but at least he sees its possibility. 
These non-Christian members of the Community of Christians do appear, however, 
to be a group whose non-Christian beliefs appear as a kind of handicap - Eliot 
describes the non-Christian politician as he who is not "able to believe the Christian 
faith" [my Italics]. At the centre of Eliot's system there is an unshakeable belief in 
the necessity for unity, and those who cannot hold the Christian faith appear at best 
as tolerated outsiders. Eliot's attitude to toleration was ambivalent. It seemed to 
denote a liberal system, with no real core of belief. He tellingly suggested that 
When the Christian is treated as an enemy of the State, his 
course is very much harder, but it is simpler. I am 
concerned with the dangers to the tolerated minority; and in 
the modern world, it may turn out that the most intolerable 
thing for Christians is to be tolerated. (Eliot 1939: 54) 
Although the above text is about toleration of a Christian minority, and not those he 
considers in The Idea of a Christian Society, it does tend to show that Eliot views 
toleration as a product of the "modem world", which, as he wrote in After Strange 
Gods, "corrupts" (Eliot 1934a: 11). 
Although Eliot addresses the problem of non-Christian members of the 
Community of Christians, he does not appear to be concerned with non-Christian 
members of the larger Christian Community. Whether he saw such non-Christians 
as having few members in the mass of English people is an important question but 
from The Idea of a Christian Society it cannot be answered. That Eliot does not 
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address the question might show a certain limitation of his vision, or it might simply 
be the case that he did not see it as a problem. Judged from our own age's 
(generally) multi-cultural standpoint, however, it does seem an oversight, but this 
might be anachronistic. At worst, Eliot is guilty of seeing the worth only of an elite 
of "non Christians" of England; at best, he is unaware of such a potential problem 
which, given the small number of "ethnic minorities" in England in 1939 compared 
with today, might be excusable. 
In short, both Hegel and Eliot saw unity as strength and plurality as weakness. 
This doctrine in their political sciences arose from their philosophical concerns 
about the nature of reality. For Hegel, the necessity for universality was paramount. 
His vision for society was as a united whole. His world was, I suggest, ontologically 
singular - the forming substance of the world, Geist, was in Hegel's definition the 
most singular of entities. Eliot's unity was that of Christian belief in communities. 
These were identical centres of consciousness, to use the terminology of Knowledge 
and Experience, and any divergence from them would bring the whole system into 
disarray. This we see clearly in Eliot's comment on society in "the United States of 
America and the Dominions", where 
... the variety of races and religious communions represented 
appears to render the problem [of the organisation of 
society] insoluble. (Eliot 1939: 69-70) 
6.8. The role of religion 
Both our authors treat their subject matter in profoundly religious ways. As 
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Williams suggests, this religious view was simply the application of Hegel's 
metaphysics to politics, of Geist being involved in the evolution of the world: 
Hegel maintained that the state has a religious 
foundation.... ethical life is grounded in religion; this is one 
reason why the various ethical powers and the substantial 
element of the state may be venerated as sacred... This 
enduring union is its religious dimension, and its binding 
and enduring unity. (Williams 1997: 328) 
Hegel himself suggested in the Lectures that, as "... the State rests on religion" (a 
statement which Eliot annotated in his own copy) it also "... embodies... the nature of 
the state as the divine will" (Hegel 1991a: 53). Moreover, "... the state is the divine 
will as present spirit", which will evolve and develop along with Geist (Hegel 
1991b: 292). Hegel's state, however, is not as openly Christian as Eliot's. Despite 
Hegel's belief that the development of world history came to blossom in the rise of 
the Germanic and Protestant nations, it is Geist that occupies centre stage in all of 
Hegel's work and not the Christian faith as it does in The Idea of a Christian 
Socie . Hegel's religion might be seen as a Christianity of sorts, with a Trinitarian 
scheme behind it as we saw above30, but he describes that faith more abstractly than 
Eliot. Hegel translates the central tenets of Christianity into metaphysical terms. 
This can be misleading, and has prompted some into calling Hegel a deist or 
pantheist. It is a moot point, it seems, in Hegel studies. Certainly Hegel's employers 
saw him as orthodox, being "outraged" at Keyserlingk's accusation of pantheism in 
1826 and holding by its professor (Pinkard 2000: 528). One can trace in such 
30 Dickey quotes Lowith in From Hegel to Nietzsche in stating that Hegel was "the last 
Christian philosopher" (Dickey 1983: 302). 
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historical works as the Lectures a Christian theological framework of a kind. One 
of Hegel's main statements about religion is that its content is "absolute truth", and 
as such religion requires that 
... everything else should 
be seen in relation to this and 
should receive confirmation, justification, and the assurance 
of certainty from this source. It is within this relationship 
that the state.. . receive[s] [its] 
highest 
endorsement... Religion therefore also contains that point 
which... affords a consciousness of immutability and of the 
highest freedom and satisfaction. (Dickey 1983: 302) 
This can be seen clearly in Hegel's Lectures in comments on the qualities of 
Christianity, which Eliot himself annotated: 
It was then through the Christian Religion that the 
Absolute Idea of God.. . attained consciousness. Here Man, 
too, finds himself comprehended in his true nature, given 
in the specific conception of "the Son. " Man, finite when 
regarded for himself, is yet at the same time the Image of 
God... He is the object of his own existence - has in himself 
an infinite value, and eternal destiny. 
(Hegel 1905: 346) [Hegel's Italics] 
Moreover, religion was another manifestation of Reason, sharing in the quality of 
Geist. Again, in another segment from the Lectures which Eliot underscored: 
The process displayed in History is only the manifestation 
of Religion as Human Reason... (Hegel 1905: 348) 
As a foundation for the state, it was imperative that its members should hold 
religious beliefs in order to share in the state's founding principle and, moreover, 
develop into persons participating in the life of Geist. Indeed, the state "... ought 
even to require all its citizens to belong to [a religious] community" (Hegel 
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1991 a: 295)31, although Hegel was willing to countenance a multiplicity of religious 
communities, whereas Eliot appears not to. Hegel, nonetheless, preferred Protestant 
or Germanic Christianity to others because it was closer to the Idea of freedom. 
That is, it enabled people to see themselves as part of a greater community in which 
all were recognised as free agents. Other religious practices could have a 
debilitating effect on the shape of society as a whole. He notes that 
Of Quakers and Anabaptists, etc., it may be said that they 
are active members only of civil society and that, as private 
persons, they have purely private relations with other 
people... Towards such sects, the state practises 
toleration... for since they do not recognise their duties 
towards it, they cannot claim the right to belong to it. 
(Hegel 1991b: 295) [Hegel's Italics] 
As we saw above, Hegel had a similar attitude to the Jews. The main problem with 
these particular groups was that their religion tended to form them into separate 
sub-groups within society, sealed off from others, with their own particular 
Sittlichkeit: their members could never rise above their group's particularity. 
Although these "sects" were tolerated, they were not true citizens in the Hegelian 
system. Moreover, sunk in particularity as was civil society, there was always the 
possibility of the members of such groups to form the crowd, or mob. In his 
treatment of the "sects" in Philosophy of Right, Hegel may well be writing out of 
31 There is disparity, however, between Hegel's early and later writings. In Folk Religion and 
Christianity, Hegel argued against the adoption of any religion by the State: "... a state, as a civil 
state, should have no faith at all; nor should its legislators and rulers, in their capacity as such" 
(Hegel in Avineri 1972: 29-30). Hegel's position, argues Avineri, was derived from his reasoning 
that Christianity, in being adopted as a State religion, changed from being a freely-chosen faith to 
one forced upon people. Hegel's thinking here presupposes that there is dichotomy between State 
and Church, which is less pronounced in Philosophy of Rim. 
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the maelstrom of German Reformation history, in which groups like Anabaptists 
played a significant role and one not always conducive to stability. As we saw 
above, Hegel was also equivocal towards the Jews, in that they could not 
completely be members of the state because their religious principles tended to 
create their own unique Sittlichkeit. 
Both Eliot and Hegel were convinced of the religious foundation of society. 
But what form should religious practice take? Hegel was of the opinion that 
religion was rational. There was nothing of what we might pejoratively term "the 
mystical" in Hegel's account. He asserted that, in the face of such religious 
expressions as those found in ancient Egypt and India, where mere animals were 
considered to be gods, 
... we need a [religion] to rescue us from it... and to 
champion the rights of reason and self-consciousness. 
(Hegel 1991b: 292) 
Religion was reason; it "was to do with the absolute", and therefore was accessible 
to human reason. The highest forms of religious expression, indeed, tended to 
expand the powers of reason: 
Religion... affords a consciousness of immutability and of 
the highest freedom and satisfaction.. . Religion is the 
relation to the absolute in the form offeeling .. thought, and faith. (Hegel 1991b: 292-3) [Hegel's Italics] 
For Hegel, "feeling" was not mere emotion, but something more akin to Eliot's 
"sensibility", which produced amongst other things art, and here the two authors 
exhibit a certain overlap in their terminology. For Eliot the unity of thought and 
feeling was paramount not only in poetry, but also in faith. The root of Eliot's idea 
might in fact have come from Hegel himself. In his annotations of Sibree, Eliot 
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made a double vertical line by the side of the following comment Hegel made on 
the development of Christianity: 
The process displayed in History is only the manifestation of 
Religion as Human Reason-thus the discord between the 
inner life of the heart and the actual world is removed. 
(Hegel 1991a: 348) 
In The Idea of a Christian Society, Eliot was at pains to make a case for an 
intellectually respectable Christian faith. It was reasonable, but was more - it was 
also in accord with feelings. Similarly, Eliot at two points in his 1939 work 
emphasised the importance of thought and feeling in matters religious. In the 
Preface, he states that 
I trust that the reader will understand from the beginning 
that this book does not make a plea for a "religious 
revival"... the term seems to me to imply a possible 
separation of religious feeling from religious thinking 
which I do not accept... (Eliot 1939: 42) 
Eliot is also keen to make an intellectual case for Christianity. "The Idea of a 
Christian Society [note Eliot's capitalisation] is one which we can accept or 
reject... ", he wrote, 
... 
but if we are to accept it, we must treat Christianity with a 
great deal more intellectual respect than is our wont; we 
must treat it as being for the individual a matter primarily of 
thought and not of feeling. (Eliot 1939: 43) [Eliot's Italics] 
For both Eliot and Hegel religion was not only a matter of emotional engagement 
with God. It was an attitude of the whole person which was also intellectual. Being 
reasonable, religion was also an integral part of both Hegel's state (as the 
"hieroglyph of reason") and Eliot's Christian Society. Religion could not be 
compartmentalised and hived off into the nebulous world of individual piety, but it 
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also demanded "practical results". 
One such result which we might expect to see in Eliot's work is a critique of 
Church-State relations. In the years preceding Eliot's lectures, it had been a matter 
of debate. The debacle of the 1928 proposed revisions to the Anglican Book of 
Common Prayer had resulted in many books and pamphlets, amongst them 
Henson's 1929 Disestablishment, which Eliot cites in the notes to The Idea of a 
Christian Society (Eliot 1982: 90). Eliot's attitude to the matter was complex. He did 
not welcome the proposed revisions to the Prayer Book at all. However, this was not 
from the point of view that Parliament should not have the veto over matters of 
liturgy (and hence also, in Church of England terms, theology), but from the 
standpoint that the leaders of the Church of England were undermining its authority. 
In an early comment on the controversy, Eliot, in The Monthly Criterion of May 
1927 takes a linguistic line in criticism. On the proposed substitution of "infinite" 
for "eternal" in the Book of Common Prayer, Eliot suggests that it "... makes the 
English language vaguer", by "... throwing a mathematical cloak over theology" 
(Eliot 1967s: 190), hinting that the revisers were trying to ape the ascendancy of 
mathematics in the intellectual world. Later in the year, in The Monthly Criterion of 
December 1927, in considering the language of the new revisions, he laments that 
It is a pity when... ecclesiastics fail to think clearly, for if 
they cannot think clearly they cannot write well. 
(Eliot I967f£482) 
Eliot's ideas on whether Parliament, in rejecting the Prayer Book Measure, was 
acting correctly, were never made public, at least in print. This reticence appears in 
The Idea of a Christian Society. Eliot is at pains to state that the "... problem of 
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Church and State is... not my primary concern" (Eliot 1982: 54). His stated reasons 
are twofold. First, he claims that it is not "... a subject in which the general public 
takes much interest", and when that interest is aroused by "newspaper exploitation" 
then the public "... is never well enough informed to have the right to an opinion" 
(Eliot 1939: 45). Second, the subject matter of the book, that of the "Idea" of the 
society, is according to Eliot "... preliminary to the problem of Church and State" 
(Eliot 1939: 45-46), and therefore discussion of it would be out of place. Were these 
two reasons valid? The first, that the public was not interested in such discussions, 
is implausible. Eliot, at least in his prose writings, almost never directed his 
message to "the public" (the only other example is the 1943 Reunion by 
Destruction, which was "addressed to the laity") and, it seems, hardly ever took 
public opinion into account in his writings. Moreover, if this were the case, that 
public opinion was misinformed, then surely Eliot would have been performing a 
public duty in attempting to educate. This kind of task he did attempt in the 1943 
Reunion by Destruction, which is the closest Eliot came to a direct appeal to the 
public. The second reason is more plausible, that the book was approaching the 
question on a different plane than that of a critique of Church-State relations. 
However, as Eliot writes at length on the curriculum of society's Christian 
education, and the relationship between Church and State is surely as important to a 
Christian Society, we are perhaps compelled to say that Eliot is simply shying away 
from the discussion. The reasons for this are probably manifold. Certainly Eliot's 
disillusionment with both Parliament and the hierarchy of the Church had a part to 
play, and also the Abdication Crisis had had a profound impact. And we must not 
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ignore the more obvious reasons: Eliot was either not interested in the topic or did 
not have enough of a grasp of it to have anything important to say; or, faced with the 
threats from overseas, Eliot believed the relations between Church and State was 
tangential. Whatever the reason, from our contemporary situation, in ignoring the 
issue in The Idea of a Christian Society, Eliot's work lacks a dimension and this 
weakens it. 
Hegel had a more developed understanding of Church-State relations. Hegel 
begins his discussion with considering the role of the individual. Churches are 
formed, he states, "... whenever individuals of the same religious persuasion join 
together to form a community or a corporation"; as such, this will be "... subject to 
the policing and supervising of the state" (Hegel 1991b: 296). However, the 
doctrinal side of religion, its teachings and beliefs, are not subject to State control, 
for this "... has its province in the conscience, and enjoys the right of subjective 
freedom of self-consciousness... which is not the province of the state" (Hegel 
1991 b: 296-297). Hegel suggests that the locus of authority in matters doctrinal is in 
the individual. Churches, in the aspect of the matters of faith, are wholly 
independent of the state (that is, the "state proper", its governmental side). However, 
its members also being members of civil society and (ultimately) of the state, and by 
their power of reason their grasp of ultimate things being such, there would (in 
theory at least) be no conflict between the aims of the Church and the aims of the 
state. As Weil expresses it, being both products of reason and both having the 
content of absolute truth, "... no contradiction between the two can possibly arise" 
(Weil 1998: 47). Ultimately, Christians (of the Reformed traditions at least) would 
197 
recognise that their personal convictions merged with the doctrine of the Church as 
a whole, and in so doing, as Brod suggests, they "... abandoned their particularity" 
(Brod 1992: 45). As Hegel expressed it in the Lectures, in the development of 
Lutheranism, 
... the subjective feeling and the condition of the individual is 
regarded as equally necessary with the objective side of 
truth. (Brod 1992: 44) 
This for Hegel was the primary principle of the modern world. 
It is perhaps this Hegelian dynamic which lies behind Eliot's obscure rationale 
of Church-State relations. The two systems have some things in common, but as 
Eliot's treatment of the subject is brief this commonality must remain as tantalising 
possibilities rather than anything clearer. Like Hegel, Eliot (in his 1939 book at 
least) seems to base religious authority in individuals rather than structures. Perhaps 
by 1939 he was already on the path of critical reflection on the role of the hierarchy 
of the Anglican Church, which had first arisen in Eliot's consideration of the 
revisions to the Book of Common Prayer (and hence to the English language itself), 
and which would shortly be proposing one of Eliot's bete noirs, the union of the 
Indian Churches. A case can certainly be made that Eliot considered the leaders of 
the Established Church (that "oddest of institutions" [Eliot 1932cc: 353]) to be a 
threat to its life, and hence to English society, and that in The Idea of a Christian 
Socie he appeals over their heads to the members of his new kind of clerisy. This 
would be, given Eliot's trenchant criticism of the Bishops of the Anglican 
Communion in his 1931 Thoughts after Lambeth, a wise idea. In this essay, he talks 
of the official Report circulated after the 1928 Lambeth Conference, and notes that 
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to some readers its "... recommendations and pious hopes will be disappointing. " 
Moreover, Eliot seems to suggest that the Bishops are incapable of steering the 
Church: 
... 
it ought not to be an occasion to us for mirth that three 
hundred bishops together assembled should, on pooling 
their views on most momentous matters, come out with a 
certain proportion of nonsense. (Eliot 1932cc: 354) 
Whether this is simply a criticism of the work of Bishops in 1928, or of the office of 
Bishop within the Anglican Church per se, it is difficult to determine. But certainly 
by 1943 Eliot was laying at the door of the Bishops and their plans for South India a 
much greater charge than that of muddled thinking: that of the destruction of the 
Church itself. Possibly, Eliot had begun to consider that the leaders of the Church in 
the 1930's, like their counterparts in politics, could simply not be trusted to see the 
problems that lay ahead or to lead the Church. To read Eliot on the Church of 
England of the 1920's and 1930's, and that of the age of Lancelot Andrewes and 
John Bramhall, is to read about two different Churches, although Eliot knew that it 
was, in theory at least, the same. There is a strong case to be made that the newly 
converted Eliot has a huge sense of disappointment in the Church he finds, and this 
is seen in his virtual sidelining of it in its institutional aspects in The Idea of a 
Christian Society. It is difficult to find any positive reference in Eliot's writings to 
the contemporary Anglican Church; his approbative comments are always made of 
the historic Church. Given this, and perhaps following the Hegelian line that there 
was a vital connection between the interior life of individuals and the exterior life of 
society, Eliot does seem in The Idea of a Christian Society to eschew any kind of 
role for a centralised and clerical Church. Eliot's key group, the Community of 
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Christians, is not clerically based, but is formed from the most able of both clergy 
and laity. It forms a kind of Hegelian association of individuals who believe the 
same kinds of things and who act in a similar fashion. Eliot's parish system, too, as 
we saw above, has overtones of the Hegelian Corporation. Hegel does not articulate 
any formal structure of the Church, although he had a Lutheran model immediately 
at hand. Eliot likewise does not adopt any existing Church structure, preferring a 
description of his two Christian communities. Both writers seem to skirt around the 
problem of Church-State relationships. And here we must comment on a deeper and 
more fundamental reason why neither author seems to spend much time on 
discussing the Church-State divide, although because it is just conjecture this 
comment must be brief. Perhaps, given their inclination to unity, the thought of such 
a dichotomy was abhorrent. Division was weakness, and in a formal separation of 
Church and State division somewhere along the line was almost inevitable. Their 
solution was, instead of separating the powers in their formal aspects, to root the 
dynamics of both church and state in a single, united group: the people at large. For 
Hegel, members of the Churches were also members of the state; there were no 
conflicting calls on their duty - as we saw above in Eliot's annotated note from the 
Lectures, there is no "... discord between the inner life of the heart and the actual 
world", by virtue of reason (Hegel 1991a: 348). For Eliot, society was primarily 
composed of what amounted to faith groups - the two communities. Their lives, as 
Eliot describes, are a unified whole of ethics and belief; there is no room for any 




In one way, unity in society was achieved by the educative process. Both 
Hegel and Eliot see education as the way by which individuals take upon 
themselves the wider concerns of society and are able to cohere within its 
ideological frameworks. For Hegel, the process of education was a complex process 
and mirrored in small the development of humanity in general. As Inwood suggests, 
the gist of Hegel's educational policy was 
... a progression from a stage of primitive natural unity to a 
stage of alienation and estrangement, and then to a stage of 
harmonious reconciliation. (Inwood 1992: 70) 
The natural world, where as we saw earlier Geist is "sunk", has to be overcome not 
only by societies as a whole but also by individuals. Children were beings entirely in 
the "natural" state. They are "... free in themselves", and "... their life is merely the 
immediate existence of this freedom" (Hegel 1991b: 212). They were like animals, 
living for the moment and for themselves only. It was in the family unit that the first 
stage of education began, that of 
... raising children out of natural immediacy in which they 
originally exist to self-sufficiency and freedom of 
personality. (Hegel 1991b: 212) 
This would eventually allow them to leave the confines of the family and enter civil 
society. This process was to be augmented by formal schooling. In this, Hegel 
desired the first stage in education to be the alienation of the mind -as he expressed 
in his "Nuremburg Address" - "... from its natural essence and state" (Hegel in 
Inwood 1992: 70), and this was best done by the study of the ancient world and its 
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languages, their cultural and historical distance being sufficient to "separate" the 
student from his immediate surroundings. However, the Classical world was 
sufficiently close (culturally speaking) to enable an eventual reconciliation with the 
present day, in order to "... find ourselves again" but enriched "... in conformity with 
the... universal essence of the mind" (Inwood 1992: 70). Education, overall, aimed at 
the elimination of "natural simplicity", that is, "... the individuality in which spirit is 
immersed", so that the person may "... take on the rationality of which [he] is 
capable, namely the form of universality... " (Hegel 1991b: 225). Hegel summed up 
the educative process as 
... 
in its absolute determination ... [a] 
liberation and work 
towards a higher liberation; it is the absolute transition to 
the infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical life, which 
is no longer immediate and natural, but spiritual 
and. . . raised to the shape of universality. 
(Hegel 1991b: 225) 
Hegel placed responsibility for education on the state. It was "... the prime duty of 
the state to further education and learning" (Avineri 1972: 1). This was done not 
only in schools and colleges, but also in the Corporations, although these would 
educate their members by methods other than the study of Classics. However, the 
basic raising of the individual from his "natural state" remained the same. Civil 
Society, at one level, was a vast school-room, in which its members imbibed the 
universal for which they exchanged their particularity. Within Civil Society, 
observed Hegel, 
... the 
interest of the Idea, which is not present in the 
consciousness of these members of civil society as such, is 
the process whereby their individuality and naturalness are 
raised... to formal freedom and formal universality of 
knowledge and volition... 
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(Hegel 1991b: 224) [Hegel's Italics] 
Eliot's thought on education has similarities to Hegel. Eliot consistently showed a 
keen interest in society's education. He had spent many years as a student himself, 
and as a teacher in England. As Margolis suggests, "Even after he abandoned the 
classroom, Eliot remained an educator" (Margolis 1972: 3). Eliot would speak on 
education at conferences such as Malvern in 1941, would write about it in The 
Criterion and in the 1940's spoke regularly on it. It was a burning issue for Eliot, 
and The Idea of a Christian Society bases its first principles on the assumption that 
the citizens have been educated "... in Christian categories". Eliot's aim for education 
in the Christian society was straightforward: 
In a Christian society education must be religious ... 
in the 
sense that its aims will be directed by a Christian philosophy 
of life. (Eliot 1939: 64) 
In this notion of "... a Christian philosophy of life", was Eliot here making a stand 
for some kind of Hegelian "universal"? Eliot would have understood Christianity to 
be of the magnitude of the Hegelian universal. The aim of Eliot's educational system 
was to produce a citizenry which was united in Christian values, and its aim was the 
universal in human affairs. Eliot, however, in The Idea of a Christian Society does 
not expand much on the initial ideas on education that we have cited here. There is 
none of the Hegelian dynamics of the development of the child from its "natural 
state", nor discussion on the role of formal schooling nor the parishes in the 
educational process. 
In other writings, however, there is evidence that Eliot took a similar line to 
Hegel over the role of the Classics in British education. Eliot, a self-proclaimed 
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"classicist", always stressed the importance of studying the ancient world. This was 
not for any superficial reason, however, as he asseverated in the 1936 "Modern 
Education and the Classics". Its central theme - "... it is only within a particular 
social system that a system of education has any meaning" (Eliot 1936a: 161) - is the 
same as developed three years' later in The Idea of a Christian Society. Eliot argues 
that Classics should be preserved as a major element in education, and for all ability 
levels, not simply because of tradition, or "... sentimental Toryism... [or] classical 
quotations in the House of Commons" (Eliot 1936a: 172), but because it underlay 
the real understanding of "... something permanent: the historical Christian faith" 
(Eliot 1936: 172). Education in the Classics is education in Christian civilisation, 
according to Eliot, and 
... 
it is only upon readers who wish to see a Christian 
civilisation survive and develop that I am urging the 
importance of the study of Latin and Greek. 
(Eliot 1936a: 174) 
The role of Classics, in Eliot's thinking, is to lead students into Christian ways of 
thought. Although he does not articulate this in the essay, this process may well 
have had overtones of an Hegelian process of alienation in the student's mind, which 
eventually would lead to a reconciliation with his own culture and thereby ensure its 
survival and indeed - in Eliot's word - development. 
A stronger parallel between Eliot and Hegel on education comes in another 
Eliot piece on the importance of Classics, this time from The Criterion of April 
1925. A propos of the then Headmaster of Eton's article in the Evening Standard, 
which Eliot criticises for coming out with the "usual arguments" for studying 
Classics, Eliot puts forward his own reasons for the place of Classics in education. 
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Eliot eschews the obvious reasons that Greek is "... the greatest of languages" or that 
its literature is "... the greatest of literatures", by suggesting (perhaps surprisingly, 
given his usual objective stance) that "... the standards for such a comparative 
judgement cannot be found" (Eliot 1967h: 341). Rather, he advances a surprising 
argument, which suggests perhaps that Eliot is working with a more Hegelian type 
of framework: 
... the study of Greek is a part of the study of our own mind. Our categories of thought are largely the outcome of Greek 
thought... One of the advantages of the study of a more 
alien language is to throw this fact into bold relief: a mind 
saturated with the traditions of Indian philosophy is and 
must always remain very different from one saturated with 
the traditions of European philosophy - as is every 
European mind, even when untrained and unread. What 
analytic philosophy attempts to do for the individual mind, 
the study of history - including language and literature - 
does for the collective mind. Neglect of Greek means for 
Europe a relapse into unconsciousness. 
(Eliot 1967h: 342) [Eliot's Italics] 
I would suggest that Eliot's highly metaphysical turn of phrase here is directly 
related to the Hegelian use of Classics in education. In studying the "alien" language 
of Greek (and here Eliot uses a very Hegelian term) -a process in which the mind 
studying it will surely become "alienated" - the student will come to understand the 
underlying philosophy of his own culture, and hence become part of a greater 
association of persons - Eliot's "collective mind". Moreover, if the Classics fall into 
desuetude then that "mind" will fail and civilisation will "relapse into 
unconsciousness". In this "unconscious" state we perhaps have a glimmer of the 
Hegelian particularised and "natural state" mind of the child, which needs to be 
educated in order to reach full humanity. The correlation between Eliot's 
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educational theory and Hegel's appears quite strong. 
6.10. The Sittlichkeit Thesis 
The role of education in Hegel's political system naturally leads into 
discussion of a central element in his political thought, that of Sittlichkeit, discussed 
above. Education in Hegelian society was meant to immerse the individual into the 
universal state and this state was governed by a distinct ethical life. As Hegel wrote 
in his essay On Natural Law, education 
... 
is by definition the emerging progressive cancellation of 
the negative or the subjective; for the child... is something 
subjective or negative, whose development to manhood is 
the cessation of this form and whose education is the 
disciplining or subjugation of the form. (Hegel 1975: 115) 
This education, as we saw above, is both formal in schools, and within family and 
social groups. Hegel saw this process as simplicity itself: the child, he says, 
... 
is suckled at the breast of universal ethical life ... it passes 
over into the universal spirit. (Hegel 1975: 115) 
This led Hegel, in the Lectures, to make the statement about the content of ethical 
life and morality in general, 
The content of what is good or not good... is, in ordinary 
matters of private life, to be determined by the laws and 
customs of a state. There is no great difficulty in knowing it. 
(McCarney 2000: 73) 
This universal spirit which the educated person passed into led the child into larger 
social spheres, and it is these groupings of people in the state who were to live an 
ethical life in accord with society's aims, and this system Hegel termed Sittlichkeit. 
This might be most accurately translated (according to Kotkavirta, following 
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Smith), as "the institutions of ethical life" (Kotkavirta 1997: 40), meaning not the 
formal institutions like the police but the mental parameters of everyday living. 
Despite this, Hegel's term is normally translated into English simply as "Ethical 
Life", which tends to rob it of some force. 
For Hegel, everyday life was - at least in the developed state - the universal 
life of freedom, according to the will of Geist. For Hegel, as we have seen, free 
action is that in which persons ignore all external pressures, and concentrate solely 
on the rational, universal will. This system of rational actions and mores is the heart 
of Hegel's "ethical life", Sittlichkeit. It was a system which was both subjective, in 
that actions were the result of the individual's own powers of reason, and objective, 
in that being reasonable they were universal and therefore applicable to everyone. 
Sittlichkeit, in Wood's words, "... disposes the individual to do what the institutions 
require" (Wood 1991: xii). The ethical life of the state was the union of duty and 
desire; in it, human nature was a harmonious whole, and freedom was not curtailed 
but enhanced. Everyone, it would appear, was happy and self-fulfilled. As Wood 
again suggests, in the "rational society" in which Sittlichkeit flourishes, 
... the 
demands of social life do not frustrate the needs of 
individuals... duty fulfils individuality rather than 
suppressing it. In such a society rational individuals... need 
not make great sacrifices in order to give priority to right or 
duty... (Wood 1991: xii) 
Hegel's view of Sittlichkeit had developed over many years and was not just 
present in Philosophy of Right. An early formulation of it appeared in what is 
known as the Early Theological Writings composed between 1793 and 1800. In 
studying the religious customs of the ancient world of the Greeks, Romans and 
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Jews, Hegel saw that they provided a framework of rational ethical life which 
formed the basis of the societies in which they were practised. He termed these 
religions "folk religions", or the "religion of the People", the Volk. It was a force 
which united the citizens of a nation, and it asked "... individuals to assume 
responsibility for acting ethically in the world" (Dickey 1999: xix). Christianity, 
Hegel argued, was similar: it was a religion of Sittlichkeit, for it asked its 
adherents to realise the "spark of divinity" which God had implanted in them 
(Dickey I999: xix). Hegel saw in the teachings of Jesus an expectation that his 
principles would be carried into the world by his followers, "... forming 
communities of religious fellowship in the process" (Dickey 1999: xix). This idea 
Hegel expanded in his essay On Natural Law, which Eliot may well have read. 
Here, Hegel proposes a complex system of ethical life which comprehends the 
whole life of the people in an organic unity, which Hegel termed "organic ethical 
life" (Hegel 1975: 66). This was not a natural state of affairs; human beings did 
not enjoy ethical life by simple biology. "The state of nature", according to Hegel, 
enjoyed only "... moments of organic ethical life" (Hegel 1975: 66). It was 
fragmentary; human beings had to organise and educate themselves in what Hegel 
called "... actualised communities of ethical life" and develop out of their natural 
state in order that their true destiny in the state could be realised. This view of 
organic ethical life was not just the social and ethical mores of a particular people 
in a particular place which had developed over time; it was a "positive principle" 
that "... absolute ethical totality is nothing other than a people" (Hegel 1975: 92) 
[Hegel's Italics]. In other words, the Sittlichkeit of the people was the People 
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itself; to describe the People was to describe their ethical life, and vice versa. 
Whoever was raised in any particular place was bound to be imbued with its 
Sittlichkeit; it was therefore also the dynamic force in both individuals and groups. 
There could be no conflict of aims, logically. Hegel summed up this organic union 
of the one and the many with the following (and telling) quotations from the 
Ancient World: 
As regards ethical life, the saying of the wisest men of 
antiquity is alone true, that "to be ethical is to live in 
accordance with the ethics of one's country. " And as regards 
education, the reply of a Pythagorean to the question "What 
is the best education for my son? " is "Make him a citizen of 
a well-ordered state. " (Hegel 1975: 115) 
that is, the state with Sittlichkeit. However, Sittlichkeit was not simply for the 
attaining of the Good Life within society, much as the ancient Greeks saw it. It was 
also an integral part of the unfolding of Geist. Being rational, Sittlichkeit partook of 
the nature of Geist, and in living by the norms of ethical life each citizen, in Taylor's 
words, enjoys 
... 
his essential relation to the ontological structure, the other 
being in the modes of consciousness which Hegel calls 
"absolute spirit", and this real relation through the life of the 
community is essential to the completion of the return to 
conscious identity between man and the Absolute. 
(Taylor 1979: 93) 
Ethical life became the interface of rationality between humanity and Geist; by 
living Sittlichkeit, man became spiritual as well as ethical. In this sense, by living 
successfully the ethical life, human beings became truly free. As Patten suggests, 
freedom and Sittlichkeit are "reciprocal concepts": 
Freedom consists in rational self-determination and this 
means engaging in actions that one can fully endorse on a 
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rational basis. Freedom and ethics are reciprocally linked, 
because in acting ethically an individual is contributing to 
the realisation of an end that is partially constitutive of his 
status as a free agent - the preservation and promotion of his 
own freedom. (Patten 1999: 101) 
In a sense, Hegel's theory of freedom is Hobbes' turned on its head. In the former, 
individuals band together and live by Sittlichkeit in order to become truly free and 
self-realised; in the latter, people give up their freedom in order to be preserved. The 
state, as Hegel observed, is the arena for the development of this higher form of 
freedom; it is "... the actuality of concrete freedom" (Hegel 1991b: 282). 
One potential and not inconsiderable problem for the theory of Sittlichkeit is 
that which Patten calls "under-determination". There is simply not enough practical 
content to Hegel's theory with which to work. Patten suggests that 
Faced with some practical dilemma, a given individual 
might find himself pulled in conflicting directions by the 
demands of the different institutions and traditions of his 
community. (Patten 1999: 2) 
Patten cites the Sartre dilemma in the novel sequence Les chemins de la liberte of 
the young man who suffers a crisis of choice between his duty as a family member 
to care for his parent, and his duty as a citizen to join the Resistance Movement in 
occupied France. Sittlichkeit, Patten argues, would find it difficult to see a way 
forward, although Hegel would claim that it would be "quite simple". This is a fair 
criticism; Hegel appears to leave Sittlichkeit purely in the speculative realm and he 
does not trouble to give concrete examples of ethical choices. He seems to operate 
on a plane where ethical choices are somehow also logical choices, as if the whole 
system were mathematical. Hegel's system, like Eliot's in The Idea of a Christian 
Society, relies upon a monoculture with no conflicting interests inside it. The 
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modern world, in its pluralism, is in one view simply too diverse in its ethical 
situations and mores for the Sittlichkeit thesis to work satisfactorily; there are just 
too many variations of what is ethical. Taylor also makes a similar point, in 
suggesting that in Hegel's ethical life "... there is no gap between what ought to be 
and what is" (Taylor 1979: 83). Perhaps Hegel was reticent in listing the actual 
content of Sittlichkeit because in so doing he might have limited it. For how does 
one describe something which, by definition, is in process of development? Hegel, 
perhaps, preferred to describe the dynamics of Sittlichkeit and left it for 
participating societies to determine in their own way its content. This would, in 
one view, be the most faithful interpretation of Hegel's own philosophy. As with 
Eliot, Hegel was not intending his description of society to be "a blueprint". He 
did not want to describe a society which, in particulars, had just vanished as the 
last word about it had been written - another Minervan owl. In describing in 
general terms the way society operated, Hegel was enabling it to be applied to a 
variety of different nations, although his main sphere of interest was of course the 
Germanic countries. 
6.11. Eliot and Sittlichkeit 
Does Eliot in his social criticism display elements of Hegelian Sittlichkeit? 
When one considers Eliot's notion of "the Christian Community" in The Idea of a 
Christian Society, there appear some correlations. As we saw above, the Christian 
Community is the majority of Christian Society, in contrast with the "Community of 
Christians" who are the movers and shakers within society, in regards to its 
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Christian purposes. Hegel's Sittlichkeit theory rested on the naturalness of ethical 
life, that is, its organic nature. The child was ".... suckled at the breast of universal 
ethical life" in its upbringing and education; "... there is no great difficulty in 
knowing it". In being born into a certain culture, a child naturally developed into 
that culture and imbibed its mores; it was a process of osmosis, almost. Eliot had a 
similar theory. In the Christian Community, he stated, 
... the 
Christian faith would be ingrained, but it requires, as a 
minimum, only a largely unconscious behaviour. 
(Eliot 1939: 58) 
Clearly Eliot considered the Christian faith to be the basis of the ethical life of the 
Christian society, something which Hegel does not actually specify. However, Eliot 
in dealing with his larger group of citizens, tends to treat Christianity as some kind 
of Sittlichkeit of the people. It is the citizens' traditional theoretical life; they are to 
be educated "in Christian categories" and their social, working and domestic lives 
are to be lived in ecclesiastical units of parishes - particular places, or Sitten. But 
like Sittlichkeit it is not mere theory: it is actuality, the very life of the people, for 
Eliot suggests that for the member of the Christian Community 
... their capacity 
for thinking about the objects of faith is 
small; their Christianity may be almost wholly realised in 
behaviour... (Eliot 1939: 58) 
The whole of their religious and social life is governed by the ethical life of 
Christianity. There does appear to be an Hegelian tincture at least to Eliot's 
Christian Community. 
This appears even stronger when one considers Hegel's specific observations 
on the religious nature of ancient societies. As we saw above, Hegel observed in the 
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"Volk religions" of the ancient world, and also in modem-day Christianity, a certain 
disposition which united a nation around a set of principles which demanded action. 
This people were to do in "... communities of religious fellowship" which were at the 
same time "... actualised communities of ethical life". Eliot's Christian Community 
was united around a shared Christian faith which we have seen was to be more lived 
than thought. Eliot didn't leave the process there, however: this living the Christian 
life in English Society, English Sittlichkeit, was to be done in a particular setting, 
the local parish, essentially an ecclesiastical area which could trace its origins in fact 
to the Roman Villa system of the second century. Eliot as we have seen called the 
parish the "community unit"; it was the natural unit of social and religious life, 
presumably large enough for its inhabitants' everyday lives but small enough to be 
cohesive. It is interesting that Eliot bases his whole religious-ethical-social setting in 
the parish, a particular place; this we have seen was a concept encapsulated in the 
very word Sittlichkeit and indeed according to Hegel the Greek term ethics. It was 
argued above that in some ways Eliot's parish mirrors the Hegelian Corporation, but 
it also mirrors Hegel's concrete ethical communities and an organic system of 
organisation. The way society was organised in The Idea of a Christian Society is by 
its religious principles. Its people fall into divisions by way of their Christian faith; 
they live in ecclesiastical areas; and their social lives are governed by an in-dwelling 
Christian faith. To describe the citizens of Eliot's society is to describe their 
Christian lives, and to describe the Christian life of the Society is to describe its 
inhabitants and this is at the heart too of Hegel's theory of Sittlichkeit. 
The above is true for both Eliot's Christian Community and in certain ways for 
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the Community of Christians. They were expected to live and work within parishes, 
and their ethical life would be the same as their fellows. The difference was their 
ability to reflect on the content of Christian belief. This group had no real 
correlation, ethically speaking, in Hegel: the Civil Service is the nearest equivalent, 
and Eliot's Community of Christians is too "nebulous in outline" to fulfil a similar 
task. However, although Hegel does on one level suggest that everyone in his 
society is capable of achieving the ultimate goal of being a member of the rational 
state, he is on another level more realistic that many will never do so. Hegel would, 
in the end, have to settle on a two-track citizenry, and this would not be so 
dissimilar from Eliot's. This might be seen when one considers the ultimate aim of 
society in both of our authors. For Hegel, as Taylor suggested above, this was "... the 
conscious identity between man and the Absolute", in order for the Absolute to 
complete the process of self-realisation. For those who could not develop this 
rationality, there would still be benefits of living in Civil Society, and some form of 
self-fulfilment but necessarily of a fragmentary nature. Hegel defined this in the 
following words: 
This substantial unity [of the State and "the substantial will"] 
is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom 
enters into its highest right, just as this ultimate end 
possesses the highest right in relation to individuals, whose 
highest duty is to be member of the state. 
(Hegel 1991b: 275) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel couches this description of the goal of the state in religious terms, and Eliot's 
idea of the final destination of society is also religious. However, at the beginning 
we must say that Hegel's vision of the state was fulfilment in this world: Geist 
would reach self-realisation in the state, rather than its citizens progressing from the 
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state to "beatitude". Eliot's idea for society is, in Christian terms, more orthodox, 
although it does have certain Hegelian overtones. For the Community of Christians, 
the Christian Society was the bed from which they were to rise to what Eliot called 
"beatitude", a "supernatural state". For the Christian Community, however, 
Christian Society had a lesser function, that in which "... the natural end of man - 
virtue and well-being... is acknowledged. " Exactly what this "beatitude" of the 
"supernatural end" of man might be, Eliot does not explain. He does not state that 
the destiny of the Community of Christians is the Kingdom of Heaven, and that all 
the Christian Community can hope for is a secular good life. However, we must also 
say that Eliot is terse on the relationship between the Kingdom of God and human 
society, and on whether the latter is the preparation for the former or whether the 
Kingdom of Heaven will appear in the world. Eliot's omission on this point is 
interesting, but we cannot see much beyond that, although on one level Eliot's 
"beatitude" might be read as similar to Hegel's "... absolute and unmoved end in 
itself. " 
As suggested above, both Eliot and Hegel's ethical systems are 
"underdetermined". Neither wishes to formulate a system for their societies. Eliot 
explicitly does not wish his The Idea of a Christian Society to be a "blueprint", and 
nor does he on the whole tie down his descriptions to a particular time or place, 
although his stress on parishes is obviously English. Eliot sees that different 
Christian societies will have different political modes and organisations; he is 
concerned instead with the fundamental basis on which a society can be Christian. 
Society in the United States, the Colonies, even in Wales, Eliot suggests, would be 
215 
different from England. How, then, can every society have the same kind of basic 
"community unit" as England? In the United States, as Eliot would have known, the 
parish system was never such a fundamental part of life; Churches, not being 
established like in England, never had any role to play in government. This was also 
true of Wales, since the disestablishment of the Church in Wales in the 1920's; the 
colonies were another moot point. At this juncture, we might suggest, like Patten of 
Hegel using the Sartre razor, that Eliot's The Idea of a Christian Society lacks depth 
in particularity. It relies upon an assumption of cultural uniformity which 
historically is perhaps a myth in England, and doubtless in every nation. Like Hegel, 
Eliot's Minervan Owl had already flown by the time of The Idea of a Christian 
Society's publication. 
An important difference between Hegel and Eliot in their notions of ethical 
life is freedom. For Hegel, this was fundamental. In living together ethically, 
citizens would enjoy a degree of self-fulfilment and freedom they would not enjoy 
in particularity. Freedom is not a concept Eliot dwelled upon frequently. He was not 
interested in the political side of freedom, being suspicious that it was a dangerous 
concept akin to liberalism and anarchy, both of which ultimately led to 
totalitarianism. He reserved his use of the concept - at least in his poetry - almost 
exclusively for religious purposes, as in the line from Burnt Norton "The inner 
freedom from the practical desire" (Eliot 1969: 173), which might contain an echo of 
the Hegelian notion that to be free was to exercise the rational will, freed from 
external (practical? ) influences. Overall, Eliot does not adopt freedom as a political 
or social term. 
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Another concept missing from Eliot but which was important for the Hegelian 
system was that of law. Law for Hegel was objectified Sittlichkeit. "When what is 
right in itself', he wrote, 
... 
is posited in its objective existence - i. e. determined by 
thought for consciousness and known as what is right and 
valid - it becomes law.. . right 
itself becomes positive right 
in general. (Hegel 1991b: 241) [Hegel's Italics] 
This was a process of bringing something which is right in itself "... to the 
consciousness as a universal" (Hegel 1991b: 241). Thus Sittlichkeit is not something 
which hangs around in the ether; it is also at hand in the law books. There is no 
conflict between these written and unspoken rules: "... the valid laws of the nation do 
not cease to be its customs merely because they have been written down and 
collected" (Hegel 1991b: 241). Thus the child in Hegel's state can learn his ethical 
life both in his mother's milk and by reading. Hegel spends some twenty or so 
sections of Philosophy of Right in outlining the system of law and its 
implementation. Eliot, by contrast, has scant interest in the role of law. He makes 
little mention of it in The Idea of a Christian Society. The word appears only six 
times in his Collected Poems and three of these are in "Macavity: the Mystery Cat". 
This absence of law might be seen to be odd given Eliot's religious nature. The 
element of law, whether positive or negative, is strong in Christianity. The Ten 
Commandments, for example, were to be read at each celebration of Holy 
Communion, according to The Book of Common Prayer. But here we must be 
careful. Eliot's early upbringing in Transcendentalist Unitarianism put the stress 
much more upon the inner disposition of the soul than external order, and Eliot 
would rarely have heard the Ten Commandments in any Church service - St 
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Stephen's, Gloucester Road, where he worshipped, was a church which used the 
English Missal instead of the Book of Common Prayer and the Ten Commandments 
were not part of the liturgy. 32 Eliot preferred instead, it seems, to put his trust in the 
keeping of his version of the ethical life in the sheer power of the Idea of 
Christianity, that internal disposition of the soul. 
6.12. The Alienated Life 
Both authors have a mind set against the consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution in society. 33 This, for Hegel, was the main cause of social and political 
alienation. As we saw above, Hegel had a vision of society which was based 
primarily on the soil and its products. Any substantial move away from this 
organicism would have profound effects on the character of the citizens. A person's 
work was supposed to be his o vNn, made with his own hands or mind. The 
introduction of machine production was for Hegel a dangerous phenomenon. In The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, for example, Hegel suggested that 
... 
in the machine, man suspends... [the] formal activity of his 
own and lets it do all the work for him. But this deceit that 
he practices against nature-takes its revenge upon him; 
what he gains from nature and the more he subdues it, the 
lower he sinks himself.. . the more machinelike 
labour 
becomes, the less it is worth and the more one must work in 
32 1 owe this information to the late Donald Nicholson, sometime Curate at St Stephen's, who 
shared lodgings with Eliot in the Vicarage. 
33 We use this term in the knowledge that this "Revolution" was a process rather than an 
event, and that during the process some areas of Europe de-industrialised, such as the Weald of 
Sussex. 
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that mode. (Hegel 1977: 134) 
Hegel also talked of "the machine state", with workers as cogs, whose minds are 
"... impoverished to the last extremes of dullness" (Hegel 1977: 136). This 
detachment from the fundamental reason for work - which Hegel described as "... the 
purely particular activity and occupation of the individual [which] refers to the 
needs which he has... " (Hegel 1977: 213)34 - leads ultimately both to alienation from 
the natural process of production by which man is able to see the universal element 
in his own labour, and also to an atrophy in his faculty of reason, in that his will is 
not involved in the production process. This ultimately led to instability in society, 
with sections of the populace distanced from the rational political processes. 
Eliot too had a fear of industrialisation. In the 1934 After Stran eg Gods, he 
lectured his Virginian audience on the evils of modern society which was "... worm- 
eaten with liberalism" (Eliot 1943: 13). In Virginia modernity had been held at bay. 
There was still an organic tradition in the Southern States, which had not yet been 
afflicted with what Eliot called 
... the 
immense pressure towards monotony exerted by the 
industrial expansion of the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and the first part of the twentieth century. 
(Eliot 1934: 16) 
This "monotony" produced an unvaried culture and one which, by the influx of 
foreigners, ensured that local cultures were obliterated. He warned the Virginians of 
the threat from the industrialised Northern States; but he was also sanguine in that 
3a In exercising this particular activity (a function of Civil Society), the labourer eventually 
gains participation in the universal, realising that what he produces is "for all". 
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You [i. e. the Virginians] are far away from New York; you 
have been less industrialised and less invaded by foreign 
races; and you have a more opulent soil. (Eliot 1934: 16) 
This shows Eliot's core social beliefs in their most extreme forms, which although 
present in the later The Idea of a Christian Society, are muted. Eliot credits 
urbanisation with social decline; his vision for society, like Hegel's, was primarily 
rural. The forces of industrialisation and its enlarged labour-force bring havoc to the 
organic communities of "natural" society. And, tellingly spelled out for us here, 
Eliot credits the Southern States with a good soil, which was literally the basis for a 
healthy society. In the Southern States, there was a "life of significant soil", and this 
soil Eliot seems to reverence - it is far more than the mere earth in the fields; it has a 
metaphysical significance. All these facets of Eliot's thoughts have a certain 
resonance in Hegel's system. 
6.13. A Conclusion: Similarities and Differences 
At this juncture, it may be worthwhile to consider what the foregoing might 
show us as to the similarities and differences between Hegel and Eliot. We are bound 
to note major differences between the two authors' political and social systems. First, 
there is a question of their theology. Hegel, especially in the notion of Geist that is 
central to his whole philosophy, cannot be said to be fully orthodox, although he sees 
the role of the (Reformed) Church as crucial in society's development. Eliot appears 
never less than orthodox and soundly within the Anglican tradition. Second, Eliot 
would not have placed an emphasis upon freedom as would Hegel, which was the 
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goal of his human society and also that of Geist. Third, Eliot's conception is that 
society is static; there is no grand process of evolution throughout history as there is 
in Hegel, although in his literary criticism Eliot does use such a theory. 
However, there are I believe sufficient likenesses between their writing which 
suggest that Eliot adopts Hegelian ideas. The idea of a living and vibrant (literary) 
Tradition, unfolding throughout history, a key to understanding Eliot's work, might be 
seen as a distinctive form of Hegel's Geist. The concept of "Mind" is also close to 
Eliot's heart - we have the "European Mind", for example, and the English Mind. 
Eliot chooses to express his theory of art in Hegelian terminology. His theory of 
education also mirrors Hegel's, in the need for the mind to be "alienated" in the study 
of different cultures (in both cases, the Classical world), and then returned to its own 
with deeper understanding. 
Eliot's adapted Hegelianism may be seen throughout The Idea of a Christian 
Society. I have argued that it is fundamentally a work from the Idealist school. It is 
centred around the position that a society exists as the unified embodiment of an idea; 
Eliot is at pains to define the word "idea" in a way that suggests it is an organic, 
objective force. He dresses his definition using the words of Coleridge, as if to 
establish his work in the English tradition. But Coleridge is, I suggest, merely a 
bridge, the end of which lands in the heart of Germany, at the feet of Hegel. Eliot's 
The Criterion had already hinted at this, when Every, reviewing White's The Political 
Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge -a book of crambe repetita if ever there were 
one - suggested that Coleridge's "Idealism was not Kant's. For Coleridge the ideas are 
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`one with the very power and life of nature. ' 05 These words would have crossed 
Eliot's editorial desk in the autumn of 1938, when he was preparing to write the 
lectures which would become The Idea of a Christian Society (and see Chapter 9). 
There is an Hegelian strand running throughout The Idea of a Christian Society. 
Central to it is the religious underpinning of society. Hegel's theory of politics shared 
a very similar underpinning, and as we saw Eliot marked the phrase "society rests 
upon religion" in The Lectures. This religious practice has to be uniform, conscious 
for some people and unconscious for others. Both Hegel and Eliot assume the 
existence of a kind of Volk, all of whose members share the same mores, faith and 
language. This is brought sharply into focus in Eliot by his insistence upon the 
Englishness of his book, and that it would not be appropriate for the Welsh, a stance 
which otherwise might seem eccentric. Eliot was rarely interested in Britain, only ever 
England - History is now and England Indeed, it is hard to find references to Britain 
in Eliot's oeuvre. 
Eliot's insistence on the family also mirrors Hegel's. It underpins the Christian 
ethos of the whole nation and like Hegel's family it is the basic building block of the 
state. Civil Society in Hegel was the next level of the state, and in this Hegel's 
Corporations have a certain resonance in Eliot's notion of parishes. There are 
differences, of course; but both Corporations and Parishes are organic units in which 
individuals form wider social bonds than in the family. It is important to bear in mind 
here that Eliot's ideas are compressed, and leave much to the asking, but I believe 
35 In The Criterion, V XVIII, October 1938, p. 128. 
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there is sufficient to show Hegelian leanings. Like the use of Coleridge's definition of 
"idea", Eliot in his use of the parishes as the "community unit" of England can be seen 
as an attempt to ground his theory in an English tradition, Hegel's concept of the 
Corporation not having a natural equivalent. Eliot's parochial system seems eccentric 
and unworkable, an attempt to translate the rural organic community as expressed in 
East Coker into what had become, by 1939, a largely urban country. 
Hegel's system was monarchical, as was Eliot's until the Abdication Crisis, after 
which he became virtually silent on the subject. I would argue that, if the Crisis had 
not occurred then The Idea of a Christian Society would have been completed with 
the figure of the monarch. This would finish the geometry of the book, topping off the 
pyramid of the state, with families at the base and the parishes in the middle. Its 
omission makes society as conceived by Eliot looking flat, a featureless plain of 
micro-communities which make up the nation; there is no tier of mediation between 
the parishes and the state, as there is in Hegel. 
The ethics of society are in both authors best described by Hegel's term 
Sittlichkeit. It is a system of ethical life which is organic and local, learned at 
mother's breast and broken only with danger to the unity of society as a whole. 
English society is governed by Christian principles which, for Eliot (as well as for 
Hegel, in the final analysis) are a matter of habit. Ethics are the blood of the people; 
to describe the people is to describe their Sittlichkeit, and vice versa. Although the 
ethical life of both systems is what we might call natural, it was not without its 
serious flaws. A problem was that of the non-compliant member of society who 
chose not to live by its ethics. Neither of our authors sufficiently accommodates 
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these persons. This is, perhaps, a problem at the heart of Idealist systems of society - 
the wish for harmony and connectedness over-rides differences of opinion; what I 
have called the imperative of integration allows no variation of ideology or practice. 
Taken alongside the literary echoes, borrowings and indeed paraphrases from 
Hegel, there is I suggest a very strong case to be made that Eliot in his social and 
political thought in the period under review, and especially in its later stages, 
returned to his Hegelian roots. With the West facing disaster from the rise of 
continental Fascism and Bolshevism, both of which drew strength from their unified 
ideologies and societies, Eliot believed that only by adopting a similar unitary 
system, this time based on Christianity, would England survive. Unity was indeed 
strength in Eliot's world. This concept was one of the touch-stones of his Absolute 
Idealist inheritance, and it was to that philosophy's political thought that Eliot 






All truths are connected - Appearance and Reality (Bradley 1946: 125) 
On Margate sands 
I can connect 
Nothing with nothing - "The Waste Land" (Eliot 1969: 70) 
Introduction 
There are a number of serious objections to this thesis which will have to be 
dealt with before we conclude. These are neatly summed up in the two quotations 
above. Absolute Idealism - in some ways at least - may be summarised by the 
statement from Bradley, that everything is ultimately connected. Eliot's putative 
rejection of Idealism, which will be discussed below, is encapsulated in the Margate 
Sands lines of "The Waste Land". 
Overall, it seems that there are four main problems which confront anyone 
attempting to chart the persistence of Absolute Idealist philosophy in Eliot's mind 
between 1916 and 1939 and whether it played a part in forming Eliot's political and 
social thought. First, Eliot appeared disparaging of his own philosophical 
endeavours in his main contribution to the discipline, his doctoral dissertation 
published in 1964 as Knowledge and Experience. Second, Eliot virtually never 
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admits any debt to any Absolute Idealist in his own career and often appears 
antagonistic to Absolute Idealists (especially Hegel). Third, soon after abandoning 
his professional philosophical career his critical work seems to adopt a "scientific" 
model in line with the sea-change in philosophy away from Idealism to science- 
based Realism, as championed by Bertrand Russell. And fourth, and with particular 
interest to our concern with The Idea of a Christian Society, Eliot's admitted 
influences in social and political affairs were his contemporaries, such as Demant 
and Dawson, and not his long-dead and seemingly rejected philosophical masters. 
In what follows, I shall endeavour to raise each objection and then attempt to 
deal with its main points. 
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Chapter 7. Eliot shuns Absolute Idealism 
7.1. Objection One: Eliot's "unintelligible" Dissertation 
That was a way of putting it - not very satisfactory: 
A periphrastic study in a worn out... fashion "East Coker" (Eliot 1969: 179) 
Forty-six years after my academic philosophizing came to an end, I find 
myself unable to think in the terminology of this essay. Indeed, I do not 
pretend to understand it. 
Knowledge and Experience (Eliot 1964: 10) 
What is the importance to our study of Eliot's 1964 publication of his Harvard 
Doctoral Thesis? Although its contents are ostensibly far removed from the social 
criticism we are examining here, being concerned with a small facet of Bradley's 
epistemology, I would argue that Eliot's attitude to his thesis and his wish for it to be 
published are relevant for our undertaking. This shows, I believe, that Eliot's mind 
in 1964 was still operating within an Absolute Idealist framework and it marks, in 
some way, a public declaration of this. My argument is simply this: if Eliot could, as 
late as 1964, publish his major philosophical work, then it might be argued that he 
never abandoned other Absolute Idealist ideas, either, such as in politics and social 
theory. As Mallinson argues in her 2002 TS Eliot's Interpretation of FH Bradley, 
The dissertation which Eliot completed in 1916 is the 
repository of his philosophical investigations up to that 
time and the source of many of his subsequent ideas. 
(Mallinson 2002: 1) 
and 
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The concepts of the disassociation of sensibility and of the 
impersonality of the poet... [are] rooted in the 
dissertation's engagement with the work of Bradley. 
(Mallinson 2002: 2-3) 
However, there is much argument against this view, and the most plangent from 
Eliot himself. We will have to examine this carefully before my case can be seen. 
Much scholarly opinion has been happy to concur with Eliot's own apparent 
dismissal of his thesis. Manju Jain, for example, calls it a "haunted" book, and in its 
... tortured obscurity.. . 
it is often difficult to disentangle the 
inferences that Eliot draws from Bradley's arguments from a 
statement of his own views. (Jain 1992: 205) 
According to Ackroyd, it is in places "... quite unintelligible" (Ackroyd 1984: 69), 
and to the professional Wollheim it is "... a painfully obscure work" (Wollheim 
1970: 170). Gordon suggests that in the dissertation "... Eliot's tortuous style 
obscures the content so that the dissertation is almost unreadable" (Gordon 
1977: 51). There are more negative comments in the literature - indeed, there are 
few positive - such as Thompson's, that Knowledge and Experience is 
"... unreadable... " and "... formidable" (Thompson 1969: 18). Overall, modern 
commentators seem to dismiss Knowledge and Experience as an example of late 
British Idealism, where that strand of philosophy has reached its natural end. 
Do these criticisms, however, add up to anything substantial alongside Eliot's 
own critique? Probably not. They are for the most part the thoughts of non- 
specialists such as Ackroyd and Gordon, whose interests in Knowledge and 
Experience are primarily biographical and literary. Nor has any critic made a 
comment on what is perhaps the most important single facet of Knowledge and 
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Experience: it lacks a large part of its conclusion, presumably lost forever during its 
long years' sojourn in the library of Harvard University. Eliot's definitive ideas on 
Bradley's philosophy cannot therefore be properly known. Eliot's substitute for the 
missing pages at its 1964 publication - his later essays "The Development of 
Leibnitz' Monadism" and "Leibnitz' Monadism and Bradley's Finite Centres" - have 
not garnered any comment at all - even in Mallinson's study - although they are 
surely significant unless Eliot intended them to be a page-filler. According to the 
"Preface", these two essays are in "... partial compensation for the loss of the 
concluding page or pages" (Eliot 1964: 11), and are a kind of conclusion. 
In these two essays, Eliot perhaps takes a chance at re-concluding his 
thoughts on Bradley. The extant manuscript of Knowledge and Experience ended 
with the unfinished sentence "For if all objectivity and all knowledge is relative... " 
(Eliot 1964: 176). This open-endedness Eliot decided to change to the much more 
conclusive new final sentence, 
And this emphasis upon practice - upon the relativity and 
the instrumentality of knowledge - is what impels us 
towards the Absolute... (Eliot 1964: 176) 
It is important to realise here what Eliot was attempting. If he were solely after the 
publication of Knowledge and Experience as a purely biographical and historical 
piece, as he claimed in its "Preface", then why change the ending of the extant 
manuscript? And why append the two extra essays as a kind of alternative 
conclusion? The answer must be that Eliot was trying to finish the book some forty 
years after he abandoned it. Perhaps he still felt himself, in 1964, as "impelled 
towards the Absolute" as he had in 1916, although we might suggest that by 1964 
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his earlier Absolute had acquired a name in the Holy Trinity of Christian doctrine. 
Moreover, Eliot's "new" final sentence to the dissertation brought it more in line 
with the last sentence of Bradley's Appearance and Reality, which ended with the 
line 
Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any 
reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the 
more is it veritably real. (Eliot 1964: 176) 
Perhaps we might see Eliot consciously aligning the conclusion of Knowledge and 
Experience with that of Bradley. 
The two essays might also suggest that in Knowledge and Experience he was 
formally repatriating Absolute Idealism into his life and work. In the first essay, the 
1916 "The Development of Leibnitz' Monadism", Eliot is at pains to point out that 
Leibnitz bridged the gap between ancient and modem philosophy. In his doctrine of 
monads, he "... restored to life.. . the 
doctrines of Plato and Aristotle" (Eliot 
1964: 197). Leibnitz, therefore, in Eliot's eyes stood like the artist before tradition in 
the essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent", not only ready to bow down to 
what had gone before, but also to reinterpret it and move it forward. In his thinking 
on monads, Leibnitz did this by "... open(ing) the way for modern idealism" (Eliot 
1964: 197). All philosophy, therefore, like all art, truly understood was part of an 
unfolding of tradition. Each segment was valid and able to inspire those who 
looked to it. 
In the second and shorter essay, "Leibnitz' Monads and Bradley's Finite 
Centres", first published alongside "The Development of Leibnitz' Monadism" in 
the October 1916 The Monist, Eliot moves on the argument. In the first essay, the 
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reader was told how Leibnitz occupied a pivotal role in the history of Western 
philosophy. He was ancient and modem, idealist and realist. In the second, Eliot 
argues that Bradley is a superior philosopher to Leibnitz, in some respects. Over the 
question of monads, for example: 
Bradley's Monadism is in some ways a great advance 
beyond Leibnitz'... It unquestionably presents clearness 
where in Leibnitz we find confusion... Bradley is a much 
more skilful, much more finished philosopher than 
Leibnitz. (Eliot 1967: 207) 
The second essay can be seen as a eulogy on Bradley's philosophy which is the 
counterpart to the eulogy on Bradley's artistic style published in 1926 after 
Bradley's death, in "Bradley's Ethical Studies". If the latter showed how much Eliot 
wanted to emulate his master in writing clear and concise prose, then the former 
showed him reverencing the philosophy behind that "melancholy grace" and 
"languid mastery" (Eliot 1964: 207). Overall, Knowledge and Experience's Absolute 
Idealist message can be seen to have remained with Eliot even in 1964 and he still 
thought it important enough to attempt some kind of conclusion to its lost thesis. 
This is in sharp contrast to his poetry, where he never attempted such an 
undertaking of completing his unfinished work, such as "Unfinished Poems". 
Knowledge and Experience's publication in 1964 perhaps meant that it was 
considered by Eliot himself as part of his official Canon and he wanted it as 
complete and as well-presented as possible. 
However, despite these observations it is not at first glance easy to overcome 
Eliot's own disparagement of Knowledge and Experience. At the publication of the 
work in 1964 Eliot wrote perhaps its most plangent criticism within its own pages. 
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It was dedicated "To my wife", "... who urged me to publish this essay" (Eliot 
1964: 7). Perhaps Valerie, therefore, should take the blame for its appearance; Eliot 
seems reluctant to let it have a wider audience. He appears to hide behind his wife. 
Also it should be noted that Eliot calls it his "essay", not his book, thesis, or 
dissertation. By calling it an essay, he ranks it with the contents, perhaps, of his 
Selected Essays, although it is twenty times longer than any piece in that collection. 
In the "Preface", Eliot also seems to distance himself from its contents. In a 
paragraph of unstinting hostility to his own work, Eliot states 
Forty-six years after my academic philosophising came to an 
end, I find myself unable to think in the terminology of this 
essay. Indeed, I do not pretend to understand it. As 
philosophising, it may appear to most modern philosophers 
to be quaintly antiquated. I can present this book only as a 
curiosity of biographical interest, which shows, as my wife 
observed at once, how closely my own prose style was 
formed on that of Bradley and how little it has changed in all 
these years. It was she who urged me to publish it. 
(Eliot 1964: 10-11) 
Eliot appears apologetic. But there are a number of misleading suggestions in the 
above paragraph. Eliot finds himself unable to think in the terminology of this essay 
- but is its terminology different from its content? The way of expressing the 
ideas 
in Knowledge and Experience had, by 1964, decayed. But the burden of their 
message, the nature of Ideas and Reality, it can be suggested, Eliot still believed in 
1964 as he did in 1916. It was the terminology, rather than its central message, 
which Eliot could not understand; but that he must have been able to understand 
something about it is implied in the comment that it would appear antiquated. 
Despite this change in the terminology of Knowledge and Experience, Eliot 
would surely not have allowed something he had written to be published if he did 
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not understand it, especially given the extreme caution he displayed over the rest of 
his oeuvre, no matter what pressure Valerie had put him under, which one imagines 
was not a great deal. Eliot in the Preface to Knowledge and Experience is as 
slippery as he appeared in that to For Lancelot Andrewes. It was, perhaps, designed 
to disarm the reader and defend the writer from a potentially hostile readership, that 
of academic philosophers. By 1964 Bradley and his Hegelian colleagues such as 
Bosanquet were long out of fashion. In the meantime Logical Positivists had 
divested philosophy of much of its metaphysical content and such an "essay" as 
Knowledge and Experience would have perhaps appeared as a piece of antiquated 
idealism. Eliot was on the defensive. That Knowledge and Experience was so out 
of fashion perhaps suggests, ironically, that Eliot passionately believed in its 
message, or else he would not have agreed to its publication, which may have 
harmed his cherished reputation. Certainly we may assume it was not published 
merely for biographical interest, given Eliot's loathing of his private life being 
discussed in the public domain. That he should consider seriously that Knowledge 
and Experience had any biographical content at all is moreover risible; surely there 
can be fewer books written which contain less information about its author. Its 
appearance in 1964, we may assume with some confidence, was because Eliot 
believed it to a be a serious work the message of which he still believed in. That it 
was published at the time when Eliot was revising substantial parts of his oeuvre 
also suggests that it was in the mainstream of his life's work. That its style was still 
the same as he possessed in 1964 - according to the "Preface" - is another example 
of Eliot repatriating it into his canon. 
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Another argument that Eliot considered Knowledge and Experience as 
orthodox in his own canon comes in the fact that Eliot, after the manuscript of the 
dissertation was discovered by Professor Ann Bolgan in the archives of Harvard 
University, allowed it to be published by his own firm, Faber and Faber. It was 
perhaps part of Eliot's 
... 
fight to recover what has been lost 
And found and lost again and again. (Eliot 1969: 182) 
Eliot was always exceptionally careful in what work of his should be published. 
Parts which he realised were controversial but insubstantial, or did not adequately 
reflect his true beliefs, he did not allow to be reprinted. After Strange Gods, for 
example, has been kept in its shroud since 1934. For Lancelot Andrewes shared the 
same fate, being reissued as Essays Ancient and Modem in 1936 but with very 
significant deletions: gone were the intriguing preface and the eccentric (and 
Hegelian) essay on Machiavelli, and that on Richard Crashaw. For Lancelot 
Andrewes did not go to another edition in Eliot's lifetime. Eliot's continual refining 
of his Selected Essays shows the same preoccupation with presenting an agreeable 
public front. Thus the appearance of his dissertation suggested that Eliot considered 
it a worthy edition to the Eliot canon, and that it would not detract from its overall 
worth. That is was not published earlier is simply that the manuscript was presumed 
lost. That it was published by Faber and Faber, his beloved firm of which he himself 
had been an architect almost from its beginning, shows that he considered it a piece 
on which it was worth staking the company's reputation. That Faber and Faber 
published it in such large numbers - its 5,040 copies were 3,000 more than the first 
edition of The Idea of a Christian Society, and almost as many as the first edition of 
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Four Quartets and Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, both of which had 
6,000 (Gallup 1969: 75) - suggests that Eliot was willing for it to have a wide 
audience, or that Faber and Faber knew a good marketing opportunity when it saw 
one. Eliot, of course, could have had it printed and distributed privately, as he had 
his Poems Written in Early Youth, which had only twelve copies published in his 
lifetime, and those distributed privately (Gallup 1969: 84). Whatever the reasons 
behind its issue, the volume of Knowledge and Experience's sales surely makes it 
one of the most successful of maiden philosophical works ever. Its author's self- 
criticism should not be taken as anything other than a convenient smoke-screen. We 
must look elsewhere to find a convincing argument against Eliot's continuing 
Idealism from 1916. 
7.2. Objection Two: Eliot's Monstrous, Grotesque and 
Corrupt Idealists 
Eliot virtually never admits any debt to any Idealist philosopher in his own 
career (with the exception of Bradley) and often appears antagonistic to Idealist 
thinkers (especially Hegel). If one were to consult an index to Eliot's works of the 
period 1916-1939, such as to The Criterion, The Sacred Wood or Selected Essays, 
one would not find many references to Idealist philosophers, and what does emerge 
is usually unsympathetic. Moreover, as late as 1932 he was dismissing the Idealists 
as unimportant, as in his comment in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism 
I have read some of Hegel and Fichte.. . and forgotten it. 
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(Eliot 1933: 77-78) 
These attitudes, at least at face value, are seemingly incontrovertible evidence that 
Eliot was not an Idealist himself. 
In this period, there are no mentions at all in Eliot's work of either Berkeley 
or Kant except for the latter being somewhat idiosyncratically listed as an example 
of a nineteenth-century philosopher in The Clark Lectures of 192636. These two 
paragons of Idealism seem to have entirely slipped out of Eliot's sights, and this 
despite Eliot's close study of Kant as a post-graduate student. It was as though they 
did not exist. The same cannot be said of Hegel, who does make some entrance into 
Eliot's written work. He appears as a kind of historic demon figure, summing up all 
Eliot found disagreeable. Hegel was German, Protestant, may be described as part 
of the Romantic movement, and was a supporter of political revolution. These 
categories of Eliot's antagonism are worth further inspection. 
Hegel's Teutonic background perhaps found Eliot naturally antipathetic. He 
was an instinctive Greco-Roman in things cultural, more Virgil and Dante than 
Goethe. In The Criterion of October 1923, a propos of the current debate about the 
status of the Classics in English education, Eliot wrote 
The fact is, of course, that all European civilisations are 
equally dependent upon Greece and Rome ... If everything derived from Rome were withdrawn... what would be left? 
A few Teutonic roots and husks. England is a "Latin" 
country... (Eliot 1967ra: 104) [Eliot's Italics] 
36 Eliot is correct that Kant (1724-1804) lived in the nineteenth century, but to suggest that 
he is a philosopher of this century is anachronistic. It is like calling Queen Victoria (1819-1901) a 
twentieth-century monarch. 
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These "Teutonic roots and husks" were the European nations' putative Anglo-Saxon 
origins which Eliot found disagreeable. In the same article, he calls this theory of 
British racial origin the "absurd conclusion" and the "noxious... absurdity" of 
"... popular ethnology and popular philology" (Eliot 1967ra: 104). Quite why Eliot 
found these theories so repulsive - an over-reaction, one might think, except for the 
benefit of journalistic bite - is hard to say because he never expanded them fully. 
Perhaps he harboured resentment for the German nation from the First World War, 
which saw his summer vacation and study tour of 1914 cut perilously short and 
which made his job at Lloyd's Bank a particularly difficult one (he was responsible 
for the reconciliation of pre-war German debts to the Bank). As early as 1911 his 
stance was broadly anti-German, as was witnessed in one of his marginal 
annotations of his copy Hegel's Lectures. By the side of Hegel's observation of "The 
time-honoured and cherished sincerity of the German people" (Hegel's Italics), Eliot 
wrote in bold capitals, "BULL" (Hegel 1991a: 414). Clearly he had some grudge, 
which at least for the moment is unclear. However, it might have something to do 
with Eliot's lack of fluency in the language. Although he had a great mastery of 
French, composing poetry and prose in the language, his grasp of German, as argued 
above, was never strong. 
Hegel's Protestantism was another possible objection for Eliot taking him as a 
source. He never found certain forms of Protestantism palatable. Eliot's history of 
invective against Protestantism is striking. In the essay "Baudelaire and our Time", 
published in For Lancelot Andrewes, for example, he comments that 
Symons [Baudelaire's translator, in this instance] appears a 
more childish child than Huysmans, merely because a 
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childish Englishman - bred a Protestant - always appears 
more childish than a childish Frenchmen, bred a Roman. 
(Eliot 1970: 73) 
Protestantism is immature, probably because - in Eliot's view - it invested the 
individual, and not an objective authority, as its centre of reason. This led to the 
decay of society, as Eliot outlined in "The Humanism of Irving Babbitt" (Eliot 
1970: 99-112). Protestantism was a cultural dead-end and tended to decay quickly. 
The reason was simple: by rejecting the "... outer restraints of an orthodox religion", 
and supplanting it with "... the inner restraint of the individual over himself' (Eliot 
1970: 105) Protestantism descended into chaos. The end result was humanism, which 
Eliot decried as a "... by-product of Protestant theology in its last agonies" (Eliot 
1970: 104). This cultural problem Eliot expanded on in his 1934 book After Strange 
Gods: 
I trust that I shall not be taken to speaking in a spirit of 
bigotry when I assert that the chief clue to the understanding 
of most contemporary Anglo-Saxon literature is to be found 
in the decay of Protestantism ... 
individual writers can be 
understood and classified according to the type of 
Protestantism which surrounded their infancy and the 
precise state of decay which it had reached. (Eliot 1934: 38) 
Eliot's target here was particularly Lawrence, whom Eliot saw as the corrupt product 
of dissenting chapel culture. Given these views, to Eliot, Hegel's stress on 
Protestantism freeing the Germanic World from the constrictions of medieval 
Catholicism was dubious and dangerous. Hegel had commented on the "... corruption 
of the [medieval] Church" (Hegel 1991a: 412), the "externality" of which (in its laws 
and authority) had "become evil", developing itself "... as a negative principle in its 
own bosom" (Hegel 1991a: 413), and demanding "slavery" to its own authority. This 
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enslavement prevented the growth of Geist, which was towards freedom. These kinds 
of views, virtually in complete contradiction to Eliot's, were to the poet 
"... monstrous" (Eliot (1967e: 2). 
Not only was it horrible, but it was also a corrupting influence. In his essay 
"The Perfect Critic", collected in the 1920 volume The Sacred Wood, Eliot indulges 
in invective against Hegel. This is perhaps surprising: the essay is ostensibly about 
literary criticism, and indeed begins by observations on Coleridge and Arnold. Either 
Eliot's conception of literary criticism is very broad, being based in pure philosophy 
(a debatable point, especially in his critical opinions circa 1920), or he is prepared at 
any length to distance himself from Hegel. This latter point will be argued below. In 
"The Perfect Critic", Eliot charts the development of criticism in Western culture. 
Hegel's contribution was negative: 
Finally Hegel arrived.. . 
he was certainly the most 
prodigious exponent of emotional systemisation, dealing 
with his emotions as if they were definite objects which 
had aroused these emotions... [his] corruption has spread 
very far. (Eliot 1928b: 8-9) 
Some six years later, in The Clark Lectures, Eliot was to repeat this charge: 
... the philosophies of the nineteenth century, whether of 
Kant, or Fichte, or Hegel, of Schopenhauer, or James, or 
Bradley or Russell, are corrupted by feeling... 
(Eliot 1996: 221-222)37 
It was the emotional content that was so damaging. Eliot always tended to see the 
emotions as something chaotic and destructive. In a letter to Sydney Schiff of 30th 
November 1920, for example, he castigated Middleton Murry's literary criticism as 
37 Eliot is again anachronistic in terming Russell's thought nineteenth-century. 
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being "... dictated by emotion" (Eliot 1988: 422). In East Coker, Eliot spoke against 
... the general mess of 
imprecision of feeling, 
Undisciplined squads of emotion... (Eliot 1969: 182) 
Eliot's "objective correlative" might also be seen as an attempt to by-pass the 
beguiling emotions as well. Emotions denied the power of the mind, trammelling it 
into unproductive, romantic episodes. Eliot tended to be suspicious of the emotions, 
and in The Clark Lectures he warned his audience against the excesses of emotion by 
conjuring up the spectre of Marcel Proust: "... try to imagine a society in which 
everyone was... a Marcel Proust" (Eliot 1996: 221). This was, to Eliot, self-evidently 
unacceptable, and to his mind the cause of this excess of emotionalism was Hegel. 
Presumably, Eliot had in mind such works of Hegel's as The Phenomenology. To 
suggest that Hegel's work had the emotions at its heart, however, is an unusual view: 
Hegel, in his "Preface" to the Phenomenology, makes aspersions against the 
"... ordinary common sense" view of the world since it "... makes [its] appeal to 
feeling" (Hegel 1977: 43). It was Hegel's wish to replace this false view with "... a 
scientific system of... truth" (Hegel 1977: 3). That Eliot so obviously misreads Hegel 
perhaps suggests that his comments have a certain amount of hyperbole, meant to 
make his readers take note. However, despite this bias it still appears that Eliot was 
as far away from Hegel's scheme of thought as was possible. Even as late as 1952, in 
the preface to Joseph Pieper's Leisure the Basis of Culture, Eliot was still criticising 
Hegel: 
... the colossal and grotesque achievement of Hegel may 
continue in concealed or derivative forms to exercise a 
fascination upon many minds. (Eliot 1952: 17) 
Perhaps here Eliot had in view the political followers of Hegel. Hegel had in his 
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Lectures seemingly approved the revolutionary zeal of the French. 1789 had 
accomplished at once what the Reformation had achieved over decades in Hegel's 
German nations. Lacking the Reformation's "Spirit of Freedom... " (Hegel 
1991a: 417), the French nation in its political condition was nothing but "... a confused 
mass of privileges altogether contravening Thought and Reason" (Hegel 1991a: 446). 
The lack of freedom - towards which Geist always worked - "... began to agitate men's 
minds", and to the citizenry of France "... the entire political system appeared one 
mass of injustice" (Hegel 1991a: 446) There was no alternative than a complete 
change in the nation's political life. This process was "... necessarily violent" (Hegel 
1991a: 446) and the "... idea of Right asserted its authority all at once" (Hegel 
1991a: 447). This was "... a glorious mental dawn" (Hegel 1991a: 447) which 
"... thrilled through the world, as if the reconciliation between the Divine and the 
Secular was now first accomplished" (Hegel 1991a: 447). To Eliot's mind, deeply 
imbued with the idea of tradition and history, this sweeping away of a nation's culture 
and political inheritance was not acceptable. This was evidenced in the "Preface" to 
the 1927 For Lancelot Andrewes, where Eliot described himself as "... classicist in 
literature, royalist in politics and anglo-catholic [sic] in religion" (Eliot 1970: 7)38. All 
these three stand-points were anti-revolutionary. Moreover, Eliot's critique of Hegel's 
38 Eliot's use of lower-case in "anglo-catholic" is, I believe, unique. The normal usage is 
"Anglo-Catholic" (and indeed many scholars, when quoting this passage, render Eliot's words thus). 
It cannot be argued that this was a printing error, for all editions of For Lancelot Andrewes carry this 
typography. The use of lower-case where upper would normally appear was of course a signature of 
Modernist writers, and perhaps Eliot was showing that despite his asseverations to the contrary, 
something of the Modernist remained in him post-conversion. He was playing `possum once again. 
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politics does not end only in historical events. In the July 1929 The Criterion, which 
summarised the preceding articles about the literatures of Fascism and Communism 
by Barnes and Rowse respectively, Eliot ascribes the "... materialist theory of history" 
as "iss[uing] directly from the brain of Hegel" (Eliot 1967pp: 684). He was the 
spiritual father of Marx, and therefore of Communism. Communism was to Eliot the 
great foe of Western Civilisation. It mixed the heady ingredients of "... science with 
feeling" (yet another reason for Eliot to dislike it), and threatened to replace 
Christianity as the European creed. The Communist was a dangerous individual, 
according to Eliot, because (here quoting Penty), he was "... a man of principle" (Eliot 
1967vvv: 276). He had powerful ideas - "fundamental ideas" (Eliot 1967rrr: 64-66) 
which could fall into men's minds to replace the vague platitudes of corrupt 
liberalism. Hegel had unleashed the ideas which led to Communism, and Eliot was 
naturally against both ideas and the man. 39 
In the face of such hostility to Hegel, the thesis here under consideration might 
well appear to be a futile venture, especially as it wishes to show that some of Eliot's 
work itself was part of this "concealed or derivative" Hegelianism. There are a 
number of factors, however, which militate against the foregoing arguments against 
Eliot's Idealism and dislike of Hegel and Hegelianism. Although Eliot - with the 
exception of Bradley and his style - never acknowledged the debts of Idealist 
philosophers over his work (the nearest he gets to this is the "some" Hegel he had 
read but had "forgotten"), this should not be taken as being proof that they had no 
39 See, for example, Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, an example of how far 
Hegel's political system was the foundation of Marx's. 
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influence. Eliot rarely acknowledged anyone's influence over his work, and indeed 
there is perhaps no reason why he should. In the search for the influences over his 
political and social thought, we might take a cue from the critics of Eliot's literary 
oeuvre. The search for sources here is a very rich seam of investigation. As even a 
quick perusal of Ricks' footnotes to Eliot's early poetry as contained in Inventions of 
the March Hare (Eliot 1997: 64-66) will show, there are a myriad of literary echoes to 
be found in Eliot's work. Take, for example, the notes to the 1910 poem, "The First 
Debate Between Body and Soul". Ricks identifies echoes from Aristotle, Donne, 
Marvell, Dante, Laforgue, Milton, Hawthorne, Shelley, Keats, de Gourmont, 
Cavalcanti, Flaubert, Bertrand, Shakespeare, Byron, James, Rogers, Bradley, 
Symons, Tennyson, Wordsworth, Marston, Verhaeren and Coleridge (Eliot 
1997: 228-237), and this is for a poem of only fifty lines. According to Ricks, the 
range of literary influences on Eliot's poetry is enormous. Unless we take Ricks' 
textual notes as an excuse to parade his own scholarship - which would be most 
unfair - Ricks' work must be taken seriously. As Moody has suggested, Eliot was 
foremost a poet (Moody 1994a: 19), and I believe that in searching for influences over 
his prose works we should take the cue from critics of his poetry, who are willing to 
hear an extraordinarily wide range of voices mixed in Eliot's. There are other 
examples of Eliot's unwillingness (or inability, if he suffered from some form of 
"reading amnesia" which Bowker suggests afflicted Lawrence Durrell [Bowker 
1998: 392]40) to reveal his sources. The 1964 Knowledge and Experience shows a 
40 Bowker calls this, erroneously, "cryptamnesia". 
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mere fifty references and foot-notes to Eliot's original thesis, and this is an academic 
work which should show the highest level of quantifiable research. Some of Eliot's 
famous phrases are also borrowed without acknowledgement. The "objective 
correlative" of the 1919 "Hamlet and his Problems", according to Frank Kermode, 
was a phrase Eliot had picked up from Santayana (Kermode 1967: 236)41. It might 
even be the case that Eliot does not recognise these influences himself, forgetting the 
specific provenance of what he had read but remembering deep in his creative psyche 
lines of poetry and schemes of thought which emerge from time to time in his own 
works. 
Such a phenomenon may be seen in his frequent mis-quotation of lines in The 
Clark Lectures. For example, he quotes the following lines from Lewis Carroll's "The 
Hunting of the Snark": 
... 
from necessity, not from good will, 
Marched along shoulder to shoulder. (Eliot 1996: 52) 
Whereas the lines actually run, 
Till (merely from nervousness, not from good will), 
They marched along shoulder to shoulder. (Eliot 1996: 52: fn 19) 
In the same lecture, Shakespeare is also misquoted. Eliot misquotes from King Le : 
Man must abide 
His going hence, even as his coming hither; 
Ripeness is all. (Eliot 1996: 53) 
which should actually run 
41 The actual phrase was "object correlative". Eliot, in a 1955 letter to Chatterji, said that 
although he thought he had coined the phrase he now believed that it came from Washington 
Allington. 
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Men must endure 
Their going hence, even as their coming hither. 
Ripeness is all. (Eliot 1996: 53: fn 21) 
These mis-quotations show two things. First, that Eliot's memory had the capacity to 
hold an enormous amount of literary "hard copy", and second that it could not always 
place its recall properly. If Eliot had this capacity to store poetry, why not prose also? 
This was demonstrated above, with Machiavelli. Eliot's mind, it seems, hardly forgot 
anything he ever read, despite his claim to the contrary over Fichte and Hegel. 
Moreover, as the work of Ricks shows, Eliot at least in his literary output does not 
pause to acknowledge the echoes and phrases and schemes of other writers in his 
own work. Such a labour would have taken an inordinate amount of time, and 
required footnotes so extensive as to make his works unpublishable. Such a practice 
would have been eccentric in any case. But again, if Eliot's poetry is like this (except 
for the notorious "notes" to "The Waste Land"), then why not his prose? As Eliot 
himself suggested, 
Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets 
deface what they take, and good poets make it into 
something better. (Eliot 1928a: 105) 
Perhaps in his prose works, the same criteria applied, and Eliot the thief knew how to 
cover his tracks (most of the time) in his poetry and his prose. Dante, after all, had 
shown the way, for he "... knew how to pillage right and left" (Eliot 1928a: 52). 
Eliot was also inconsistent with his judgement of various authors, in the way 
that he was capable of praising in one place an author he had previously stigmatised. 
This was not a process of re-evaluation, as with Milton. It was more a case of Eliot 
holding mutually exclusive views at the same time. A good example of this is Proust. 
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While Eliot could summon him as a spectre in The Clark Lectures, as seen above, to 
show his audience what a monster was the writer who dwelt upon the emotions, he 
could, as editor of The Criterion, despite all its classicist leanings, harry the 
Frenchman for a contribution to its pages. He also asked Jacques Riviere and Sydney 
Schiff to persuade Proust to contribute. Eliot's creative mind was simply larger than 
any programme for which he might try to put it to work. Proust was more than 
willing to submit a piece of his newly published A La Recherche de Temps Perdu, 
but ill-health prevented him. In July 1922, shortly before his death, Proust wrote to 
Schiff that "I am in deep despair at not having yet written to Mr Eliot" (Ali 1986: 7)42. 
Proust's "Death of Albertine" was to appear in The Criterion in October 1923, 
translated by Scott-Moncrieff. Many years later, in the "Preface" to the collected The 
Criterion, Eliot was to declare himself "... proud to introduce English readers to the 
work of Marcel Proust" (Eliot 1967a: v). 
Another writer around whom Eliot held contradictory views was Lawrence. In 
After Strange Gods, Eliot had derided Lawrence as a heretic in literature, a product of 
decayed Protestantism. He was immoral and a danger to Western Civilisation. Yet 
Eliot was willing to stand as a witness for the defence in the obscenity trial over 
Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's Lover (he was never called), and in the collected The 
Criterion Lawrence's name is ranked alongside Proust's as those Eliot called himself 
proud to have published (Eliot 1967a: v). Murry was another author who occupied 
contradictory places in Eliot's mind, but we will discuss this later on. Overall, Eliot's 
42 Proust was to die in November 1922, in bed. 
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sometimes forthright condemnations of authors did not reveal his full or true beliefs 
about that person or his works, and cannot be taken as incontrovertible. If Proust and 
Lawrence can be said to occupy such a position, both of whom were bogeymen for 
Eliot in some of his works, might not the corrupt and grotesque Hegel also? 
There is one person to whom Eliot does acknowledge a debt of influence over 
his own works, and that (tellingly, for the purposes of our study) is Bradley. It is 
worth looking at Eliot on Bradley in some depth. Eliot wrote two studies on Bradley 
other than his doctoral thesis, one an obituary notice in The Criterion and the other a 
eulogy on Bradley's style Bradley's Ethical Studies and published in The Times 
Literary Supplement of 29th December 1927 and then in the 1928 in For Lancelot 
Andrewes. In the short notice of October 1924 (Eliot 1967e: 1-2), Bradley is praised. 
Eliot muses that although Bradley did not achieve "kingdoms of this world which 
have been conveyed to HG Wells and Bernard Shaw", his name is among a handful 
of writers which "... carry the most promise of future power. " This is a revealing 
statement: it suggests that Idealist philosophy, to Eliot's mind, has not run its course. 
It is still relevant, even in the era of "... the latest scientific novelty" (Eliot 1967e: 1). 
Eliot proceeds to praise Bradley for "... restor[ing] the rank of Britain amongst 
philosophers". His philosophy is indigenous, being "English", and was saved from 
the "... emotional ubiquities which render German metaphysics monstrous" (Eliot 
1.967e: 1-2). This is another critique of Hegel, and Eliot is at pains to point out that 
Bradley's debt to the German is "apparent" only. The true essence of Bradley is "... the 
light of medieval schoolmen" (Eliot 1967e: 1). Their tradition was of course Latin, 
and European, rather than German, the significance of which has been noted above. 
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Eliot seems to go to some length to paint Bradley as some kind of native genius 
unsullied by rough Teutonism, imbibing instead the pure waters of medieval 
philosophy through some kind of osmosis in the precincts of Oxford, or as Eliot says 
in his article, "Who shall say that [Bradley's scholarship] does not draw some of its 
virtue from the genius of the place with which it is associated? " (Eliot 1967e: 2). 
Eliot's Bradley appears like Eliot's Blake, a native genius, except that Blake's 
supposed limitations (he was not part of the European Tradition) were not Bradley's 
(Eliot 1928a: 128-134). 
Bradley's claim to greatness was two-fold. First, there was his graceful prose, 
which according to Eliot was "... the finest philosophic style in our language, in which 
acute intellect and passionate feeling preserve a classic balance" (Eliot 1967e: 2). 
Eliot attempted to model his own prose style on Bradley, and many years later 
delighted to let the world know that it was a successful imitation, according to the 
1964 Knowledge and Experience. Second, Bradley's greatness was simply the content 
of his message, that is, his Absolute Idealist philosophy. His was a power to change 
lives. Those who "... surrendered patient years to the understanding of his meaning" 
(1967e: 2) were greatly rewarded: on them 
... his writings perform that mysterious and complete 
operation which transmutes not one department of thought 
only, but the whole intellectual and emotional tone of their 
being. (Eliot 1967e: 2) 
Eliot was doubtless one of these, for he had devoted many years to studying 
Bradley. He was, by his own admission, forever changed by it. And this is a 
powerful counter-argument to the main objections to the thesis as outlined in this 
present chapter. In the very midst of the period in which he appears to jettison his 
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philosophical credentials, on the death of Bradley he declares himself still his pupil. 
In the longer essay on Bradley, Eliot expands the outline of Bradley's 
greatness that The Criterion obituary notice contained, or at least the part which 
dealt with Bradley's literary style. After considering that Bradley's genius "... was 
the singular one of thinking rather than the common one of writing books" (Eliot 
1967e: 2) - in that Bradley purportedly published very little and that sporadically - 
Eliot suggests that Bradley's writings do not form nor contrive to form a "system". 
Eliot assiduously collects Bradley's own disclaimers in supporting this hypothesis. 
Ethical Studies did not aim "... at the construction of a system of moral philosophy" 
(Eliot 1967e: 2). Principles of Logic "... makes no claim to supply any systematic 
treatment of logic" (Eliot 1967e: 2), and Appearance and Reality "... does [not] carry 
out the idea of a system" (Eliot 1967e: 2). In the 1927 essay, he appears anxious to 
deny that Bradley's thought was in any way attempting a systematic approach to 
knowledge, ethics and logic. Eliot's Bradley (at least in 1927 form) appears to be an 
occasional writer of elegant though unconnected tracts, and then only when the 
need arose. Is this view tenable, and why did Eliot hold it? It might be considered 
that Eliot is attempting to protect Bradley from the stain of Hegelianism. Hegel was 
the architect of a very considerable "system", which in Eliot's day still "corrupted". 
Bradley, in Eliot's view, should not be seen as an Hegelian derivative attempting to 
forge a similar system in England. 
This view of an "unsystematic" Bradley might be considered eccentric, 
another example of Eliot pushing a view to something near absurdity, as with 
Machiavelli. Bradley's work can surely not be seen as "occasional". His major 
249 
works occupy six substantial volumes (Ethical Studies, Principles of Logic, 
Appearance and Reality, Essays on Truth and Reality, and two volumes of 
Collected Essays) and Bradley published regularly throughout his long career. 
Moreover, Bradley was a great exponent of "system", which lay at the heart of his 
philosophical quest. In Essays on Truth and Reality, for example, Bradley states 
emphatically 
What I maintain is that in the case of facts of perception 
and memory the test which we do apply, and which we 
must apply, is that of system. (Bradley 1994: 296) 
This "system" is simply the whole content of connected knowledge, "... as wide and 
as consistent as may be" (Bradley 1994: 296). Integral aspects of this system are 
"... coherence and comprehensiveness" (Bradley 1994: 322). Modern critics of 
Bradley's work find this system easily enough. David Holdcroft, for example, in the 
1998 Appearance versus Reality, uses the Bradleyan coherence-comprehensiveness 
"system" in examining the notion of "floating ideas" (Holdcroft 1998: 171-172). It 
seems that Bradley had a system, and it lay at the heart of his philosophical 
enquiries. That Eliot chose to ignore this aspect arose from the desire to conserve 
Bradley for his English audience. 
What, then, Eliot asks, are Bradley's claims to permanent importance? Three 
years after The Criterion's obituary notice, in which Eliot may have been a little 
unguarded for his own liking in his praise of the contents of Bradley's metaphysics, 
the lasting worth of Bradley was principally to be found in his style. Eliot changes 
his appreciation of Bradley from substance to form, although the two were very 
closely connected in Eliot's view, at least in 1927. This can be seen in his article 
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about Russell in the March 1919 edition of The Nation, 
It is impossible to give oneself over to a judgement of any 
philosopher based purely on his prose, in the narrower sense 
of the word "style", yet a great deal of light may often be 
thrown on a philosopher by holding his work up to the 
standards of literature. For literary standards help us to 
perceive just those moments when a writer is scrupulously 
and sincerely attending to his vision. .. For where that 
is, 
there will the style be; and where the style does not 
convince, the vision will be lacking. 
(Eliot 1919a: 768) 
Notably, the 1927 essay on Bradley was collected in For Lancelot Andrewes, which 
was subtitled Essays in Style and Order. Bradley has power and influence, Eliot 
reasons, by virtue of "... his great gift of style" (Eliot 1975: 197)43. For Bradley's 
purposes it was "... a perfect style" (Eliot 1979: 197). Notably, Bradley's "purposes" 
were for Eliot solely to "... demolish the Logic of Mill and the psychology of Bain" 
(Eliot 1975: 199). This, surely, is a deliberate miss-reading of Bradley's raison 
d'etre. But style is what chiefly concerns Eliot in 1927. Bradley's writings were akin 
to Matthew Arnold's. They were "... alike in their purple passages", and possessed a 
".... similarity of tone and tension and beat" (Eliot 1975: 198). His was a battle 
against "... raw and provincial [writing]" (Eliot 1975: 199), replacing it with 
something "... catholic, civilised and universal" (Eliot 1975: 199). Bradley here 
appears like Lancelot Andrewes himself, whose possession of "... breadth of 
culture" put him "... on terms of equality with [his] Continental antagonists and 
enabled him to elevate [his] Church above the position of a local heretical sect" 
43 This would appear to contradict the opening sentence of the 1919 quotation. We might 
reconcile the 1919 to the 1927 Eliot by suggesting a simple development of thought, especially as in 
1919 Eliot had entered his "scientific" phase of criticism. 
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(Eliot 1970: 14). Eliot wants Bradley to appear in a tradition of English writers, and 
this meant that he had to be free of the Hegelian and foreign (as in Teutonic) taint. 
Why is there such a difference between Eliot's thoughts on Bradley in 1924 
and 1927? It might be posited, as hinted above, that in 1924, on Bradley's death, 
Eliot was off his guard. The news of Bradley's death "... brought an intimate and 
private grief' (Eliot 1970: 14). In this Eliot's true feelings came to the fore: he 
admits to being one who had "... surrender[ed] patient years to the understanding of 
[Bradley's] meaning", which "transmuted" one's whole being (Eliot 1970: 14). His 
style was "consummate" also, but it is the contents of Bradley's work, not their 
form, which Eliot praises in 1924. By 1927 this focus had changed. It was a change 
which was perhaps tied in with his personal circumstances: it was the year that saw 
Eliot both baptised and confirmed as an Anglican and become a British subject. For 
Lancelot Andrewes can be seen as a kind of apology for this movement, in parts 
celebrating what was best in English culture. A consistent theme of this book was 
the application of a writer's skills to the pressing needs of the day, in a kind of wise 
pragmatism. Andrewes and Hooker did this in founding the English Church. John 
Bramhall achieved the same in Ireland. Machiavelli (although an eccentric choice 
for the book) did the same in Renaissance Italy. And Bradley fought against the 
"... insular and immature and cranky" (Eliot 1970: 59) philosophy of Utilitarianism 
principally with his majestic irony. Like the other characters of For Lancelot 
Andrewes, Bradley's importance is strictly tied to a particular period and to a 
particular need. 
Eliot, then, was keen to admit his debt to Bradley. In 1924 this was a debt both 
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to content and style; by 1927/8 it was merely style. Bradley was one of the "masters" 
guiding Eliot's hand, whose face is perhaps part of "a familiar compound ghost" of 
Little Gidding (Eliot 1969: 193). It could be argued that Eliot was here admitting 
Hegelian influence, perhaps unwittingly. Despite Eliot's assertion that Bradley had 
only an "... apparent debt to Hegel" (Eliot 1967e: 2), Bradley's debt was in fact far 
greater. His Ethical Studies, according to Wollheim, is "Hegelian in many of its 
ideas... [and] to an even greater extent Hegelian in its method" (Wollheim 1988: xv), 
and references to Hegel's works occur often in Appearance and Reality, where the 
German is appealed to as if he were an ultimate authority44. In The Principles of 
Logic Hegel also appears as teacher and guide, when Bradley makes the following 
observation on science: 
Science from the first is a process of idealisation; and 
experiment, Hegel has long ago told us, is an idealising 
instrument. (Bradley 1994: 88) 
Moreover, Hegel is nowhere more present than on the last page of Appearance and 
Reality, where Bradley admits his debt: 
I will end with something-perhaps more essentially the 
message of Hegel. Outside of spirit there is not, and there 
cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is 
spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real. 
(Bradley 1946: 489) 
To Eliot, who had spent so many "patient years" studying Bradley, Bradley's reliance 
upon Hegel's philosophy could not have been unknown. Although he was anxious to 
distance himself and Bradley from Hegel, in acknowledging his debt to Bradley, was 
44 See, for example, the footnote on page 450 of Appearance and Reality. 
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he not also tacitly acknowledging his debt to Hegel? 
7.3. Objection Three: The Scientific Mr Eliot 
... art may be said to approach the condition of science 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent" (Eliot 1927: 44) 
Eliot, at least in the earlier part of the period under review, set himself to 
counter-balance what he saw as excessive emotionalism in art and literature by 
resorting to what might be described as a "scientific" criticism. He sought after the 
objective, factual, and external, rather than the subjective which he saw Hegelianism 
as representing. Some of Eliot's most celebrated work comes from this period, most 
notably "Hamlet and his Problems"45 and "Tradition and the Individual Talent"46. In 
these works, he is perhaps under the influence of Russell and the new "doctrine" of 
science which he represented. Eliot had studied under Russell at Harvard and was 
beguiled by him. He took to studying Russell and Whitehead's Principia 
Mathematica, so much that Eliot's friend Blanshard 
... recalls [Eliot's] sitting 
for hour after hour at the dining- 
table of their little [holiday] cottage with one of the volumes 
of this work propped up before him. (Sencourt 1971: 49) 
Eliot was struck by its formal beauty and was later to commend the Principia as one 
of Europe's great cultural achievements. Eliot attempted to carry this objective clarity 
+s First published in The Athenaeum, 26th September 1919, number 4665, pp. 940-941. 
46 First published in The Egoist, VI: 4, September 1919. 
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into his own critical work. In "Hamlet and his Problems", for example, he searches 
for an objective basis on which to judge the play: 
Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be interpreted; there 
is nothing to interpret; we can only criticise according to 
standards, in comparison to other works of art; and for 
"interpretation" the chief task is the presentation of certain 
historical facts which the reader is not assumed to know. 
(Eliot 1927: 82) 
Facts are what the critic needs to give his reader so that the reader can make a more 
informed judgement. Otherwise, art is quite useless: it has no connection with the 
world. Not only does Eliot in this essay suggest a more objective task for the critic 
(more an historian than an interpreter of symbols), but he tellingly suggests that the 
failure of the play Hamlet is the way it mishandles emotion: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by 
finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of 
objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the 
formula of that particular emotion, such that when the 
external facts... are given, the emotion is immediately 
evoked. (Eliot 1927: 85-86) 
Eliot here appears to want to strip emotions of any potential ambiguity, and define 
and delineate them until their portrayal approaches something like scientific 
notation. Eliot insists that this is the "only way" of treating emotion in art. 
The subject of the scientific basis for criticism is articulated in "Tradition and 
the Individual Talent". Eliot argues for the necessity for the individual artist's 
personality to be subsumed into his or her inherited cultural tradition. This does not 
come naturally or easily, as in some Romantic inspiration, but has to be worked at 
with great toil with "... a great amount of erudition" (Eliot 1927: 43). The personality 
of the artist, as the seat of the emotions, has to be brought under control and 
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eventually extirpated. It might be considered that Eliot is here attempting to make 
the artist into some form of laboratory scientist, whose personal involvement with 
the work in hand begins and ends at his finger-tips: 
The progress of the artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a 
continual extinction of personality. (Eliot 1927: 44) 
It is in this "process of depersonalisation" according to Eliot that art "... may be said 
to approach the condition of science" (Eliot 1927: 44). As such, it is almost as 
though Eliot suggests that in becoming more like a science art approaches 
perfection. As he wrote to Lewis about his work in The Criterion, "I am not an 
individual but an instrument, and anything I do is in the interests of literature and 
civilisation" (Ali 1986: 37). Eliot further uses scientific terminology in an analogy 
for the mind of the artist. It is like a strip of platinum, acting as a catalyst in the 
creative process wherein his raw experience is turned into art. Eliot's catalytic 
process involves "... finely filiated platinum" being introduced to "... oxygen and 
sulphur dioxide" (Eliot 1927: 44). These, Eliot asserts, will form sulphurous acid, 
leaving the platinum untouched. It is significant that Eliot gets his chemistry 
wrong. Oxygen (02) and sulphur dioxide (2SO3) will produce only 2SO3, which 
only in the presence of water will give H2SO4, sulphuric acid, according to the 
review of the 1932 edition of Eliot's Selected Essays (Anon 1967: 167). This 
anonymous review may well have been by Eliot himself, which would add a rich 
irony. Even if it were not by Eliot, it would have crossed his editorial desk and 
(presumably) met his approval for publication. The reviewer spends his entire 
piece on the chemical error, and concludes: 
Whether the theory of poetic creation which Mr Eliot 
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supports by this celebrated metaphor remains valid, is more 
difficult to decide. (Anon 1967: 167) 
Presumably there was a doubt that it did: perhaps this doubt had larger 
ramifications, that Eliot's entire "scientific" phase was bogus. 
Not only were his essays ground for Eliot's new scientific regime of thought. 
Eliot's quest after objectivity saw many other effusions. Perhaps most important is 
the publication of Eliot's The Criterion. Although the name was suggested by 
Vivien, being the name of a restaurant which she used to frequent (Ali 1986: 4), it 
also expressed a definite, quantifiable standard. Ali suggests that the standard 
... was to try to make Classicism the spirit of the age, to have 
a base from which the individualist, irrational impulses 
associated with Romanticism could be challenged and 
rejected. (Eliot in Ali 1986: 10) 
The Criterion, according to Eliot, 
... aims at the examination of 
first principles in criticism, at 
the valuation, and re-evaluation of old works of literature 
according to principles, and the illustration of these 
principles in creative writing.. . 
It aims at the assertion of 
order and discipline in literary tastes. (Ali 1986: 21-22)47 
Eliot wanted these standards to be universal, just like the scientific systems of 
classification. Writing to Ford, on the foundation of The Transatlantic Review, Eliot 
congratulated his magazine for being the sister publication of The Criterion - 
... I 
have always maintained what appears to be one of your 
capital tenets: that the standards of literature should be 
international. (Eliot in Ali 1986: 29) 
The Criterion, in its job of promoting these universal standards, sought contributors 
This description is from a flyer inserted into the July 1923 issue. 
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whose work would (in Eliot's words) further "... the formation of a design and the 
execution of a purpose" (Ali 1986: 31)48. Its job was to be a kind of literary The 
Lancet. It seemed that Eliot was far from the concerns of Absolute Idealist 
philosophy with which he had occupied himself until 1916. As Bowker suggests, 
Eliot in his work encapsulated the current thinking in scientific circles: 
Einstein's theory [of relativity] had relativized not only 
[the] view of the material world but also the view of the 
human personality... Joyce, Proust and Eliot, whose work 
proceeds through spiralling and counter-spiralling motion, 
represents the new [way of thought]. (Bowker 1998: 191) 
Eliot's apparent attachment to things scientific can however be seen to be both 
temporary and illusory, at least in part. His lack of understanding of the chemical 
process, which played so prominent a role in "Tradition and the Individual Talent", 
has already been highlighted. But his unscientific way of thinking runs much deeper 
than mere miscalculation. A careful perusal of The Criterion shows that despite 
Eliot's desire for a new-found "objectivity" in literature, his mind in reality was still 
set against this precision. It took four issues before Eliot offered to his readers any 
definition of what The Criterion was about, and then its "criterion" was defined as 
little more than "... the application, in literature, of principles which have their 
consequences also in politics and in private conduct" (Eliot 1967ai: 421). These 
"principles" were never precisely defined; it was as though Eliot could not force 
himself to limit his scope as editor by such formulas, despite his apparent wish to do 
so. The Criterion's criteria, like the asseveration in the Preface to For Lancelot 
48 This is from a flyer to the October 1923 issue. 
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Andrewes, were really an illusion49. That Eliot's "scientific" period was little more 
than a passing fad can be seen in an examination of the unfortunate Bertrand Russell. 
Russell was the point at which Eliot's antagonism towards the scientific method often 
emerged. Arguing against Russell's article in the March 1923 edition of The Dial, 
Eliot states: 
One is immediately struck by the arrogance of the scientist. 
(Eliot 1967b: 233) 
This might be brushed aside as a piece of personal vendetta against Russell50 
However, Eliot broadens the scope of the criticism in a very important way: 
The man of letters or the man of "culture" of the present 
time is far too easily impressed and overawed by scientific 
knowledge... the claims of the scientists are fortified by the 
cowardice of the men of letters. (Eliot 1967b: 233) 
It does not seem possible that the author of "Tradition and the Individual Talent" 
could possibly be the same who here accuses his fellow "men of letters" of quailing 
before scientific method. Perhaps there is an element of self-criticism here, of his 
1919 piece. Eliot at least appears contradictory. Such a stand against the claims of 
science is not isolated to 1923. In the October 1924 The Criterion, Eliot in his 
obituary note for Bradley bewails the fact that contemporaries will simply note the 
fact of his death "... and will hurry on to the discussion of the latest scientific 
49 In this preface, on p. 7, Eliot stated that he was "classicist in literature, royalist in politics, 
and anglo-catholic [sic] in religion. " He immediately deflated these claims by writing: "I am quite 
aware that the first term is completely vague, and easily lends itself to clap-trap; I am aware that the 
second term is at present without definition... [and] the third term does not rest with me to define. " It is 
remarkable how many Eliot scholars do not consider these caveats. 
50 The cause of this may have been Russell's 1917 affair with Vivien Eliot. 
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novelty" (Eliot 1967e: 1). In Eliot's thought, there now appears a dichotomy between 
art and science, whereas for a brief time the two had to be combined. The same 
Commentary in The Criterion also contained an attack on the British Association for 
the Advancement of Science. Although Eliot suggests that 
... there never was a time more 
dangerous than now for the 
humble man of letters to paddle in the tides of science. 
(Eliot 1967e: 3) 
(another instance of the arts-versus-science shift in Eliot's mind), he feels called to 
warn his audience against "making use of scientific generalisations". Here is another 
instance of "to criticise the critic", and this piece of advice Eliot could use against 
himself. Importantly, Eliot sees the coming danger of applying scientific ideas to 
civilisation. Writing against Gamble's paper "Construction and Control in Animal 
Life", Eliot sees the application of zoology to human affairs as "... hardly a prospect 
to be desired" (Eliot 1967e: 3). Eliot begins to associate scientific thinking with the 
mechanisation of civilisation and the destruction of the environment, which in The 
Idea of a Christian Society is prominent (Eliot 1982: 80-81). By 1926, Eliot's anti- 
scientific mind-set has become permanent. Science should be kept in its proper 
place, and not spill over to the concerns of art and civilisation. Again Russell is the 
flash-point for Eliot, in a notice on Russell's What I Believe: "... when he trespasses 
outside of mathematical philosophy his excursions are often descents" (Eliot 
1967j: 6)_ 
Eliot's putative rejection of Absolute Idealism - summed up, perhaps, in "The 
Waste Land"'s lines 
On Margate sands 
I can connect 
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Nothing with nothing (Eliot 1969: 70) 
- and his apparent adoption of objective, almost scientific criteria for literary 
criticism, can I feel be seen to be temporary. It can be argued that by the launch of 
The Criterion in 1922 this phase in Eliot's development had already passed. In the 
"Notes" appended to the first volume of The Criterion, in July 1923, Margate sands' 
"unconnectedness" seems to have vanished. In defining the nature of a literary 
review, Eliot suggests that 
A literary review should maintain the application, in 
literature, of principles which have their consequences also 
in politics and in private conduct. (Eliot 1967ai: 421) 
Essentially, these principles enjoy a particular relationship. Eliot wished to view 
"... every human activity, and to perceive it in relation with every other" (Eliot 1967ai 
: 421). Every human endeavour was therefore connected - in a very real sense, "... all 
truths are connected" (Bradley 1946: 46). In setting his new journal to make these 
connections, Eliot in a sense was fleshing out a central concern of Absolute Idealist 
philosophy. 
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Chapter Eight: The Contemporary Eliot 
8.1. An introduction 
... the classical English treatises on 
Church and State.. . 
do not give me 
the assistance that I need. (Eliot 1982: 46) 
The fourth objection to our thesis, which is perhaps the most powerful and 
certainly the most pertinent to our enquiry, is that the influences Eliot himself cites 
for The Idea of a Christian Society are his contemporaries. In the "Preface" to its 
published form, Eliot denies that his ideas are original. He writes, 
To aim at originality would be an impertinence: at most, this 
essay can be only an original arrangement of ideas which did 
not belong to me before and which must become the property 
of whoever can use them. (Eliot 1982: 41) 
One is reminded perhaps of Eliot's dictum on the writers of verse, that "mature poets 
steal". The victims of Eliot's theft are - according to the "Preface" - two distinct 
groups. First, there are "... certain friends whose minds are engrossed" (Eliot 1982: 41) 
with the problems that Eliot confronted in his work, and with whom Eliot has 
discussed the matters in hand, and who are not named. Second, there are what Eliot 
calls "recent books", and these are listed. In what order, if any, this list is put is not 
revealed. To these works Eliot admits that he "... owe(s) a great deal" (Eliot 1982: 41). 
There is Dawson's Beyond Politics; Murray's The Price of Leadership; "... the writings 
of the Rev. V. A. Demant", which are not specified in the "Preface" (although they 
are later on - see the following) except for his Religious Prospect [of Mankind] 
which was published after Eliot wrote The Idea of a Christian Society; and "... the 
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works of Jacques Maritain, especially his Humanisme inte rgal" (Eliot 1982: 42) To 
these two groups, for purposes of our study, must be added the works cited by Eliot 
either in the text or in the footnotes. These are more numerous than those admitted to 
in the text, and they are: 
-a work by AJ Penty, not specified (p. 60) 
- Coleridge's Church and State (p. 83). Eliot does not give the full title here. 
-a work or works by RH Tawney, cited as an example of the "... several Christian 
economists and sociologists" whose work had influenced Eliot (p. 83). 
- Demant's Christian Polity (p. 83). 
- Hauer's "essay" in the volume Germany's New Religion (p. 86). Eliot omits to 
mention that Hauer wrote two essays in this volume. 
- de Rougemont, L'Amour et 1'occident (p. 87). 
- Henson's Cui Bono? and Disestablishment (p. 92). 
- Austin, Moral Re-Armament (p. 95). Eliot mis-cites the title here. 
-H Beevor, Peace and Pacifism (p. 97). 
I propose to discuss the major works in each category (to examine all of them would, 
alas, make this project unmanageable), and attempt to portray what influence each 
had on The Idea of a Christian Society. These must be dealt with in some detail as it 
was Eliot's clear wish for his readers to see his 1939 work as inspired by his 
contemporaries. I propose only to deal with written sources, as attempting to see what 
influence Eliot's interlocutors had over him would be a near impossible task. 
However, before we begin, we must explore the possible reasons why Eliot was 
so inaccurate in his citing of the titles of other works in The Idea of a Christian 
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Socie . As we saw above, this was a 
habit that can be demonstrated at various 
periods in Eliot's career. First in the list of reasons is that Eliot was quoting titles 
from memory as he prepared his manuscript for publication. Perhaps the original 
manuscript, a set of lecture notes, would not have contained such information. This 
might well explain away such omissions as the retitling Austin's Moral Rearmament: 
the Battle for Peace as simply Moral Re-Armament. Eliot the school-teacher perhaps 
wanted to correct Austin's putative error, also. If Eliot was simply misquoting from 
memory, it is a blight upon his skills as both editor and author. Second, and more 
seriously for our study, Eliot wanted to somehow cover his tracks. His omission to 
say that Hauer's work was read in translation - although by the fact that Eliot gives it 
its English title it might be reasonably assumed it was a translation - perhaps shows 
Eliot wishing to hide his lack of skill in German. This point was discussed above vis- 
a-vis Hegel. Here we may have Eliot the not-so-scholarly scholar covering 
deficiencies. An even more interesting omission involves the work of Coleridge. 
Eliot had misquoted titles of works before - for example, giving Bramhall's A Just 
Vindication of the Church of England from the Unjust Aspersion of Criminal Schism 
as simply Just Vindication of the English Church (Eliot 1970: 36). Thus the 
misquoting Coleridge's On the Constitution of the Church and State according the 
Idea of each as simply Church and State had a long pedigree. This was not perhaps 
simply a dysfunction of memory, however. It might well have been a deliberate 
concealment. Eliot's re-naming Bramhall's A Just Vindication of the Church of 
England from the Unjust Aspersion of Criminal Schism as Just Vindication of the 
English Church (a title which does not make particularly clear sense) revealed a 
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hidden purpose in For Lancelot Andrewes: it was part of Eliot's own attempt at 
vindicating the Church to which he had submitted in baptism. Bramhall's work 
becomes Eliot's work, and it is transmuted in the process. It was part of a living 
tradition and this was what living artists did with tradition, according to "Tradition 
and the Individual Talent". Moreover, Eliot changes Bramhall's "Church of England" 
to "English Church". This was significant, as it reflected Eliot's Anglocentricity and 
his desire to become thoroughly English. Eliot's own concerns, it might be seen, 
transformed his material into his own image. With Coleridge, this might also be seen. 
Coleridge's influence on The Idea of a Christian Society will be discussed shortly, but 
here we must pause and ask why Eliot misquotes its title. What he omits is of crucial 
importance. First, he leaves out "On the Constitution of... " Why this omission? It was 
surely not simply because it was too long for him to write down. Perhaps it was 
because Eliot did not wish to deal with constitutional issues in The Idea of a 
Christian Society - he had, after all, stated early on that "The subject of Church and 
State... is not my primary concern" (Eliot 1982: 45) - and did not wish Coleridge's title 
to imply that this was some kind of weakness of Eliot's part. The Idea of a Christian 
Socie might have paled in comparison with Coleridge's book and Eliot might have 
been careful to avoid this. Second, Eliot omits "... according to the Idea of each" from 
the title. This is an even more significant "oversight". Eliot uses the word "Idea" in 
his title; it is The Idea of a Christian Society, and this looks close if not identical to 
Coleridge's use of the word in his title. Moreover, it is not an idea, but the idea in 
each book. This is a specific use of the word. It does not mean "general plan" or "blue 
print", but rather a set of values which translate into actuality. Eliot attempts to define 
265 
this in The Idea of a Christian Society, and interestingly he uses the definition of 
"idea" which Coleridge used in On the Constitution of the Church and State 
according to the Idea of each, almost verbatim. This is not acknowledged in the 
actual text, but only as a footnote. Eliot has stolen again, and appears to wish to hide 
that theft. We must ask ourselves, why? It might appear to be a surprising 
concealment, as Eliot may have wished to link his views with those of Coleridge, if 
only to borrow some glory. It would also have placed Eliot in a rich tradition in 
English thought, alongside Newman's The Idea of a University. But Eliot instead 
distances himself and chooses - very uncharacteristically - to be aloof from tradition. 
The reason might be two-fold. First, Coleridge's views, often characterised as Broad 
Church, were perhaps antipathetic to Eliot's. Coleridge was not entirely orthodox on 
religious matters and perhaps the consciously ultra-orthodox Eliot did not want any 
Coleridgian contamination in his work. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
Coleridge represented a strain of thought in nineteenth century letters that was 
heavily influenced by German Idealism. That Coleridge put so much emphasis upon 
the role of "the Idea" was symptomatic of this way of thought. Eliot, although doing 
exactly the same in The Idea of a Christian Society, did not want it to be that 
obvious, given the reasons as outlined above. 
It might be put that Eliot's "Preface" and footnotes for The Idea of a Christian 
Society are in the mould of his other prefaces and footnotes. They are inaccurate and 
misleading, perhaps deliberately so. Eliot always seems to want to conceal himself. 
He makes it very difficult to know his sources. Those sources he does reveal are also 
partly concealed - "I am here/Or there, or elsewhere. " (Eliot 1969: 178) 
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8.2. Christopher Dawson: Beyond Politics 
Christopher Dawson was a lay Roman Catholic theologian whose Beyond 
Politics was published in January 1939 by Sheed and Ward, shortly before Eliot 
delivered the lectures which composed The Idea of a Christian Society. It was part of 
the soul-searching that provoked many works in the 1930's on the future of Christian 
Society, of which Eliot's is one of the last. The concerns of both Beyond Politics and 
The Idea of a Christian Society are similar. Dawson saw that the important issue of 
the late 1930's 
... was a change 
in the whole social structure of the modern 
world, which affects religion and culture as well as politics 
and economics... (Dawson 1939: 3) 
This change in the basic structures of civilisation was observable in Britain, so that 
"we might expect to see the rise in democratic totalitarianism" (Dawson 1939: 3). 
This concern The Idea of a Christian Society echoes to a great degree. According to 
Eliot, "... the real issue[s] of contemporary civilisation" (Eliot 1982: 41) was the state 
of "... the substratum of collective temperament, ways of behaviour and unconscious 
values" (Eliot 1982: 50) of Britain. For both Dawson and Eliot, it was by reviving 
this dormant life of the people that the threats of Fascism and Communism to 
Western Society could be overcome. For Dawson, 
... the problem which confronts us today 
is how the 
democratic states are to make themselves strong enough to 
exist in the face of new powers... (Dawson 1939: 11) 
This was to be done, primarily, by the better organisation of society and its values: 
If Western civilisation is to be saved it is necessary to find 
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some way of removing the divided aims. . . that [is] the 
weaknesses of democracy. (Dawson 1939: 12) 
According to Dawson, the reason for totalitarianism's successes was its ability to 
organise people and unite them in aim and purpose: 
It is through their realisation of that truth [of organising] 
that the dictators have earned their success. . . they 
have been 
aspired [sic] to change the spirit of a people... 
(Dawson 1939: 12) 
Eliot's concerns are virtually the same. He wrote, "In times of emergency" 
... it may prove 
in the long run that the problems we have 
postponed or ignored [i. e. those of contemporary 
civilisation]... will return to plague us. (Eliot 1982: 42) 
Against the threat of the totalitarian regimes, 
We [i. e. the Western democracies] could not match 
conviction with conviction, we had no idea with which we 
could either meet or oppose the ideas opposed to us. 
(Eliot 1982: 82) 
Eliot sought in The Idea of a Christian Society not to revive the existing flagging 
political system, but something more: 
What we are seeking is not a programme for a party, but a 
way of life for a people... (Eliot 1982: 51) 
For Eliot, Fascism and Communism were ideas and belief systems, which unified 
their followers in a way which democracy could not. He shared with Dawson a 
desire to see the free nations become as vigorous in their cultural life as Germany 
and Russia, or else they would fall into the same state. A lack of principles, either 
political, cultural or religious, Eliot saw as disastrous. For in a vacuum of principle, 
such as Britain in 1939, a man of principle - whatever it was - would gather 
adherents. And a Communist was definitely a man of principle, according to Eliot; it 
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was his main strength (Eliot 1967ppp: 276). As he wrote in The Criterion of July 
1933, 
Communism... has come as a godsend (so to speak) to those 
young people who would like to grow up and believe in 
something. (Eliot 1967nnn: 472) 
Both authors see the problem as bigger than that of mere politics. For Dawson, 
... 
if it is dangerous to attempt the fundamental 
reorganisation of economic life by purely political means, it 
is far more dangerous to bring politics into the order of 
culture, for this means the invasion of the human soul by the 
hand of power. (Dawson 1939: 18) 
Eliot had a similar lack of faith in the power of politics and parties. These 
"... conceal from us the real issues of contemporary civilisation" (Eliot 1982: 41), 
and can only deliver fudged agreements like Chamberlain's in September 1938. 
Politics only dealt with superficial problems, as its tendency was "... towards 
expediency which may become cynical manipulation" (Dawson 1939: 56-57). For 
both Eliot and Dawson what was needed was a fundamental reorganisation of the 
cultural life of Britain which cut deeper than politics. Dawson saw that 
... the coming of the totalitarian regimes 
has put an end to 
[the] rule of laissez faire [in culture] ... They 
have shown that 
a nation which organises the whole of its social life gains an 
immense access of strength... We must create a new 
institution... for the organisation of national culture... 
(Dawson 1939: 56-57) 
Eliot also wished for a fundamental shift in the organisation of British life. "The 
Christian", he wrote, 
... can 
be satisfied with nothing less than a Christian 
organisation of society... (Eliot 1982: 62) 
This "Christian community" is homogeneous. There "... is a unified religious-social 
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code of behaviour", and "... social customs would take on religious sanctions" which 
would "... make for social tenacity and coherence" (Eliot 1982: 62). Such 
organisation in society was necessary to combat what both authors saw as the 
problems of contemporary culture which was driven by mass movements such as 
the radio and the cinema. For Dawson 
... there is the... 
fundamental... problem of how the 
individual... is to resist the pressure of mass emotion... the 
average man and woman.. . their minds are moulded and 
their opinions formed insensibly by the mass suggestion 
and propaganda of the press, radio and cinema. 
(Dawson 1939: 77) 
Against these mass movements of communication and propaganda, Western 
Christianity is effete, according to Dawson: 
[Christianity's] ideological influence is weak, even where 
its moral influence is still active. And this provides the new 
socio-economic ideologies both with an opportunity and a 
justification... the greatest danger that threatens modern 
civilisation is its degeneration into the hedonistic mass 
civilisation of the cinema, picture paper and dance hall, 
where the individual, family and nation dissolve into a 
human herd without personality, tradition or beliefs. 
(Dawson 1939: 78-79) 
Eliot is synoptic in his view, and in a passage bewailing the fall of society from its 
former Christian state, he even uses some of the phrases from Dawson, suggesting 
that the Tatter's influence over The Idea of a Christian Society is indeed strong. "The 
more highly industrialised the country", wrote Eliot, 
the more easily a materialistic philosophy will flourish in 
it, and the more deadly that philosophy will be... And the 
tendency of unlimited industrialisation is to create bodies 
of men and women - of all classes - detached from 
tradition, alienated from religion, and susceptible to mass 
suggestion... (Eliot 1982: 53) 
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That Eliot follows Dawson's text closely at this point may be seen in the following 
points. He uses the phrase "men and women", where he would usually employ the 
word "men". "Mass suggestion" also appealed to Eliot, perhaps because of its quasi- 
sociological tone. Another word borrowed from Dawson was "tradition", although as 
this was a familiar term and concept in the Eliot canon perhaps its use is not unusual 
here. 
Against this monster of mass culture51, both Eliot and Dawson suggest that 
organisations are needed in order to withstand the cultural forces of totalitarianism. 
For both writers, these organisations had to be independent in order to be truly 
effective. "It is still possible", wrote Dawson, 
to create an organisation of national culture which would 
not be dependent on the State... (Dawson 1939: 27-28) 
Eliot concurred. He desired a body of people which would "... collectively form the 
conscious mind and the conscience of the nation", and lead the cultural life of the 
Christian Society of the land (Eliot 1982: 68). This group would be drawn from all 
walks of life and not be connected - in view of their cultural work, at least - to any 
particular institution. Despite this desire for some kind of group of like-minded 
people to lead the nation's cultural life, Eliot and Dawson's plans are different in 
their suggested form for these groups. Dawson wanted firm principles: 
If the English tradition is to survive... [w]e need a definite 
organisation which does not compete with that of political 
parties, but which is strong enough. . . to meet the 
s' At this point we should note that Eliot's stance on popular culture was ambiguous - he had 
an affinity for the music-hall, for example. The recent work of the Chicago scholar David Chinitz 
explores this theme. 
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competitive organisations and ideologies of communism 
and fascism... (Dawson 1939: 54-55) 
Dawson's vision is for some kind of institution like the British Council, independent 
and self-assured. Presumably it would be a voluntary organisation whose members 
(except for a salaried few to administrate) would work for no stipend, while holding 
other careers, although Dawson does not trouble his reader with such details. 
Despite these grey areas, Dawson's cultural group is much firmer round the edges 
than Eliot's. The cultural guardians in The Idea of a Christian Society are much less 
obviously a group. For Eliot, the members of what he called "the Community of 
Christians" 
... would 
include, besides many of the laity engaged in 
various occupations, many, but not all, of the clergy.. . The 
Community of Christians -a body of very nebulous outline 
- would contain both clergy and laity of superior intellectual 
and/or spiritual gifts. (Eliot 1982: 64-65) 
Eliot's group would appear to be less cohesive than Dawson's. Dawson's group 
seems to be an institution, whilst Eliot's is more of a communion of like minds. It 
appears that Eliot had no vision of his Community of Christians ever coming 
together in one place, but instead its members are diffused throughout the land. In a 
sense, Eliot's vision of his Community of Christians is like his view of the Christian 
Society which it served - it is fundamentally parochial, in the sense it is locally based 
in ecclesiastical parishes, as we saw above. 
Perhaps ironically, Dawson's more organised cultural institute has less well- 
defined membership criteria than Eliot's group. It is open to anyone who is not 
fascist or communist, and who "is loyal" to what Dawson calls "... national tradition 
and national institutions and ideals" (Dawson does not suggest what these are). Eliot 
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is on the other hand more exclusive, perhaps elitist, in his membership criteria. His 
"Community of Christians" is broad-based, including "... many of the laity engaged in 
various occupations" and "... many, but not all, of the clergy". This is Eliot's first 
membership criterion, although at first glance it may not seem like that at all, as the 
terms laity and clergy, when put together, are naturally all-inclusive. However, the 
laity in Eliot's Community are those who work - they are "engaged in various 
occupations". Moreover, the group might be seen to be very clericalised. The phrase 
that gives this impression is "many, but not all" of the clergy. The suggestion here, 
perhaps, is that most of the clergy would be members. This would fit with Eliot's 
planned basic structure of society, the ecclesiastical parish, which he described as 
"... the traditional unit of the Christian Community in England" (Eliot 1982: 58). 
Naturally, one of the key members of these parishes would be the parish priest, who 
would indeed be one of the few people significantly tied to parish boundaries, apart 
from the Wardens of the parish church and the civil Parochial Council. Eliot, as 
Warden of St Stephen's Church, Gloucester Road, would surely have known this. 
Although Eliot is keen to avoid matters of differing race and religion in The 
Idea of a Christian Society, nevertheless there is a current of religious and cultural 
monism in the 1939 work, albeit below the surface. Eliot, given his convictions, 
appears to want a unified and indeed uniform system of religious, ethical and social 
beliefs and practices in his society. That he calls it a Christian Society would 
naturally tend to exclude certain belief systems from its founding principles. 
Moreover, the members of the Community of Christians may be identified, 
according to Eliot, by their "identity of belief and aspiration" and their "background 
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of a common system of education and a common culture". It is significant that Eliot 
uses the singular in his description - it is belief, not beliefs, et cetera - implying 
uniformity of belief and experience. Eliot's society is monolithic. A practising Jew, 
Hindu, Muslim or Atheist could not by definition belong to this Community. 
Although Eliot is at pains to deny this - he says that "I cannot foresee a future 
society in which we could classify Christians and non-Christians simply by their 
professions of belief' (Eliot 1982: 68) - his stance is nonetheless exclusively pro- 
Christian. He admits this in his putative denial of it - he says that there are already 
Christians and non-Christians in society, however one defines them. Eliot simply 
believes that Christianity is the best and perhaps only route for a society to follow. 
He certainly finds it hard to understand people who are not Christian, as can be seen 
in his tone of incredulity when commenting on those who are hostile to the faith: 
And perhaps there will always be individuals who.. . will 
remain blind, indifferent, or even hostile [to Christianity]... 
(Eliot 1982: 68) [Italics added] 
Although in 1939 the numbers of non-Christian citizens was not massive, it was 
significant and well-established. Eliot could not but have known about his fellow 
Britons who were Jewish, Hindu, Muslim or Atheist (Bertrand Russell is an obvious 
example of this group), and in his rationale of his society's educational and cultural 
and religious system, he actively excludes them from its most important group, the 
Community of Christians. Dawson, in contrast, makes no religious or cultural 
division. In composition, Eliot and Dawson's groups differ widely. Dawson wants a 
kind of patriotic league; Eliot wants a Christian intellectual elite. 
There are other points on which Dawson and Eliot agree, and which Eliot may 
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well have followed his predecessor. Both authors see the necessity of examining the 
Christian past in order to understand what society's response should be to the crisis of 
the late 1930's. Dawson is quite clear in this aspect. He remarks, 
It is more instructional to turn back to Christian origins, for 
there in the Roman Empire-we find a parallel to the 
situation of the modern world. (Dawson 1939: 87) 
These parallels were, essentially, that of a materialist society which had "a source of 
vital degeneration" in its hedonism. Into this world erupted "the new light" of the 
Christian faith which re-invented society by way of its message of "otherness" and 
"forgiveness" (Dawson 1939: 88). Dawson wishes a second infusion of the Christian 
spirit into the world of 1939: 
Can this miracle be repeated in a world that has for a 
second time grown old? Can the Word of Life once more 
enlighten the darkness of... civilisation? (Dawson 1939: 90) 
Eliot likewise saw the past as holding a key to the present. He locates his historical 
cynosure in roughly the same period as Dawson, that of "the Christian Fathers". 
Eliot's appeal to the Christian past is couched in much the same language as 
Dawson's. Dawson wants to "turn back to Christian origins", and Eliot writes 
We need to know how to see the world as the Christian 
Fathers saw it; and the purpose of reascending to origins is 
that we should be able to return, with greater spiritual 
knowledge, to our own situation. 
(Eliot 1982: 81) [Italics added] 
It might well be that Eliot took the language as well as the idea from Dawson, 
although possibly relocating his historical period and also its focus - the "Christian 
Fathers" perhaps constituted the first "Community of Christians". Certainly they 
were a group of men with outstanding intellectual and spiritual gifts. Dawson's 
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appeal, mirroring the criteria of his cultural movement in contemporary society, 
appears more democratic. 
Another area on which Dawson and Eliot share common ground is that of anti- 
industrialisation. In condemning "... the growing inhumanity of our civilisation", 
Dawson observes 
We see it on a large scale in the way that the modern 
industrial system... reduces the countryside to desolation and 
involves the population in troughs of depression and 
scarcity. (Dawson 1939: 5-6) 
Eliot was also keen to see the evils of the industrial world. In "... an industrial 
society like that of England", he wrote, "I am surprised that the people retains as 
much Christianity as it does" (Eliot 1982: 59). Industrialisation was part of the 
"mass culture" which stripped the populace from its traditions. It had to be 
confronted and questioned rigorously in a Christian Society. If we accept a 
Christian rationale for Britain, suggests Eliot, that 
... must 
lead us inevitably to face such problems as the 
hypertrophy of the motive of Profit into the social ideal, the 
distinction between the use of natural resources and their 
exploitation... 
(Eliot 1982: 61) [Eliot's Italics and capitalisation] 
Although Eliot does not exactly demand the abolition of these practices, it is clear 
where his sentiments lie. Although it is an anachronism to call Eliot a writer on 
"green issues", he was certainly one of the first in Britain to give these issues a 
wider audience. A modern critic like Scott sees Eliot's critique of society from an 
environmental standpoint as one of The Idea of a Christian Society's most 
"memorable" achievements (Scott 1994: 71). Dawson's lament on the "smoking 
desolation" of the countryside was in tune with Eliot's concerns and perhaps 
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Dawson's inclusion of them in Beyond Politics influenced Eliot in The Idea of a 
Christian Society. 
Although agreeing in several key areas, Eliot and Dawson differ on some 
fundamental issues, notably democracy, and the role of the Church. Dawson is 
basically a democrat, both in politics and in culture. In the field of culture, he submits 
the following argument for adopting democratic principles: 
A democratic society must find a correspondingly 
democratic organisation of culture. (Dawson 1939: 24) 
This was to be done primarily by the creation of different cultural "parties" 
modelled on the Parliamentary system: 
In these circumstances it seems to me that the form of 
organisation ... 
is the party - that is to say a voluntary 
organisation for common ends based on a common 
"ideology". (Dawson 1939: 24) 
Although Dawson does not expand on the composition of these party groups, it 
would not be unreasonable to suggest that, like their Parliamentary correlatives, 
they would be groups of individuals cohering around core beliefs. However, there 
would be plurality within each group and indeed plurality of groups. It would seem 
that each would be self-regulating. On what platform these groups would exist - as 
Parliament allows a stage for the political parties - Dawson does not divulge. 
Politically, in Beyond Politics Dawson also seeks democratic solutions to 
contemporary problems, albeit in a form different from that of the 1930's. The main 
thrust of Dawson's arguments here are that the current political and social forces are 
creating a mass society, with "... the standardisation and mechanisation of culture and 
the supremacy of the mass over the individual" (Dawson 1939: 48). One of the ways 
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by which this is happening is the "... destruction of social inequality" and "... the 
reduction of our culture to the lowest factor of intelligence" (Dawson 1939: 47), 
through "... the wireless, cinema, motor transport [and] the popular press" (Dawson 
1939: 46). It was this inequality that gave England its characteristic richness. By its 
very inequalities the fundamental principles of what Dawson calls "... individual 
liberty and responsibility" (Dawson 1939: 43) are safeguarded. Here, Dawson's 
arguments may seem quaint, and he appears to be appealing to a nineteenth-century 
(or even seventeenth century) way of politics. For it was England in its aristocratic 
vestiges that would guarantee these fundamentals of the constitution of England, the 
individual's responsibilities and liberties. Parliamentary and political liberties, argued 
Dawson, were really "... vestiges of [the] aristocratic tradition" (Dawson 1939: 47), 
that is, historic institutions. This lynch-pin of democracy, the aristocracy, Dawson 
does not expand on, and the reader is left to surmise how the aristocracy safeguards 
liberties. It might be that, in being independent, the guardians of England's liberties 
acted altruistically in politics. They were - presumably - able to resist the onslaught 
of totalitarianism. Dawson here may be seen to be naive, and also historically 
ignorant. However, as he does not tell the reader much about the composition of the 
aristocracy, these must be speculations only. 
In this system, Dawson believes that the dynamics of a classic "mixed 
constitution" would exist and thrive. Social homogenisation would be prevented, 
suggests Dawson, and political uniformity avoided. One of the features of political 
diversity is the range of political groups within society. Dawson welcomes the 
proliferation of political parties in England. He comments, 
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... the coexistence of political parties within the political 
structure is one of the characteristic features of the English 
system. (Dawson 1939: 51) 
However, Dawson does not invest all his faith in this diversity. He admits that these 
parties would always be "... part of the machinery of government" (Dawson 1939: 51), 
but their role in the wider life of the nation would "... tend to become less important", 
their place taken by Dawson's "national organisation of culture". Essentially, Dawson 
does not trust politicians to safeguard the life of the nation. This must be done by the 
people themselves, although the nation must be governed and run by the politicians. 
The latter group was best organised under the auspices of the ancient and mixed 
constitution of the land, the survival of which Dawson doubted in the moves he saw 
to the mass society of the late 1930's. 
Eliot, on the other hand, was no lover of democracy in any form. In The Idea of 
a Christian Society, he hardly mentions party politics at all and the machinery of 
government rarely. These are side-issues for Eliot, who is principally concerned with 
the health of the culture of England. Eliot's antipathy to democracy had had a long 
history prior to 1939. Democracy he equated with the disintegration of society, as we 
saw above. Democracy to Eliot did not mean liberty, but licence. It was no surprise to 
Eliot that English democracy in the 1930's had come unstuck. It had become 
subsumed into economics, and become "... subservient... to plutocracy" (Eliot 
1982: 84)_ It had no interest in culture, art or religion, the very things that England 
needed strong in order to combat totalitarianism. As he had written in The Use of 
Poetry and the Use of Criticism, 
The rise of the democracy to power in America and Europe 
is not, as had been hoped, to be a safeguard of peace and 
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civilisation. (Eliot 1933: 103) 
There was no way in which Eliot could agree with Dawson on how to safeguard the 
liberties of England. Dawson hoped for a revised democracy, a mixed constitution, 
whereas Eliot eschews discussion of the political structure virtually altogether and 
instead puts his faith in the Community of Christians. 
Dawson's revision of the English constitution also encompasses the role of the 
Church and monarchy. As we saw above, Dawson sees the history of ancient Rome 
as paradigmatic for the society of 1939. Into this ancient but decayed society the 
Christian faith exploded and brought cohesion. In a somewhat Hegelian turn of 
phrase, Dawson comments that this transformation of society under the auspices of 
Christianity 
... was something that the civilised world of 
Greece and 
Rome could not produce from within... it was deliverance 
from the world by a power coming from without. 
(Dawson 1939: 89) 
The Church was the "... guardian of the waters of life, and its essential task is to keep 
the sources pure and inviolate" (Dawson 1939: 91). It held the same office in 
England during the twentieth century, and Dawson desired a revival of its spiritual 
power: 
Can this miracle be repeated in a world that has for a 
second time grown old? ... It 
is obvious that the Christian 
must answer in the affirmative. (Dawson 1939: 90) 
Eliot saw the situation differently. Dawson puts the case forward for the spiritual 
power of Christianity to transform miraculously. Eliot put the emphasis more on 
the intellectual rigours of the Christian faith. To Eliot, the notion of "revival" and 
spiritual sensibilities was suspect. Instead, at the beginning of The Idea of a 
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Christian Society, he writes: 
I trust that the reader will understand from the beginning 
that this book does not make a plea for a "religious 
revival"... the term seems to me to imply a possible 
separation of religious feeling from religious thinking which 
I do not accept... (Eliot 1982: 42) 
The powers of Dawson's Church are produced like some deus ex machina, while 
Eliot's Church - or, rather, his Community of Christians - study and hone their 
skills in order to fend off Fascism and Communism. 
Whilst Dawson and Eliot both put the Christian community (although in 
differing forms) at the heart of their arguments, there is a marked difference in their 
treatment of the Church's relationship with the Crown. Dawson devotes a whole 
chapter to the role of the monarchy in society and the importance of the Coronation 
Service. To open his discussion, he writes: 
The Coronation represents the most solemn and definite 
consecration of the State to Religion... Does it mean what it 
says or is it a gigantic piece of buffoonery? 
(Dawson 1939: 95) 
Doubtless responding to the Abdication Crisis of 1936, Dawson uses the 
Coronation Service and its Oaths to expand the discussion of the role of religion and 
the Church within society. Although the figure of the Monarch unites Church and 
State, Dawson argues that given the increasing secularisation of European society 
the Church's role was not one of some kind of joint ruler alongside the State. As 
society had not yet completely rejected Christianity, but was still "... open to 
Christian influences" (Dawson 1939: 110), what the Church should seek was the 
compromise of what Dawson terms "the Concordat". This was 
. any working system of limited co-operation between the 
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Church and the secular community. (Dawson 1939: 110) 
Dawson envisages co-operation in "... religious and social activities", such as, one 
presumes, the Aided and Controlled Schools and various charitable projects. 
Dawson's Concordat seems to be project-led rather than legislative or ideological. 
Eliot, on the other hand and as we saw above, eschews all discussion of the 
role of the Monarch. After 1936, there are virtually no references to the monarchy in 
Eliot's writings, except (notably) the "broken King" of Little Gidding (Eliot 
1969: 191). The Idea of a Christian Society does not summon the monarchy in any of 
its discussions. Indeed, Eliot is at pains to distance himself from the whole Church- 
State debate: he declares that his concern "... is preliminary to the problem of Church 
and State" (Eliot 1982: 46), being about the organisation of culture and society. The 
organisations of Church and State Eliot seems to believe are entirely secondary 
features of a nation. In this, Dawson and Eliot have different concerns. 
Overall, it can be demonstrated that Eliot takes some ideas and even 
phraseology from Dawson. They both identify the underlying problems of England 
in the late 1930's, chief amongst them the inability of the existing political 
institutions in dealing with the problems. They likewise see the necessity of society 
having a cultural transformation, led by some form of group of men and women 
committed to Christianity. It is here, however, that Dawson and Eliot part company. 
Dawson is essentially a democrat, Eliot not. In the composition of his cultural 
group, and a revised Parliamentary system, Dawson is leagues away from Eliot. 
Over the role of the Church and the monarchy again the authors are far apart. We 
must, I suggest, look elsewhere for the real influences over Eliot's political and 
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social thought. 
8.3. "... the writings of the Rev VA Demant... " 
Demant loomed large in Christian political, social and economic thought 
during the 1920's and 1930's. An Anglican priest, in 1949 he became Regius 
Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford. He wrote 
and edited a number of works which were in the mainstream of Christian 
interpretations of society in his time. He commenced with co-editing the 
controversial 1927 Coal: A Challenge, and proceeded with This Unemployment in 
1931, God, Man and Society in 1934 and Christian Polity in 1936. All of these 
books were known to Eliot and presumably intended by him to be the works 
included in the throw-away phrase given above in The Idea of a Christian Society. 
By the time Eliot came to write The Idea of a Christian Society, he had long 
admired Demant's work. Eliot himself reviewed Coal: A Challenge - probably 
being one of the first to do so - in July 1927, in The Criterion (Eliot 1967x: 69-73). 
Demant also drew Eliot's notice in the "Commentary" in the January 1932 The 
Criterion. Here, Eliot observes that -a propos of Demant's This Unemployment - 
The avenue from which Fr. Demant approaches the social 
problem is sympathetic to me... his whole attitude toward 
the "unemployment" problem seems to me to be very near 
the truth. (Eliot 1967hhh: 271-273) 
Demant's lucidity so impressed Eliot that he commissioned from him the article 
Dialectics and Prophecy which appeared in The Criterion in 1935 (Demant 
1967: 559-571). He was also a regular book-reviewer for The Criterion, with seven 
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volumes to his reviewing credit. 
The first of Demant's works to come to Eliot's notice, the above-mentioned 
Coal: A Challenge, was co-edited with Mairet, Newsome, Symons, Porter, Reckitt 
and Swann. It was published a year after the General Strike and was written out of 
frustration that nothing positive had arisen from that conflict. Its tone was 
confrontational, as befitted both a volume that was intended to launch the writing 
careers of some of who would become leading lights in the Christian Socialist 
Movement of the 1930's, and a work published by the Hogarth Press. As no credits 
are given to any of the contributors, it is impossible to suggest which chapter was 
written by which author, and so in this present study the whole of the book is taken 
to be representative of Demant's writings and thus grist for Eliot's mill. 
Immediately on picking up Coal: A Challenge, one is struck by its radical 
tones. "We are agreed", runs the Preface, "... that [the strikers'] protest is justified" 
(Demant 1927: 8). The striking miners, moreover, were the lions of the day, and 
their protest a sign of hope for the nation: 
... the obstinacy of the miners was the one sign of life in 
England... (Demant 1927: 22) 
Eliot, reviewing in 1927, placed the book - as indeed it was - on the left wing of the 
political spectrum. The authors, he wrote, "... would seem to be a kind of Socialist 
Christian" (Eliot 1967x: 73). This would be enough to arouse Eliot's suspicion on its 
own, especially as he commented that the authors were "... too hasty in their scorn for 
the `Constitution"' (Eliot 1967x: 73). Eliot suggested that, as the authors seemed to 
want the Church to be strengthened, it was in fact "the Kingship" which "... must be 
strengthened" (Eliot 1967x: 73). In the face of the perils in society which Coal :A 
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Challenge had recognised, Eliot was, instead of a radical solution which the book 
demanded, thinking along very traditional lines. 1927 was, of course, the year of 
Eliot's conversion and he was proceeding towards For Lancelot Andrewes' royalism. 
Despite these great differences, there were some correlations between Coal :A 
Challenge and The Idea of a Christian Society. The first was concern with the health 
of communal life in the nation. In 1927, Demant lamented the collapse of community 
life in Britain: "There is no ... communal 
life among us" (Demant 1927: 9). Eliot in his 
1939 book also saw the decline in local, community life and was eager to put forward 
the parish as the focus of community. Although both books recognise a common 
problem, the former does not examine solutions and here similarities end. One is not 
inclined to think, however, that the "Christian Socialist" authors of Coal would be 
much impressed by the belief that ancient parishes would enhance Britain's 
communal life. 
Eliot proposed an ecclesiastical solution to the problem of declining 
community life, and essentially the authors of Coal see society's ills being cured by 
religion. "There is the ultimate, the religious problem", they wrote, 
We believe that it can be solved by a miracle.. . 
by the effort 
of the whole man to change the habit of soul and body... 
(Demant 1927: 10) 
The Idea of a Christian Society saw the problem in a similar light. "My point of 
departure", wrote Eliot, 
has been the suspicion that the current terms in which we 
discuss international affairs and political theory may only 
tend to conceal from us the real issues... (Eliot 1982: 41) 
This had led him to consider the problems of the time in a religious light: 
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... what I am concerned with 
here is... the organisation of 
values ... which must 
inevitably proceed to a criticism of 
political and economic systems. (Eliot 1982: 42) 
Likewise Demant et al desired a spiritual critique of society: 
We must examine ourselves to see first what we want 
society to be, secondly what type of civilisation and culture 
we will create. (Demant 1927: 31) 
Eliot and the authors of Coal saw the debate on political affairs - although their 
writings in this instance were separated by some twelve years - as superficial. The 
fundamental issues, about civilisation and spiritual values, were being ignored. 
Although this broad concern was shared, their methods of proceeding from the 
general to the specific were very different. Indeed, it might be said that Eliot was not 
concerned with what Demant et al called the "incarnation" of spiritual values into 
society. Coal sought to 
... urge 
[people] to form self-appointed councils whose 
purpose shall be to disembarrass their minds of 
preconceptions... [and] make every effort to bring the new 
social synthesis into consciousness. (Demant 1927: 10) 
Here, Eliot would have certainly parted company with Demant. This programme of 
local action groups did indeed smack of the "Christian Socialism" that Eliot surmised 
in his 1927 review. Eliot never envisaged such a method of "incarnating" his own 
social criticism. "My concern with contemporary society", he wrote in The Idea of a 
Christian Society, 
will not be primarily with specific defects.. . 
but with the 
question what - if any - is the "idea" of the society in which 
we live. (Eliot 1982: 43) 
Principles, not action, were Eliot's concern. Describing his work as "preliminary to 
the problem of Church and State", he went on to suggest that it tackled the problem 
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"... in the widest terms and in its most general interest" (Eliot 1982: 45). On the scale 
of concepts in Eliot's mind, action was never one of the weightiest. It is well 
documented that Eliot had difficulty over the concept of "Christian action". In 
letters to Oldham, a fellow member of the Moot group, Eliot observed that 
... the people whose thought I find most sympathetic are 
almost always those who are not concerned with any 
immediate solution... (Ackroyd 1984: 184) 
In discussing "Christian action" in matters political, Eliot believed that if the 
Christian side of the phrase were emphasised, then deadlock would ensue, people 
being driven back to their "various [denominational] positions". But if the action 
were emphasised, "... then... other forces of temperament come into play" (Eliot in 
Ackroyd 1984: 188). Eliot here can too easily be seen in a negative light, of the man 
of letters suffering from what he called his "aboulie" or lack of will-power (Eliot 
1988: 486). However, this apparent reluctance to commit himself to action may have 
its roots deep in his philosophical concerns about unity and meaning, which were 
discussed earlier. Suffice it to say here, that Eliot believed that a plurality or shades 
of belief in any given community - and here it is the Christian community - bring 
division of purpose and will and hence weakness. 
Democracy, the fount of plurality, was unacceptable to Eliot. Demant and his 
colleagues took a pro-democracy stand in Coal, which would not have found favour 
with Eliot. In suggesting ways forward from the stalemate of the General Strike, the 
writers believed that a representative council of interests would be beneficial: 
A true modem constitution would.. . unite the 
Trades 
Unions, the Employer's Association... into a permanent 
Council, with powers to frame and carry out the economic 
policy of the Nation. (Demant 1927: 42) 
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Eliot, as we saw above in the discussion of Dawson's work, believed democracy to 
be the product of an effete liberalism which eventually would lead to the downfall 
of Western Civilisation. 
Demant's pro-democracy stance would also have prevented much of his next 
publication, the 1931 This Unemployment: Disaster or Opportunity?, from forming 
part of Eliot's programme. This Unemployment was written at the height of the 
economic crisis in Britain, and at the behest of the Research Committee of the 
Christian Social Council (Demant 1931: 8). Demant believed that the economic 
problems of the day were not just problems of industrialisation or politics; they 
were at heart 
... a spiritual and social problem of the 
first magnitude. 
(Demant 1931: 11) 
According to Demant, this spiritual malaise had a profound effect on the culture of 
Britain. Its democratic system was being eroded. Demant wrote: 
The proportion of eligible voters who do not use their 
franchise is increasing... Politics appear to a growing 
section of the population to be futile in the presence 
of... industrial strains and stresses... (Demant 1931: 14) 
Demant obviously saw this as a retrograde step and an integral part of the growing 
weakness of Western Civilisation. For Eliot, democracy itself was such a sign, and 
its demise surely would not have troubled him overly much. 
Demant was much exercised by the economic problems of the day, as can be 
seen from the above. He saw industrialisation as the major force for change in 
society, and as such engaged with it head-on in his social criticism. For Eliot, in 
contrast, economics were never more than a side-issue. Despite his bewailing the 
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"congeries of banks", and his own knowledge of the subject, Eliot preferred instead 
to focus on the need for spiritual reforms in society. Demant's position was stated 
clearly in This Unemployment: 
The main problem posed to the religious consciousness by 
the present situation is whether the age of the machine can 
be made to have any power of contributing to the 
fulfilment of the spiritual destiny of man... 
(Demant 1931: 22) 
Eliot, in The Idea of a Christian Society, was to ignore this question entirely. 
Demant called for an engagement of Christian minds in the economic theories of 
the industrialised world; Eliot simply ignored it, seeing economics as somehow the 
hand-maid to the industrial process which he saw dissolving the ancient fabric of 
English life of its vital source, the parochial system. 
Despite this very different focus in This Unemployment, again in Demant's 
work there is a similar concern with the wider spiritual concerns of society. Demant 
saw the problems of society as having spiritual roots, and Eliot believed the same. 
Although Demant was to investigate industrialisation in much finer detail than 
Eliot, they shared a concern that the process of industrialisation was potentially 
harmful to human society, by turning it into some grotesque parody of the machines 
used in its processes of manufacture. Demant noted that there had arisen a 
"philosophy of industrialisation" which 
... comprises such things as the right and duty of work... and 
the principles and practices of the monetary system as 
administered by the banks. (Demant 1931: 12) 
Eliot, in a more confrontational way, perhaps, likewise questioned the benefits of 
industrialisation on English society. "In an industrialised society like that of 
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England", he wrote, "I am surprised that the people retains as much Christianity as 
it does" (Eliot 1982: 59). He argued against 
... the 
hypertrophy of the motive of Profit [note 
capitalisation] into a social ideal, the distinction between 
the use of natural resources and their exploitation... the 
misdirection of the financial machine, the iniquity of 
usury... (Eliot 1982: 61) [Eliot's Italics] 
However close their instincts were in questioning industrialisation, Demant and 
Eliot's line of proceeding with it are markedly different. Demant engages with 
economic theory (most of This Unemployment is concerned with it); Eliot avoids it 
like a heresy. 
Demant's next published work, the collection of essays Christian Polity, sees 
more correlation between Eliot and Demant. This is symbolised by the fact that it 
was published, in 1936, by Faber and Faber. As by that time Demant had become 
one of The Criterion's contributors, it would not be wide of the mark to suggest that 
the book was commissioned by Eliot himself and its contents reflected in some way 
the predilections of Demant's editor. Certainly Essay Four - "The Catholic Doctrine 
of Freedom in Relation to Secular Totalitarianism" - contained much discussion of 
the dangers of the European dictatorships, a concern which was exercising Eliot's 
mind at the time in the pages of The Criterion. In that essay, Demant stated that 
The Christian Church can only confront secular 
totalitarianism with a doctrine that sees [through 
it] 
... Secular totalitarianism is a heresy into which the spirit 
of man is being driven in reaction to the disasters and 
spiritual void which spring from the opposite heresy of 
secular liberalism. (Demant 1936: 75-76) 
This is remarkably close to Eliot's own position on the subject, and, moreover, 
couched in terms Eliot himself used. In his 1934 After Strange Gods, subtitled "A 
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Primer in Modern Heresy", Eliot had suggested that ". .. `le monde moderne avilit'. 
It also provincialises, and it can also corrupt" (Eliot 1934a: 11). The chief problem 
with "le monde moderne" was liberalism. Eliot was so convinced that it was deeply 
seated within Western civilisation that he drew the following conclusion: 
In a society, like ours, worm-eaten with liberalism, the only 
thing possible for a person with strong convictions is to 
state a point of view... (Eliot 1934a: 13) 
Eliot appeared like some Christian evangelist, preaching the Gospel to the heathen 
in the hope of it falling on to fertile ground. Indeed, the whole of After Strange 
Gods is couched in religious language. Eliot associates liberalism with an anti- 
religious standpoint, and quotes the nineteenth century observer William Palmer 
who characterised the liberal spirit as 
... eager to eliminate 
from the Prayer Book the belief in the 
Scriptures... (Eliot I934a: 22) 
Liberalism was a modern-day heresy, dissolving culture. In this instance, Demant 
may have been influenced by Eliot, who certainly preceded him in naming 
liberalism as heresy. As Demant was by this time inside Eliot's circle, this cross- 
fertilisation of ideas was possible. However, Demant's case that liberalism in some 
way prepares the way for totalitarianism certainly found a home in Eliot's mind. In 
"The Humanism of Irving Babbitt", collected in the 1928 book For Lancelot 
Andrewes, Eliot had already seen liberalism (in its guise as humanism) as part of the 
process of the decline in religious values. Demant was to show that the decline did 
not end there, that the end of liberalism was in dictatorship. Eliot, by The Idea of a 
Christian Society, had fully fleshed out this process: 
By destroying traditional social habits of the people... 
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liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its own 
negation: the artificial... control which is a desperate 
remedy for its own chaos. (Eliot 1982: 49) [Eliot's Italics] 
Demant and Eliot's thoughts on liberalism were, perhaps, symbiotic. Eliot provided 
Demant with the vocabulary with which to classify liberalism in religious and 
social terms, and then Demant helped Eliot crystallise his own thoughts on the 
dynamic of liberal thinking in society, the end result being The Idea of a Christian 
Society. 
In confronting this liberalisation of society, the Church, according to 
Demant, was not effective. Some of the blame for decline must be laid at the 
Church's door: 
The secularisation of life is largely due to the failure of the 
Church... Totalitarianism is... a phenomenon which should 
turn the Church to a revolutionary penitence for its 
apostasy. (Demant 1936: 131) [Demant's Italics] 
The Church had accepted liberal values into itself, with disastrous consequences: 
The Church, by interpreting spiritual values as detached 
from, rather than giving significance to, other human 
purposes, has tended to send men to find some objects of 
faith and loyalty outside themselves... The State comes in 
conveniently as an object of Faith. (Demant 1936: 124) 
Eliot was to concur. Eliot considered that the Communist was a man of principle, 
and religious principle at that, who had been allowed to wander from the Christian 
fold for lack of something to believe in. Liberalism had instead raised 
... the notion that religion was a matter of private 
belief and 
of conduct in private life... (Eliot 1982: 53) 
The structures of the Church had been dissolved, and those who wanted to believe in 
something greater than themselves were forced into the arms of Communism and 
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Fascism. 
Both Demant and Eliot desired a return of whole-hearted Christianity to 
combat this Totalitarian menace. Demant, as we saw above, wanted the Church to 
repent. It had to return to a form of Apostolic zeal for the truth: 
Must not the Church therefore say to its own members... 
that that very source of its life must be exercised in a 
spiritually disciplined community, with a life of its own... 
(Demant 1936: 127) 
Eliot likewise saw this "spiritual purpose" as the key to reclaiming society from the 
dictatorial menaces: 
... one can assert that the only possibility of control and balance in society] is.. . religious. . . that the only 
hopeful 
course for a society... is to become Christian. That prospect 
involves, at least, discipline... (Eliot 1982: 55) 
Both authors use the word "discipline"; this was a watchword in Eliot's circle at the 
time. 
Despite these likenesses, however, there is a key point in Christian Polity 
which would not have found a sympathetic hearing with its publisher. These were 
Eliot's bugbears of freedom and democracy. Demant in Coal had revealed himself as 
a democrat. In his 1936 book, he still showed himself to hold democratic beliefs. 
These were raised in Demant's discussion of the problem of Church and State, in 
essays four and seven of the book. The Church, he held, should concern itself with 
freedom: 
The freedom for which the Church can fight is the freedom 
of the person to be a person.. . The Church's 
bid for freedom 
has to be a message that this is a possibility for all men. 
(Demant 1936: 91) 
This "freedom of the person to be a person" seemed very similar to the central plank 
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in the liberal-humanist movement, of the sovereign autonomy of the individual. 
This way of reasoning Eliot had attacked in his essay on Irving Babbitt, who was 
according to Eliot 
By tradition an individualist, and jealous of the 
independence of individual thought. (Eliot 1975: 281) 
Although Demant here is particularly addressing the problem of totalitarian 
government, whereas Babbitt was not, the turn of phrase may have looked suspicious 
to Eliot. In essay seven of Christian Polity, Demant also writes in a liberal turn of 
phrase: 
Such an authority for the Church [to speak as a 
representative voice on political and moral issues] cannot 
now be claimed on the ground that it represents all citizens. 
It must be claimed on the more ultimate ground that the 
Church has a responsibility to safeguard the individual's 
rights... (Demant 1936: 122) 
Eliot's view of the Church was never as a representative organ, as Demant seems to 
assume it at least once was, and nor was it there, in Eliot's view, to safeguard the 
individual's rights for anything. The Church was to safeguard society and culture, as a 
collective phenomenon. Eliot never thought in terms of individual rights but only the 
rights of large groups of individuals who were in a cultural tradition. 
The next book under investigation here, God, Man, and Society was written, 
according to Demant's preface, after 
... a request made to me 
by the Research Department of the 
Christian Social Council... (Demant I934: ix) 
According to Demant, a society may be called Christian when it fulfilled three key 
objectives. First, a society 
.. which allows or encourages 
behaviour which does 
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violence to... the dignity of human nature is not a Christian 
Society. (Demant 1934: 38) 
Second, a society is Christian 
... where the problems which call 
for the exercise of human 
effort are... the problems that inhere in man's... spiritual 
nature. (Demant 1934: 38) 
and third, 
... a Christian social order will be one where the social 
problems of men living together come as completely as 
possible within the sphere of moral free will. 
(Demant 1934: 39) 
Did Eliot use these three "tests"? Throughout The Idea of a Christian Society, he 
does not attempt at length a definition of what a Christian Society actually is. The 
closest he comes to it is the following comment: 
... the Christian can 
be satisfied with nothing less than a 
Christian organisation of society... It would be a society in 
which the natural end of man - virtue and well-being in 
community - is acknowledged for all, and the supernatural 
end - beatitude - for those who have eyes to see it. 
(Eliot 1982: 62) 
There is some correlation between Eliot's definition and Demant's. Eliot's "virtue 
and well-being" may be held to be equivalent to Demant's "dignity of human 
nature" and its safe-keeping, and Eliot's "natural end of man" may be thought to 
contain Demant's concern for the "social problems of men". However, there the 
similarity ends. Eliot couches his definition of Christian society with a different 
emphasis than Demant. The latter - following the Thomist line - sees man's nature 
as "inherently spiritual", whereas Eliot seems to view the "supernatural end" (I here 
take Eliot's "supernatural end" as meaning "spiritual end") as being only for a few 
discerning souls. Demant, essentially, is egalitarian; Eliot differentiates between 
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what he called the "Christian Community" and the minority "Community of 
Christians". The former's Christianity was unconscious and instinctual, the latter's 
was conscious and reflective (Eliot 1982: 59). Although I think we must not 
suggest that Eliot saw salvation only for a few - his Christian tradition would have 
informed him that it was God's desire for everyone - his (admittedly sparse) 
discourse on salvation in The Idea of a Christian Society might be considered 
ambiguous on this point. 
Eliot does offer two further definitions of Christian society, albeit by saying 
what it is not. There are two points of view as to how to judge whether England is 
a Christian society. The first judges it a non-Christian state 
... when religious practices 
have been abandoned... and 
when in effect prosperity in this world for the 
individual... has become the sole aim. (Eliot 1982: 47) 
The second point of view would judge that 
... a society 
has not ceased to be Christian until it has 
become positively something else. (Eliot 1982: 47) 
In neither of these definitions - and Eliot favours the second - do Demant's "three 
tests" seem to have had an influence. 
Despite this methodological difference, there are some points on which 
Eliot's work is similar to that of Demant's God, Man and Society. Both saw the role 
of the Christian faith as pivotal in the future of society. "The Christian religion", 
wrote Demant, 
claims to offer through Christ.. . the 
life of Truth, not in any 
possible world but in the world in which God has set man 
his task... (Demant 1934: 4) 
Christianity could, therefore, be the basis on which society functioned. Eliot held 
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the same point of view. He wrote that 
... the only alternative... to totalitarianism ... 
is to aim at a 
Christian society. (Eliot 1982: 52-53) 
In order that Christian tenets could be adopted, Demant held that Churches had to 
become political. He believed that in some respects the Churches were becoming 
so, but that the rank-and-file members were not yet able to do so (whether Demant 
means the Church's institutions or its clergy when he talks of the "official 
Churches", is not clear): 
In spite of the official Churches, the greater part of the 
religious believers... continue to act and think as though 
religion were only concerned with ... man's relationship with his personal deity. (Demant 1934: 6-7) 
There were 
... 
few signs that congregations realise that religion has a 
task in drawing within their field the social problems of 
mankind. (Demant 1934: 6-7) 
He called on the Churches to raise a more politically conscious membership: 
There is still a task before the Church in arousing the 
Christian Community to the possibility of 
redeeming... social evils. (Demant 1934: 12) 
Not all the Churches' members, however, were to be encouraged to attempt this: 
The Christian religion will always make calls upon the 
heroic choices of its adherents... But there is no warrant in 
Christian ethics for demanding... heroism for the majority. 
(Demant 1934: 16) 
Here, Demant makes an important if not fully developed point about the varying 
degrees of political and social involvement he expects from Church members. 
Such participation in solving society's ills he does not see coming from the 
majority of believers, whom he views as simply doing their quotidian tasks. 
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Political action must come from the "heroic" few. These, as far as we can see, do 
not seem to be connected in any formal way to their Churches' hierarchy. They 
appear to be laity. This outline is remarkably close to Eliot's "Christian 
Community" and "the Community of Christians". To the former, Christianity 
... must be primarily a matter of 
behaviour and habit, must 
be integrated with its social life... (Eliot 1982: 59) 
Like Demant's "majority of men", these peoples' pursuits are a "... fulfilling [ofJ 
their daily duties and associations". Eliot's other grouping, the "Community of 
Christians", appear like Demant's "heroic" Christians. Of these, Eliot wrote that 
they 
... will 
be the consciously and thoughtfully practising 
Christians, especially those of intellectual and spiritual 
authority. (Eliot 1982: 59) 
Like Demant's "heroes", Eliot's Community of Christians was "... not the Church in 
any one of its senses", being an unofficial grouping. Although, as we shall see, 
Eliot possibly derived his ideas for the "Community of Christians" from other 
sources, there certainly is a chance that Demant provided him a model, albeit brief. 
God, Man, and Society shares other concerns with The Idea of a Christian 
Society. As with Coal, industrialisation is attacked. "The breakdown of our entire 
Western Civilisation", warns Demant, 
is clearly envisaged in the self-destructive forces of the 
industrialisation... (Demant 1934: 27-31) 
The processes of manufacture tended to turn man away from its natural focus of 
attention, that of salvation, to the concerns of profits. It is the Churches' task to 
provide a corrective: 
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... the 
Church is called upon to recover what she once 
regarded as the supernatural dispensation, the setting forth 
of an order in human activities with her laws as standards 
of reference. (Demant 1934: 33) 
Eliot would have concurred. He would also have agreed with Demant's apparent 
dislike of urbanisation: 
It is well known that urbanisation makes for an aggressive, 
proud, fatalistic, and neurotic life outlook. 
(Demant 1934: 218) 
Behind each writer there appears to be a wistful, even romantic, view of some kind 
of organic and rural English past where industrialisation had not reared its head, a 
kind of society attached to the soil as Eliot was later to envisage in East Coker. 
Demant put this yearning for organic community in these words: 
Human association is inherent in human reality, and its 
disturbance is due to that perversion of man's spiritual 
nature which Christians call sin and which seeks absolute 
instead of functional ends.. . The validity of all 
human 
activity in an organic whole can only be sustained by an 
orientation of life which is more than a philosophy of 
social living. (Demant 1934: 226-227) [Demant's Italics] 
This might be taken as the basis for Eliot's insistence on the parish's "community 
unit", and also why he termed his two groupings in society the "Christian 
Community" and the "Community of Christians". 
In spite of these strong correlations between God, Man, and Society and The 
Idea of a Christian Society, there are issues on which their authors differ, and 
sometimes markedly. As with Demant's other works discussed above, it is clear in 
God, Man, and Society that he is a writer of democratic principles. Although he 
sees contemporary democracy failing, he is nonetheless convinced that it is the only 
possible system of government and wishes to see it revitalised. He puts the locus of 
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authority within the citizenry of the nation: 
... the citizens 
in representative government are nominally 
the authority in the State... (Demant 1934: 88) 
As we saw above, such sentiments were impossible to Eliot. He was not concerned 
at all with the machinery of government. His concerns in The Idea of a Christian 
Society "... are preliminary to the problems of Church and State" (Eliot 1982: 45), 
and what form a Christian State should take is a matter of little interest to him: 
What I mean by the Christian State is not any particular 
political form, but whatever State is suitable to a Christian 
Society... (Eliot 1982: 46) 
It is clear that in Eliot, Christian Society comes first, and the State afterwards. For 
Demant, this dynamic if unfeasible. State and Society are inextricably linked; there 
is no causal relationship between them. The State appears to have an independent 
existence from society. "The State", he wrote, 
is the community's organised function of government... It is 
necessary for the Christian citizen to be clear as to what he 
can expect the State to do before he can judge how far his 
own action is rightly reflected in the organisation of 
government. (Demant 1934: 89) 
Demant's notion of the independent or disinterested State was not just for the 
benefit of Christians within society. Demant's notion of society was essentially 
pluralist, although he held that Christians would be in the great majority. The State 
had to reflect this. He wrote: 
It [can] no longer be laid down that "it pertains to the office 
of a Prince to care for the good life of his people in such a 
fashion as conduces [sic] to the attainment of eternal bliss" 
(Aquinas), for the State now includes many whose 
conception of eternal bliss [are] at variance ... It is simply a fact that the modem state includes people of all religions... 
(Demant 1934: 90-91) 
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For Eliot, this was unacceptable. Plurality was a sign of inherent weakness in a 
system. His remark in the 1934 After Strange Gods, about the danger of too many 
"free thinking Jews", shows this attitude in its fullness. By 1939, with The Idea of a 
Christian Society, this attitude was toned down, but was still discernible. On 
commenting that it would be difficult to classify people as Christian and non- 
Christian, Eliot writes 
And perhaps there will always individuals who, with great 
creative gifts of value to mankind ... will yet remain 
blind, 
indifferent, or even hostile [to the Christian faith]. That 
must not disqualify them from exercising the talents they 
have been given. (Eliot 1982: 68) 
Eliot's "perhaps" shows how incongruous he felt it was that anyone could be 
indifferent or hostile to Christianity. He restricts the membership of these 
dissentients in society to "individuals", not groups. Demant's plea for pluralism 
would have been an aberration to Eliot, especially as he linked this to democracy: 
The careful regard which the State pays to minorities has 
been laid down as one of the tests of democracy. 
(Demant 1934: 107) 
Eliot was neither in favour of democracy nor minorities. Despite several 
correlations between the work of Demant and Eliot, notably Demant's nascent idea 
of Christian society being made up of "heroic" and "normal" citizens, there are too 
many differences between their work for us to take too seriously Eliot's own view 
that "the writings of the Rev Demant" played a part in forming his own views on 
social criticism. Indeed, a case can be made out that the flow of influence was the 
other way round. 
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8.4. Eliot's "deep debt" to Jacques Maritain 
It is curious that Eliot was not put off Maritain's work by the title of the book 
he cites in The Idea of a Christian Society. Maritain's Humanisme integral, 
published in October 1938, is an attempt at combining humanism with Christian 
thought in the face of the rising Totalitarian regimes of Europe. (The work was later 
translated by Adamson and published as True Humanism. In the following, I use 
this translation). Although Eliot would have had respect for Maritain's Thomist 
pedigree, he would not - at least at first sight - have had any time for Maritain's 
apparent humanism, Eliot's antipathy to which we have seen above. Perhaps, in 
citing Maritain's work, Eliot was playing a kind of game, suggesting that he read 
the latest continental thought on the problems in hand - and in French to boot - so 
as to give his endeavours extra credence. 
Despite these reservations, there is much to suggest that Maritain's work 
would have found favour with Eliot, and perhaps even influenced him. Maritain's 
departure for his Humanisme integral was similar to that of Eliot. Maritain believed 
that "Modem civilisation is a worn-out vesture... " (Maritain 1946: 201). Eliot 
concurs in The Idea of a Christian Society. The problems tackled there are those 
which "... must occupy many minds for a long time to come" (Eliot 1982: 41); they 
were "fundamental", and were about "... the organisation of values, and a direction 
of religious thought" (Eliot 1982: 42). Maritain saw the origins of the social 
problems of his day as stemming from the world of the Renaissance and 
Reformation. The world issuing from these movements has 
... 
been torn by powerful... energies, where truth and error 
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feed upon each other... (Maritain 1946: ix) 
Eliot would have concurred. The world of the Renaissance, according to Eliot, was 
destructive. This attitude may be seen in his comments on Hobbes in For Lancelot 
Andrewes. Hobbes was, according to Eliot, 
... one of those curious little upstarts whom the chaotic 
motion of the Renaissance tossed into an eminence... 
(Eliot 1970g: 29) 
By "Renaissance", Eliot meant "... the period between the decay of Scholastic 
philosophy and the rise of modern science" (Eliot 1970g: 29). In other words, it was 
the same world that Maritain derided. Hobbes' fault was the same that Maritain had 
observed. Hobbes' 
... attitude... toward moral philosophy has by no means disappeared from human thought... (Eliot 1970g: 30) 
The Renaissance, therefore, "commingled truth and error", and its dynamics were 
still operating in human thought. This area of study long interested Eliot, and 
indeed in his Clark Lectures of 1926 he had outlined his intention to write a trilogy 
of books on the subject (Eliot 1996: 41). 
By the way Eliot and Maritain trace society's development from the 
Renaissance, they clearly invest ideas with power, such as those of Constitutional 
Monarchy and democracy. Both writers were concerned with the role of ideas in 
society, and how by changing these society could be reformed. Maritain saw the 
failure of the Christian world in terms of its intellectual incapacity: 
There is a [third] cause.. . which makes apparent to what an 
extent modern civilisation, even when it calls itself 
Christian, has suffered from a lack of Christian philosophy. 
(Maritain 1946: 110) [Maritain's Italics] 
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This "lack of philosophy" had prevented a medieval-style realisation of Christian 
principles in society as well as individual souls. Eliot also wanted a transformation 
of ideas in order to create a new Christian world. "The Idea of a Christian society", 
he wrote, 
is one which we can accept or reject; but if we are to accept 
it, we must treat Christianity with a great deal of more 
intellectual respect than is now wont... 
(Eliot 1982: 43) [Eliot's Italics] 
Being concerned primarily with ideas, both writers had similar reactions to 
Communism, which they considered as a rival to Christianity. Eliot's concerns have 
already been dealt with in the above discussion, and it is easy to see correlations with 
the work of Maritain. "Communism", Maritain wrote, 
is a complete system of doctrine and life which claims to 
reveal to man the meaning of his existence.. . It is a 
religion... of atheism... (Maritain 1946: 28) 
Although Eliot's opinions on Communism were formed before he read Maritain's 
work, it is striking how close they come in seeing Communism as a religion with its 
own doctrine and ethics. There is a further passage in Maritain which may well have 
influenced Eliot. This is specifically about how the religious feeling of a people can 
be turned from Christianity into Communism. Maritain writes, 
[Communism] is not bound up in Russia.. . with a rationalist 
tradition... its basis is in the nature of the religious feeling 
of the people which.. . can 
be turned in one or other 
direction... 
(Maritain 1946: 59) 
Eliot was concerned that this religious "indifference" would lead to the adoption of 
a totalitarian system, as it had done in Germany and Russia. Eliot thought that the 
vast majority of the English had only a "vestigial" Christianity, which was 
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unthinking and expressed in behaviour only, and that the problem was that it had no 
defences against the new doctrines of absolutism. The liberal way of life which had 
created this morass, according to Eliot, 
... can prepare the way for that which 
is its own negation: the 
artificial... control which is a.. . remedy 
for [liberalism's] 
chaos. (Eliot 1982: 49) 
Into the vacuum liberalism creates, came either Communism or Fascism. Although 
Maritain and Eliot have similar views, and we might suggest that Eliot is influenced 
by Maritain by his view that Communism feeds off religious indifference, it must be 
stated that Maritain is much more detailed in his analysis of Communism and its 
social impact than Eliot. Eliot never develops his ideas beyond a few paragraphs 
throughout his whole oeuvre, whereas Maritain in True Humanism alone spends 
over fifty pages discussing it. Another point of difference is that Maritain is willing 
to concede Communist principles in Christianity. "Among the original elements of 
Communism", he writes, 
there are some which are also Christian. St Thomas More 
held certain communist ideas.. . 
it is the mis-directed 
Christian virtues. . . which communism seeks to direct to its 
own uses. (Maritain 1946: 32-33) 
For Maritain, Communism was a kind of a (wrongly) developed Christianity. For 
Eliot, Communism was separate from Christianity but parasitic upon it. 
Another area in which Maritain and Eliot appear to agree is that of society's 
possible structures. For Maritain, the humanity's goal was relatively simple: 
... 
[man] is made for a supernatural end: to see God as God 
beholds himself... (Maritain 1946: 2-3) 
Society had to seek to form itself so that this "supernatural end" of man could be 
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realised on earth. There was another "end" of man, however, and this was the 
"natural end". This dual nature of human existence was summed up by Maritain in 
the following words: 
... 
in the practical and moral order we come to the 
conception... that man and human life are simultaneously 
directed to two different absolutely final ends, one.. . which 
is purely natural and is prosperity here on earth, the other 
the supernatural final end which is perfect beatitude in 
heaven. (Maritain 1946: 13-14) [Maritain's Italics] 
Eliot, at first glance, may appear to have assimilated this Thomist doctrine. His 
thoughts on society's use the Maritain/Thomist vocabulary of natural and 
supernatural ends and beatitude: 
... It would 
be a society in which the natural end of man - 
well-being in community - is acknowledged for all, and the 
supernatural end - beatitude - for those who have eyes to 
see it. (Eliot 1982: 62) 
Despite this similarity in language, however, there is a divergence here. For 
Maritain, everyone's goal is both natural and supernatural; for Eliot, the natural 
goal is "for all", yet the supernatural end (at least on one reading) is only for "those 
who have eyes to see it". Although this does not logically limit beatitude to a 
specific group, it would not seem inappropriate to conclude that Eliot here is 
thinking of a minority of Christians, an idea which fits with his notion of the 
"Community of Christians". As we saw in our discussion on Demant, Eliot - at 
least in the pages of The Idea of a Christian Society - might be seen as ambiguous 
on the subject of salvation. Maritain is democratic; Eliot appears elitist. 
We have already seen that Eliot's "Community of Christians" is crucial in 
society, acting like the nation's guiding conscience. For Maritain, there was a 
306 
similar group which he saw working in society. In examining the life of the 
monastic Orders, he makes an observation that 
... the man who 
is engaged in [the] profane and temporal 
order [as distinct from the Monastic Orders] should... tend 
towards sanctity.. . 
for the justice of the Gospels claims to 
penetrate all things... (Maritain 1946: 115) 
This would seem close to Eliot's Community of Christians who themselves had to 
"attain union with the divine" in their quest after beatitude. However, like 
Maritain's democratic wish for all to have natural and supernatural ends, his vision 
of the men "engaged in the profane and temporal order" is more democratic than it 
might appear. Although 
... it is... in the order of things that it is not in the secular life, but in certain souls hidden from the world.. . that the 
first 
light of the dawn of sanctity.. . 
is breaking. 
(Maritain 1946: 119) 
this new way is not to be confined to that first group. It must 
... spread 
from thence into all our temporal and secular ways 
of life. (Maritain 1946: 119) 
Eliot's Community of Christians, in contrast, has no point of contact with wider 
society elucidated for them. It remains sequestered. Maritain does envisage, 
however, a group which has some correlation to the Community of Christians, 
despite his democratic leanings. In reviewing the historical aspect of social 
organisation, he suggests that 
... the part played by the agent of unity which was played by 
the Christian King in regard to the city of yesterday 
belongs.. . to the most politically evolved ... Christian laity 
and the popular elite in the new temporal order... 
(Maritain 1946: 162) 
These persons he calls the "cives praeclari", that is 
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... that enlightened political element who will play this 
animating and formative part of which I have been 
speaking.. . It 
follows from this that a city animated and 
guided by such elements will [be]... under the reign of 
Christ. (Maritain 1946: 163) 
These "cives praeclari" would seem to be near to Eliot's Community of Christians. 
He calls it "... the idea of an organised political fraternity" (Maritain 1946: 164), and 
its members would 
... 
be to the State... as in the sacred sphere the various 
religious orders are to the Church... (Maritain 1946: 165) 
This would appear a typically French view of the body politic, arising from the 
constitutional thought of the seventeenth century, which had its natural end in 
Louis XIV's dictum "1'etat? C'est moi ". Eliot, following an English model instead, 
would have found this theory alien. Maritain does eventually clarify his thoughts 
on his cives praeclari, after his discussion of the pluralist society (more of this 
below). He calls it 
... a gathering together of men of good will... acting in 
concert with professional groups and ready. . . to collaborate in things useful for the common good. (Maritain 1946: 262) 
It should be noted that there is no hint of any doctrinal or social prerequisite to this 
group, as there is in Eliot's Community of Christians 
Despite these ostensible similarities, there are several ideas in Maritain's work 
which are divergent from those in Eliot. Foremost is the concept of humanism, 
which lies at the heart of Maritain's vision. Maritain sees his work in the light of 
humanity's quest for freedom. His whole endeavour as a writer is, he claims, in the 
sphere of "practical philosophy", which he describes as 
still philosophy and remain[ing] a mode of speculative 
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knowledge; but... it is from the outset directed to action as 
its object.. . 
it is above all a science of freedom. 
(Maritain 1946: viii) 
Eliot would not have described his work in like manner. He may have preferred to 
describe his social criticism as a "science of order". Freedom, to Eliot, was 
potentially dangerous. This sense of freedom - for the individual as well as society as 
a whole - was the setting for Maritain's attempt at reintegrating humanism into a 
religious understanding of the world. Maritain coined the phrase "heroic humanism" 
for this, the paragon of which was the recently canonised Sir Thomas More. He was 
to be considered as the true blend of Catholicism and the New Learning of the 
Renaissance which was the birth of modern humanism: 
The example of the humanist saint, the admirable Thomas 
More for instance, is from this point of view particularly 
significant. (Maritain 1946: xiii) 
(Maritain conveniently forgets More's penchant for burning Lollards). Maritain is 
keen to counter the opinion that "... humanism can by definition only be... anti- 
religious" (Maritain 1946: xiv): 
... Western humanism springs from religious sources... 
classical and Christian.. . 
by the very fact that the order of 
medieval Christendom was one of unity of soul and 
flesh.. 
. 
it held in its consecrated forms a virtual and implicit 
humanism. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries this 
began to "appear" and became manifest. 
(Maritain 1946: xv) 
Maritain sees humanism as an organic growth from and natural end to medieval 
Catholicism. Eliot rather saw humanism as parasitic upon decayed forms of 
Catholicism. Humanism and Catholic Order, believed Eliot, were mutually 
exclusive. Maritain's wish to combine the two was folly, despite Maritain's concern 
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that 
... this new 
humanism [i. e. integral, or heroic, humanism]... I 
see as directed towards a social-temporal realisation of that 
evangelical concern for humanity which ought not to exist 
only in the spiritual order... (Maritain 1946: xvii) 
and that he sought to give this new humanism a theological underpinning: 
... [in] this new epoch 
in the history of Christian culture the 
creature will neither be belittled nor annihilated before 
God; his rehabilitation will not be in contradistinction to 
God or without God, but in God... humanism indeed, but a 
theocratic humanism... integral humanism, the humanism 
of the incarnation. (Maritain 1946: 65) 
The phrase "... the humanism of the incarnation" is simply not one we would 
associate with Eliot. Overall, Maritain's concern to give a revitalised humanism a 
key role in social order was unacceptable to Eliot. In thinking of society, one 
started from God, and not humankind. 
Another area of marked difference between the two writers is that of the 
nature of culture and civilisation. For Maritain, "... the two terms can be treated as 
synonymous" (Maritain 1946: 89), whereas in Eliot there is a greater 
differentiation. For Eliot, civilisation was a cross-national phenomenon (Eliot 
1982: 41), a set of shared values, which in Europe's case were principally inherited 
from classical Greece and Rome (Eliot 1967r: 124). Culture, on the other hand, was 
something on a lesser scale, and could be localised or even class-based. One is 
tempted to suggest that in Eliot's view culture was the localised form of 
civilisation. There may be English, Welsh, French and German cultures, but there 
is a European civilisation. Culture was "... a society's or a group's established way 
of life" (Kojecky 1971: 208). Culture was also dependent on social class (Eliot 
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1982: 91), whereas civilisation was not. For Maritain, culture/civilisation was 
concerned not just 
... with the necessary material 
development which permits 
the proper life here below, but also primarily with men's 
moral development, the development of... activities which 
rightly merit the name of human progress... Since this 
development is not only material, but also and principally 
moral.. . the religious element plays a primary part 
in it... 
(Maritain 1982: 88-89) 
This religious side of things Maritain firmly places not within a culture, but within 
the life of God, being transcendent: 
For the Christian, the true religion is essentially 
supernatural and... it is not a part of man... it belongs to an 
inner life of God. It transcends all civilisation... it is 
strictly universal. (Maritain 1946: 90) 
A certain dualism may here be detected in Maritain's thought. There appears to be a 
dichotomy between the life of humanity and that of God. Religion belongs to God, 
and - it would seem - cannot be mingled with human life. Although Eliot would 
surely have acquiesced with Maritain that religion transcends all civilisations and 
cultures, he would not, perhaps, have agreed with the Frenchman that "it is not a 
part of man... nor of a culture, nor of civilisation". The whole thrust of Eliot's social 
criticism, surely, is that British and European culture is (or has been) a Christian 
culture which needs reforming and preserving. Maritain further limits culture and 
civilisation to an earthbound sphere in the words: 
... culture and civilisation have a specific object (the earthly 
and perishable... life here below) whose proper order is the 
natural order.. . The order of culture or civilisation appears 
then as the order of the things of time, as the temporal 
order. (Maritain 1946: 90) [Maritain's Italics] 
For Maritain, culture and civilisation (it is unfortunate that, after defining them as 
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the same entity, he continues to use both terms) are incidental to religion, almost 
arbitrary. For Eliot, culture and civilisation (in their differing aspects) are the 
necessary incarnation of the faith held by the people, and therefore he can talk of a 
Christian society. One reason for this difference of emphasis perhaps is the 
different denominations to which the two writers belonged. For Maritain, the 
Christianity of his cross-national Roman Catholic Church traversed different 
cultures. While the Christian faith remained the same (ostensibly), the civilisations 
it lived in were diverse. This may well have led him to articulate the opinion that 
the cultural setting of faith was arbitrary, if not unimportant. Eliot, however, was 
fast in his Church of England, the Englishness of which he strongly emphasised, as 
can be seen in For Lancelot Andrewes. He was more parochial, more willing to see 
the culture around the faith as intrinsically part of that faith, so that if the culture 
disappeared, then faith would also. This was simply not possible for Maritain. He 
believed that even if civilisations and cultures died, then the Christian faith would 
live on, being transcendent. This gave him great hope for the future of Christianity, 
despite European Totalitarianism. "The Church does not die", he wrote, 
"civilisations die" (Maritain 1946: 134). And in a paragraph that would surely have 
displeased Eliot, Maritain comments: 
... neither should we 
be astonished that Christian 
civilisations perish as do other ones... Such is the growth of 
human history, which is not a process of repetition, but of 
expansion and progress. (Maritain 1946: 286-287) 
For Maritain, Christianity was an inextinguishable light, held in the clay vessel of 
culture. The vessel may occasionally break and be rebuilt, but the light remains 
constant. For Eliot, there is no such triumphant tone. He is apocalyptic in the face 
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of rising Fascism and Communism, which he sees as rival creeds and cultures. For 
him, the light of Christianity and the lamp of culture in which it shines are 
inseparable, and they break together. 
This distinction being made, it is easier to see how Maritain and Eliot differ 
widely on the question of cultural pluralism. For Maritain, the Church being 
irrefrangible it did not need a uniform culture or uniform religious practices in 
which to flourish. Differences of opinion or even religious faiths did not matter. In 
opposing Totalitarianism's threats, Maritain envisaged in society which he 
described as 
... the conception of a pluralist commonweal, which will 
gather together in its organic unity a diversity of social 
groupings... a pluralist commonweal would give the fullest 
possible measure of autonomy... 
(Maritain 1946: 157-158) [Maritain's Italics] 
For Eliot, cultural diversity meant weakness, and a descent into Liberalism which 
paved the way for Totalitarianism. In the light of Eliot's insistence that virtually all 
the inhabitants of his Christian Society had to hold the Christian faith, Maritain's 
vision of pluralist society must surely have been unacceptable. "In the modern city", 
Maritain wrote, 
believers and unbelievers are mingled.. .a Christian 
commonweal under modern conditions could not be other 
than a Christian city within whose walls believers and 
unbelievers live alike and share in the same temporal 
commonwealth... (Maritain 1946: 159-161) 
Not only would there be a diversity of groups, opinions and beliefs, but these plural 
interests and mores would have legal status as well. In Maritain's scheme of things, 
by the above definition, Eliot's more uniform Christian Society has the hallmarks of 
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being a quasi-Totalitarian system. Eliot surely could not have been but aware of 
this major difference. Maritain, moreover, did not see a society's religious life as 
being the hub of its unity, as it would be in Eliot's. "The unity of such a 
civilisation", Maritain wrote, 
would no longer be a unity of essence or of a constitution 
assured from above by the profession of the same faith and 
dogmas [it is]... a unity of orientation... for a form of 
common life in better accord with the supra-temporal 
interests of the person. (Maritain 1946: 162) 
This "unity of orientation" coalesced around the quest for the material well-being of 
the individuals and groups in society - Maritain's "natural" end of man - which in 
turn was the basis on which the "supernatural" was founded. Maritain and Eliot 
have different loci of unity. Maritain's is the "natural" end of man, his economic 
well-being. Eliot's focus of unity is more in line with the "supernatural end" of man, 
his Christian destiny. The former enables Maritain to be pluralistic, the latter forces 
Eliot to be monolithic. As Maritain put it, 
Such a unity [in society] will not be... a maximal one [i. e.. 
based on doctrine]: it will be, on the contrary, a minimal 
one, its core of formation.. . on the plane of the temporal itself... [this] unity does not in itself require a unity of faiths 
and religion... (Maritain 1946: 166) 
Eliot's scheme of society was, by this definition, medieval. Maritain's society was 
startlingly modern by comparison. As the medieval system promoted harmony and 
uniformity, so Maritain's modern order 
... multiplies liberties... this solution gathers the unification 
of the temporal community into one natural point: a simple 
unity of friendship... we must renounce the search for a 
common profession of faith... (Maritain 1946: 167-168) 
By this statement, we may see that, ultimately, Maritain's social criticism is actually 
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poles apart from that of Eliot. Although they have similarities, in their fear of 
Communism, their doctrinal beliefs, and their opinion that a committed group of 
Christians held the key to future Christian society, Maritain's quest for an "integral 
humanism" - enough by itself to ward off Eliot - and his profoundly liberal ideas on 
social structure, set the two apart. In looking for the true influences on The Idea of a 
Christian Society, we must surely pass by Maritain. 
8.5. "Mr Middleton Murry's The Price of Leadership" 
If Maritain has to be passed by, then also must Murry, at least at first glance. It 
is perhaps surprising that Eliot included Murry's book on his short-list of influences 
in The Idea of a Christian Society. Eliot, despite collaborating with Murry on The 
Athenaeum, in print at least was almost always hostile to his works. He had 
described Murry at various turns as "... merely an Orthodox Unitarian" (Eliot 
1967t: 256), "... a genuine heretic" (Eliot 1967aa: 179), a Bergsonian (Eliot 
1967dd: 344), and an atheist (Eliot 1967iii: 468). If we are to believe Eliot, there was 
always a profound disagreement between him and Murry. Eliot found himself 
"... nearly always opposed" to Murry (Eliot 1967ccc: 308). However, it can be argued 
that Eliot's public opinions were often contradictory and even designed to hide their 
opposite. This I suggest is somewhere near the truth with Murry, at least in his 
social thought, and in examining Murry's book we are brought closer, I suggest, to 
the spring from which the waters of Eliot's social theory were drawn. (There are, 
however, major differences, and these will be drawn out as we proceed). 
Murry's The Price of Leadership had started as a lecture course "... which I was 
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invited to deliver in the summer of 1937 by the Incorporated Society of Assistant 
Masters in Secondary Schools" (Murry 1939: 7) It is therefore not surprising that 
education lies at the heart of this book, and how educational reforms were needed in 
order to bolster society against the threats from Totalitarian Europe. In order to posit 
his ideas on education, Murry needed also to flesh an idea for society in which 
education could take place. For him this idea was fundamentally Christian. 
Murry has a similar approach to Eliot in the social structure within such 
Christian Society. For Murry, there has always been a "ruling class" in England, a 
fact which "... no unbiased observer could deny" (Murry 1939: 25). Traditionally, this 
ruling class was instinctively Christian: 
To be an Englishman was to acknowledge oneself a 
member of a Christian society. In such a society it was 
natural that the Christian Church should be 
"established"... and that education should be under its 
control. (Murry 1939: 38) 
This system was eventually to be dismantled, however. According to Murry, the 
"Puritans" (he does not define the term) dissented from this cultural-religious unity, 
which set in motion a chain of secularisation: 
Puritans, by dissociating themselves from this social 
tradition of Christianity, contributed to the secularisation of 
the Church in the eighteenth century. (Murry 1939: 38) 
The author of The Humanism of Irving Babbitt would surely have agreed: 
Protestantism eventually leads to secularisation. For Murry, the ruling class 
therefore not being totally congruent with a Christian educated class, the role of the 
ruling elite in its cultural aspect was now under question, and 
The question is, how this ruling class should be recruited 
and by what "beliefs it shall be guided? "... In England.. . 
it is 
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recruited from the relatively rich ... A capitalist class 
is the 
raw economic fact: to become a ruling-class, it has to be 
educated into the role. (Murry 27-28) 
The question was, therefore for Murry, a question of education, and he expatiates 
on this at length. Eliot also spends time discussing education in The Idea of a 
Christian Society, but it is a fraction of Murry's. The key similarity between Murry 
and Eliot here is the creation of a ruling class. For Murry, by "ruling class" 
... I mean ... a really 
dynamic class - to rule politically.. .1 
maintain that this class of men, educated for political and 
administrative rule, is a necessary class in modem society... 
(Murry 1939: 45) 
This scheme would appear similar to Eliot's "Community of Christians", at least in 
the aspect of a group with consciously held common aims to "... decide the future of 
society. " However, it must be said that Murry does seem to envisage a more 
cohesive group than Eliot's "rather nebulous" community. This is a major difference 
between Eliot's Community of Christians and Murry's "ruling class". Murry makes 
his group part of the established class system of England, envisaged like a throw- 
back to the Victorian ideal of the "governing class", educated for their task in the 
great public schools and Universities. This would limit its membership to those who 
could afford such an expensive education - presumably the upper middle and upper 
classes. For Eliot, however, never imbued with a great sense of class consciousness, 
given his American upbringing, was more egalitarian: membership of the 
Community of Christians was based solely on merit. Here, Eliot is radical, and 
Murry conservative. The absence of this ruling class, forebodes Murry, means that 
society is heading for disaster. Here, Eliot and Murry are twins in their fear of social 
collapse leading to the adoption of totalitarianism. Murry writes, 
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... [the 
lack of this ruling class] means we are heading for a 
peculiar form of the totalitarian state... Theoretically, I can 
conceive of a sort of tertium quid between Fascism and 
Communism... (Murry 1939: 46) 
By recovering its Christian origins through the offices of a specifically educated 
ruling class, argues Murry, such a fall may be avoided. Although Murry's way of 
creating this ruling class - principally by educating its candidates in a modified 
public-school system - is different from that of Eliot (who allows the members of 
the Community of Christians simply to "appear" naturally), the function of both 
groups is the same. 
In promoting this ruling elite, which gains its position by education and not 
election, Murry proclaims himself as a non-Democrat. His credentials are thus the 
same as Eliot's. Both writers harbour grave doubts as to the effectiveness of the 
democratic system. This doubting of democracy - common in the 1930's - had a 
terrifying root: Hitler had come to power by democratic process, principally by 
preying upon the fears and jealousies of the uninformed minds of the masses. Murry 
writes, 
We need to free our minds of much cant about democracy. 
The moment it is regarded... as something which we have 
attained... it has ceased to be vital... To achieve the form of 
full democracy.. 
. 
is merely the beginning of the real test 
upon society. . . the problem 
is to educate democracy. 
(Murry 1939: 47) 
Presumably, this "education" involves convincing the mass of the need of this 
unelected ruling class. Indeed, one of the failings of democracy is that it has 
"... ignored the necessity of a ruling class" (Murry 1939: 48). 
There is another similarity between Murry's work and Eliot's which, despite 
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the otherwise light-weight nature of Murry's contribution to the political debate of 
the 1930's, is extremely important in the context of this study and its exploration of 
Idealism in Eliot's social criticism. This similarity can be seen if Murry's stress on 
society's rural aspects is examined. Both Murry and Eliot have what we might term 
a rural focus. Eliot holds that the parish remains the true "community unit" for 
England, a system which, it can be argued, only has real significance in rural 
districts where it often coincides with village-based boundaries. Eliot also decries 
industrialisation. Murry too has a pastoral ideal. But whereas Eliot's is quite 
carefully concealed, Murry's is open and considerably romanticised. "I sometimes 
stay", he tells his reader, 
... 
in a sparsely populated parish... Every man in the village 
works on the land, including the innkeeper. 
(Murry 1939: 11) 
He laments that there is in this village "... an empty house, which used to be the 
Rectory", and that "... the wheelwright has gone to glory", and when 
... a new 
farm-tumbril comes that way - which is seldom 
enough - the body is mass-manufactured; the wheels are 
stamped, like buttons, out of steel, and the shafts are iron 
piping. (Murry 1939: 13-14) 
Murry gives considerable space to his paean on rural decay - including a rather 
painful description of the plight of a "young lad" who was run over by a car - and it 
might perhaps be seen to be over-sentimental. Although Eliot may have agreed with 
the gist that rural life was in jeopardy, he would I feel never have voiced his fears in 
such emotional ways. But he would have agreed with Murry's view that the life of 
the parish church was central to that of the community in which it was set: 
The parish church in the rural district is still the focus of 
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[community] life ... In the church the 
inhabitants of the 
village become conscious of community... And in the cases 
where the parson is still mindful of his relation to the 
village community.. . 
he is... the father of his parishioners... 
(Murry 1939: 89) 
Behind this statement lurks the figure of Coleridge and On the Constitution of 
Church and State. Coleridge had envisaged a man of learning (though not 
necessarily a priest) in each parish to be exactly the sort of person Murry wants his 
parson to be. Coleridge plays an important part in The Price of Leadership, and 
Murry suggests that 
... Coleridge was the 
first English political thinker who 
achieved a definite conception of English society as held 
together by... the potency of an incarnate and spiritual 
"idea"... (Murry 1939: 110) 
It was not only Coleridge to whom Murry acknowledges a debt. He also describes 
the work of Arnold, following Coleridge: 
... Coleridge's thought 
fell on good ground in Arnold's 
mind, and grew into an original theory of English society. 
(Murry 1939: 110) 
In my view, this is the real worth of Murry's book, in introducing Coleridge to the 
scene. If Eliot had not already encountered Coleridge as social critic (he had 
already, of course, as literary critic), then Murry would have perhaps have 
awakened him to the possibility. It does not seem possible to say at this stage of 
Eliot studies whether Eliot had read On the Constitution of Church and State before 
Murry's 1938 book, although The Criterion did run a review of R White's The 
Political Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: A Selection, by George Every, in 
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Volume Eighteen, of October 1938.52 The appearance of Murry's book and the 
review of what might be described as an otherwise unoriginal and derivative 
anthology perhaps shows that Eliot's mind was beginning to see the possibilities of 
Coleridge as a source of social ideas from circa 1938. The contemporary works that 
Eliot cites as influencing him in the writing of The Idea of a Christian Society are, I 
suggest, another smoke-screen to hide Eliot's tracks. We have already outlined in 
some depth Eliot's putative Hegelian leanings, and now we must examine another 
possible strand in his social, the Coleridgian. Whether this will discredit our initial 
thesis remains to be seen. 
52 1 have not been able to find any references in Eliot's published work to Coleridge's 
Church and State, other than those cited above. Nor have any of my fellow members of the TS 
Eliot Society whom I have canvassed. 
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Chapter Nine: Samuel Taylor Coleridge - 
"The Perfect Critic" 
In the penultimate edition of The Criterion, of October 1938, Eliot gave space 
to a review of RJ White's The Political Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Eliot 
always chose the books that were reviewed. His choice of this anthology was 
significant: it perhaps mirrored his own preoccupations with social thought at the 
time he was preparing the lectures which were to become The Idea of a Christian 
Society. The review, albeit only two pages long, by George Every SSM, is 
significant as a preface to what we must examine below. 
Although Every is critical of White's selection of texts - it reduces, he writes, 
"... the Lay Sermons and the Constitution of Church and State to the condition of 
disjecta membra" (Every 1967: 126) - he is able to make in passing some telling 
comments which are important for our study. He suggests that White is attempting 
to "... apologise for Coleridge's conservative sympathies in politics and religion" 
(Every 1967: 127), tenets which we might apply to Eliot. 53 Every also raises the 
subject of German philosophy in his review. Although Every acknowledges that 
Coleridge used Kantian philosophy, it was only as a tool rather than a heart-felt 
ideal. "Kant", writes Every, 
was ammunition... in the attempt to get... behind Bentham 
and Locke... (Every 1967: 128) 
53 Scruton portrays Eliot as an "articulate conservative" in The Meaning of Conservatism 
(Scruton 1984: 20). 
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But this use of Kant was only an expedient. Every suggests that Coleridge's 
"... Idealism was not Kant's": 
... 
ideas are not simply forms whereby the mind orders the 
confused manifold of sense. The idea of the Church and the 
idea of the State are not unrealised political ideals, but 
principles which underlie... Church and of the State, though 
they can never be perfectly realised at any single 
moment... (Every 1967: 128) 
If Coleridge's Idealism was not Kant's then it was possibly Hegel's, although Every 
does not elaborate on this. It might perhaps be seen that Every's explanation of 
Coleridge's dynamic of ideas in history is broadly Hegelian in outline. This does not 
imply, of course, that Coleridge was actually Hegelian, only that Every puts an 
Hegelian kind of interpretation on Coleridge's ideas. Whatever the nature of 
Coleridge's Idealism, this review in some sense unwittingly describes the 
underlying philosophy of Eliot's The Idea of a Christian Society. Eliot's "Idea" was 
indeed a principle rather than an "unrealised political ideal" - Eliot asserts that it is 
not a "blueprint" - and, as we will see below, he does not believe that it will be 
"perfectly realised at any single moment"; rather, it will be adapted to suit the 
particular situations in Christian cultures which desire to incarnate their faith in 
social organisation. 
Every's article could not of course have informed all of Eliot's mind as to the 
nature of Coleridge's thought, but it can be seen to chime with some of Eliot's ideas. 
Eliot's knowledge of Coleridge was greater than a simple review or even the 
anthology which sparked it. Coleridge had a long and distinguished career in Eliot's 
mind before the appearance of this review. In the 1920 The Sacred Wood, Eliot was 
to describe Coleridge as "... perhaps the greatest of English critics, and in a sense the 
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last" (Eliot 1928b: 1). Although this was referring specifically to his literary 
criticism, in examining more closely the ideas behind The Idea of a Christian 
Society, we might begin to see that it also referred to Coleridge's social criticism. In 
discussing Coleridge, we actually depart from our original intention in Part Three, 
that of looking at the named sources of inspiration in The Idea of a Christian 
Society. Coleridge's On the Constitution of Church and State, According to the Idea 
of Each does not appear alongside the works of Dawson, Demant, Maritain, and 
Murry in the opening pages of The Idea of a Christian Society. Its influence is, 
rather, hidden, although definitely there. 
This influence is clearly seen in the paragraph in Eliot's book which is 
virtually a recapitulation of one in Coleridge. This paragraph is the key to 
understanding the methodology of The Idea of a Christian Society and aids the 
reader in understanding the concept of the book. Significantly, this debt to 
Coleridge is not acknowledged in the text nor by a marked foot-note, but rather by 
an end-note added in the published version of the lecture (Eliot 1982: 83). We might 
be tempted to conclude that - at least at the moment when Eliot delivered his 
lectures - he wished his thought, derived from Coleridge, to be considered as 
his 
alone. The paragraph runs: 
In using the term "Idea" of a Christian Society I do not 
mean primarily a concept derived from the study of any 
societies which we may choose to call Christian: I mean 
something that can only be found in an understanding of 
the end to which a Christian Society. . . must 
be directed. I 
do not limit the application of the term to a perfected 
Christian Society on earth: and I do not comprehend in it 
societies merely because some profession of Christian 
faith.. . 
is retained. My concern with contemporary society 
will not be primarily with specific defects ... 
but with the 
324 
question, what - if any - is the "idea" of the society in 
which we live? to what end is it arranged? 
(Eliot 1982: 43) 
In the end-note to this paragraph, Eliot writes this: 
In using the term "Idea" I have of course had in mind the 
definition given by Coleridge [in his]... Church and State: 
"By an idea I mean (in this instance) that conception of a 
thing, which is not abstracted from any particular state, 
form or mode, in which the thing may happen to exist at 
this or that time; nor yet generalised from any number or 
succession of such forms or modes; but which is given by 
the knowledge of its ultimate aim. " 
(Eliot 1982: 83) [Eliot's Italics] 
What both Eliot and Coleridge are saying is that they are not relying upon empirical 
thought or research in outlining their ideas, as for example did Aristotle who 
famously blended his theory of politics with research on over one hundred and thirty 
city constitutions in The Politics. The Englishmen's conception of the Christian 
Society is based on "pure" theory, unsullied by experience and based on teleology. 
Uncharacteristically, Eliot accurately quotes his source (except for a minor 
punctuation error 54), which perhaps shows how seriously he took Coleridge's dictum. 
This would suggest that, when writing the end-note, he had Coleridge's book in front 
of him, something which, in the Clark Lectures, for instance, he was not used to 
doing, quoting from memory. In doing this, he not only put himself in the Platonic 
camp, but with aligning himself with Coleridge, he was putting himself in a firm 
tradition of English thought on constitutional matters. Coleridge's On the 
Constitution of Church and State was not the only work of the early to mid- 
54 Eliot deletes the comma after Coleridge's "form" in the phrase "state, form, or mode". 
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nineteenth century which we might term Idealist in approach. Newman - influenced 
by Coleridge - continued the tradition with his 1852 Idea of a University. Eliot's work 
might be seen as a continuation of this tradition, albeit belatedly, just as certain 
critics see The Criterion as the last of the great Victorian literary journals (Tate 
1967: 358)'5. Tradition was of course a crucial notion in Eliot's work, and to be able 
to link The Idea of a Christian Society with works by Coleridge and Newman would 
have been very satisfying. A further, stylistic link with the work of Coleridge might 
also be seen in the opening paragraphs of The Idea of a Christian Society, which 
again helps put Eliot in the tradition. Eliot suggests that he "... owe[s] a great deal to 
conversations with certain friends whose minds are engrossed by these and similar 
questions" (Eliot 1982: 41). Coleridge, too, owed a debt to a friend over his own 
book: 
The occasion of this little work will be sufficiently 
explained by an extract from a letter addressed to me by a 
friend... (Coleridge I884: xxiii) 
Although the circumstances are clearly different - Coleridge's friend was concerned 
with Roman Catholic Emancipation - the introduction of a friend or friends to 
sharpen the mind of the English Man of Letters is too striking a similarity not to 
warrant comment. Perhaps Eliot is here claiming kinship with Coleridge, just as he 
may well have been doing in the 1920 essay The Perfect Critic -a title, we might 
hold, that Eliot himself was claiming a century after Coleridge. 
There are several other points of similarity between the work of Coleridge 
55 This is in Davies' essay "Mistah Kurtz: He Dead": "Eliot should certainly be 
remembered... as the last great periodical editor of the nineteenth century. " 
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and Eliot. Both are ostensibly humble about their respective books. Coleridge, in 
the "Advertisement" for his volume, calls it "... this little work" (Coleridge 
I884: xxiii), and Eliot is as self-deprecating when he suggests that The Idea of a 
Christian Society "... can have little importance by [itself]" (Eliot 1982: 41). Again, 
perhaps, Eliot is planting himself in the English tradition. 
This tradition, as explained above, was of tackling an issue through its 
guiding idea, or principle. Neither Eliot nor Coleridge were interested in being 
prescriptive about how the English constitutional system might be changed. 
Coleridge, according to his book, had considered a further part to the work which 
he would have called "What is to be done now? ", but 
I have considered it more expedient that the content of this 
volume should be altogether in strict conformity with its 
title... [there shall be] no more and no other than ideas of 
the constitution in Church and State. 
(Coleridge I884: xxv) 
It was a hypothetical work, Coleridge desiring 
... the friendly reader to bear in mind the 
distinction 
enforced in these pages, between the exhibition of an idea, 
and the way of acting on the same... (Coleridge 1884: 42) 
Eliot, it could be said, had exactly the same distinction in his mind when he wrote 
his work. He did not want it to lead to any kind of programme or movement. He is 
at pains to state that he does not want religious ferment to follow in its wake: 
I trust that the reader will understand from the beginning 
that this book does not make any plea for a "religious 
revival"... (Eliot 1982: 42) 
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(The appeal to "the reader" - uncharacteristic in Eliot's work56 - is yet another 
conscious link with Coleridge, who appeals to both "the friendly reader" and "the 
reader" in his book [Coleridge 1884: xxv, 30]. ) In another place, Eliot again asserts 
that The Idea of a Christian Society is not a manifesto: 
I am not investigating the possible line of action by which 
such a Christian Society could be brought into being. I 
shall confine myself to a slight outline of ... [the] essential 
features of this society... (Eliot 1982: 55) 
Both Eliot and Coleridge operate in the realm of ideas. This is the background to 
the essential similarity between the two in the area of the two major divisions 
within society, on which their whole social theories rest. For both Coleridge and 
Eliot, the ability to grasp what Coleridge calls "the ultimate aim" of society - for 
Eliot, the "supernatural end" of society - is bound up in the ability of individuals to 
grasp and digest ideas per se. For Coleridge, 
... this 
knowledge [i. e. of the "ultimate aim" of society]... 
may very well exist and powerfully influence a man's 
thought and actions, without his being distinctly conscious 
of the same... On the other hand, it is the privilege of the 
few to possess an idea: of the generality of men, it might be 
more truly affirmed that they are possessed by it. 
(Coleridge 1884: 30-31) 
This crucial distinction, we might think, is that which also lies at the heart of 
Eliot's division of society into the Christian Community and the Community of 
Christians. The former composed the mass of society, whose lifestyles were 
instinctive and unreflective. For these, 
56 The only other such appeals I can find are in After Strange Gods, on p. 11, and the Preface 
to the 1943 Reunion by Destruction, both of which are highly polemical works. 
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The religious life.. . would 
be largely a matter of behaviour 
and conformity... (Eliot 1982: 62) 
These persons would indeed be "possessed by" the idea of Christian living. Eliot's 
Community of Christians, on the other hand, would be those who are 
"consciously. . practising Christians", akin to Coleridge's 
"privileged" few who 
"possess an idea". From the latter groups would develop Coleridge's "clerisy", and 
Eliot's "Community of Christians". 
The role of ideas is crucial to both men's work. Church and State and The 
Idea of a Christian Society, by their titles, suggest this. Not only are they more 
interested in what we might term the theoretical side of politics than the practical, 
their insistence on the place of ideas reaches further than a mere love of 
intellectualisation of problems. Both come at their subjects, we might posit, from 
the Idealist standpoint, as outlined in Part One. For Coleridge, who spent years 
studying German Idealism, the Idea was king. This can be seen in his footnote to 
the following comment on the nature of a Constitution, "... a Constitution is an idea 
rising out of the idea of a State" (Coleridge 1884: 34): 
... 
for a constitution itself is an idea. This will sound like a 
paradox... for those with whom an idea is another word for 
a fancy. . . but not to those who in the ideas contemplate the 
most real of all realities... (Coleridge 1884: 34, footnote) 
He further enunciates his Idealist position in the main text of his work: 
... we speak... of the 
idea itself, as actually existing, that is, 
as a principle existing in the only way in which a principle 
can exist - in the minds and consciences of the persons 
whose duties it prescribes... the Constitution has real 
existence... because it both is, and exists as, an idea. 
(Coleridge 1884: 35) 
Coleridge's Constitution, then, is a kind of shared idea, which has the force of a 
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shared faith, we might think. Being the driving force linking persons together, it is 
real, having power and influence. It is not a concept restricted to the minds of the 
population only, but links those minds with and indeed enables those minds to 
shape the world outside of mind, that is, society itself. Coleridge here, we might 
think, has an Idealist map of the power of ideas and the minds that form them. 
Mind creates reality; mind creates Constitutions, and, as we shall see later, those 
individual minds are linked by an even greater force or mind that drives the engine 
of history itself. To a degree, I suggest, this is what Eliot intends in The Idea of a 
Christian Society. 
If one takes Eliot's notion of the Christian Society, and Coleridge's idea of the 
Constitution, we can see that they have similar shape and dynamics. For Coleridge, 
the Constitution was the over-arching principle which bound together people and 
their relationships in community. It was an Idea, but more than just a notion; it was 
a force. Eliot's Society has similar shape. Thought and ideas precede institutions. 
He introduces the matter of The Idea of a Christian Society with these words: 
... what I am concerned with 
here is not... institutions in their 
separated aspect, but the organisation of values... 
(Eliot 1884: 42) 
Eliot starts with ideas - and he does not stray beyond them - and these it is which 
then form the systems of worldly action. It is important to see that Eliot hardly 
mentions the contemporary world at all in his book, except in the aspect of the 
threats to it from Totalitarian regimes, and these are discussed as ideas rather than 
political entities. Coleridge likewise has exiguous references to his own times. It 
could be put, however, that this concern with ideas does not necessarily mean that 
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Eliot or Coleridge is per se an Idealist when it comes to social and political thought. 
Books, after all, are about ideas, and cannot be about action by themselves. The 
work of Demant, Dawson, Maritain and even Murry can be described as being 
concerned with ideas and theory. However, there is a crucial distinction to be made 
here, which is grist for our thesis. Whereas all the other writers discussed in this 
chapter have the ultimate concern for putting their ideas into action, moving their 
arguments from their pages into political reality, Eliot, it seems, has no desire to 
form a programme, a movement, or even an influence. He does not appear to 
consider the realm of political action as important. Everything depends on the idea 
and the mind which will conceive his ideas as put forward in The Idea of a 
Christian Society. He does not approach the question of The Practice of a 
Christian Society, nor that of How to Achieve the same. Rather, he is solely 
concerned with expounding the Idea, that conception of society, which will fill 
men's minds. Eliot suggests this with his disclaimer, 
My concern with contemporary society.. . will not 
be 
primarily with specific defects ... 
but with the question, 
what - if any - is the "idea" of the society in which we live? 
(Eliot 1982: 43) 
By achieving the right idea - and Eliot may be seen to suggest that he is using the 
word "idea" differently from normal usage by putting it into inverted commas - 
society will naturally fall into place around it. Ideas are reality; ideas have force and 
influence by themselves. It is by an idea that the Community of Christians is 
formed, and also the Christian Community (albeit subsumed into behaviour), and it 
is by the force of ideas and not arms that Fascism and Communism are perceived as 
a threat. The force of ideas had long impressed Eliot by the time he came to write 
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his 1939 lectures. In the 1916 thesis, he had written, in the context of an example of 
an idea found in literature: 
Becky Sharp exists in the time-order of Vanity Fair, but 
this time-order does not itself exist. Becky exists as an 
event in the life of Thackery, and as an event in the life of 
every reader in the same way that every real person 
exists... [she] is simply the identical reference of several 
points of view. (Eliot 1964: 125) 
Entities are real as far as they are shared. This might be considered as a 
fundamental factor in Eliot's insistence on the shared Christian nature of society. It 
is a system of shared ideas, beliefs. If it is so, then it is real, like Becky Sharp. 
Despite their insistence on the power of ideas to form reality, neither 
Coleridge nor Eliot desire their works to be "blueprints" for any future society. 
Although this might be taken as an argument against the idealist view of things I 
have argued that both authors hold, in that if ideas have ultimate power then their 
implementation in the world would not be compromised, this should be seen rather 
as a refinement of an Idealist stance on society. In offering the "ideas" of Church, 
State, and Society, Eliot and Coleridge were outlining the basic principles, and not 
complete systems. These complete systems could be enlarged and expanded in 
differing ways whilst still keeping true to the fundamental ideas. Unity in principle 
did not necessarily mean uniformity. Coleridge takes great care in explaining how 
Church and State is not a detailed plan for action: 
We should be aware.. . that the particular 
form.. 
. that may 
best fit to render the idea [i. e. of the Constitution] 
intelligible.. . 
is not necessarily the.. . 
form in which it 
actually arrives at realisation ... A naturalist... whose 
knowledge had been confined exclusively to the human 
frame.. . might 
have regarded the lungs as the only form in 
which this idea [of respiration] ... was realisable. Ignorant 
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of the function of the spirncula in insects, and of the gills 
of fish, he would, perhaps... degrade both to the class of 
non-respirants. (Coleridge 1884: 35-36) 
In other words, although insects, fish, and humans breathe differently, they are true 
examples of the general idea of respiration. The same went with societies. Eliot 
followed suit, offering not a "blue print" but a set of principles of the idea of a 
Christian Society which could be implemented anywhere according to local needs. 
His discussion of Christian Society "... involves [the] problem in its widest sense 
and in its most general interest" (Eliot 1982: 45), and he acknowledged that 
Christian Society will take 
... a 
different form according to the traditions of [each]... - 
Roman, Orthodox, or Lutheran. (Eliot 1982: 69-70) 
Each differing Christian nation would be free to "... develop a positive culture of 
[its] own" (Eliot 1982: 69). For both Coleridge and Eliot, although the essence of 
the idea was the same, its implementation could follow a variety of forms. 
This essential core of ideas Coleridge called "the principle of unity" within 
society: 
... 
having the principle of unity within itself, whether by 
concentration of its forces, as a constitutional 
monarchy ... or... 
by... the lex equilibri, the principle 
prescribing the means and conditions by and under which 
the balance is to be established and preserved, being the 
constitution of the State. (Coleridge 1884: 37) 
For Coleridge, the Principle of Unity within Britain, as he saw it, was the balance 
achieved between the "two orders" in society, which he called "... the agricultural or 
possessors of land; and the mercantile... and professional bodies" (Coleridge 
1884: 40) which ensured the "... permanence of the State" (Coleridge 1884: 39). In 
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brief, he saw the former class (or classes - Coleridge would divide the "possessors 
of land" further into Major and Minor Barons) as providing the permanent stability 
of society, while the latter, being more recent, providing the engine for change 
which society needed. These seemingly opposing forces were to meet and be 
reconciled within the Parliamentary system 
... secured 
by a legislature of two Houses; the first 
consisting wholly of barons-the second of the knights or 
minor barons, elected by... the remaining landed 
community, together with the burgesses, the 
representatives of the commercial, manufacturing, 
distributive, and professional classes. (Coleridge 1884: 43) 
In balancing society, the king played a crucial role: 
The King, meanwhile, in whom the executive power is 
vested, it will suffice at present to consider as the beam of 
the constitutional scale. (Coleridge 1884: 43) 
Coleridge's approach to understanding society, it must be said, is far from Eliot's. 
For Coleridge, society - or at least landed and mercantile and professional society; 
he had little time for the labouring classes - could be neatly divided into precise 
groups, each having its legislative place in Parliament. And over all of them stood 
the King, a sort of arbiter figure. Coleridge was of his time, seeking to regulate and 
contain a burgeoning commercial society within an ancient landed order. Eliot, far 
removed from Coleridge's emergent modem Britain, has no such conception of 
society. He has no wish to classify people into landed or mercantile or professional 
classes. Indeed, he has no conception of England's ancient landed order at all. 
Whereas Coleridge is basically aristocratic and rural in his view of Britain, Eliot is 
urban, despite his seemingly rural leanings. For Eliot, society's balance is not by 
legislative harmony between the interests of a few powerful groups, but rather by 
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doctrinal and ethical unity held by all strata of society. 
There are, perhaps, several reasons why Eliot should have no apparent interest 
in political structures, unlike Coleridge. Principal amongst them were the apparent 
failures of the political system in the 1930's, as we saw above. Moreover, by 1939 
Eliot had lost faith in what Coleridge saw as the balancing beam, of society - the 
Monarchy. The Abdication Crisis, and the role played in it by Parliament, to my 
mind robbed Eliot of a central plank in his political thought, from which it never 
truly recovered. There was a vacuum thereafter in his politics, and helps explain 
why he is so reticent over political forms in The Idea of a Christian Society. For 
Eliot, the figure of the King should have been pivotal, as it was for Coleridge. It 
might be argued that, without the Abdication Crisis, The Idea of a Christian Society 
would have been a very different book. Eliot might well have chosen to focus upon 
the monarch as focal point for society, while keeping his Christian 
Community/Community of Christians dynamic intact. Instead, Eliot was forced to 
abandon his belief in monarchy and, by the way the Crisis unfolded, the role of 
Parliament within society. In a sense, Eliot in The Idea of a Christian Society is 
radically democratic, appealing to the mass of the population (albeit in rather 
paternalistic terms) to take their roles seriously, rather than spending time on the 
institutions of State. 
Yet despite these differences between Coleridge and Eliot, Eliot did subscribe 
to Coleridge's idea of a "principle of unity" within society. Eliot may not have 
gleaned this from Coleridge, of course, and such thinking may already have lain 
within Eliot's mind, but Eliot does in practice have this Coleridgian principle, albeit 
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in a different field. The Principle of Unity for Eliot, was not an institution or group 
of people, but a shared idea (as it was, really, for Coleridge). This idea united 
differing groups of people together. As he had written in Knowledge and 
Experience, as mentioned above, this unitive idea existed like the heroine Becky 
Sharp in Thackery's Vanity Fair, "... as an event in the life" of everyone who shared 
it, "... for it is... the identical reference of several points of view" (Eliot 1964: 125). 
The idea was the Christian faith, both in its dogmatic and ethical character. The 
members of Eliot's Community of Christians were united by their shared doctrinal 
understanding, and the Christian Community by its Christian lifestyle. The shared 
idea formed society out of disparate groups of people. This dynamic of unity 
around an idea within Eliot's The Idea of a Christian Society might be seen to be 
similar to that he explained in Knowledge and Experience, where he suggested that 
The idea is the total content which we mean about reality in 
any particular presentation.. . 
furthermore, its meaning 
partially coincides with the reality which it intends. Nor is 
the idea purely a logical entity, since it always, in the end, 
comes to occupy a place in a real world. 
(Eliot 1964: 40) 
And again, 
The idea is that reality which I intend, and the identity is 
only the assumption of one world; it is not the 
characteristic of it as idea, but as world. 
(Eliot 1964: 43) [Eliot's Italics] 
These extracts from Eliot's thesis might stand as a gloss on what he intended the 
"Idea" to be in the title of his 1939 work. It is not merely a conception or notion, 
and certainly not a blueprint. It is a reality which Eliot intended for England, and it 
encompassed all society - "the total content". The Idea did partially exist within 
336 
society as he saw it, and by articulating it Eliot sought to extend it. As intending 
reality, as occupying "... a particular place in a real world", Eliot's Idea of a 
Christian Society yoked together (the phrase is Eliot's) diverse groups into a whole. 
The above might be seen to be an over-philosophical interpretation of The 
Idea of a Christian Society. There are two points at this juncture which may 
support the interpretation, however. First, there is a linguistic link between Eliot's 
1939 book and the conclusion he drew in his thesis. Eliot, as we saw above, saw an 
idea not as a "purely a logical entity" but as something more substantial, "since it 
[i. e. the idea] always.. . comes to occupy a particular place in a real world. " The 
Idea in Eliot's mind in 1939 being Christian Society, it is perhaps significant that 
he termed it a Christian Society, not the Christian Society. His Idea of it was 
definite - it was the Idea - but the Society he envisaged was, in his words, not 
intended for any specific incarnation, but one which could be adopted for any 
society. It was the Idea for a "real world", that is, a real society. This could be in 
Britain, the United States, or "the colonies". Although one might think that Eliot's 
title for his book is neither here nor there, I would suggest that he chose it very 
carefully indeed. 
Second, such quest for unity around an idea may also be seen in Eliot's 
treatment of groups within society which did not share the Christian faith. Eliot's 
ostensibly anti-Semitic stance has been well explored in recent years, but the debate 
may well have been approached from the wrong angle. His putative anti-Semitism 
(and indeed his anti-minority stance) stems more perhaps from his philosophical 
quest for unity rather than his cultural or social mores. Despite decrying the 
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"... iniquity of usury" in The Idea of a Christian Society (Eliot 1982: 61), Eliot's 
concern with Jewish groups is with their alternative belief systems rather than 
social differences. In After Strange , 
for example, he suggests that "... reasons 
of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews 
inadvisable" (Eliot 1934: 11-12). It is these free thinkers, not other kinds of Jews, 
that Eliot does not desire, for by their rejection of their tradition they undermine 
society. In The Idea of a Christian Society Eliot's tone is softer, but the main thrust 
of the argument is still present. Although he can imagine "individuals" in society 
who "... remain blind, indifferent or even hostile" (Eliot 1982: 68) to Christianity, 
these are surely automatically excluded from the Community of Christians because 
the Community is defined by its "... identity of beliefs and aspirations. " (Eliot 
1982: 68) To introduce alternative - if not hostile - ideas into society would 
undermine the unity which a single idea would bring. Even if one subject did not 
share the common Christian beliefs, these could not be called truly common and the 
circle of unity would be broken. In Knowledge and Experience's terms, this would 
introduce another world into the picture and a potential dualism would be created. 
Eliot could not tolerate this, especially as he saw Fascism and Communism's 
strengths lying in their unity of doctrine. 
Another similarity between the two authors is their anti-Industrialisation and 
pro-rural stance. Coleridge, placed as he was near the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, could see the dangers inherent in the nascent system of manufacture and 
employment. In a long list of ills of society, he observes: 
Then we have the... corn-laws, cotton factories, 
spittalfields... and the remainder of the population 
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mechanised into engines for the manufacturing of new rich 
men... (Coleridge 1884: 64) 
As we saw above, this concern with the ills of the industrial process was still 
evident in Eliot's day. Interestingly, Coleridge lay the blame for this sea-change in 
English society at the door of Eliot's bugbear, Hobbes. Philosophers such as 
Hobbes, suggests Coleridge, in developing a mechanistic philosophy, paved the 
way for a mechanistic way of life: 
The mechanico-corpuscular theory [they] raised to the title 
of the mechanic philosophy, and [it was] espoused in 
philosophy by the actors of the so-called Revolution in the 
State. (Coleridge 1884: 64) 
Coleridge would surely have acquiesced in Eliot's comment that Hobbes had 
developed "... a particularly lamentable theory of the relation between Church and 
State. " (Eliot 1970g: 33) Moreover, Eliot saw in Hobbes the seeds of Totalitarian 
government (which perhaps correlates with Coleridge's "Revolution in the State", if 
he had in mind the French Terror), when he suggested that "... materialistic 
determinism [which Eliot traced to Hobbes] and absolutist government fits into the 
same scheme of life" (Eliot 1970g: 33). 
Industrialisation had a disastrous effect upon the rural life of England, 
according to both authors. For Eliot, it laid waste tracts of countryside; for 
Coleridge - more subtle here - it threatened the land by denuding it of agricultural 
labourers to till it. Both writers have a somewhat rural society in mind when they 
describe their ideal societies, although as we saw above, Eliot's two-community 
division in society is essentially urban. Moreover, both placed the parish system at 
the heart of the grand picture of England. This is such an unusual way of looking at 
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society that I suggest that Eliot could surely only have received the idea from 
Coleridge. Coleridge sees the parish unit as the place for society's revitalisation. 
The "Nationality", as he termed the life-force of the nation, was to be properly 
maintained and promoted by three particular means: 
... 1, [in] the universities and the great schools of 
liberal 
learning; 2, [by] a pastor.. . 
in every parish; 3, [by] a 
schoolmaster in every parish, who in due time should 
proceed to the pastorate... working to the same 
end.. . namely, the production and reproduction, the 
preservation, continuance, and perfection, of the necessary 
sources and condition of national civilisation... 
(Coleridge 1884: 57) 
These members of the clerisy - and most would be clergymen, in Coleridge's 
scheme of things, especially when one considers that University teachers in 
Coleridge's day were clergymen - would form a nucleus of culture in every parish in 
the land. Around these men, presumably, the rest of the population would gather in 
order to be instructed in the nation's culture. This would happen in two ways, first, 
in schooling and also through the parish church. It is worth noting here that 
Coleridge does not seem to envisage a role for Dissenting Churches (which did not 
operate on a parish basis, which was a peculiarly Anglican system) nor other 
religious groups. His system appears remarkably ecclesiastical and indeed clerical. 
Eliot's Community of Christians is also highly clericalised. Although there is not so 
obviously a clerical bias as in Coleridge, Eliot's community was described as 
"... consciously and thoughtfully practising Christians, especially those of 
intellectual and spiritual authority" (Eliot 1982: 62). Although these criteria are not 
a clerical monopoly, it might be felt that this group would include more clerical 
than lay members. And although Eliot does not restrict the Community of 
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Christians to a specific geographical base, in his scheme of the parishes as the 
fundamental "community unit" in which people would have their entire lives, in 
effect they would be parochially based. Eliot is at pains in The Idea of a Christian 
Society to define his Community of Christians against Coleridge's Clerisy. He 
believed that his ". .. `Community of Christians' is somewhat different" (Eliot 
1982: 36). Yet the reasons he gives for these differences are somewhat spurious. He 
suggests that Coleridge's insistence on Christian education by Christian teachers 
11 can no longer be taken for granted", and in future in schools "the personnel will 
inevitably be mixed". Eliot's points are perhaps disingenuous. In suggesting that the 
existence of Christian teachers cannot be taken for granted, he is in fact straying 
beyond the methodological limits of The Idea of a Christian Society, which 
purports not to be a critique of existing structures. The comment is strangely out of 
synchronisation with the rest of the book, which has few other comments on 
existing systems. In fact, in Eliot's day the vast majority of teachers would have 
called themselves Christians, one would suspect, especially given the number who 
would have been trained in Church of England colleges. Moreover, Eliot in his 
book insists that the education system would have to teach Christianity as the 
national culture, so the teacher's belief or not would have little relevance. As this is 
the only point of departure from Coleridge's Clerisy that Eliot gives, the difference 
between the two can be seen as little. 
Why, then, should Eliot have tried to distance himself from Coleridge, 
especially given that the works can be seen to stand in a solid English tradition of 
thought? Perhaps the most important reason was Coleridge's somewhat unorthodox 
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position in English letters. Since his own day, he 
... 
has been variously criticised as a political turn-coat, a 
drug addict, a plagiarist, and a mystic humbug. .. a great 
progenitor of the English Romantic spirit... 
(Drabble 1984: 212) 
To Eliot he was not totally salubrious, especially as he represented the Romantic 
tradition in English letters, over which Eliot had grave reservations. Therefore he 
could not be seen to be too close to his nineteenth century predecessor. As a Broad 
Churchman, too - although the title is somewhat anachronistic - Coleridge was poles 
apart from Eliot. His belief in the necessity of Christian re-unification would have 
been unacceptable to Eliot, who saw such moves as a dilution in orthodoxy in 
participant Churches and reunion, as the title of his 1943 pamphlet on the reunion of 
the Indian Churches shows, as a means of destruction. 
Eliot may also have wished to distance himself from Coleridge over other 
matters. We have seen above how Coleridge stressed the importance of Parliament 
in the body politic, which suggests that at heart he was a democrat. Eliot would have 
had no time for this particular leaning. Coleridge's conception of the State, deriving 
from its structure, was also antipathetical to Eliot. To Coleridge, the term State had 
two meanings: 
... in one sense.. . the State as a whole and comprehending 
the Church... [and] the State as one of the two constituent 
parts... (Coleridge 1884: 94-95) 
Although Eliot in The Idea of a Christian Society proclaimed himself as not being 
interested in matters of Church and State (thereby another difference with 
Coleridge, this time methodological), one cannot but help think that Coleridge's 
definition of State would not have found favour with Eliot. Moreover, Coleridge 
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wished to see the State as synonymous with "... a constituted realm, kingdom, 
commonwealth or nation... " (Coleridge 1884: 95). Eliot could not see England as 
such a phenomenon. Although it might be said that Coleridge's term State was in its 
broader meaning the same as Eliot's "Society", it is perhaps differently nuanced. 
For Eliot, Christian Society was made from the ground (or, rather, parish) upwards. 
In describing it he had no need nor indeed time for describing either State apparatus 
nor ecclesiastical systems. It was, as hinted above, a radically popular entity, 
founded solely on people and their belief systems. In other words, in Eliot's view of 
fundamental society as contained in The Idea of a Christian Society, there is little or 
no role either offered or indicated for institutions. In Coleridge, there is. Institutions 
form the balance for the whole system. Church and State (in its lesser role) 
cooperate but also restrain, as do Parliament and King. Although Coleridge does 
spend considerable time in outlining his clerisy, which was to be spread amongst 
the people, he is not actually concerned with what in Eliot would be the "Christian 
Community". 
There is also a massive difference between the two over the role of the 
Church. At one level, Coleridge's vision of the Church does not appear much 
different from Eliot's or indeed many other mainstream ecclesiologies of the 
Reformed traditions. He suggests that the Christian Church 
... 
is not a kingdom... of the world.. . 
it is the appointed 
opposite to [it] ... the ... correcting, 
befriending opposite of 
the world... whatever is beneficent and humanising in the 
aims... of the State, the Church collects itself as in a focus, 
to radiate them back in a higher quality.. . And 
for these 
services the Church... asks of the State neither ways nor 
dignities. (Coleridge 1884: 98) [Coleridge's Italics] 
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Although this definition is hardly controversial, there are other facets of 
Coleridge's thought that would not have found favour with Eliot. Although 
Coleridge is in favour of a "National Church" - and here he picks up a phrase from 
the Book of Common Prayer, and so is not being radical at least in his terminology 
- which is legally safe from "... any measure subverting or tending to subvert 
[its] 
safety and independence" (Coleridge 1884: 77), he does not believe that this 
National Church necessarily must be Christian. Ultimately, the National Church is 
more important for the role it plays within society rather than its claim to truth. 
Coleridge observes that 
In relation to the National Church, Christianity ... 
is a 
blessed accident, a providential boon... Christianity [is]... no 
essential part of the being of the National Church. .. a 
National Church might exist, and has existed, without.. . the 
Christian Church; - as the Levitical Church in the Hebrew 
Constitution.. . would suffice to prove. 
(Coleridge 1884: 59) 
The religion of the National Church, so it seems, can be virtually anything. Eliot 
could not have agreed to this. Moreover, Coleridge sees the National Church - that 
is, the religious life and institutions of the nation - in England having been through 
bad periods. Its Christianity was not always such of a "boon", for it had suffered 
much in 
... the dark age of 
Queen Elizabeth, in the unenlightened 
times of Burleigh, Hooker.. . and 
Lord Bacon... 
(Coleridge 1884: 63) 
Eliot may well have disagreed. Under Hooker, for example, Eliot saw the Church 
of England almost at its apogee, his achievement alongside his contemporary 
Andrewes immense: 
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The intellectual achievement and the prose style of Hooker 
and Andrewes came to complete the structure of the 
English Church as the philosophy of the thirteenth century 
crowns the Catholic Church. (Eliot 1970a: 18) 
Any description of Hooker as part of the obfuscation of the Church would be 
diametrically opposed to Eliot's, who would rank Hooker alongside Aquinas. 
Such a difference in views can also be seen in the writers' approach to the 
constitution of their "clerisies". For Coleridge, the clerisy is a broad group of 
people. It had a long history, and although Coleridge thought it had fallen into 
desuetude, its historical parameters were those with which it should be 
reconstituted: 
The Clerisy of the nation... in its ... original 
intention, 
comprehended the learned of all denominations.. . 
in short, 
all the so-called liberal arts and sciences, the possession 
and application of which constitute the civilisation of a 
country... (Coleridge 1884: 53) 
Although there is a stress on theology in Coleridge's scheme, as there is in Eliots, 
the two are somewhat different. For Coleridge, although membership of the clerisy 
is open to all denominations and sects, in practice membership is open only to those 
of the Protestant and Reformed traditions: 
The [members of the] Clerisy... shall be fully... citizens of 
the State, neither acknowledging the authority, nor within 
the influence, of any other State in the world... and in no 
capacity... pretences, owning any other earthly sovereign or 
visible head but the King. (Coleridge 1884: 72)D7 
Eliot's Community of Christians, however, has no denominational boundaries. And 
57 In 1830, the Pope was not just a spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church, but also the 
ruler of an Italian State, the Papal States. This region had its own administration and army, and so 
Coleridge's reference to "other States" also refers to the Pope. 
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whereas Coleridge puts the membership criterion firmly on intellectual prowess, 
Eliot also has a spiritual orientation, as we saw above: 
... [the members of the 
Community of Christians] will be 
the consciously and thoughtful practising Christians, 
especially those of intellectual and spiritual authority. 
(Eliot 1982: 62) 
Coleridge's Clerisy might appear to be the learned who just happen to be Christian, 
whereas Eliot's are what might be called visceral Christians, whose faith permeates 
their whole being. Moreover, Coleridge's Clerisy is a more institutional group than 
Eliot's. The latter's Community of Christians is a collection of people "... nebulous 
in outline", not forming 
... local groups, and not the Church 
in any one of its senses, 
unless we call it "the Church within the Church". 
(Eliot 1982: 62) 
Coleridge, on the other hand, suggests that the Clerisy are 
... members of the permanent learned class... planted 
throughout the realm.. . the 
immediate agents and 
instruments in the great and indispensable work of 
perpetuating... [the] civilisation of the nation... entitled to 
remain its trustees and usufructuary proprietors. 
(Coleridge 1982: 56) 
Moreover, Coleridge is moved to say that 
... I hold it a disgrace and calamity of a professed statesman 
not to know.. . that a permanent, nationalised, learned order, 
a national Clerisy... is an essential element of a rightly 
constituted nation... (Coleridge 1884: 66) 
That they are "planted", and have the usufruct of the nation makes these members 
of the clerisy very much to appear like the parochial clergy of England. Presumably, 
they were "planted" by someone or institution, and that Coleridge wants a member 
of the Clerisy in "every parish" would suggest that this is the case. Perhaps 
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Coleridge is here arguing in an oblique way for a professionally trained clergy. 
There was a movement for this within the Anglican Church at the same time as 
Coleridge published Church and State, in 1830. Both lines of thought were perhaps 
provoked by the increased freedom of the Roman Catholic Church in Britain, 
which could boast a properly trained priesthood. Overall, Coleridge's clerisy is 
more institutional and less broad-based than Eliot's Community of Christians, 
although its raison d'etre is very similar. 
Eliot's debt to Coleridge is great. Not only do they appear similar in their use 
of ideas as forces within society, but the role of the land itself, their treatment of 
non-Christian inhabitants and the place of a specialised Christian elite put them in 
the same kind of English tradition. 
At this juncture we must turn our attention to another scholar who has 
identified Coleridge as a predecessor to Eliot, and see to what conclusions he 
arrived. Kojecky, whose 1971 TS Eliot's Social Criticism remains the only full- 
length study on the subject, suggests that 
Coleridge appears at important places in Eliot's social 
writing. The "idea" in The Idea of a Christian Society was 
as much Coleridge's as Plato's, and the "clerisy", a term 
coined by Coleridge, was fertile in the ground of Eliot's 
thought. (Kojecky 1971: 19) 
Kojecky traces both men's origins in Unitarianism, as well as their philosophical 
and literary similarities. He briefly traces the outline of argument concerning the 
clerisy in Church and State (he does not, alas, ever give its full title, losing an 
invaluable link between it and Eliot), and suggests in general terms the correlation 
with Eliot's book. He does not, however, discuss Coleridge's theory of ideas, nor 
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that of Eliot, and does not in depth discuss the role of the land, Church or State in 
Church and State. Kojecky' discussion, although important, runs to only six pages, 
and his conclusion that 
Both he [i. e. Eliot] and Coleridge looked to historically 
sanctioned institutions and to constitutional forms for 
national Christian renewal. (Kojecky 1971: 24-25) 
may be disputed: ostensibly, neither Coleridge's clerisy nor Eliot's Community of 
Christians has a real historical basis. Moreover, Eliot wished for more than a 
"Christian renewal": it was a renewal in Christian society, the broader meaning of 
which Kojecky does not appear here to recognise, restricting it to a more personal 
level. 
Given the role of Coleridge in The Idea of a Christian Society, do we 
therefore need to look further in the search for influences over Eliot's social 
thought? It might be contended that we already have a rich harvest in our searches 
so far, which puts Eliot in a tradition alongside Coleridge and Newman. Therein 
lies a clue to our further studies: from where did this tradition come? Eliot, as well 
as Coleridge and indeed Newman (in following Coleridge; Newman knew no 
German) were perhaps drawing on a deeper foundation of thought than their own. 
This is to be found within German philosophy. 
Coleridge may again provide a bridge for Eliot to German Idealism, although 
as we saw in Part One Eliot was already well acquainted with it. It is sometimes 
argued that Coleridge is Kantian. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church 
states that Coleridge in 1798 "... went to Germany to study the Kantian philosophy" 
(Cross and Livingstone 1983: 312). A more modern study, Bywater's 1997 Samuel 
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Taylor Coleridge, suggests that, apropos of the perceiving mind, 
We saw such an ideal of perception to be already implicit 
in [the poem] "The Lime Tree Bower"; later, under the 
influence of Kant, Coleridge works out this implication in 
some detail. (Bywater 1997: 17) 
However, Coleridge's thought, it can be argued, at least within On the Constitution 
of the Church and State, is more like Hegel's than Kant` s. This suggestion is, I 
realise, a bold one to make in the face of recent Coleridge studies, where the name 
of Hegel hardly makes an appearance. Current thinking - Bywater excepted - is that 
Coleridge drew upon the post-Kantian work of such thinkers as Schelling and both 
the Schlegels as well as that of Kant himself, and as Hamilton suggests, when he 
returned to England from his German sojourn in 1798, although he 
... 
does not let himself be swallowed entire by post- 
Kantianism... [he] takes with him a host of religious 
animists [as Hamilton describes them] with whom to build 
a critical emplacement within the idealist promised land. 
(Hamilton 2002: 172) 
Hegel, it seems, does not figure in this list of post-Kantians, and nor does he in the 
studies of Coleridge's philosophy or politics such as those by of Morrow (1996), 
Kitson (2002) and Colmer (1959). 
However, there is incontrovertible evidence that Coleridge knew and strong 
evidence to suggest that he also assimilated Hegel's work. In the Coleridge 
Collection in the British Library is his copy of Hegel's 1812 Wissenschaft der 
Logik, which Coleridge annotated throughout its first ninety pages (Muirhead 
1930: 270). Although it appears that only Muirhead in his 1930 study Coleridge as 
Philosopher notices this and sees it as important, this seems to me to be crucial, at 
least for our study. Firstly, it shows us that Coleridge, long after his return from his 
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German tour (on which it is extremely unlikely that he met Hegel, on examination 
of his itinerary in Holmes' Coleridge: Early Visions and comparing it with Hegel's 
whereabouts in 1798 as recorded in Pinkard's Hegel: A Bio rg aphy) was acquiring 
the texts of the latest German philosophy, and if this was so of Hegel's 
Wissenschaft der Logik it may well have been true of his other works, which have 
been considered above. (That they do not survive in the Coleridge archive is not 
evidence that they never existed for Coleridge). And secondly, in examining a little 
of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik (or, at least in an English translation, known as 
The Encyclopaedia Logic), we see, I suggest, that some of Coleridge's thought 
changes after he reads it. 
As this appears to be a new idea in Coleridge studies, and is important to our 
own here, this is worth examining. Before reading Hegel's Logik, Coleridge's 
theory of ideas appears to be Platonist. In the Biographia Literaria, for example, he 
defines "idea" in the following way: 
The word IBcc [Idea], in its original sense... represented 
the visual abstraction of a distant object... Plato adopted it 
as a technical term... The ideas themselves he considered 
as mysterious powers... exempt from time... 
(Coleridge 1985: 209, fn) 
Throughout Biographia Literaria, Coleridge uses "idea" in this Platonic sense, as 
a thing distant from the world. For example: 
Essence ... means the principle of 
individuation ... It 
is 
equivalent to the idea of a thing, whenever we use the 
word idea with philosophic precision. Existence, on the 
other hand, is distinguished from essence, by the 
superinduction of reality. (Coleridge 1985: 348) 
Ideas, for Coleridge here, are not part of reality. In Hegel's Logik, Coleridge 
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would have come across a very different notion of idea, which we have examined 
at some length in Part Two. In describing idea, Hegel suggests that 
The Idea is what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity 
of Concept and objectivity. Its ideal content is nothing but 
the Concept in its determinations; its real content is only 
the presentation that the Concept gives itself in the form of 
external thereness [sic]... 
(Hegel 1991 C: 286) [Hegel's Italics] 
An idea is therefore the objective existence of a concept, its incarnation. This is far 
removed from the Platonist position that Coleridge holds in his earlier career, and it 
can be demonstrated that he adopts it consciously in his later writings. His 
definition of the "Idea" of the constitution of a state has already been quoted, and it 
is couched in Hegelian terms, a la the definition he would have encountered in his 
reading of Hegel's Logik. 
There are several other pieces of evidence for the conclusion that Coleridge 
adopts Hegelian lines of thought in his own writings. Both Coleridge and Hegel, for 
example, give space to the notion of a grand force in human history which 
influences its progress. For Hegel this was called Geist, and was clearly charted in 
the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Coleridge, without actually 
giving this entity or force a name, likewise gives credence to such a phenomenon. 
In his comments on the expansion of the rule of law in Church and State, Coleridge 
suggests that 
My assertion is simply this, that its formation has advanced 
in this direction. The line of evolution, however sinuous, 
has still tended to this point, sometimes with, sometimes 
without, not seldom, perhaps, against, the intention of the 
individual actors, just always as if a power, greater and 
better than the men themselves, had intended it for them. 
(Coleridge 1884: 43) 
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Moreover, Coleridge has the same scientific interest in history as did Hegel: 
The reading of history may dispose a man to satire; but the 
science of history... as the great drama of an ever-unfolding 
Providence, has a very different effect. It influences hope 
and the reverential thought of man and his destination. 
(Coleridge 1884: 44) 
Another Hegelian twist in Coleridge's thought is the concern for the alienation of 
property. In Coleridge's historical survey of the pre-Reformation period, he 
suggests that 
... 
large masses were alienated from the heritable properties 
of the realm.. . under the common name of Church 
property ... Had every rood, every stone.. . 
been re-transferred 
and made heritable at the Reformation, no right would have 
been invaded... (Coleridge 1884: 56) [my Italics] 
In combating this alienation, argues Coleridge, Henry VIII's name 
... would have outshone that of Alfred if he had availed himself of the wealth and landed masses that had been 
unconstitutionally alienated from the State, namely, 
transferred from the scale of heritable lands and revenues, 
to purchase, and win back whatever had been alienated 
from the opposite scale of the Nationality... 
(Coleridge 1884: 56-57) [my Italics] 
This attitude, it can be argued, can be linked with that of Hegel. For him, property 
embodied the person and will of the owner, and could only be given up by the 
freewill of the same: 
It is possible for me to alienate my property, for it is mine 
only in so far as I embody my will in it. Thus I may 
abandon as ownerless anything belonging to me... only in so 
far as the thing is external in nature. 
(Hegel 1991b: 95) [Hegel's Italics] 
Hegel's idea of inalienable property and Coleridge's alienated land seem to be very 
similar. Coleridge, it might be put, believed that the Nationality (a kind of "national 
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spirit") had been robbed of its force by the pre-Reformation Church, which 
sequestered property and labour for its own ends, and while doing so served a 
foreign power, the Pope. These properties should have been restored to the nation 
at the Reformation, but Henry VIII had failed to undo the knots of alienation. This 
had led to an unbalanced constitution. 
The figure of the king is also similar in both Coleridge and Hegel. We have 
identified Coleridge's idea that the king was a "visible head" of State, the beam of 
balance between the chambers of Parliament (Coleridge 1884: 72). Hegel, an 
admirer of the English Constitution, held the same kind of notions about the 
monarch. The king was, according to his German Constitution, a balancing 
mechanism in society: 
The State requires a universal centre -a monarch, and 
Estates - in which the various powers.. . are united, a centre 
which not only directs but also has the necessary power to 
assert itself and its resolutions. (Hegel 1964a: 12) 
Hegel's monarch was also a symbol of unity: 
Political authority must be concentrated in one centre.. . If 
popular respect ensures that this centre is secure in itself 
and immutably sanctified in the person of the 
monarch.. . every estate, city, etc. can enjoy the 
freedom to 
do and implement for itself what lies within its province. 
(Hegel 1964a: 21) 
Further correlations might be found between Hegel and Coleridge in their uses of 
the terms fancy and imagination (the Hegel scholar Knox suggests this in his 1975 
translation of Hegel's Aesthetics, p. 5), their absolutely high regard of Shakespeare, 
their use of the term Universal, and many other subjects. Muirhead sums up the 
meaning of these convergences with the comment 
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... the coincidence 
[between Coleridge and Hegel] ... 
is 
sufficiently remarkable and tempts one to imagine that 
there was something in the deeper spirit of the time which 
it was given to these two writers.. . to seize upon and 
express. (Muirhead 1930: 88) 
It would seem, therefore, that there is a solid argument, albeit in the seeming 
face of current scholarship, to suggest that Coleridge had a definite Hegelian root 
to some at least of his thinking. The same we have been arguing for Eliot, and if 
we accept even in little this line of reasoning, then we have a solid English 
tradition formed between Coleridge and Eliot, with Newman in between as a side- 
branch from Coleridge. 
This discovery - if discovery it is - might then lead us to question further the 
strictly Hegelian origins of Eliot's political thought: he might have conceivably 
(as Kojecky argues) received all his Hegelian thought via the mediating mind of 
Coleridge. However, we can dismiss this idea easily, by reminding ourselves of 
the evidence presented in Part Two, that Eliot knew many of Hegel's works (in 
English translation) at first hand and their assimilation and indeed direct quotation 
can be found in his works. Eliot in fact appears more Hegelian than Coleridge. In 
conclusion to this section on Coleridge, it might be seen that Eliot did not need 
him to be a mediator of Hegel's ideas, but Coleridge's assimilation of them into 
the mainstream (albeit Romantic, although in Coleridge Eliot's antipathy to 
Romanticism is muted; Coleridge is the "perfect critic", after all) English tradition 
gave Eliot the authority to use them in his own writings, and in parts to dress them 
in Coleridgian clothes to give them extra weight and to hide their German origins, 
which at the time of Eliot's writings would have been detrimental, as we saw in 
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This essay offers a new interpretation of Eliot. It shows that a number of his 
works were influenced to a noticeable degree by the Hegelian philosophy that he had 
encountered as a student. We know that Eliot annotated Hegel's Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History. It can also be demonstrated that he knew several of 
Hegel's works, including Natural Law, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, The 
German Constitution and Philosophy of Right. Words and phrases from these books 
(in English translation) occur in several places in Eliot's poetry, particularly Four 
Quartets. Within East Coker especially there resides a close poetic rendering of an 
Hegelian vision of rural society. Both authors have an abiding interest in the soil; the 
roots of this surely lie in Herder's theory of Volk. 
At 6: 13 we noted the major differences and similarities between Eliot and 
Hegel. Hegel's Geist, his "Idea" of Freedom, and his theory of evolving history found 
no real correlation in Eliot's social and political thought, although they did in his 
literary criticism - Eliot's concept of the "European mind" may have a ghost of an 
Hegelian Geist to it, as well as the theory of the developing Tradition. 
At this juncture we might summarise the echoes of Hegel to be found in Eliot's 
criticism. These are especially clear in the essays contained in the 1928 For Lancelot 
Andrewes. Eliot disavows Hobbes in a strikingly similar phrase to one used by Hegel 
in a parallel attack. Above all, Machiavelli occupies precisely the same position in 
Eliot as he does in Hegel. Eliot's essay "Nicolo Machiavelli" is virtually a 
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recapitulation of Hegel's earlier comments on Machiavelli as contained in "The 
German Constitution". Eliot in 1928 appears - in two essays at least - in Hegelian 
guise, and it is notable that he does this in a landmark collection which saw him 
appear in the world in his new and true colours, as an Anglican, royalist and classicist. 
Hegel appears very close to the heart of the true Eliot, at least in 1928. 
1928 marks a kind of watershed for Eliot. In the years following, his concerns 
became much broader. Literature, he saw, had an impact in society. Bad literature 
made bad society; this was the thrust of the 1934 After Strange Gods. The Criterion 
became more concerned with politics, sociology and economics in the years after 
1928. Eliot joined The Chandos Group and The Moot, although it could hardly be 
said that Eliot was ever a political activist. The whole process of Eliot's increasing 
engagement with the regulation and the future of society came to a head in our central 
text for this study, The Idea of a Christian Society. 
Whereas For Lancelot Andrewes contains easily recognisable Hegelian 
elements, those of The Idea of a Christian Society are well concealed. I have not been 
able to extrapolate Hegelian phrases or words from the text, as for the 1928 book. It is 
likely that Eliot took pains to conceal the Hegelianism which he had let freely flow 
some eleven years earlier. Why should he have done this? It was surely not because of 
his alleged rejection of Hegel, as we saw in Part Three. The reason, I suggest, lies in 
the political developments of the 1930's in continental Europe. The rise of German 
Fascism, and the increasing influence on the British intellectual scene of Soviet 
Communism, could both be traced in some part to the figure of Hegel. Marx drew his 
inspiration direct from Hegel, and Lenin from Marx, and so it could be claimed that 
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Soviet Russia was a child of Hegel, or at least those who claimed to be his followers. 
German Fascism, with its quasi-religious belief in the Volk and the German 
homeland, could also trace precedence to Hegel's door, although in a much less 
intellectually rigorous way. Eliot, who always asseverated his objections to both 
Fascism and Communism, believing them to be pagan, would have been acutely 
aware that both movements owed much to Hegel, twisted though their Hegelianism 
was. In writing The Idea of a Christian Society, any reference to Hegel, or any 
Hegelian sounding phrase, might well have been seen to deflate Eliot's cause. Instead, 
he attempted to place his 1939 book in the English tradition, with references to 
Coleridge, and also Dawson, et al. His inclusion of Maritain (straw man though he 
was) was perhaps a way of linking this Englishness to the European mind - and a 
French version of it at that - something Eliot was always anxious to do for such 
figures as Andrewes and Hooker. Eliot's attempt at concealing his Hegelian tone has, 
it must be admitted, been very successful; this study is the first to even suggest it, let 
alone argue for it in an extensive manner. But it should be noted that, at the very same 
period when Eliot was writing The Idea of a Christian Society, he was deeply 
immersed in (arguably) his greatest poetical work, Four Quartets, which as we have 
seen contain a number of Hegelian phrases and even arguments. Here we might have 
stumbled across a difference in the creative powers of Eliot's mind. His prose works, 
perhaps, were drawn from a more conscious, more overtly reasoning level of his 
mind, where he could identify different strands of his own thought and then disguise 
them if necessary. His poetry, on the other hand, perhaps came from another (one dare 
not say deeper), less reflective level, into which phrases and words and indeed whole 
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lines of argument encountered before could arise and be expressed. This can only be a 
suggestion as there is no way properly to ascertain this, although one of Eliot's 
marginal annotations to the Lectures may help us here, in suggesting that "Prose 
requires greater self-consciousness than poetry" (Sibree 1905: 169). Overall, I would 
suggest that many of the ideas that Eliot produces in The Idea of a Christian Society, 
and those in many of his other works, come from his early reading in Hegel, and that - 
in the words of Little Gidding, which perhaps are a postscript for all Eliot's work - 
the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started (Eliot 1969: 197) 
although, in the case of his social thought, this arrival was not to "Know the place for 
the first time" (Eliot 1969: 197). That place he had known at least as early as 1911 in 




TS Eliot's annotations in his copy of Sibree's 
translation of GWF Hegel's Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History 
There are several classes of underlining and marginal scoring made by Eliot 
in the book. There is the simple horizontal line under the lines of texts themselves 
(Appendix la). There is the single vertical line by the side of longer passages 
(Appendix lb). There is a double vertical line marking (Appendix 1c), and the 
multiple line marking (Appendix l d). Then there are the marginal notes 
themselves (Appendix le). Whether Eliot implied, by the number of markings, a 
hierarchy of importance in these highlighted texts, it is difficult to say but it is 
tempting to suggest that the more he marked a page the more it meant to him. 
In studying the marginal notes and underlinings, they will be given in Italic 
type to distinguish them from any accompanying commentary. Where words 
appear Italicised in the original, these are given in normal type in the extracts. 
Where vertical lines by the side of the text do not follow precisely sentence breaks, 
but overlap other sentences, the complete sentences are given. 
Fly-leaf notes 
There are several notes written by Eliot on the fly-leaf, and these have been 
commented on before, notably Lyndall Gordon and Peter Ackroyd. They introduce 
us to some of Eliot's grand themes which would occupy him for many years to 
come, notably in Four Quartets. Presumably they were instigated by Eliot's reading 
of the Lectures. They are as follows: 
What is Reason? 
God as the ultimate Abstraction? Time? 
Is there any present reconciliation between ourselves and the past? 
The past exists to us as present. 
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Can we argue about anything but the present? 
Have we anything but the present? 
Textual Notes 
p. ix. (from Sibree's Introduction) single line by the side of: 
The successive phases which humanity has assumed in passing ftom that primitive 
state of bondage to this condition of Rational Freedom forms the chief subject of 
the following lectures. 
p. 2. Double vertical line by the side of 
It is short periods of time, individual shapes of persons and occurrences, single, 
unreflected traits, of which he [i. e. the ancient historian such as Herodotus] makes 
his picture. And his aim is nothing more than the presentation to posterity of a 
image of events as clear as that which he himself possessed in virtue of personal 
observations, or life-like descriptions. 
p. 3. Double vertical line by the side of 
These historians, whom we must make thoroughly our own, with whom we must 
linger long, if we would live with their respective nations, and enter deeply into 
their spirit: of these historians, to whose pages we turn not for the purposes of 
erudition merely, but with a view to deep and genuine enjoyment, there are fewer 
than might be imagined. 
p. 4 Underlining of 
The workman approaches his task with his own spirit. 
p. 6 Underlining of 
Amid the pressure of great events, a general principle gives no help. 
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p. 7 Single vertical line by the side of 
The French, on the other hand, display great genius in reanimating bygone times, 
and in bringing the past to bear upon the present condition of things. 
p. 11 Underlining of 
It is only an inference from the history of the World, that its development has been 
a rational process. 
and 
[We must proceed historically ] empirically. 
and 
To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn, presents a 
rational aspect. The relation is mutual. 
p. 17 Single vertical line by the side of 
We have therefore to mention here: 
1. The abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit. 
2. What means Spirit uses in order to realise its Idea. 
3. Lastly, we must consider the shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit 
assumes - the State. 
p. 24 Single vertical line by the side of 
Nothing therefore happens, nothing is accomplished, unless the individuals 




We assert then that nothing has been accomplished without interest in the part of 
the actors; and - if interest be called passion, in as much as the whole 
individuality, to the neglect of all other actual or possible interests and claims, is 
devoted to an object with every fibre of volition, concentrating all its desires and 
powers upon it - we may affirm that nothing great in the World has been 
accomplished without passion. 
and following from this 
I mean here nothing more than human activity as resulting from private interests - 
special, or if you will, self-seeking designs. 
p. 25 Single vertical line by the side of 
I shall therefore use the term 'passion"; understanding thereby the particular bent 
of character, as far as the peculiarities of volition are not limited to private 
interest, but supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds 
shared in by the community at large. 
p. 28 Single vertical line by the side of 
Thus the passions of men are gratified; they develop themselves and their aims in 
accordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the edifice of human 
society; thus fortifying a position for Right and Order against themselves. 
p. 29 Single vertical line by the side of 
By this example I wish only to impress on you the consideration, that in a simple 
act, something farther may be implicated than lies in the intention and 
consciousness of the agent. 
p. 31 Single vertical line by the side of 
Such are all great historical men, - whose own particular aims involve those large 
issues which are the will of the World-Spirit. They may be called Heroes, in as 
much as they have derived their purposes and their vocation, not from the calm 
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regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order; but from a concealed 
fount - one which has not attained to phenomenal, present existence, - from that 
inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface, which, impinging on the outer world 
as on a shell, bursts it in pieces, because it is another kernel than that which 
belonged to the shell in question. 
p. 34 Single vertical line by the side of 
A World-historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a variety of wishes to 
divide his regards. He is devoted to the one Aim, regardless of all else. 
p. 37 Double vertical lines by the side of 
It is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals, in states, and in Providence, 
than to see their real import and value. 
pp. 40-41 Single and then double vertical lines, and marginal note "The State", by 
the side of 
For it must be understood that this latter [i. e. the State] is the realisation of 
Freedom, i. e. of the absolute final aim, and that it exists for its own sake. It must 
further be understood that all the worth which the human being possesses - all 
spiritual reality, he possesses through the State. For his spiritual reality consists in 
this, that his own essence - Reason - is objectively present to him, that it possesses 
objective immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is 
he a partaker of morality - of a just and moral social and political life. 
p. 43 Single vertical line by the side of 
The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that 
term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and 
aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, desire, passion - pertaining to the 
particular individual as such -a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a 
fettering of Freedom. We should on the contrary look upon such limitations as the 
indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and State are the very conditions 
in which freedom is realised. 
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p. 45 Single vertical line by the side of 
Besides, it is a dangerous and false prejudice, that the People alone have reason 
and insight, and know what justice is; for each popular faction may represent itself 
as the People, and the question as to what constitutes the State is one of advanced 
science, and not popular decision. 
p. 50 Single vertical line by the side of 
Only the rational will is that universal principle which independently determines 
and unfolds its own being, and develops its successive elemental phase as organic 
members. Of this Gothic-cathedral architecture the ancient knew nothing. 
p. 53 Double vertical line by the side of 
Freedom can exist only where Individuality is recognised as having its positive 
and real existence in the Divine Being. The connection may be further explained 
thus. -- Secular existence, as merely temporal - occupied with particular interests - 
is consequently only relative and unauthorised; and receives its validity only in as 
far as the universal soul that pervades it - its principle - receives absolute validity; 
which it cannot have unless it is recognised as the definite manifestation, the 
phenomenal existence of the Divine Essence. On this account it is that the State 
rests on religion. 
p. 54 Single vertical line by the side of 
Summing up what has been said of the State, we find that we have led to call its 
vital principle, as actuating the individuals who compose it, - Morality. The State, 
its laws, its arrangements, constitute the rights of its members; its natural features, 
its mountains, air, and waters, are their country, their fatherland, their outward 
material property; the history of the State, their deeds; what their ancestors have 
produced, belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just 
as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their existence, their being. 
p. 55. Single vertical line by the side of 
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Among the Athenians the word Athens had a double import; suggesting primarily, 
a complex of political institutions, but no less, in the second place, that Goddess 
who represented the Spirit of the People and its unity. 
p. 56 Single word underlined in the following sentence 
This peculiarity in the world of mind has indicated in the case of man an 
altogether different destiny from that of merely natural objects - in which we find 
always one and the same stable character, to which all change reverts; - namely, a 
real capabilityfor change, and that of the better, an impulse of perfectibility. 
p. 57 Single word underlined in the following sentence 
The principle of Development involves also the existence of a latent germ of being 
-a capacity or potentiality striving to realise itself. 
Single vertical line by the side of 
That development which in the sphere of Nature is a peaceful growth, is in that of 
Spirit, a severe, mighty conflict with itself. 
p. 62 Double vertical lines by the side of 
Rationality begins to manifest itself in the actual conduct of the World's affairs (not 
where it is merely an undeveloped potentiality), - where a condition of things is 
present in which it realises itself in consciousness, will and action. 
Single vertical line by the side of 
Freedom is nothing but the recognition and adoption of such universal substantial 
objects as Right and Law, and the production of a reality that is accordant with them 
- the State. 
p. 69 Single vertical line by the side of 
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And on this ground [i. e. that nobility can be found even amongst "the most savage and 
the most pusillanimous nations"] a doubt has been suggested whether in the progress 
of history and of general culture mankind have [sic] become better; whether their 
[sic] morality has been increased, - morality being regarded in a subjective aspect 
and view, as founded on what the agent holds to be right and wrong, good and evil; 
not on a principle which is considered to be in and for itself right and good, or a 
crime and evil, or on a particular religion believed to be the true one. 
p. 70 Single vertical line by the side of 
What it [i. e. "the History of the World"] has to record is the activity of the Spirit of 
Peoples, so that the individual forms which that spirit has assumed in the sphere of 
outward reality, might be left to the delineation of special histories. 
p. 82 Single vertical line and the comment "True" by the side of 
The life of a people ripens a certain fruit; its activity aims at the complete 
manifestation of the principle which it embodies. But this fruit does not fall back into 
the bosom of the people that produced and matured it; on the contrary, it becomes a 
poison-draught to it. That poison-draught it cannot let alone, for it has an insatiable 
thirst for it: the taste of the draught is its annihilation, though at the same time the 
rise of a new principle. 
Single vertical line and a question mark by the side of 
Philosophy, as occupying itself with the True, has to do with the eternally present. 
Nothing in the past is lost for it, for the Idea is ever present; Spirit is immortal; with 
it there is no past, no future, but an essential now. 
p. 103 Single vertical line by the side of 
What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still 
involved in the condition of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as 
on the threshold of the World's History. 
p. 127 Single vertical line by the side of 
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Five duties are stated in the Shu-King as involving grave and unchangeable 
fundamental relations. 1. The mutual one of the Emperor and people. 2. Of the 
Fathers and Children. 3. Of an elder and younger brother. 4. Of Husband and Wife. 
5. Of Friend and Friend. 
p. 137 Double vertical line by the side of 
Their consciousness of moral abandonment shews itself also in the fact that the 
religion of Fo is so widely diffused; a religion which regards as the Highest and 
Absolute - as God - pure Nothing; which sets up contempt for individuality, for 
personal existence, as the highest perfection. 
p. 137 Single vertical line by the side of 
But in China religion has not risen to this grade [i. e. of spiritual maturity], for true 
faith is possible only where individuals can seclude themselves - can exist for 
themselves independently of any external power. 
p. 140 Underlining of words in the following sentence 
With this deficiency of genuine subjectivity is connected moreover, the form which 
Chinese science assumes. 
p. 145 Underlining of words in, single vertical line by the side of and the following 
marginal comment 
"Hegel quite fails to understand Chinese art. I think he 
makes the mistake of approaching the Chinese from an 
utterly hostile point of view" 
on the following: 
The burden which presses them [i. e. the Chinese] to the ground, seems them to be 
their inevitable destiny; and it appears nothing terrible to them to sell themselves 
as slaves, and to eat the bitter bread of slavery. Suicide, the result of revenge, and 
the exposure of children, as a common, even daily occurrence, shew the little 
respect in which they hold themselves individually, and humanity in general. And 
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though there is no distinction conferred by birth, ad every one can attain the 
highest dignity, this very equality testifies to no triumphant assertion of the worth 
of the inner man, but a servile consciousness - one which has not yet matured itself 
so far as to recognise distinctions. 
p. 147 Double vertical line by the side of 
The Indian view of things is a Universal Pantheism, a Pantheism, however, of 
Imagination, not of thought. 
p. 168 Single vertical line by the side of and underlining of words in the following: 
In India the primary aspect of subjectivity, - viz. that of the imagination, - presents 
a union of the Natural and Spiritual, in which nature on the one hand, does not 
present itself as a world embodýg Reason, nor the Spiritual on the other hand, as 
consciousness in contrast with Nature. Here the antithesis in the [above stated] 
[words in brackets are Sibree's] principle is wanting. Freedom both as abstract will 
and as subjective freedom is absent. The proper basis of the State, the principle of 
freedom is altogether absent: there cannot therefore be any State in the true sense 
of the term. This is the first point to be observed: if China may be regarded as 
nothing else but a State, Hindoo political existence present us with a people, but no 
State. Secondly, while we found a moral despotism in China, whatever may be 
called a relic of political life in India, is a despotism without a principle, without 
any rule of morality and religion (as far as the latter has a reference to human 
action) have as their indispensable condition and basis the fteedom of the Will. 
p. 169 Single vertical line by the side of, and the following marginal comment 
"Prose requires greater self-consciousness than poetry" on the following 
For History requires Understanding - the power of looking at an object in an 
independent objective light, and comprehending it in its rational connection with 
other objects. Those peoples therefore are alone capable of History, and of prose 
generally, who have arrived at that period of development, (and can make that 
their starting point, ), at which individuals comprehend their own existence as 
independent, i. e. possess self-consciousness. 
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p. 170 Marginal comment 
"The Hindoo lacks the sense of actuality necessary to the 
evolution and (perpetration? ) of history. " 
by the side of the following: 
As the Hindoo Spirit is a state of dreaming and mental transiency -a self- 
oblivious dissolution - objects also dissolve for it into unreal images and 
indefinitude. 
p. 172 Following sentence underlined 
The Brahmins have no conscience in respect to truth. 
p. 174 Double vertical line by the side of, underlining in, and the following 
marginal comment 
I think this originates in the conception of human life as a 
mechanical and automatic organism. This neglect of 
individualisation won't explain and justify the ritual. " 
on the following passage: 
If, then, in conclusion, we once more take a general view of the comparative 
condition of India and China, we shall see that China was characterised by a 
thoroughly unimaginative Understanding; a prosaic life amid firm and definite 
reali : while in the Indian world there is, so to speak, no object that can be 
regarded as real, and firmly defined, - none that was not at its first apprehension 
perverted by the imagination to the very opposite of what it presents to an 
intelligent consciousness. 
p. 176 Underlining in and the marginal comment "Is "nothingness a sufficient 
definition? "" on the following: 
The negative form of this [i. e. Buddhist] elevation is the concentration of Spirit to 
the infinite, and must first present itself under theological conditions. It is 
contained in the fundamental dogma, that Nothing is the principle of all 
things, - that all proceeded from and returns to Nothingness. 
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p. 177 Double vertical line by the side of the following: 
But while this [i. e. Buddhist] is the negative form of the elevation of Spirit from the 
immersion in the objective to a subjective realisation of itself, this Religion also 
advances to the consciousness of an affirmative form. Spirit is also the Absolute. 
Yet in comprehending Spirit it is a point of essential importance in what 
determinate form Spirit is conceived. When we speak of Spirit as universal, we 
know that for us it exists only in an inward conception; but to attain this point of 
view, - to appreciate Spirit in the pure subjectivity of 
Thought and conception, - is 
the result of a longer process of culture. At that point in history at which we have 
now arrived, the form of Spirit is not advanced beyond Immediateness 
[(translator's parentheses) the idea of it is not yet refined by reflection and 
abstraction]. God is conceived in an immediate, unreflected form; not in the form 
of Thought - objectively. But this immediate Form is that of 
humanity. The Sun, the 
Stars do not come up to the idea of Spirit; but Man seems to realise it; and he, as 
Buddha, Gautama, Foe - in the form of a departed teacher, in the 
living from of the 
Grand Lama - receives divine worship. 
p. 179 Underlining in the following sentences: 
The Lama's personality as such - his particular individuality - is therefore 
subordinate to the substantial essence which it embodies. 
and 
The idea never crosses the minds of the Lama-worshippers to desire of the Lama 
to shew himself Lord of Nature - to exercise magical and mysterious power; for 
from the being they call God, they look only for a spiritual activity and the 
. bestowal of spiritual 
benefits 
p. 187 Underlining in the following sentence: 
It is implied in this [i. e. in the teaching of the Persian Vendidad] that man should 
be virtuous: his own will, his subiective freedom is presupposed. 
p. 202 Single vertical line by the side of: 
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[on Greek religion: ] Here, on the contrary, human pain becomes an element of 
worship; in pain man realises his subjectivity: it is expected of him, - he may here 
indulge self-consciousness and the feeling of actual existence. Life here regains its 
value. A universality of pain is established: for death becomes immanent in the 
Divine, and the deity dies. 
pp. 203-204 Single vertical line by the side of: 
[of Judaism: ] Nature, - which in the East is the primary and fundamental 
existence, - is now depressed to the condition of a mere creature; and Spirit now 
occupies the first place. God is known as the creator of all men, as he is of all 
nature, and as absolute causality generally. 
p. 205 Single vertical line by the side of, underlining of words and the following 
marginal comment 
"Characteristically Jewish idea in religion also Puritan 
sects. Santayana. " 
on the following passage: 
With this [i. e. "walking in the way of the Lord"] is conjoined happiness, life and 
temporal prosperity as its reward; for it is said: "that thou mayest live long in the 
land. "- Here too also we have the possibility of the historical view; for the 
understanding has become prosaic; putting the limited and circumscribed in its 
proper place, and comprehending it as the form proper to finite existence: Men are 
regarded as individuals, not as incarnations of God; Sun as Sun, Mountains as 
Mountains, - not as possessing Spirit and Will. 
p. 215 Underlining of words in the following sentence: 
[of Egyptian society: ] A plan of society that is to be adopted and acted upon, as 
an absolutely complete one, - in which everything has 
been considered, and 
especially the education and habituation to it, necessary to its becoming second 
nature, - is altogether opposed to the nature of Spirit, which makes contemporary 
life the object on which it acts; itself being the infinite impulse of activity to alter 
its forms. 
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p. 216 Underlining of words in the following: 
[of Egyptian isolationism: ] It is that African imprisonment of ideas combined with 
the infinite impulse of the spirit to realise itself objectively, which we find here. 
p. 228 Single vertical line by the side of and the following words underlined in the 
proceeding passage: 
If, in conclusion, we combine what has been said here of the peculiarities of the 
Egyptian Spirit in all its aspects, its pervading principle is found to be, that the 
two elements of reality - Spirit sunk in Nature, and the impulse to liberate it - are 
here held together inharmoniously as contending elements. We behold the 
antithesis of Nature and Spirit, - not the primary Immediate Unity (as in the less 
advanced nations), nor the Concrete Unity, where Nature is posited only as a basis 
for the manifestation of Spirit (as in the more advanced); in contrast with the first 
and second of these Unities, the Egyptian Unity - combining contradictory 
elements - occupies a middle place. The two sides of this unity are held in abstract 
independence of each other, and their veritable union presented only as a problem. 
p. 229 Double vertical line by the side of: 
[of transition of Geist to the Greek world: ] All that is now needed is to posit that 
particular existence - which contains the germ of ideality - as ideal, and to 
comprehend the Universality itself, which is already potentially liberated from the 
particulars involving it. It is the free, joyful Spirit of Greece that accomplishes 
this, and makes this its starting point. 
pp. 229-230 Two sets of double vertical lines by the side of, and underlining of 
words in the following: 
That the Spirit of the Egyptians presented itself to their consciousness in the form 
of a problem, is evident from the celebrated inscription in the sanctuary of the 
Goddess Neith at Sais: "I am that which is, that which was, and that which will be: 
no one has lifted my veil" 
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p. 230 Underlining of words in the following: 
[of Apollo's utterance of "Man, know thyself': ] In this dictum is not intended a 
self-recognition that regards the specialities of one's own weaknesses and defects: 
it is not the individual that is admonished to become acquainted with his 
idiosyncrasy, but humanity in General is summoned to self-knowledge. 
p. 231 Double vertical line by the side of and the following comment 
"The expansion of Spirit not dependent on duration" 
on the proceeding sentence: 
[of why some civilisations once possessed by the Geist survive and others not: ] In 
the first place we must here banish from our minds the prejudice in favour of 
duration, as if it had any advantage as compared with transience: the 
imperishable mountains are not superior to the quickly dismantled rose exhaling 
its life in fragrance. 
p. 233 Single vertical line by the side of. 
We have, then, to distinguish three periods in Greek history: the first, that of the 
growth of real Individuality; the second, that of its independence and prosperity in 
external conquest (through contact with the previous World-historical people); 
and the third, the period of its decline and fall, in its encounter with the succeeding 
organ of World History. 
p. 244 Underlining of words in the following sentence: 
[of the Greek view of nature: ] It does not maintain the position of stupid 
indifference to it as something existing, and there an end of it; but regards it as 
something in the first instance foreign, in which, however, it has presentiment of 
confidence, and the belief that it bears something within it which is friendly to the 
human Spirit, and to which it may be permitted to sustain a positive relation. 
p. 245 Double vertical line by the side of: 
[on the Gods communicating with men: ] In what has been stated we have, on the 
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one hand, the Indefinite, which, however, holds communication with man; on the 
other hand the fact, that such communication is only a subjective imagining - an 
explanation furnished by the percipient himself. 
p. 245 Single vertical line by the side of: 
Greek freedom of thought is excited by an alien existence; but it is free because it 
transforms and virtually reproduces the stimulus by its own operation. This phase 
of Spirit is the medium between the loss of individuality on the part of man (such 
as we observe in the Asiatic principle, in which the Spiritual and Divine exists only 
under a Natural form), and Infinite Subjectivity as pure certainty of itself - the 
position that the Ego is the ground of all that can lay claim to substantial 
existence. 
p. 243 Single vertical line by the side of 
The activity of the Spirit does not yet possess in itself the material and organ of 
expression, but needs the excitement of Nature and the matter which Nature 
supplies: it is not free, self-determining Spirituality, but mere naturalness formed 
to Spirituality - Spiritual Individuality. 
and also by the side of 
In Greek Beauty the Sensuous is only a sign, an expression, an envelope, in which 
Spirit manifests itself. 
p. 250 Single vertical line by the side of 
[on the inventions by which man "turns Nature against itself' to his own benefit: ] 
These human inventions belong to Spirit, and such an instrument is to be respected 
more than a mere natural object. 
p. 251 Underlining of words in the following sentence: 
The exhilarating sense of personality, in contrast with sensuous subjection to 
nature, and the need, not of mere pleasure, but of the display of individual powers, 
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in order thereby to gain special distinction and consequent enjoyment, constitute 
therefore the chief characteristic and principal occupation of the Greeks. 
p. 252 Single vertical line by the side of: 
In contrast with this kind of seriousness, [i. e. "labour that has reference to some 
want"] however, Sport presents the higher seriousness; for in it Nature is wrought 
into Spirit, and although in these contests the subject has not advanced to the 
highest grade of serious thought, yet in this exercise of his physical powers, man 
shews his Freedom, viz. that he has transformed his body to an organ of Spirit. 
p. 253 Single vertical line by the side of: 
But on the other hand, it must be observed, that the divinity of the Greeks is not yet 
the absolute, ftee Spirit, but Spirit in a particular mode, fettered by the limitations 
of humanity - still dependent as a determinate individuality on external conditions. 
p. 256 Single vertical line by the side of: 
That higher thought, the knowledge of Unity as God, - the One Spirit, - lay beyond 
that grade of thought which the Greeks had attained. 
p. 258 Single vertical line by the side of: 
But the Greek gods must not be regarded as more human than the Christian God. 
p. 260 Single vertical line by the side of: 
[of Greek religion: ] Neither human nor divine subjectivity, recognised as infinite, 
has as yet, absolutely decisive authority. 
p. 261 Single vertical line by the side of: 
The Democratical State is not Patriarchal, - does not rest on a still unreflecting, 
undeveloped confidence, - but implies laws, with the consciousness of their being 
founded on an equitable and moral basis, and the recognition of these laws as 
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positive. 
p. 263 Single vertical line by the side of: 
Subjectivity was a grade not greatly in advance of that occupied by the Greek 
Spirit; that phase must of necessity soon be attained: but it plunged the Greek 
world into ruin, for the polity which that world embodied was not calculated for 
this side of humanity - did not recognise this phase; since it had not made its 
appearance when that polity began to exist. Of the Greeks in the first and genuine 
. 
form of their Freedom, we may assert, that they had no conscience; the habit of 
living for their country without farther [analysis or] reflection, was the principle 
dominant among them. 
pp. 268-269 Single vertical line by the side of: 
But the leading principle that characterises this state is Political Virtue, which 
Athens and Sparta have, indeed, in common, but which in the one state developed 
itself to a work of Art, viz., Free Individuality - in the other retained its substantial 
form. 
p. 275 Single vertical line by the side of: 
This Greek morality, though extremely beautiful, attractive and interesting in its 
manifestation, is not the highest point of view for Spiritual self-consciousness. It 
wants the form of Infinity, the reflection of thought within itself, the emancipation 
from the Natural element - (the Sensuous that lurks in the character of Beauty and 
Divinity [as comprehended by the Greeks]) - and from that immediacy, [that 
undeveloped simplicity, ] which attaches to their ethics. Self-Comprehension on the 
part of Thought is wanting - illimitable Self-Consciousness - demanding, that what 
is regarded by me as Right and Morality should have its confirmation in myself - 
from the testimony of my own Spirit; that the Beautiful (the idea as manifested in 
sensuous contemplation or conception) may also become the True - an inner 
supersensuous world. 
p. 290 Single vertical line by the side of, and underlining of words in the 
following: 
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[Hegel has here reached the discussion of "The Roman World": ] Here, in Rome 
then, we find that free universality, that abstract Freedom, which on the one hand 
sets an abstract state, a political constitution and power, over concrete 
individuality; on the other side creates a personality in opposition to that 
universality, - the inherent freedom of the abstract Ego, which must 
be 
distinguished from individual idios ny crasy. For Personality constitutes the 
fundamental condition of legal Right: it appears chiefly in the category of 
Property, but it is indifferent to the concrete characteristics of the living Spirit 
with which individuality is concerned. These two elements, which constitute Rome, 
- political Universality on the one hand, and the abstract freedom of the individual 
on the other, - appear, in the first instance, in the form of Subjectivity. This 
Subjectivity - this retreating into one's self which we observed as the corruption of 
the Greek Spirit - becomes here the ground on which a new side of the World's 
History arises. 
p. 323 Double vertical line by the side of: 
[on the rise of the Emperors: ] In this way the world-wide sovereignty of Rome 
became the property of a single possessor. This important change must not be 
regarded as a thing of chance; it was necessary - postulated by the circumstances. 
The democratic constitution could no longer be really maintained by Rome, but only 
kept up in appearance. 
p. 329 Single vertical line by the side of. 
[of the knowledge of philosophy amongst a wide section of the population in Rome: ] 
But the inward reconciliation by means of philosophy was itself only an abstract one 
- in the pure principle of personality; for Thought, which, as perfectly refined, made 
itself its own object, and thus harmonised itself, was entirely destitute of a real object, 
and the immobility of Scepticism made aimlessness itself the object of the Will. 
p. 331 Single vertical line by the side of: 
The Greek Spirit was a consciousness of Spirit, but under a limited form, having the 
element of Nature as an essential ingredient. 
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and also 
Spirit appeared as specialised in the idiosyncrasies of the genius of the several Greek 
nationalities and of their divinities, and was represented by Art, in whose sphere the 
Sensuous is elevated only to the middle ground of beautiful form and shape, but not of 
pure Thought. 
p. 332 Underlining of words in the following sentences: 
Outward suffering must as already said, be merged in a sorrow of the inner man. He 
must feel himself as the negation of himself- he must see that his misery is the misery 
of his nature - that he is in himself a divided and discordant being. 
p. 334 Vertical line by the side of: 
implicitly and explicitly, then, we have the truth, that man through Spirit - through 
cognition of the Universal and the Particular - comprehends God himself. 
p. 335-336 Single vertical line by the side of, and the following marginal comment 
"Definition of Spirit" 
on the following passage: 
But what is Spirit? It is the one immutably homogeneous Infinite - pure Identity - 
which in its second phase separates itself from itself and makes this second aspect its 
own polar opposite, viz. as existence for and in self as contrasted with the Universal. 
p. 336 Words underlined in the following sentence: 
If Spirit be defined as absolute reflection within itself in virtue of its absolute duality - 
Love on the one hand as comprehending the Emotional, [Empfindung] Knowledge on 
the other hand as Spirit [including the penetrative and active faculties, as opposed to 
the receptive] - it is recognised as Triune: the "Father" and the "Son" and that 
duality which essentially characterises it as "Spirit". 
Single vertical line by the side of and words underlined in the following: 
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Man, on the contrary, is God only in so far as he annuls the merely Natural and 
Limited in his Spirit and elevates himself to God. That is to say, it is obligatory on 
him who is a partaker of the truth, and knows that he himself is a constituent 
[Moment] of the Divine Idea, to give up his merely natural being: for the Natural is 
the Unspiritual. 
p. 340 Double vertical line by the side of. 
We may say that nowhere are to be found such revolutionary utterances as in the 
Gospels; for every thing that had been respected, is treated as a matter of indifference 
- as worthy of no regard. 
p. 342 Double vertical line by the side of, and marginal comment "Spirit" on the 
following: 
[commenting on the worship of Isis and Mithras: ] But the West desired a deeper, 
purely inward Universality - an Infinite possessed at the same time of positive 
qualities. 
p. 346 Single vertical line by the side of: 
It was then through the Christian Religion that the Absolute Idea of God, in its true 
conception, attained consciousness. Here Man, too, finds himself comprehended in 
his true nature, given in the specific conception of "the Son ". Man, finite when 
regarded for himself, is yet at the same time the Image of God and a fountain on 
infinity in himself. He is the object of his own existence - has in himself an infinite 
value, and eternal destiny. Consequently he has his true home in the supersensuous 
world - an infinite subjectivity, gained only by a rupture to break their power within 
him. 
p. 348 Double vertical line by the side of: 
The process displayed in History is only the manifestation of Religion as Human 
Reason - the production of the religious principle which dwells in the heart of man, 
under the form of Secular Freedom. Thus the discord between the inner life of the 
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heart and the actual world is removed. To realise this is, however, the vocation of 
another people - or peoples - viz., the German. In ancient Rome itself, 
Christianity 
cannot find a ground on which it may become actual, and develop an empire. 
p. 352 Words underlined in, and the following marginal comment 
"neat and meretricious way of putting things" 
by the side of: 
[Hegel is here commenting on the Christological controversies of the Early Christian 
Era: ] In the contest of the question whether Christ were homousios or homoiousios 
[this is a transliteration of the text's Greek] - that is of the same or of similar nature of 
God - the letter i [i. e. the Greek letter iota] cost many thousands their 
lives. 
p. 410 Double vertical line by the side of: 
It [i. e. the Christianity of the Crusades: ] was practically undeceived; and the result 
which it brought back with it was of a negative kind: viz., that the definite 
embodiment which it was seeking, was to be looked for in Subjective Consciousness 
alone, and in no external object; that the definite form in question, presenting the 
union of the Secular with the Eternal, is the Spiritual self-cognisant independence of 
the individual. Thus the world attains the conviction that man must look within 
himself for that definite embodiment of being which is of a divine nature: subjectivity 
thereby receives absolute authorisation and claims to determine for itself the relation 
[of all that exists] to the Divine. 
p. 412 Single vertical line by the side of: 
Grieved to the heart by the defeat of the Christians [i. e. in the Crusades], the Popes 
again and again urged them to advance to the rescue; but lamentation and entreaties 
were vain, and they could effect nothing. Spirit, disappointed with regard to its 
craving for the highest from of the sensuous presence of Deity, fell back upon itself. A 
rupture, the first of its kind and profound as it was novel, took place. From this time 
forward we witness religious and intellectual movements in which Spirit, - 
transcending and repulsive and irrational existence by which it is surrounded, - 
either finds its sphere of exercise within itself, and draws upon its own resources for 
satisfaction, or throws its energies into an actual world of general and morally 
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justified aims, which are therefore aims consonant with Freedom. The efforts thus 
originated are now to be described: they were the means by which Spirit was to be 
prepared to comprehend the grand purpose of its Freedom in a form of greater purity 
and moral elevation. 
To this class of movements belongs in the first place the establishment of 
monastic and chivalric orders, designed to carry out those rules of life which the 
Church had distinctly enjoined on its members. That renunciation of property, riches, 
pleasures, and free will, which the Church had designated as the highest of spiritual 
attainments, was to be a reality - not a mere profession. 
p. 428 Single vertical line by the side of, and the marginal comment "Nonsense" on 
the following: 
These three events - the so-called Revival of learning, the flourishing of the Fine Arts 
and the discovery of America and of the passage to India by the Cape - may be 
compared with that blush of dawn, which after long storms first betokens the return 
of a bright and glorious day. This day is the day of Universality, which breaks upon 
the world after the long, eventful, and terrible night of the Middle Ages -a day which 
is distinguished by science, art and inventive impulse - that is, by the noblest and 
highest, and which Humanity, rendered free by Christianity and emancipated through 
the instrumentality of the Church, exhibits as the eternal and veritable substance of 
its being. 
p. 431 Words underlined in and marginal note "BULL" by the side of the following: 
[of the Reformation: ] The time-honoured and cherished sincerity of the German 
people is destined to effect this revolution out of the honest truth and simplicity of its 
heart. 
p. 438 Single vertical line by the side of, and words underlined in the following; 
But what is this peculiarity of character which hindered the attainment of Spiritual 
Freedom? We answer: the pure inwardness of the German Nation was the proper soil 
for the emancipation of Spirit; the Romance Nations, on the contrary, have 
maintained in the very depth of their soul - in their Spiritual Consciousness - the 
principle of Disharmony: they are a product of the fusion of Roman and German 
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blood, and still retain the heterogeneity thence resulting. 
p. 440 Single vertical line by the side of. 
The development and advance of Spirit from the time of the Reformation onwards 
consists in this, that Spirit, having now gained the consciousness to its Freedom, 
through that process of mediation which takes place between man and God - that is, 
in the full recognition of the objective process as the existence [the positive and 
definite manifestation] of the Divine essence - now takes it up and follows it out in 
building up the edifice of secular relations. That harmony [of Objective and 
Subjective Will] which has resulted form the painful struggles of History, involves the 
recognition of the Secular as capable of being an embodiment of Truth; whereas it 
had been formerly regarded as evil only, as incapable of Good - the latter being 
considered essentially ultramundane. It is now perceived that Morality and Justice in 
the State are also divine and commanded by God, and that in point of substance there 
is nothing higher or more sacred. 
p. 441 Words underlined in the following sentence: 
In this obedience [i. e. "obedience to the laws of the State, as the Rational element in 
volition and action, was made the principle of human conduct"] man is free, for all 
that is demanded is that the Particular should yield to the General. 
p. 442 Single vertical line and marginal "? " by the side of: 
In the first instance this reconciliation [i. e. between "God and the World"] must take 
place in the individual soul, must be realised by feeling; the individual must gain the 
assurance that the Spirit dwells in him, - that, in the language of the Church, a 
brokenness of heart has been experienced, and that Divine grace has entered into the 
heart thus broken. By Nature man is not what he ought to be; only through a 
transforming process does he arrive at truth. The general and speculative aspect of 
the matter is just this - that the human heart is not what it should be. 
p. 458 Single vertical line by the side of, words underlined in and the marginal note 
"God Spirit" by the side of: 
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Thought is the grade to which Spirit has now advanced. It involves the Harmony of 
Being in its purest essence, challenging the external world to exhibit the same Reason 
which Subject [the Ego] possesses. Spirit perceives that Nature - the World - must 
also be an embodiment of Reason, for God created it on the principles Of Reason. An 
interest in the contemplation and comprehension of the present world became 
universal. Nature embodies Universality, in as much as it is nothing other than Sorts, 
Genera, Power, Gravitation, &c., phenomenally presented. Thus Experimental 
Science became the science of the World; for experimental science involves on the 
one hand the observation of phenomena, on the other hand also the discovery of the 
law, the essential being, the hidden force that causes those phenomena - thus 
reducing the data supplied by observation to their simplest principles. 
p. 459 Twin double vertical lines by the side of: 
It seemed to men as if God had but just created the moon and the stars, plants and 
animals, as if the laws of the universe were now established for the first time; for only 
then did they feel a real interest in the universe, when they recognised their own 
Reason in the Reason which pervades it. The human eye became clear, perception 
quick, thought active and interpretative. 
Words underlined in the following sentence: 
Thus all miracles were disallowed: for Nature is a system of known and recognised 
Laws; Man is at home in it, and that only passes for truth in which he ands himself 
home; he is free through the acquaintance he has gained with Nature. 
pp. 460-461 Single vertical line by the side of: 
This principle of thought [i. e. the "basis of inward demonstration"] makes its 
appearance in the first instance in a general and abstract form; and is based on the 
axiom of Contradiction and Identity. [there is here a translator's footnote to the text, 
which Eliot also marks, and which is given below] The results of thought are thus 
posited as finite, and the ecclairissement utterly banished and extirpated all that was 
speculative from things human and divine. Although it is of incalculable importance 
that the multiform complex of things should be reduced to its simplest conditions, and 
brought into the form of Universality, yet this still abstract principle does not satisfy 
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the living Spirit, the concrete human soul. This formally absolute principle brings us 
to the last stage in History, our world, our own time. 
The foot-note is as follows: 
The sensational conclusions of the "materialistic" school of the 18th century are 
reached by the "axiom of Contradiction and Identity" as applied in this simple 
dilemma. "In cognition, Man is either active or passive; he is not active (unless he is 
grossly deceiving himself), therefore he is passive; therefore all knowledge is derived 
ab extra " What this external objective being is of which this knowledge is the 
cognition, remains an eternal mystery - i. e., as Hegel says: "The results of thought 
are posited as finite. "- TR. 
p. 462 Single vertical line by the side of the following Translator's footnote to the 
text But the metaphysical process by which this abstract Will develops itself, so as to 
attain a definite form of Freedom, and how Rights and Duties are evolved therefrom, 
this is not the place to discuss. 
"Freedom of the Will", in Hegel's use of the term, has an intensive signification, and 
must be distinguished from "Liberty of Will" in its ordinary acceptation. The latter 
denotes a mere liability to be affected by extrinsic motives: the former is that absolute 
strength of Will which enables it to defy all seductions that challenge its persistency. 
Its sole object is self-assertion. In fact it is Individuality maintaining itself against all 
dividing or distracting forces. And to maintain individuality is to preserve consistency 
- to "act on principle, "- phrases with which Language, the faithful conservator of 
metaphysical genealogies, connects virtuous associations. In adopting a code of 
Duties, and in acknowledging Rights, the Will recognises its own Freedom in this 
intensive sense, for in such adoption it declares its own ability to pursue a certain 
course of action in spite of all inducements, sensuous or emotional, to deviate from it. 
These remarks may supply some indications of the process referred to in the text. - 
TR. 
p. 466 Single vertical line by the side of, and words underlined in the following 
sentence: 
A constitution, therefore, was established in harmony with the conception of Right, 
385 
and on this foundation all future legislation was to be based. Never since the sun had 
stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived 
that man's existence centres in his head, i. e. in Thought, inspired by which he builds 
up the world of reality. Anaxagorous had been the first to say that nous [i. e. mind, 
this is a transliteration of the Greek in the original] governs the World; but not until 
now had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that Thought ought to 
govern spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking 
beings shared in the jubilation of this epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred in 
men's minds at that time; a spiritual enthusiasm thrilled through the world, as if the 
reconciliation between the Divine and the Secular was now first accomplished. 
End pages 
The end pages of Eliot's copy of the Lectures are full of the publisher's catalogue, 
some of which titles Eliot has ticked. On the penultimate page of the book, there is a 
note which runs 




An example of TS Eliot's underlining 
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End Note - where do we go from here? 
This study was inspired by and made use of just one of Eliot's annotated texts 
from the Houghton Library at the University of Harvard. There are eleven more. The 
on-line catalogue (http: //hollisweb. harvard. edu, search string COAC9. EL464. ZZ) 
lists the following volumes with annotations: 
1. Aristotle, Selections from the Organon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1897). 
2. Jackson, H J, Texts to illustrate a course of elementary lectures on the history of 
Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. (London: Macmillan: 1901). 
3. Hume, D, Philosophical Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press: 1902). 
4. Holt, E B, An Experimental Study of Sensation, (Cambridge, Mass.: (no publisher 
given): 1903). 
5. Green, T G, Prolegomena to Ethics, Ed. Bradley, A C, (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 
1906). 
6. Horace, The Works, ET Smart, C, (Philadelphia: Mackay: (no date given)). 
7. Bakewell, C M, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy, (New York: Scribner: 1907). 
8. Chaucer, G, Works, Ed. Skeat, WW (Oxford: Oxford university Press: 1908). 
9. Springarn, J E, A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, (New York: 
Columbia University Press: 1908 (1949 printing)). 
10. Bosanquet, B, The Essentials of Logic (London: Macmillan: 1910). 
11. Milton, J, Poems (no publishing details given). 
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